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AUTHOR	Murphy, Jerome T.
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ABSTRACT

This study of the impact of unrestricted federal aid on State bureaucracies describes how federal money was spent in nine SEA's (particularly in Massachusetts, New York, and South Carolina). It also examines whether Title V promoted a rethinking of SEA priorities and led to a "thorough overhaul" of SEA activities. Study findings reveal that, while SEA budgets and staffs doubled between 1965 and 1970 (one fifth of the 1970 dollars coming from Title V), SEA strengthening varied significantly from State to State. In New York and Massachusetts, the Title V outcome took the form of marginal adaptations of ongoing activities in procedures, activities, or roles; while in South Carolina, marked changes took place. However, the author notes that in none of these States did Title V stimulate a rethinking of priorities or promote a thorough overhaul of activities. Even in South Carolina, Title V failed to promote basic change, but rather acted as a facilitator for a SEA that was "ready to go." The report explores explanations for the failures of Title V and concludes that the underlying reasons why Title V failed to promote basic institutional change may have as much to do with the way complex organizations typically behave with free money as it does with particular institutional or individual shortcomings. An extensive bibliography is appended. (Page 355 may reproduce poorly. Page 424 is either missing, or the pages have been misnumbered.) (Author/JF)

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GREASE THE SQUEAKY WHEEL

A Report on the Implementation of Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Grants to Strengthen State Departments of Education*

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by

Jerome T. Murphy

February, 1973

Center for Educational Policy Research
Harvard Graduate School of Education
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . .

I. AN OVERVIEW 1

Title V Background. 4

Needs 7

Hopes 8

How has Title V worked in practice?. . . . 10

This Investigation: Issues and Methodology . 12

Who is to blame? 21

The theory 22

II. TITLE V AS GENERAL AID: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS . 30

The law. 30

USOE's stance 31

An explanation of USOE's behavior 34

Concluding summary 39

III. TITLE V IN MASSACHUSETTS 41

The Setting 41

The Massachusetts Department of Education . . 44

Manpower 46

Manpower--some remedies. 51

The Implementation of Title V 55

Data Processing and Information Center . . 60

Regional Education Centers 67

CHAPTER PAGE

Expansion of departmental operations. . 70

The Title V Decision-Making Process. . . 72

Conclusions. 77

IV. TITLE V IN NEW YORK 84

The Setting. 84

The State Education Department 92

Title V's Implementation 97

1965-1966 98

1966-1970 101

General observations. 102

Title V Decision-Making Process. . . . 114

Priorities and Planning. 120

Conclusions. 125

V. TITLE V IN SOUTH CAROLINA 130

Traditional Politics 131

The Traditional State Education Department . 134

The State Education Department in 1971 . . 136

The SEA in Transition 139

Title V decision-making 146

1966-1967 149

1967-1968 151

1968-1969 155

1969-1970 157

1970-1971 159

CHAPTER PAGE

Title V's Impact 161

The Impact of the Organizational Reform. . 169

Conclusions. 179

VI. CONCLUSIONS 182

SEA Strengthening 182

Title V Outcomes: An Explanation . . . 187

Who is to blame?. 190

The theory 199

Implications 215

VII. NOTES ON ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION. . . 222

Financial Assistance to SEA's 225

General aid 226

Grant consolidation 232

Categorical aid to SEA's. 235

Concluding observations on financial assistance. 240

Federal Regulations. 242

Technical Assistance 247

Differential Treatment of the States . . 250

Governmental Accountability. 256

The problem 256

Some alternatives 260

Planning 269

Comprehensive planning 270

Policy analysis 277

CHAPTER PAGE

Summary and Conclusions 285

NOTES 291

APPENDICES:

A. STUDY ADVISORY PANEL 349

B. THE METHOD OF THE EXPLORATION 352

C. TITLE V IN SIX STATES:

Tennessee 361
Kentucky 367
Colorado 372
Texas 381
Kansas 391
Maryland 396
Notes 401

D. MISCELLANEOUS TABLES 414

BIBLIOGRAPHY 419

CHAPTER I

AN OVERVIEW

This study explores the impact of unrestricted financial assistance on complex organizations. The specific program under scrutiny is Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Grants to Strengthen State Departments of Education. Title V provides resources with few strings attached to

> stimulate and assist States in strengthening the leadership resources of their State educational agencies, and to assist those agencies in the establishment and improvement of programs to identify and meet the educational needs of States.[1]

As part of this exploration, I describe the program's implementation in several state education agencies (SEA's) and examine the ways in which they have been "strengthened" consistent with Title V's broad purpose quoted above. In addition, I explore why the program was implemented as it was. This is particularly crucial because Title V, although strengthening SEA's in several ways, did not act as the stimulus for institutional reform hoped for by some of its legislative designers. By examining a variety of possible explanations, I attempt to point out reasons why Title V did not live up to this hope of the reformers and, more generally, to shed some light on the use of unrestricted money as a device for promoting institutional change.

There are several reasons for exploring these issues. One is that many people believe that SEA's should play a major role in education. This view was expressed succinctly by the 1964 Presidential Task Force on Education:

> The role of the State is strategic. It supplies about 40 cents out of every dollar spent by the average local district.* It has legal powers that affect every local district, e.g., its control over the size and shape of school districts. It plays a key role in information gathering for the State as a whole. Because of its fiscal contributions, its regulatory powers, and its statewide perspective, it enjoys a certain leadership potential--not always achieved but always there....
>
> The Task Force is deeply convinced that State education agencies must be given new strength and vitality,...[3]

Hence, it is important to weigh the impact of federal efforts to enhance SEA capacity. This importance is underscored today by the increasing interest both in greater state involvement in the financing of education and in improving state government generally.

Federal attempts to strengthen SEA's, then, are of sufficient interest to motivate this investigation. But more than that, the way SEA's have utilized general or unrestricted financial assistance has critical implications for the current debate over general versus categorical aid. Title V is important because it calls into question much of the rationale for general assistance. Critics argue that narrow federal categorical programs have created administrative nightmares. Excessive red tape, multiple guidelines, and complicated reporting requirements are blamed for increasing governmental paralysis. General aid proponents believe that state and local institutions have lacked both the resources and the flexibility to meet their own--as opposed to federal--priorities.

---

*In 1971, the figure was forty-one cents out of every dollar.[2]

What is needed, proponents say, is institutional reform through greater use of general rather than categorical federal assistance.* This approach would strengthen the capacity of state and local institutions, themselves, to respond to state and local needs. Federal bureaucratic stumbling blocks would be eliminated and the locus of power would be shifted closer to "the people." The belief is that general aid would stimulate creativity and result in comprehensive and flexible programs.[4]

This approach raises fundamental questions. Does general assistance, in fact, result in institutional reform? Are the obstacles to more effective institutions really the absence of discretionary resources and the overabundance of federal red tape? This study shows how an understanding of the use of general assistance (Title V) by complex organizations (SEA's) can, in turn, help answer these key contemporary policy questions.

The remainder of this chapter sets the stage for an examination of Title V's implementation in various SEA's. I begin by delineating some important Title V background factors--the need for the legislation, its intent, and the findings of some earlier studies of Title V. This is followed by a detailed discussion of what this study is about and how it was conducted. The final section sets out the reasons generally given to explain why Title V did not promote reform, and also discusses some concepts drawn from organizational theory which lead to a different explanation.

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*Of course, other justifications might be offered in support of general assistance. These include the need for simple fiscal relief, more services, or sharing in rising costs.

I. Title V Background

As with each part of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Title V was designed with both educational reform and political reality in mind. According to U. S. Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel--the program's chief architect--Title V's reformist intent was to "revitalize our State departments of education."[5] This revitalization, hopefully, would lead to more effectively administered federal programs and would strengthen the institutional role of SEA's in the governance of education. Keppel explained in 1965 congressional testimony:

> The success of past Federal investments in education, and of others that may come, depends upon strong and blanced State educational leadership, planning and coordination. This is why title V is essential in the proposed new five-part program [ESEA].
>
> Thus, the essential consideration in formulating this legislation was to meet expanded national needs in education and at the same time to maintain and strengthen our decentralized system of State, local, and institutional control....
>
> In the long run, nothing we in education can do--whether in Washington or anywhere else--can be more important than strengthening the capacity of our States to respond to the educational needs of our time.... In this Nation of 50 States with vast and independent enterprises for education, the Federal Government must participate--not toward domination, but as a partner in a vital enterprise.[6]

At the same time, however, Title V was widely viewed in 1965 Washington political circles as a way to line up the Council of Chief

State School Officers* in support of ESEA's passage. The "Chiefs," or at least their vigorous legislative spokesman, Edgar Fuller, apparently were troubled by Title III of ESEA (school innovation) which bypassed SEA's, and by other parts of the legislation authorizing aid to children in parochial schools. Title V, then, provided a carrot to win the support of the state educational establishment for all parts of the legislation. Indeed, one participant in the development of the legislation described Title V as an essential ingredient in that "ingenious political contrivance," the 1965 ESEA.[7]

Title V authorized three separate programs. One called for personnel interchanges between the states and the U. S. Office of Education (USOE).[8] Another program authorized the U. S. Commissioner of Education to make special project grants to the states for solving problems or testing new ideas common to two or more SEA's; fifteen percent of the funds appropriated for Title V were to be reserved for this purpose.[9] The third program apportioned eighty-five percent[10] of the funds among the states and outlying territories for use as so-called basic grants.** This report focuses exclusively on this part of Title V, section 503, since this is the program which in effect provides general assistance to SEA's. Hereafter, in this study, "Title V" means specifically section 503 of Title V.

---

*The Council is a Washington-based organization of state superintendents and commissioners of education from the fifty states and outlying territories.

**Up to two percent of this eighty-five percent was reserved for the outlying territories. From the remainder, $100,000 was apportioned to each of the states (including the District of Columbia). The remainder was apportioned among the states based on their relative number of public school pupils.[11]

The law itself listed examples of the kinds of activities eligible for funding as basic grants: educational planning, collection and processing of statistical data, dissemination of information, research activities, publication of curricular materials, teacher education programs, finance studies, programs to measure student achievement, inservice training, and consultative services to local schools.[12] Though this list was set forth as part of the legislation, largely to explain to the Congress what the Executive Branch thought Title V might be used for, it did not set requirements but made "only suggestions." The law made it clear that "other areas may assume higher priority in individual State proposals."[13] To be sure, SEA's could propose any activity consistent with the broad purpose of the law--to "strengthen" SEA's.

The only major constraint on SEA activity was to be exercised by USOE during the administration of the program. Before receiving its apportionment, each SEA was required to submit project applications to USOE for approval describing "how the agency's leadership resources would be strengthened."[14] In practice, USOE conducted negotiations with some states, but the SEA's were able to spend the money as they wanted; no application was ever rejected. Hence, Title V became general aid with few string attached. The reasons for this are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

In fiscal 1966, the first year of the program, $14.5 million was appropriated for Title V basic grants, resulting in an average SEA budget increase of eleven percent.[15] During the first seven years of the program, some $175 million[16] was allotted to SEA's through Title V.

Needs: The authors of Title V believed that SEA's badly needed improvement, particularly with the new responsibilities facing them in the administration of ESEA. While some SEA's in 1965 were considered well-managed and amply staffed, many had "reputations of weakness and conservatism."[17] Most lacked the resources even "for adequate leadership, direction, and service of existing State educational programs."[18] The number of professional employees in 1965 ranged from 613 in New York to fifteen in North Dakota, with seventy-five professionals on the average SEA staff. Fifteen states had fewer than fifty professionals.[19]

The staffing problem involved not only the number, but also the overall quality of SEA personnel. One long-time observer of SEA's described the situation candidly:

> Some state education departments are poorly staffed, too highly bureaucratized, and politically dominated. Some are characterized by intellectual incest: the personnel, in training and experience, seem to have come from the state's own educational system, and often from small school systems.[20]

The personnel problems faced by SEA's were also exacerbated by lopsided staffing patterns created by federal programs. In 1960,* more than half the SEA professionals worked for federally subsidized programs. In thirteen states, the figure exceeded seventy percent.[21] The result was that certain areas (e.g., vocational education and certain subject matter disciplines) had disproportionately large staffs. Other "vital areas"[22] (e.g., planning and research) not subsidized by the federal government were staffed sparsely, if at all.[23]

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*When Title V was debated in 1965, the latest available data on this point were from 1960.

Despite their staffing problems, SEA's administered a wide range of activities: collecting statistics, distributing state funds for education, operating specialized schools (e.g., schools for the handicapped), and carrying out regulatory responsibilities (e.g., accreditation of schools, and certification of teachers). In addition, SEA's typically provided some instructional services to local schools, most often in the form of subject matter consultants and curricula materials. SEA's also were generally engaged in such other activities as inservice training of teachers, administration of federal programs (e.g., vocational education) and consultation to school districts on school transportation and facilities planning.[24]

This diversity and orientation of SEA activity is important to an understanding of Title V's impact. Although the above listing is only a quick review of the functions of an average SEA in 1965, it underscores the fact that these small agencies had a broad range of responsibilities and that most of their activities were oriented either toward regulation or service to local public schools.

Hopes: As part of achieving stronger SEA's, it was expected that Title V would be utilized to fill in important gaps in service and management. But, in addition, it was hoped that Title V would stimulate SEA's to go beyond the strengthening of traditional activities. Commissioner Keppel in The Necessary Revolution in American Education described the need for Title V:

> If the national goal of equal educational opportunity is to be met, if the nation is to assure the strength--perhaps even the viability--of America's decentralized system of public education, state organization and state policies will need a thorough overhaul. To bring about this change requires action in three key requirements: the need for better information on the condition of education within the states and among the states; the need for stronger leadership and planning by state departments of education in relation to local districts; and the need for innovation based upon sound research throughout the educational enterprise.[25] (Emphasis added.)

It was assumed that Title V would help fill these needs, partly by stimulating the hiring of more and better qualified educational professionals as well as individuals with careers outside education. Commissioner Keppel noted:

> The new legislation therefore makes possible the provision of money to help provide skilled professionals now clearly needed but infrequently found--economists, political scientists, planners, sociologists and the like....[26]

Hopes for what was to be Title V were also reflected in the then-secret report of the President's 1964 Task Force on Education, headed by John W. Gardner, who had been briefed on Administration planning by Commissioner Keppel. The report stated:

> Too few [SEA's] are adequately organized or staffed to do the job. Top-caliber State boards and first-rate superintendents are rare. Not enough are insulated from political influence by the governors and legislators whose programs they administer....
>
> The States need help in strengthening themselves administratively. The Federal Government should provide support, perhaps up to $75 million a year, to assist them to create satisfactory administrative structures. For example, it could assist in the improvement of State leadership and planning by supporting the kinds of specialists who could assist in long-range educational planning. It could provide funds to strengthen the States' information and statistical services. It could assist the State in strengthening its research and development capability.[27]

So Title V had many purposes. On the political level, it was designed to soothe the chief state school officers and help insure the passage of ESEA. At the same time, it was assumed that Title V would bolster the management and services of SEA's, thus improving the administration of state and federal programs. But more than that--even though the law was flexible enough to support practically any SEA activity--the hope of some educational reformers, notably Keppel and Gardner, was that Title V would be expended on more than services traditionally offered by SEA's. Rather, they hoped that Title V would stimulate SEA's to undergo a "thorough overhaul," to develop some entirely new roles and activities (e.g., planning), and in the process "to build the kind of balanced, professional, high-quality staff that would be needed"[28] for a position of leadership. And, ultimately, Title V was viewed by both reformers and chiefs as a vehicle to maintain and strengthen the nation's decentralized control of education.

How has Title V worked in practice?: Several studies have evaluated Title V's implementation and have found SEA's "strengthened" in some ways but not in others. The only full-scale extragovernmental investigation of Title V, conducted by Roald F. Campbell (then of the University of Chicago), and his colleagues, concluded in 1967 that Title V had a "major impact" upon SEA's, particularly in permitting substantial growth in staff size and budget. But they also stated:

> We have indicated previously our concern that the funds, especially in smaller state departments of education, were being used chiefly to provide more of the traditional services. Insufficient attention has been paid, we feel, to those activities

> included under the broad heading of research and development, and public information and support. Overmuch attention has been concentrated on activities such as consultation to local districts.
>
> Further, we are now concerned that many departments seem intent upon providing new or extended services with the same personnel, or more of the same kind of personnel...they provided virtually no evidence that they have been considering procedures which might develop new sources, new career programs, or new inducements to attract top educators with a variety of talents.[29]

Further evidence that Title V did not measure up to the hopes of some reformers is seen in the 1968 statement of Ewald B. Nyquist, then Deputy Commissioner of Education in New York:

> While these funds [Title V] provide a fine opportunity to make departments as strong in practice as they are presumed to be in theory, too many state education departments primarily expanded their traditional functions (regulatory, operational, service, and public support and cooperation).... Developmental activities deserve the highest priority, with a particular emphasis on comprehensive planning and evaluation capability....[30]

In addition, after three years of reviewing nationwide data on Title V, the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education expressed concern about the adequacy of SEA planning efforts. While the Council praised Title V for strengthening the services and management of SEA's, it reported in 1968:

> What remains a matter of grave concern to the Advisory Council is the readiness of the State departments of education for comprehensive statewide educational planning.
>
> In each of its previous reports, the Advisory Council indicated its concern that State education agencies should recognize the vital importance of this function....
>
> Until there exists and is exercised a capability of anticipating educational needs and of planning comprehensively for them, the State educational agencies will not be the leaders of educational developments in their States, but mere reactors to events which they cannot control.[31] (Emphasis in original.)

This concern about the lack of planning also was echoed by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. In 1970, the Committee concluded: "As currently conducted, statewide educational planning and evaluation is wholly inadequate."[32] What's more, USOE reported that "insignificant"[33] amounts of Title V funds were used to establish or expand planning units. The hope for a Title V-inspired focus on planning was not met.

These reports, then, indicate that Title V resulted in SEA staff and budget growth, but expansion took place largely in traditional areas. For the most part, funds were not used for hiring new kinds of personnel or for defining new roles. Commissioner Keppel's hoped-for "thorough overhaul" of SEA's through Title V apparently did not take place.

II. This Investigation: Issues and Methodology

This study addresses the same basic question as the studies discussed above: how has Title V worked in practice? But my investigation goes beyond the earlier reports. Besides describing how Title V was spent, I also explore several other facets of the program's implementation which help to better answer the question above. These include the influence of various forces (e.g., state politics and traditions) on Title V's implementation within a diverse group of states, the cumulative effect of Title V over the years, the differing impact of Title V from state to state, and USOE's role in administering Title V, as viewed from the SEA perspective. In view of this broader aim, I conducted case studies in a selected number of states, rather than categorizing Title V-funded activities for all states.

Carrying out this analysis required different sources of data from that used in the reports cited above. Instead of relying primarily on information collected by USOE from official state reports on Title V,[34] I concentrated on gathering data during field observations in a variety of states. On these visits I examined, firsthand, original budgets and memoranda, and matched official descriptions with actual projects. Most important, I interviewed SEA officials and others about SEA operations, specific Title V activities, and individual state politics. Interview questions reflected my concern with describing Title V effects in the setting of individual states.

Questions also were designed to discover how well Title V lived up to its intent, "to strengthen state departments of education."[35] To devise the questions, a definition of "strengthening" was needed. This was a problem for several reasons. First, the law and Title V's legislative history were ambiguous as to the precise meaning of "strengthening". This ambiguity, of course, served political purposes--anything and everything was eligible for funding. The ambiguity also reflected the fact that different individuals had different (and often vague) conceptions of what the abstraction--"strengthening"--meant. Moreover, the matter of defining "strengthening" was further complicated by attempts to link SEA activities with what happens in schools. To be sure, we know virtually nothing about what school inputs result in outputs, much less how a SEA can be "strengthened" to enhance school outcomes. Despite these problems, relying on the broad intent of the ESEA legislation and the hopes of the Title V designers, it was possible to devise some rough guideposts for the exploration of SEA "strengthening" through Title V.

A SEA could be viewed as "strengthened" by Title V if its budget or staff simply grew. If a SEA had more money and manpower, then it had the resources to play a potentially more important role in state education. This view of "strengthening", however, needed to be enlarged; bigger does not necessarily mean better.

Another way "strengthening" could be assessed was by focusing on Title V's impact on a SEA's existing roles or traditional activities. Therefore, I looked at specific projects to compare past and present performance in the particular area of SEA operation supported by Title V. The implementation of a modern data collection system would be an example of an activity "strengthened" by Title V. In addition to looking at specific projects, I also focused attention on the total impact of all the Title V projects on the SEA. If the Title V projects were "added up", did they result in more effective department-wide services and management?

Also, I turned to the hopes of Commissioner Keppel and other reformers as guidelines for two additional measures of "strengthening". I sought evidence that Title V had stimulated a SEA to pursue "new" roles (e.g., planning and research), to recruit new kinds of staff and generally to undergo a "thorough overhaul". I also sought evidence demonstrating that Title V had "strengthened" a SEA in a political sense by enhancing its capacity to establish priorities and to carry them out. A SEA's past and present influence with its state legislature was utilized as the indicator.

It is important to point out that other measures of Title V "strengthening" were not examined systematically in this study. First, I conceivably could have gauged the past and present influence of SEA's with local school districts. Limited time and resources did not permit me to devise appropriate samples of school districts and then collect the necessary data to draw conclusions.[36] Second, I could have attempted to measure systematically the effect of Title V on the past and present influence of USOE with SEA's. Although federal-state relations are explored in the administration of Title V (see Chapter II), I did not examine changes in the overall balance of power between USOE and the states. The reasons for this omission were limited resources, and the existence of other research[37] which concluded that the 1965 fear of federal dominance by USOE was a misperception of power relationships in education. If anything, the research suggests that the states' "problem" is not federal control, but rather, local autonomy.

It also should be emphasized that Title V was not the only new federal program in 1965 designed to "strengthen" SEA's. During that year, state departments also received some $6.5 million for the administration of Title I of ESEA (aid to disadvantaged)[38] and $2.4 million for the administration of Title II (textbooks and school library resources).[39] Indeed, in 1970, forty percent of SEA administrative expenditures came from federal sources, with only one-fifth[40] of these federal funds provided through Title V.* Unlike Title V, however, these other funds are nominally tied to special projects or to the administration of specific federal categorical programs. Nevertheless, these so-called categorical funds did contribute to SEA "strengthening".

While this evaluation is not meant as a full analysis of the impact of the "federal presence" on SEA's, it should be noted that it is often difficult to isolate the particular and discrete impact of Title V, as contrasted with the impact of other federal and state money. This is particularly true when judgments are made about changes in the overall operations of a SEA or its capacity to influence its legislature. In these cases, a modest effort is made, with full recognition of the problem, to assess the SEA changes and to identify Title V's role in bringing these changes about.

Based on these definitions of "strengthening" and on my concern with describing Title V in context, I asked a number of specific questions during the state interviews. These questions sought to determine how Title V was spent, whether individual project objectives were met, the relationship between the projects and past activities, the backgrounds of the people hired, and how the SEA had changed since 1965. Questions also probed the role of the state legislatures and the governors' offices in Title V decisions, the general political environment for education, and the role played by USOE in implementing the program.

---

*Although Title V represents only one-fifth of the federal contribution, it is considered the "icing on the cake"[41] by the Chiefs because of its unique status as unrestricted resources.

In selecting SEA's for study, background variables were identified which reasonably could be expected to differentiate SEA's and their experiences with Title V. The variables included size of SEA, region, SEA budget increase from Title V, percentage of school aid from the state level, and others. SEA's were chosen to avoid a group biased on these variables. (For more details, see Appendix B.) All in all, on-site interviews were conducted in nine states: Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas.

Not all nine states were studied equally in depth. Those selected for intensive study (Massachusetts, New York and South Carolina) were chosen because they seemed to be exceptions to the overall conclusions of the Title V reports cited earlier. That is, these SEA's seemed to have rethought their priorities and to have started a "thorough overhaul" as a result of Title V. Upon closer examination, however, it became clear that during the first year these SEA's budgeted Title V largely for the marginal adaptation of ongoing activities. Though Title V helped facilitate marked change in one of these SEA's over the years, the program did not act as a stimulus for institutional reform.

Why was this the case? Why did Title V not stimulate a "thorough overhaul" of SEA's? If part of this study describes what has happened, another part attempts to determine the answers to these questions.

One way to begin to deal with these issues is to ask what led the legislative framers of ESEA to believe that Title V in fact would lead to a "thorough overhaul" of SEA's. Apparently Commissioner Keppel and others assumed that the allocation of Title V would grow out of careful and considered decisions. This seems evident from the procedures designed to shape the decision-making process. First, the legislation authorized USOE to approve or disapprove Title V project applications on a case by case, merit basis. This authority was meant to furnish USOE officials with leverage to insure quality projects. Second, the original Title V proposal required the states to share in the cost of Title V activities.[42] This matching provision was viewed as a check against low priority expenditures.[43] Third, SEA's were encouraged by USOE to undergo a "thorough review"[44] to find the best ways to enhance their leadership capacity. This review apparently was presumed to mean that a SEA would generally proceed in the following manner. It would assemble and study available information about its short- and long-term needs. The assessment would then be followed by planning. This would entail the definition of strengthening in terms of agreed-upon SEA goals and objectives, the exploration of alternative ways to meet these objectives, the weighing of the consequences of various courses of action, and the choice of those alternatives maximizing SEA strengthening. In short, Title V would result from a calculated choice to meet agreed-upon objectives.

That this process was anticipated is borne out by Keppel's congressional testimony, which was drafted with the concurrence of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and the other reform-minded elements of the federal educational establishment:

> ...title V has been written to encourage each department to determine its own significant needs and to develop plans for meeting them. In particular, it asks each department...to develop and submit proposals specifically based on its own State's needs.[45] (Emphasis added.)

That the "thorough review" was to involve this sequence of activities is further demonstrated by USOE's implementation of Title V. The "initial task was to design a system that would promote quality Title V applications from the SEA's."[46] To accomplish this task, SEA's were asked by USOE to undergo a "searching self-analysis of both their strengths and shortcomings."[47] This self-analysis or needs assessment was to include a "detailed agency [SEA] evaluation of its own program performance, including projection of needs for the immediate and long-range future, and priorities for immediate remedial action."[48] The main purposes of the self-analysis were to provide the SEA's with baseline data and to assure "that proposals were relevant to the State's principal leadership needs."[49] It also was meant to provide USOE with information to assure "that program reviews and approvals were objective."[50]

I do not mean to imply by this line of reasoning that Commissioner Keppel and others had carefully thought through in advance exactly how decisions would be made in the states once Title V became law. Indeed, problems were being met a step at a time, and prior to ESEA's passage virtually all of Keppel's attention understandably was directed at the task of getting ESEA through the Congress. Still, the evidence does suggest that Title V was based in part on the assumption--whether implicit or explicit--that the stimulus of the legislation, and, later, guidelines for deciding on projects would produce a "rational" process for choosing Title V activities.[51] It was assumed that out of this process new leadership roles would arise, and the reformers' hopes for Title V would thus be met. And, presumably, after the initial projects were implemented, Title V would be used in a flexible fashion to meet higher priority needs as new problems developed.

But none of these procedures had a significant impact and Title V did not promote institutional reform. As noted earlier, USOE for the most part did not pressure the states to move in new directions, although negotiations took place. The matching provision was first postponed and later dropped from the legislation. The self-analyses had little to do with Title V decisions.*

Was Title V's failure to stimulate new priorities simply due to negligence or incompetence? What went wrong?

Answers to these questions fall into two basic categories. Individuals familiar with the program supplied a variety of reasons which usually "blamed" someone, some organization, or circumstances for Title V falling short of the reformers' hopes. The differing viewpoints seemed to depend largely on the official position of the person addressing the issue. Since these reasons were expressed time and again, I here characterized them as the "conventional wisdom". Also, there is an explanation drawn from organizational theory.

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*This will be discussed explicitly in later chapters.

Who is to blame? Perhaps most frequently, blame was placed on the SEA's for not behaving "as they should have"; presumably they did not act vigorously enough in exploring all possible alternatives. SEA's were described as unimaginative, conservative, and looking into the past.[52] Chief state school officers were characterized as "damned ornery".[53] What's more, the Chiefs wanted Title V to be entirely "free" so that they would not have to face their legislatures to ask for matching funds. They exercised their political clout and the matching provision was removed, thus making Title V even less restricted than was intended.[54]

Blame was placed on USOE for not being aggressive enough during the process of approving grants. A Budget Bureau official stated that getting USOE to move was like "punching a pillow".[55]

Blame was placed on the Congress. Appropriations were usually tardy, preventing "pre-planning"[56] and making it almost impossible to hire SEA staff in the middle of the school year. In addition, Title V appropriations did not grow as rapidly as anticipated.[57]

Blame was placed on the states. SEA salaries were not competitive because of the refusal of state legislatures to raise them. Also, bureaucratic requirements prevented the hiring of qualified individuals who lacked particular qualifications. And the states by and large did not pick up the costs of projects started with Title V. According to one USOE official, the states were the "real culprits".[58]

Finally, blame was placed on a variety of circumstances. There was no clear conception in 1965 of what ought to be done with Title V.[59]

Planning was viewed negatively by some state officials because the idea was associated with communist countries.[60] And the states were so understaffed that there was an "emergency situation";[61] SEA's were forced to use all their funds to fill in "critical gaps in service."[62]

What these explanations seemed to have in common was the belief that had these obstacles not existed, then things would have been significantly different. If SEA's had acted more vigorously in searching for alternatives, if USOE had had a clearer conception of SEA needs and had acted more aggressively, if the Congress had appropriated larger sums earlier in the fiscal year, and so forth, then the reformers' hopes for Title V would have been met. Undoubtedly these explanations are helpful in understanding Title V's implementation. For that reason, I explore the impact of these various factors in particular states.

The theory: But there is another explanation for Title V's implementation which rests on the belief that the major "problems" were not simply the obstacles identified just above, but rather, enduring attributes of organizations. Proponents of this position would argue that organizations do not move flexibly to maximize efficiency, but change slowly to minimize uncertainty. When problems arise, organizations do not seek the best solutions, but settle for ones that suffice and produce the least disorder. In this view, to suggest that SEA's should have acted in a substantially different manner when given wide latitude in the use of funds is to substitute utopian hope for the reality of organizational behavior. Stated differently, to ask "what went wrong?" and to find something to "blame" was to ask the wrong question and supply the wrong answer. If anything "went wrong", proponents of this view would argue, it was the way reformers thought about complex organizations and how they change.

This view is based largely on recently developed theories of organizations which question the role of rationality in decision-making. Rather than prescribing how organizations should behave, these theorists are concerned mainly with describing how organizations actually make decisions and change. Drawing from the work of a number of these theorists,[63] I have developed a series of propositions about the way SEA's realistically could have been expected to respond to general aid. These propositions are not meant as precise predictions, but they do suggest what typically might be expected when organizations are given unrestricted resources. In effect, they are the working hypotheses I have used in trying to explain why the money did not promote the "thorough overhaul" of SEA's that Commissioner Keppel and other reformers would have liked.

First, one would expect competition for the funds, with the money distributed to satisfy the interests of important elements in the organization, rather than the targeting of funds according to an abstractly determined set of agreed-upon priorities. In this sense, Title V would be used to "grease the squeaky wheel." Second, Title V would be expended mainly to meet pressing problems through the simple expansion of existing modes of operation. Entirely new priorities, like planning, would rarely be established. Third, standard procedures for recruiting personnel would not be affected by the availability of new resources. Fourth, organizational stakes would carry funded projects beyond the point where benefits outweigh costs; projects tend to become permanent. Finally, SEA goals and procedures would change slowly over time as a result of experience. Dramatic change usually would result from heavy pressure from outside the organization (e.g., shift in politics or breakdown in traditions).[64]

Although this is not the place to produce an extensive review of the literature on organizations, it seems wise to indicate the theoretical considerations which led me to these expectations. These considerations center on four areas: the influence of organizational culture, the absence of organizational search for the "best" solutions, the impact of uncertainty, and the notion of organizations as coalitions of participants with conflicting goals.

In the case of organizational culture, I assume that each SEA has its own history, traditions, customs, habits, accepted programs, and standard operating procedures. Such organizational culture develops over time as a result of several interrelated influences: the environment of the state; the training, experiences, and expectations of the individuals staffing the agency; the structure of the organization and its system of rewards and punishments; and the political constituency of the SEA (e.g., the legislature, local schoolmen, and state teachers association). This mix of influences results in a cultural setting which could have a marked impact on SEA behavior. Writing about the schools in 1971, Seymour B. Sarason has put it this way:

> ...history and traditions have given rise to roles and relationships, to interlocking ideas, practices, values, and expectations that are the 'givens' not requiring thought or deliberation. These 'givens' (like other categories of thought) are far less the products of the characteristics of individuals than they are a reflection of what we call the culture and its traditions....
>
> One of the most difficult obstacles to recognizing that the major problems in our schools inhere far less in the characteristics of individuals than it does in its cultural and system characteristics is that one cannot see culture or systems the way one sees individuals.[65] (Emphasis in original.)

It is reasonable to expect that the uses of Title V would adapt to the existing organizational culture rather than to expect the culture to adjust to Title V.

The second central concept is that organizations and individuals do not seek the optimal solution to a problem but settle for one that is "good enough".[66] Or, to put it another way, rather than search for the sharpest needle in the haystack, an organization will be content with one sharp enough for sewing.[67] Organizations and individuals act this way because, in Herbert A. Simon's words, "they have not the wits to maximize."[68] That is, too much confusion and uncertainty exist in a complex world for organizations to explore all available information sources and consider all possible alternatives to come up with the "best" solution to a problem. "To maximize" would put impossible demands on human capacity for thought.[69]

The third major concept is that organizations avoid the uncertainty which seems to be an organizational fact of life.[70] In the case of SEA's, uncertainties arise over the behavior of the schools, the demands of citizens, the proclamations of the legislature, and so forth.

Moreover, there is usually insufficient information about complex problems, and only limited knowledge of appropriate solutions. Contemplating every uncertainty associated with particular actions is painful and puts an impossible load on organizational officials. However, to function at all, they must learn to cope with uncertainty. One way is to avoid the multiple uncertainties associated with future events by reacting to immediate feedback from short-term pressing problems. To be sure, one of the characteristics of a pressing problem (or a crisis) is that it is relatively well defined and hence uncertainty is greatly reduced. Consequently, an outgrowth of this theoretical concept--uncertainty avoidance--is that one would expect SEA's to concentrate their efforts on solving short-term problems rather than developing long-term strategies.[71]

But while these three notions from organizational theory suggest some of the constraints affecting organizational behavior, they do not provide specific information about the way Title V decisions were made. In my view, decision-making is better characterized by considerations that have to do with intra-agency competition, bargaining, and standard operating procedures than with things like the establishment of overall goals and calculated choices to meet these goals.

This view rests on the notion that every organization is a coalition of participants (some of whom are not necessarily on its payroll, e.g., the recipients of SEA services, the legislature, and the state budget office) having disparate demands, changing focuses of attention, and only limited ability to deal with all problems simultaneously.[72] An organization's objectives result from bargaining among coalition members, within the context of organizational precedent.[73] Although imperfectly rationalized in terms of more general goals, these objectives act as constraints on an organization's behavior.[74] Thus, while the subunits of a SEA may be staffed by educators interested in SEA "strengthening", different educators (and subunits) will see "strengthening" as meaning different things: the kindergarten unit will have different views from those in secondary education.

This conception of an organization leads to the expectation that the availability of unrestricted resources could result in intra-agency competition for funds[75] with different subunits expecting their "fair share"[76] of the new resources. The degree of competition would depend on at least two important factors: the extent to which competition was encouraged by top management, and the gap between the resources subunits had to do their jobs and the amount thought necessary.[77]

To reach a decision about different possible expenditures, some procedure would be necessary. The SEA chief might unilaterally decide how the money should be expended, but a more likely tendency would be for the allocation to arise from an informal bargaining process characterized by "give and take" and mutual adjustment among SEA top management.[78] In this process, the needs of the SEA would be defined not by a formal needs assessment or a self-analysis, but by those players with access to the bargaining game.[79] If a "need" does not have an advocate, it usually would not be considered. "Needs" would not be defined in the abstract, then, but by individuals (or subunits) with particularistic perspectives on SEA priorities.[80]

What's more, the action advocated by a particular player would depend on his interests and experience, his perception of pressing problems, and on his understanding of acceptable practices.[81] The player would avoid uncertainty by eliminating short-term irritants rather than attempting to define and meet long-term problems. Little attention would be paid to changing existing standard procedures, unless they were thought "unsatisfactory."[82] The "give and take", then, would not be mainly about defining "strengthening" or "SEA leadership", or setting general priorities,[83] but about what short-term remedies advanced by what players should be funded.

The results of this process would depend on several factors. The skill and power of the bargainers and the reasonableness of their demands would play an important role.[84] But at least two other considerations also would be important. Organizational health could require SEA management to keep employees reasonably happy. Therefore, to maintain the organization, the demands of different coalition members would often be met[85] and their activities supported from year to year. Also, in complex organizations different subunits would be expected to process different information from the environment, thus keeping top management informed on what is "needed" by the organization.[86] As a result, it would be difficult formanagement to say "no" to a coalition member backing up a reasoned request with information collected by his unit. In short, the process of allocating Title V would be based more on organizational than goal-directed, analytical considerations.

To gather information on the validity of my working hypotheses, I investigated how Title V decisions were made. Who was involved? What was discussed? Was "strengthening" ever defined? What alternatives were considered? How were choices made? Where did the ideas for projects come from? What was the impact of the USOE self-analysis document? Were projects continued from year to year? Moreover, I devoted attention during my field observations to the environment in which SEA's operated and also tried to identify the internal traditions, practices, and procedures influencing SEA behavior and Title V activities. It should be noted that gathering these retrospective data was often difficult, particularly since the questions frequently touched on sensitive political issues.[87]

The following chapters explore the various issues raised so far. Chapters III, IV, and V describe in-depth the implementation of Title V in three SEA's. These case studies highlight the differences in implementing Title V and the diversity among the states. Description of Title V's implementation in the six other SEA's studied are contained in Appendix C. In Chapter VI, I present my conclusions about Title V-strengthening of SEA's, and then try to explain why the program was implemented as it was by returning to the conventional wisdom explanations and my working hypotheses. Chapter VII explores some alternative courses of action for strengthening the states further. However, before turning to the case studies, it is important to recall that Title V in effect became general aid to SEA's because of the way it was administered by USOE. Chapter II explores the reasons why this happened.

CHAPTER II

TITLE V AS GENERAL AID: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS*

Chapter I suggested that USOE administered Title V as if the program were general aid, that is, assistance provided with few strings attached. The purpose of this chapter is to explain why. This entails a discussion of USOE's legal authority, a brief description of USOE's stance in administering the program, and an exploration of the reasons for USOE's behavior. This highlights some of the problems in exercising federal influence in the nation's decentralized education system. It should be emphasized, however, that my purpose in this chapter is neither to suggest what USOE should have done, nor to examine fully USOE's various activities to strengthen SEA's (e.g., technical assistance). Chapter VII explores in detail alternative ways for USOE to deal with the states.

The law: As discussed in Chapter I, each SEA was required to submit to USOE project proposals designed to meet the broad and vague purpose of Title V--to "strengthen" SEA's. While the law contained a laundry list of suggested projects as a guide, each SEA could expend its Title V apportionment for virtually anything related to SEA activities. The only counterweight to this almost complete delegation of discretion to the states was USOE's authority to disapprove those projects not making "a significant contribution to strengthening the leadership resources of the applicant or its ability to participate effectively in meeting the educational needs of the State."[1] This authority was spelled out even more explicitly in the federal regulations. Only those Title V applications designed to meet "effectively educational needs that have a high priority under carefully developed current and long-range plans of the State educational agency"[2] were to be approved.

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*Throughout this study the term "Title V" refers specifically to section 503 of Title V of ESEA, which provides unrestricted resources to SEA's

This project-by-project approval authority was added to the draft legislation in 1965 at the insistence of U. S. Bureau of Budget (BOB) officials, who were skeptical about SEA's reforming themselves. Viewing project approval as a way to get "quality" in Title V's administration, BOB's William B. Cannon and Emerson J. Elliott thought "only good projects" would be funded by USOE.[3] If USOE rejected an application, however, a SEA could seek redress in the courts.[4]

USOE's stance: Since the program's beginning, USOE has focused on the development and maintenance of cooperative federal-state relations, with federal influence exercised through gentle persuasion.[5] A 1965 memorandum explained how USOE viewed its role:

> The Office [USOE] has taken the position that the strengthening of State education agencies requires a flexible approach in implementing this program. Both in design and purpose Title V is intended to exemplify a true spirit of helpfulness on the part of the Federal Government by encouraging and assisting the States to strengthen their State education departments without Federal control.[6] (Emphasis added.)

USOE's perception of its role permeated all facets of its dealings with the states. The first year, for instance, SEA representatives were consulted on matters ranging from the forms for collecting state data to the federal regulations for administering the program. Cooperative efforts focused especially on the SEA self-analysis, discussed in Chapter I, which was designed to help SEA's assess their needs and plan quality projects.

In keeping with its helpful and flexible approach, USOE also sent teams of officials out to the states to assist them in filling out the initial Title V forms and project applications. These officials acted mainly as consultants. The extent of their assistance depended on their inclination and ability to offer suggestions, and the willingness of SEA officials to seek advice. "What we sought to do was to understand where each SEA was in its development and to help the states understand where they were so they could plan [for the use of Title V],"[7] noted the first USOE Title V director.

Finally, USOE's helpful and flexible approach was reflected in the Title V project approval process. When received, the initial applications were quickly reviewed. If there were questions, USOE officials discussed them by phone with their counterparts at the state level, or visited the states for further negotiations. Discussions focused on technical accuracy and, to some extent, substantive content. While USOE did try to persuade some states to place a greater emphasis on the expansion of subject matter specialists, I found no evidence that USOE applied strong pressure to any of the states to move in particular directions (including planning). None of the more than 900[8] first-year Title V projects was rejected by USOE. In short, USOE's flexible approach meant that basically it deferred to the wishes of the states.[9]

Over the years federal-state relations have changed little, with a continuing focus on close intergovernmental working relationships and federal influence exercised through gentle persuasion. USOE has continued its policy of approving all SEA Title V project proposals. There has been one change in the administration of Title V, however, which bears brief mention. The amount of information required from SEA's describing Title V expenditures was greatly reduced in 1968. The purpose of this change purportedly was to curtail duplicative paperwork and to shift USOE's attention away from the review of paper proposals to the provision of more technical assistance to SEA's.[10] One side-effect was that USOE officials had only the vaguest notion of how much Title V money was being expended for particular projects. "Applications [for Title V] since 1968 have been a farce,"[11] noted one Title V program officer. It is worth noting that beginning in fiscal year 1973 the applications for Title V once more required substantial and detailed information on different Title V activities.

In sum, what developed between 1965 and 1972 might be described as a bureaucracy-to-bureaucracy program marked by little federal accountability. Problems were worked out through intergovernmental channels by friendly dealings among colleagues. USOE did not establish hard-and-fast priorities, or use its project approval authority as BOB officials had expected. SEA's were able to define their needs as they saw them, with help if they wanted it, but with little federal direction.[12] Title V, in effect, was administered by USOE as if it were general aid to SEA's.

An explanation of USOE's behavior: While the above section briefly describes what happened--or did not happen--several additional questions need exploration. Why did USOE not adopt a more aggressive posture toward the states? Why were all Title V projects approved? Why were administrative priorities not established emphasizing such things as planning?

A number of interrelated factors help answer these questions. First, USOE officials argue that shortly after ESEA was funded in 1965, USOE was pressured by the White House to get the money out to the states regardless of the quality of the projects. This way statistics could be generated immediately, demonstrating the impact of the new law in terms of new services.[13] Second, the Division of State Agency Cooperation, the USOE unit administering Title V, was staffed with a mixture of USOE old-timers and new employees hired to implement the program. To many of them, it simply was inappropriate for the federal government to try to tell the states what to do because of the long tradition of localism in education. USOE's Title V director explains how this view was translated into action:

> It is my point of view that wielding the stick in a program like Title V doesn't result in anything but polarization. In that kind of situation nothing gets accomplished. So the ideal kind of program officer is one who is perceptive about good practices he has found in state agencies and can translate them into the unique conditions of a new state. And he doesn't do that by the disapproval of a project but by eyeball explaining and describing how it can work.[14]

Third, USOE officials content that it was not clear in 1965 how SEA's ought to change. Although Commissioner Keppel had discussed the abstract notions of "planning," "revitalization," and "thorough overhaul," the operationalization of such ideas was no simple matter. "We were extremely interested in planning," one USOE staffer noted, "but we didn't have the capability. We were babes in the woods."[15] Another official put it this way:

> I don't think anyone at the federal level came to grips with what the changes ought to be in the states.... There was inadequate defining of the content of the change that needed to take place.... It was one thing [in 1965] to say that you needed better planning, and another to know what it would take to improve planning.[16]

A fourth factor, and the one most often cited by USOE officials, was that the vague language of the Title V law did not allow USOE to take a firm stand with the SEA's. How, it is asked, could USOE prove in court that a project proposed by a chief state school officer would not make a "significant contribution"? Indeed, officials viewed the law as providing virtually no federal authority, as reflected in the following comments by USOE staffers who administered Title V in 1965:

> The implicit assumption in the law itself was that the states had the right and the capability to define their own needs.[17]

> We have no authority. Anything the states want we approve.[18]

> We would only assume that when a Chief said he had examined needs and developed plans that he had done so.[19]

> We almost had to write off section 503 [Title V] the way the law was written.[20]

> We can't be tighter on the states. They've got the law on their side. When you get right down to the nitty-gritty of it, this is general aid to education.[21]

In contrast with BOB, then, USOE took the position that it did not have the legal authority to tell the states what to do.*

While these factors undoubtedly had an impact on USOE's administration of Title V, I suspect that political considerations were equally, if not more important, in determining USOE's behavior. For one thing, fear of federal control of education was an important concern in 1965; for political reasons USOE had to avoid the appearance of telling the states what to do.[23] For another, USOE was under some political pressure to take it easy with the states. Viewing the design of projects as a state responsibility, the Council of Chief State School Officers objected during 1965 congressional hearings to giving USOE the authority to reject projects not making a "significant contribution."[24] Although the Chiefs did not wage a vigorous campaign to have USOE's project approval authority removed from the legislation,** they apparently did lean on USOE not to implement it.[26]

In addition, the states themselves were under pressure which on occasion they transferred to USOE. "We were raided by every interest group there could be," noted one Title V staffer. "The [state] superintendent [of education] would call and we would ask who was on his back. We would have to say 'yes' [and approve the projects]."[27] Focusing on these political issues, a USOE official summarized the situation in 1965:

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*It should be pointed out that although USOE took the public position that they had little authority, there was debate on this issue within USOE. According to a 1965 memorandum, Title V was seen by some as a "potentially powerful mechanism to influence the nature and rapidity of state agency growth and development." The memorandum also urged that "Specific steps designed to enlarge the State agency's capacity to study, analyze, and to plan statewide programs of education should claim high priority in Office approvals;..."[22]

**It may not be a coincidence, however, that an amendment to eliminate the project approval authority was offered by Representative Charles Goodell (Republican, New York) during House debate on ESEA. Like virtually every other amendment to the bill in 1965, it was defeated.[25]

> State departments of education were at the center point of sensitive federal-state relations. If there had been any little implication that USOE was setting itself up as better able to tell the states how they should spend money, [USOE] would have run into great problems.... Very doubtful we could have done more and sustained it. We could have brought the house down around Title V.[28]

On occasion, a few USOE staffers did go too far in suggesting ways for the SEA's to spend Title V money. When this happened, or when other friction developed, a USOE old-timer and former chief state school officer was there to calm the troubled waters:

> [Wayne] Reed's job was to maintain informal contact with his friends and acquaintances in the several SEA's; to quiet their fears; to explain USOE policies; to reassure CSSO's [chief state school officers] and local school administrators of USOE's abiding commitment to local control of education; and to appear at various educational conferences and conventions as a symbol of USOE continuity and conservatism.[29]

Political problems were neither limited to the initial projects nor to feedback from the states and their professional association--the Council of Chief State School Officers. Congress was directly involved as well. "You'd question something in the states," said one Title V official, "and the next minute you'd get a call from a Congressman."[30] This made USOE reluctant to take strong stands, as another USOE official explained:

> Under title V, we can't push the states too far. [USOE] did do some negotiations, but never turned anything down. ...Congress would have gotten on our necks. Even with the negotiations we were getting calls from the Hill. ...We have to work pragmatically. We have to steer a course between professionalism

> and political pragmatism. If we push too hard the Hill will look unkindly upon requests for future appropriations.[31]

This pragmatic attitude reflected the political realities of administering federal education program. Recognizing the need for congressional support to survive, top USOE officials avoided arousing congressional wrath, particularly since they believed that withholding funds was not possible anyway. USOE staffers still cite President Johnson's overruling of Commissioner Keppel's decision to cut off funds from Chicago in October 1965 for civil rights violations.[32] A basic problem affecting USOE's role, then, was political, and Morton Grodzins describes the situation neatly:

> [The dispersion of power and control] compels political activities on the part of the administrator. Without this activity he will have no program to administer. And the political activity of the administrator, like the administrative activity of the legislator, is often turned to representing in national programs the concern of state and local interests, as well as other interest group constituencies...always [the administrator] must find support from legislators tied closely to state and local constituencies and state and local governments. The administrator at the center cannot succeed in his fundamental political role unless he shares power with these peripheral groups.[33]

Moreover, I would argue that the behavior of USOE program officers has been adapted in part to take advantage of their strategically weak bargaining position with the states. Since it would be virtually impossible for USOE to cut off Title V funds,[34] orders or demands by USOE are bound to be ineffective; they cannot be backed up with action. Furthermore, demands could alienate state officials who view themselves as primarily responsible for education. This could result in loss of communication, not to mention political repercussions. Since USOE's influence comes mostly from the power of persuasion and since it must rely on the states for information about federal programs, it is essential that USOE maintain good working relationships with the states.

Under these bargaining conditions, the states are in a position to exact a price for their good will. Consequently, USOE will be willing to sanction "bad" expenditures and to avoid establishing priorities in exchange for open communications. For if communications were closed and good working relationships did not exist, then USOE would be unable to exert any influence at all. Thus, USOE's long-suffering attitude and deferential stance toward the states can be understood in part as adaptive behavior designed to achieve the greatest possible influence from a weak bargaining position.

Concluding summary: This examination of Title V's federal administration shows that the law meant different things to different people. For some BOB officials, Title V was meant to be a project grant program which approved only quality projects. For USOE staffers, by contrast, the law was viewed as wide open with little workable authority for USOE to second-guess the quality of SEA activities. The legislation itself was a mixture of specificity and vagueness. While USOE specifically was authorized to reject individual projects, the law did not contain objective criteria which USOE could use to decide whether particular activities strengthened a SEA. The result was the approval of all Title V projects submitted by the SEA's. Problems were worked out quietly through intergovernmental channels, with the influence of USOE officials dependent on personal working relationships with their colleagues at the state level. In short, Title V in administrative practice, if not in legislative intent, became free money to SEA's with little federal accountability.

An exploration of why USOE adopted this deferential attitude toward the states suggests that ambiguous legal authority was only partly responsible for USOE's stance. Other important factors included White House pressure to get the program moving the first year, the view that gentle persuasion was the appropriate federal posture in dealing with the states, confusion as to SEA needs, and lack of expertise in such areas as planning. Perhaps most important, USOE's weak political position precluded its adopting a more aggressive posture; political control of the program ran from the states to the federal government, rather than the reverse. USOE's stance with the states, then, did not simply reflect a lack of will, as some observers have contended, but also a lack of political muscle.

Having shown that Title V was administered as if it were general aid, it is now appropriate to explore the use of these unrestricted resources by different SEA's. The next three chapters are devoted to this task.

CHAPTER III

TITLE V IN MASSACHUSETTS*

An evaluation of Title V's impact in a SEA requires focusing on the program's implementation within the context of the agency. Most of this chapter is devoted to such an evaluation in the Massachusetts Department of Education. However, in this state, as in many others, the implementation of Title V has been seriously handicapped by the Department's external political and bureaucratic environment. This first case study especially highlights some of these environmental problems by describing in detail the political and bureaucratic barriers which impede the adequate staffing of the Massachusetts SEA. All in all, the chapter analyzes the effects of Title V in a weak agency operating in a non-supportive environment.

I. The Setting

There is hardly a derisive epithet that has not been used to characterize Massachusetts politics. Discussions of Bay State ways are typically laced with words such as "corrupt," "squalid," and "irresponsible."[1] The reasons why the state has been depicted in such sensational terms are complex and intertwined; it is often difficult to isolate cause from effect. For the purposes of this analysis of

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*Throughout this study the term "Title V" refers specifically to section 503 of Title V of ESEA, which provides unrestricted resources to SEA's.

Title V, however, three characteristics of Massachusetts politics seem particularly relevant. The first of these deals with political style. Since the nineteenth century, personal relationships have played a central role in decisions affecting the allocation of public resources in Massachusetts. In a 1961 article entitled "Poisoned Politics," Elliot L. Richardson clearly depicted this style of behavior:

> The most striking feature of the Massachusetts political scene, as I view it, is the subordination of programs and principles to personal relationships. Friendships and enmities, loyalties and feuds, courtesies and slights have an importance in determining political alignments that is exceeded only by the pocketbook. Amid this welter of personal conflict, the merits of issues are soon submerged.[2]

The second characteristic is Massachusetts' historically weak state bureaucracy--"a model of administrative chaos."[3] For decades, the executive branch has been marked by fragmentation, archaic practices, and Massachusetts' own brand of ethnic and class politics. An analyst described the situation in 1965:

> It is almost a misnomer to speak of government bureaucracies in Massachusetts, since the term connotes disciplined levels of professional staffs working under unified direction. It is more typical to find policy and patronage favoritism. It exists among a wide array of cliques including members of state agencies, interest groups, and elected legislative and executive positions. With the notable exception of a few departments such as Public Health and Mental Health, there is little professional policy orientation in the operation of state government. The old notion that a state job brings security or the opportunity for enrichment to depressed immigrant-group members still exerts great pressure on the operation of public functions.[4]

The third important characteristic of Bay State politics arises from the cherished tradition of localism. Since the colonial period, Massachusetts citizens have relied mainly on the local level of government for leadership. Nowhere is this more evident than in education.

"Local control of the schools is the Battle Hymn of the Republic of New England educators,"[5] reports a Massachusetts SEA official. And one writer has used the phrase--the "religion of localism"[6]--to emphasize the importance of the Massachusetts tradition of local school control.

This attitude toward localism has reinforced the General Court (the state legislature) in its slim support for governmental activity at the state level. While only seven states have higher per capita income than Massachusetts,[7] twenty-five spend a higher per capita amount for state governmental services.[8] This absence of strong state support is particularly true for education. The percentage of total revenue for public education from the state level is less in only four states,[9] and Massachusetts' per capita state expenditures for education is less than any other state's.[10] These traditions of localism and limited state governmental activity were put in proper perspective by the 1971 annual report of the Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education:

> A hardy tradition of localism has survived the sixties.... This is, of course, a strong Massachusetts heritage, rooted in a history of village democracy. At its best, the tradition nourishes the strengths of self-reliance. At its worst, however, it spawns parochialism, inefficiency, and internecine bickering. In Massachusetts today...the tradition of localism...combines with that vacuum of state leadership to thwart efforts at even the simple kind of cooperation and improvement that exchange of information and experience might yield.[11]

But these characteristics of Massachusetts political life--personal politics, weak bureaucracy, and localism--have not continued totally without challenge. Edgar Litt has argued that the meaning of current Massachusetts politics can be found in the conflict between old and new cultures in the Bay State. On the one hand, a growing managerial class, located mainly in the suburbs, favors policy-oriented, rational government. Often in alliance with upper-class patricians, the managerial class seeks power and reform mainly through the office of the governor. Conversely, urban ethnics, and rural, old-stock businessmen share ties to traditional values of localism and personal loyalties. They often exercise their power through alliances of convenience in the legislature in an effort "to maintain the values of the status quo,"[12] and through the state agencies which have become "the union shop of the nonmanagerial strata."[13] Litt notes:

> ...managerialism and the professional classes who sponsor it are resisted by the legacy of class, ethnic and ideological politics. The last is now losing much of its power as the demands for efficiency and new services become more vocal. But, the localism of the past, like the feudal guild system in the early era of industrial capitalism, remains important.[14]

So personal politics, weak agencies, and the tradition of localism, particularly in educational affairs, have been the legacy of the past. The promise of the future is continuing conflict over the values and purposes government is meant to serve. Meanwhile, a situation exists which is not conducive to the development of strong bureaucratic leadership. It is within this overall context that one must appraise the workings of the Massachusetts SEA.

II. The Massachusetts Department of Education

The Department of Education has been no exception to the general pattern of weak state government prevalent in the Commonwealth. This point was made a decade ago in a series of articles in The Boston

Globe, by Ian Menzies and Ian Forman, describing "The Mess in Bay State Education."[15] Pinpointing educational deficiencies in schools and colleges alike, the authors placed part of the blame on the lack of state leadership by the understaffed SEA where "pencil counting dominates."[16]

The articles created a stir across the state and helped inspire the establishment by the legislature of the Willis-Harrington Commission. After two years of investigating all facets of Massachusetts education, the commission issued its report in 1965, confirming many of the charges made by Menzies and Forman.[17]

Describing the Department's checkered history in capsule form, the Willis-Harrington Report noted:

> A once strong Department with a national reputation, transformed by political onslaught into a noisy, brash and controversial organization became for some years a quiet, relatively non-controversial but relatively non-combative enterprise. Today the Department seems to be working diligently to improve its status.[18]

On a more somber note, the Report characterized the SEA as "a conglomerate historical institution trying earnestly and valiantly to become an organization."[19]

Implementing some of the Report's recommendations, the legislature passed a bill in 1965 calling for a major overhaul of the state governance of public school education. A new Board of Education was created with sole responsibility (at the state level) for elementary and secondary education and ample legal authority to enforce its regulations.[20] The SEA itself was streamlined to meet its new responsibility. Fourteen divisions and offices reporting directly to the

Commissioner, and nine autonomous units "within" the SEA but not reporting to the Commissioner, were replaced with five major divisions: Research and Development; Administration and Personnel; Curriculum and Instruction, School Facilities and Related Services; and State and Federal Assistance. The reorganization began immediately in 1965 and continued into 1966. At the same time, Title V resources also became available to the SEA. To be sure, the timing of Title V seemed ideal for changing the "old" SEA from a passive bystander into a "new" leader in Massachusetts education.

Five years later, an extensive follow-up study of the SEA examined the progress made in implementing the Willis-Harrington reforms. The so-called Gibson Report concluded in 1970:

> The Department of Education, for many reasons, continues to carry out a wide variety of mandated functions, most of which have little to do with educational leadership or which have any visible impact on improving quality of education for students in our schools...there have been very few improvements during the past five years in its operation or its performance of external functions.[21] (Emphasis added.)

One way to explore this apparent absence of progress between 1965 and 1970, despite a major reorganization and the availability of new funds from Title V, is by focusing on a particular problem area. An examination of manpower problems which have constrained not only Title V activities but the entire operation of the SEA as well, can provide helpful insights into the underlying political and bureaucratic impediments to Title V reform in Massachusetts.

Manpower: In the Massachusetts SEA, manpower problems have been serious for a long time. A high vacancy rate, inadequate staffing, rapid employee turnover, and staff homogeneity in career patterns and background have resulted in a staff ill-prepared to meet the burden of effective educational leadership. Low salaries, haphazard recruitment procedures, and external bureaucratic interference have impeded significant staff improvement.

An important problem has been the non-competitive departmental salaries which are pegged to those in other state agencies. "Senior supervisors" in the SEA, for example, earn roughly ten to thirteen thousand dollars per year.[22] These jobs might entail the administration of a major program involving millions of dollars. Yet, these low-paid SEA supervisors frequently work with local superintendents and principals who are paid an average of $21,000 and $16,000, respectively.[23]

Low salaries can hamper the operation of a SEA in several ways. They make recruitment of qualified staff difficult, and no doubt, the salary problem has been related to the Department's typically high vacancy rate. In January, 1970, for instance, more than twenty percent of the approximately 300 authorized professional positions were unfilled.[24] In addition to the ability of the SEA to attract qualified staff to join the agency, low salaries also affect the state's ability to hold them. And holding competent staff is crucial if the SEA is to develop strength and stability. In this regard, Massachusetts has had a high turnover rate, with the most promising young professionals leaving the agency after only a year or so of service.[25]

Even if all the authorized positions were filled, however, the SEA appears to have been understaffed in certain areas and relatively overstaffed in others. For instance, in early 1971 the SEA had no urban education specialists and no supervisors for mathematics, bilingual education, or elementary education.[26] Nonetheless, some forty-eight persons were administering the school lunch program. Although this staffing pattern results partly from federal funds allocated specifically for school lunch program administrators, more than two-thirds of these lunch positions were state funded.[27] This apparent mismatch of resources with needs raises questions about legislative and departmental priorities in the allocation of limited manpower resources.

But even if salaries had been more competitive in the period following the 1965 Willis-Harrington Report, and the state had authorized additional positions, attracting and hiring qualified personnel still would have been hampered by recruitment procedures. Many jobs have been filled by friends of existing employees, with the availability of a job frequently passed around by "word-of-mouth." When the personnel office became involved, the standard operating procedure was to post a new job on SEA bulletin boards. The job listing also would be sent to a limited number of schools and colleges, usually in the Bay State,[28] which for years supplied personnel for the SEA.* As a result, the vast majority[29] of the professional staff has come from Massachusetts public schools. One legislator went as far as to characterize the SEA as "a graveyard for superintendents."[30]

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*Once again an important reason for this limited approach was a small staff in the Personnel Office which was forced to spend most of its time "just keeping the place running."

Moreover, a 1969 study of top managers in the Massachusetts SEA found a striking degree of homogeneity in career patterns and background. Of the eight officials who responded to the study questionnaire, all were born and raised in New England (seven of the eight in Massachusetts), all received their undergraduate training in New England (seven of the eight in Massachusetts), all had prior experience as both teachers and administrators, and none was born, raised or had been a teacher or administrator in a city with a population of more than 100,000.[31]

It should be emphasized that this pattern of recruitment and homogeneity is not atypical among SEA's. Summarizing the backgrounds of staffers in three SEA's of different size, a 1967 study concluded:

> The most obvious generalization which can be made in summarizing our analysis is that the professional personnel in each of the states we studied comprise extremely homogeneous groups. These state departments of education are largely composed of men who have lived their lives in the rural areas of the states they serve; who have gone to a state teachers college, and perhaps the state university; who had begun careers as professional educators, generally in rural schools, before entering the department; and who had been invited to join the department by another member of the SDE [state department of education].[32]

Though staff homogeneity is not unique to Massachusetts, how have these recruitment procedures and consequent staff homogeneity affected the Massachusetts SEA?

One might predict that the staff would help perpetuate prevailing attitudes and standard operating procedures. I would argue, for example, that one effect of hiring personnel primarily from Massachusetts public schools is to staff the SEA with persons having well-ingrained attitudes toward the sanctity of local school control. Reinforced by past friendships, such attitudes are conducive to friendly state-local relationships and probably are useful in encouraging school districts to move in certain directions. However, such attitudes probably are not helpful in changing the Department's role from mainly providing services at the request of local schools, to a position of educational leadership in the state. If SEA's are to be involved more aggressively in planning and evaluation (as writers on SEA's[33] suggest and Title V s legislative designers hoped), then individuals with different training and attitudes probably will be needed in greater abundance.

Hiring friends of existing employees with basically the same background and career patterns may also contribute to a toleration of procedures which were functional in a different era but long outmoded. The Gibson Report sheds some light on this problem:

> Members of the study staff have often asked MDE [Massachusetts Department of Education] personnel why an obviously ineffective administrative procedure is never changed, or why an MDE employee persists in adhering to nineteenth-century office practices. Occasional replies, such as, 'That's the way its always been done' or 'He may be out of date, but he's a good guy,' compel us to conclude that no recommendation we or anyone else might make about improving MDE external functions will have any impact unless the internal bureaucratic operations are radically changed and improved.[34]

Homogeneity, then, may lead to inbred attitudes and approaches which probably are resistant to new ideas and procedures.

Finally, another important manpower problem results from the tight control of departmental personnel by the State Office of Administration and Finance. In a recent study of the Massachusetts SEA, Laurence Iannaccone reported:

> Hostility, suspicion and blurred communication characterize the A & F - MDE [Administration and Finance - Massachusetts Department of Education] relations. A & F's Bureau of Personnel systematically downgrades MDE job classifications for professional personnel and consistently pares the number of jobs requested by the MDE....
>
> Finally, the A & F belief that the MDE job standards should conform to the civil service pattern for all state employees makes it difficult to maximize the employment of specialists trained in educational evaluation--further reducing evaluation or serious supervision of federal and state-funded programs.[35]

The Massachusetts Department of Education, then, has had significant manpower problems for many years. The staff has been underpaid and somewhat homogenous in background. The SEA has been understaffed, misstaffed, and unable to compete for the best people. It also has been severely handicapped by rigid bureaucratic controls. As a result, it is not altogether surprising that outmoded procedures have persisted, that young professionals have typically moved in and out of the SEA quickly, and that there has been "a dearth of trained, talented manpower"[36] and "ineffective people occupying some important professional positions."[37]

Manpower--some remedies: Exploring ways to remedy these problems also reveals the political and bureaucratic barriers constraining departmental operations and the options open to an aggressive SEA leader. One possible approach would be to replace these ineffective professionals occupying important positions. This appears at first relatively simple in Massachusetts since most of the professional staff is not protected by Civil Service regulations. Actually it is extremely difficult, often for political reasons, and particularly if the employee is a veteran.

It is not uncommon, for example, to have such suggestions dismissed with: "It's impossible, his brother-in-law is a member of the Committee on Civil Service," or "He has too many friends in the State House." Discussing political intervention in the Department, a long-time legislator has put the problem in its proper perspective: "I don't think it [politics] makes a lot of difference in the hiring but if people make friends, it would make a hell of a lot of difference in the firing."[38] No doubt, such political obstacles account in part for governmental reformers' devotion to reorganization as a means to change bureaucratic leadership.

Another possible approach to remedying the manpower problems would be to change significantly the recruitment procedures by opening up the SEA to different people with different backgrounds and attitudes toward the appropriate state role in education. Indeed, this has been initiated by Commissioner Neil V. Sullivan, who joined the SEA in 1969. Beginning in the Spring of 1971, an effort has been made to recruit personnel from beyond the borders of the Bay State; some outside educators have joined the SEA in key positions. Continuation of these efforts, supplemented by attempts to recruit individuals from outside the profession (e.g., those with public administration training), could result in some improvements. Such individuals conceivably might act more creatively within the existing political and bureaucratic constraints, and might alter those constraints as well through fighting for changes in standard procedures and for a greater say in state educational policy.

There is some evidence for this. The Bureau of Curriculum Innovation, staffed mainly with new employees paid from federal funds, seems to have adopted an unusually agressive role for the SEA in the development of innovative programs. Similarly, the Office of Equal Educational Opportunity, staffed largely with individuals recruited from outside normal channels, seems to be pushing beyond what conventional wisdom dictates are the limits established by the "religion of localism."

Strengthening the recruitment procedures, however, does not necessarily guarantee that such individuals would be selected for available positions. Several interviewees contend that some units of the SEA display a distinct reluctance toward hiring anyone without the traditional credentials and background. According to these sources, such applicants are viewed as outsiders and sometimes do not get the jobs despite their qualifications. As one staffer put it: "I think you are better off here if you went to Boston University or Suffolk rather than Yale or Harvard."[39] Consequently, improving recruitment procedures may have only limited impact if not accompanied by greater flexibility in selection.

However, changes in recruitment and selection alone probably would not have a long-term impact if not also accompanied by improved salaries. While low salary levels have not been a problem recently because of high unemployment in the Boston area,* salaries are likely to create problems once again when jobs generally become more plentiful.[41]

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*Indeed, the vacancy level and turnover rate have decreased markedly since the publication of the Gibson Report in 1970. As one Massachusetts staffer put it: "It's a buyer's market."[40]

Of course, it would be going too far to claim that more competitive salaries would enhance the quality of SEA leadership overnight, or that rate of pay is the only motivating factor in job selection. Such other factors as the chance to do something worthwhile, promotion opportunities, and status in the profession are important in choosing employment. Nonetheless, without a continuing economic recession, the SEA will have problems attracing the best talent available unless the salary schedules become more competitive. This is particularly true in a SEA such as Massachusetts where bureaucratic red tape has been extensive, and non-monetary rewards have been few.[42]

Actually attaining competitive salaries is yet another matter. Accomplishing this goal would take legislative action, but the General Court has typically been less than generous in its support for the SEA. A top official described part of the problem: "The Department has no bargaining power with the General Court. We have no jobs to give out, nor do we have any political strength."[43] Ironically, this lack of support may be best exemplified in the case of the Willis-Harrington mandates for a stronger SEA. Despite the passage of the recommended departmental reorganization in 1965, little money was made available for its implementation.[44] After the Report was issued,

> ...Ben Willis went back to being superintendent of schools in Chicago, Kevin Harrington went on to become Senate president in the Massachusetts State Senate, and most recommendations went into legislative committees, never to be seen again. Others were adopted [e.g., the SEA reorganization] but emasculated by lack of money or staff.[45]

The difficulties between the SEA and the General Court have not been limited to money. The legislature, which according to some observers views itself as the "state board of education,"[46] has been less than supportive in other areas as well. Iannaccone writes:

> The legislature is the central arena for the politics of education in Massachusetts, insofar as there is a state politics of education.... Members of the legislature...gain newspaper coverage by attacking, in every educational crisis, the department's well-documented lack of leadership. In the General Court, some legislators...criticize the department for its weak exercise of the regulatory function. Others, the dominant group which espouses the religion of localism, oppose the MDE's withholding of funds from LEAs [local education agencies] even when they violate legislative mandates.[47]

The problem seems fairly clear. The SEA cannot improve unless it can hire and hold a better staff. It cannot hold a better staff unless salaries are competitive. Salaries will not become competitive until the legislature acts. But even the reformers in the legislature are hesitant in supporting the SEA until it first improves. Since it is unlikely that the SEA can improve without support, its double-bind situation simply tightens.[48] But if the current "buyer's market" for new employees at the SEA is taken advantage of, the SEA perhaps can begin to break this self-perpetuating cycle.

This examination of manpower problems, then, not only reveals fundamental impediments to departmental action, but also sets out some of the serious political and bureaucratic obstacles which have impeded governmental reform in the Massachusetts SEA since 1965. It is within this general context that Title V must be evaluated.

III. The Implementation of Title V

Massachusetts' first-year Title V application (fiscal 1966) requested funds for three projects. Half of the Department's $317,000 apportionment was budgeted for a Data Processing and Information Center;

thirty percent was set aside for the establishment of two Regional Education Centers; and twenty percent was for expanded departmental operations, particularly increased instructional services to local schools. In addition, several other projects have been added over the years. These include the support of several bookkeepers in the business office, the establishment of a departmental library, partial staffing of the federal-state coordinator's office, the hiring of printers, and support for the legal services office.[49]

In discussing Title V's implementation, I mainly describe and analyze the three initial projects. These are the best documented and enough time has passed to overcome the early hurdles of implementation. What's more, their funding has continued over the years; five years later in fiscal 1971, continuation and expansion of these projects accounted for more than half of the Title V budget.

But before discussing these projects in detail, two other facets of Title V's implementation bear mention. First, in addition to Title V providing a continuing subsidy for the activities listed above, a small part of Title V funds have been used as a contingency fund to meet pressing problems as they arise. In the 1972 budget, for instance, $19,000 was set aside for "training programs."[50] This rubric is a "misnomer," according to a SEA official. The funds were to be available during the year to "meet emergency situations."[51] Indeed, a Title V contingency fund has been used for a variety of purposes. In 1971, $5,000 of Title V was allocated for the development of SEA goals.[52] In 1972, $10,000 of Title V was used to pay part of the cost of renting new offices for the Commissioner.[53] It is worth noting that the availability of Title V to deal with crises in the middle of a budget year can be extremely helpful to SEA officials hamstrung by a stingy legislature.

In addition to the contingency fund issue, one ought to remember that Massachusetts got off to a rather slow start in implementing Title V. The state spent less than half its allotment the first year with virtually all these funds used to purchase equipment.[54] In addition, more than one-fourth of its second year allotment was returned to the U. S. Treasury[55] because of the Department's failure to obligate the funds before the end of the fiscal year.*

Part of the reason for returning the funds stems from the lateness of congressional appropriations--funds were not appropriated the first year until after the school year had already begun. This reduced substantially the pool of schoolmen available for work in the SEA. Also, finding competent staff willing to work for low SEA salaries was a factor. According to one analyst:

> Associate Commissioner Thistle says that he interviewed literally dozens of applicants for these positions, but found that either he could not offer the good applicants enough money to attract them or that applicants were not qualified enough to hire in the first place.[56]

Another factor, perhaps the most important, was the almost complete absence of a financial and information management system in the SEA. Project managers and top officials simply did not know how much of their Title V funds had been expended at any point in the year. According to a 1969 HEW audit of Massachusetts' Title V:

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*The comparable figures for the nation were 70 percent expended the first year, and 91 percent the second.

> Had proper financial controls been established, we believe these unused funds could have been directed to better meeting the objectives of the [Title V] program. For example, we are advised by one project director that in each of the fiscal years 1966 and 1967 he curtailed staff service activities to local school districts because of a lack of travel funds.[57]

Even though less than half of the 1966 funds were expended and programs were being curtailed, three months before the end of the 1966 fiscal year Massachusetts certified to USOE that the SEA would expend its total Title V allotment.[58]

It should be noted, however, that management problems have not been limited to the implementation of Title V. Another HEW audit team found that for the fiscal years 1966, 1967 and 1968, the SEA allowed Title I of ESEA allotments of more than $1 million to lapse each year because of ineffective management.[59] In other words, inadequate procedures apparently have been a departmentwide problem.

Following the Title V audit report, the SEA hired several bookkeepers. Consequently, the management of Title V has been substantially improved. A 1972 HEW follow-up audit concluded:

> The state agency's accounting records and controls at the business office adequately provide for the accountability and control of program [Title V] funds and for furnishing program officials with current financial data.[60]

Nevertheless, the obvious next step of computerizing the business office transactions has not taken place, even though the Commissioner reported to USOE in January of 1970 that plans to do so were under consideration.[61] Consequently, the SEA has been content with patching up the standard and somewhat archaic procedures for posting the books by hand.

Why the Department's computer has not been utilized is not at all clear. One official argued that the manpower does not exist to carry out the task. While this seems to be partially the case, the problem may have more to do with SEA politics and rivalries among competing units. Indeed, the utilization of the computer may be a good illustration of some deeper managerial problems existing across the agency. A 1971 USOE management review of the SEA suggests these deficiencies:

> This State management review is the fifth management study to be conducted for the department since 1965. The review team found little evidence of organized, intensive followup on the recommendations made by these studies. The Commissioner requested that this review team investigate the action taken by the department on the recommendations made by the ESEA Title V management review team in 1968. The similarities of the recommendations of the five studies made over the past five years support the conclusion that little organized action utilizing a large segment of the staff and directed toward implementing the recommendations has taken place after each study.[62]

The note of exasperation evident in this conclusion is particularly important since USOE's management review reports are typically cautious and conciliatory in tone.

So, then, part of Title V has been used as a contingency fund to meet crises as they arise, and the implementation of the entire program has been handicapped by internal management problems in addition to the external political and bureaucratic problems discussed earlier. Given this background, it is now appropriate to analyze the three original Title V projects in some detail.

Data Processing and Information Center: In 1965, the Division of Research and Statistics was staffed by three professionals laboring under "crippling handicaps"[63]--too much work and virtually no equipment to do their job. Receiving only limited funding from the state, the division relied mainly on support from Title X of the 1958 National Defense Education Act.[64] Under these conditions, no research was conducted with most of the unit's time spent on the mundane but important task of processing state aid for the schools. One official described the division as a "horse and buggy"[65] operation.

As part of the Willis-Harrington reforms, the research division grew in status from one of fourteen divisions, to one of five in the reorganized SEA. The unit's "name" was escalated in importance as well; it became the Division of Research and Development. To beef up the operation, half of Massachusetts' Title V resources were initially budgeted for a Data Processing and Information Center which has remained the backbone of the new division largely subsidizing its operation; three-fourths of the division's costs were paid through Title V in 1971. What's more, the center has continued since its beginning as the largest Title V project.[66]

The original plan envisioned a center designed to provide basic data about Massachusetts education and aimed at "bridging the gap between research and development, dissemination and evaluation."[67] The plan for the center had six objectives: to improve data collection and analysis; to disseminate research findings; to establish a sound program of research and development; to assist schools in organizing research; to train educators in conducting research; and to maintain a library of data and pertinent research studies.[68] Most of the Title V funds were to be used for the installation and operation of a sophisticated data processing system, which was viewed as the essential tool for the accomplishment of the division's mission of research and development.

The center was slow in starting. Professionals were not hired until the second year of the Title V program. First-year funds were left for the purchase and rental of unused equipment. The major problem once more was manpower. Finding qualified professionals was a particularly difficult task for the research division. In addition to the departmentwide problem of low salaries, the research division also encountered long delays in clearing job descriptions for computer specialists with the Office of Administration and Finance. The requirements of central clearance had a crippling impact on efforts to get the program off the ground.[69]

Although the center currently is in full operation, the output has not yet matched the objectives articulated in the 1965 plan. Almost the entire operation is devoted to the collection and processing of statistical data on school finances, pupil enrollment, educational personnel, curriculum, and school facilities. The data analysis consists mainly of producing simple frequency tables, means, and standard deviations. There has been little or no attempt to go beyond the presentation of rudimentary facts about Massachusetts' education.

Virtually no research on educational outcomes is conducted by the division. In fact, less than two percent of the division's 1971 budget was allocated to "develop research plans, initiate research studies, develop new techniques to meet emerging educational issues and needs assessment activities of the Department."[70]

In addition, little effort has been made either to evaluate or disseminate the findings of research studies conducted in universities or other research organizations. The department's few forays into this area, to say the least, leave something to be desired. For example, a discussion in a 1969 R&D Bulletin of what makes a good school system states:

> Research conducted sometime ago by Dr. Paul Mort of Columbia University revealed a positive relationship between expenditure for education and educational quality. In general, the school system spending more money on education were providing superior education for their children and youth. Those which were spending less were providing a relatively inferior education.[71]

It is curious to note that the more recent Coleman Report which reached opposite conclusions was not mentioned.

The research division only recently has begun to go beyond the collection of measures of school inputs to use its capability for the evaluation of output data. In January of 1971, the division conducted its first statewide testing program, administering standardized tests to fourth graders. Viewing this evaluation as the first of many, the division director wants to "continue to move in the area of accountability." The biggest obstacle to doing more evaluation and research, in his view, has been the absence of job slots and the Department's inability to attract and hold competent researchers. "I can't keep people here long enough to capitalize on their strengths," he said while bemoaning the low state salaries.

Despite these protestations, there is an almost total preoccupation with the collection of statistical information and a complementary neglect of research. This probably would continue even if more staff were available. This impression is reinforced by a May of 1971 memorandum from the division director to the Commissioner setting out future staffing needs. Practically all of the proposed new job slots would buttress the existing data processing operation.[72] The Data Processing Center, then, has been used primarily to equip the SEA with a data bank containing simple statistics about input variables in Massachusetts education. The question arises: How well has this task been done?

Leo Turo, a former senior supervisor at the center, was probably fairly accurate when he argued in 1971 that the SEA has "one of the best data banks in the country. We are really proud of it." Nonetheless, several problems have impeded the implementation of this statistics operation. For one thing, problems have been created by the shortage of personnel. According to a 1969 HEW Audit of Massachusetts' Title V:

> We found that (1) generally there was no appreciable expansion of programs or services over and above those which were in operation in fiscal year 1967, (2) Key EDP staff positions which, in our opinion, comprise an integral part of an effective computer operation remain vacant since the project was approved by USOE in February 1966,...[73]

For another, the bulk of center time is spent meeting a variety of emergency requests from the SEA and local superintendents; gathering data to put out "brush fires" takes precedence over research. But even the time remaining after meeting these ad hoc requests seems poorly utilized. Despite needs in research, for instance, the center has used its time to pump out an almost endless array of data, including such things as a survey of school secretaries.

Finally, the center has made poor use of its expensive equipment. Renting at a cost of more than $50,000 a year, the computer has operated only forty-four hours per week,[74] a grossly inefficient utilization rate. An HEW audit team appraised the situation in 1972:

> ...available EDP resources in which substantial federal and state funds are invested have not been effectively and economically utilized to strengthen the management of the Department of Education.... In our opinion the state agency has not committed itself to developing and implementing a plan of action to expand the use of EDP resources. The state agency will improve its EDP operations only if a concerted planning effort is undertaken.[75]

Problem-free collection and processing of information still would be of only limited value if not accompanied by adequate procedures for making the data available. However, getting studies printed has been a major undertaking, largely because the SEA has had great difficulty staffing its printing operation. This is not surprising since the SEA has paid its printers below union wages.[76] Moreover, a supervisor in the research center claimed that the center could use its entire printing budget in a single week. In fact, the center as a last resort has taken to mimeographing its findings so they become available while they are still timely.

Dissemination is still another serious problem. Despite the production of reams of statistics on Massachusetts education, virtually none of these data, until recently, has been available in the Department's public information office.* Just as the research division conducted little research, so too the Department's public information office provided little public information. Dissemination has been carried out by the research division on an ad hoc basis. Typically, single copies of reports are sent to each school superintendent and the center responds to specific requests.[77]

Tied to the dissemination problem has been the related difficulty of communication among different SEA units and the research center. A USOE review of SEA management in Massachusetts concluded in 1971:

> ...there is a large amount of information available in the division [of research and development] that is not utilized by other divisions. In fact, programs have gone outside the department and purchased services of consultants without first determining the availability of such services in the R & D Division. Such events support the conclusion that (1) communication between R & D Division and the staff is not what it should be and can be; (2) the information requirements of the various bureaus have not been effectively communicated to the R & D Division; and (3) feedback of the bureau to R & D Division on services rendered has not been formalized.[78]

To help remedy these communication problems, in the summer of 1972 the R & D Center was moved to the central headquarters building in Boston from its old location a good distance away.

One final problem needs mention. The SEA has been singularly unsuccessful in convincing the legislature to pick up the costs of the computer operation. While a large portion of the staff salaries is paid from state funds, virtually the total cost of renting a building and a computer--$117,000 in 1971--continues to be funded by Title V.[79] This is true even though the division was created by the legislature and much of the work of the center is mandated by the General Court--collecting and processing reports from the schools.

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*In the spring of 1971, the only documents available were a compendium of Massachusetts education laws and a 1967 annual report of the Commissioner which was the last one published. Since that time, substantial improvements have been instituted.

The reasons for this situation are unclear. The research director blamed the legislature for its close-mindedness, saying that it had "a lack of understanding of what we do." He suggested that there may be some political mileage in paying the salaries of departmental employees, but there is none in using state funds to pay rental charges for a computer. Another SEA staffer argued that the legislature's "standard practice"[80] is simply not to use state funds to pick up the costs of those activities supported by the federal government. On the other hand, one legislator summarized the criticism of the center, commenting: "That's not R & D, it's a storage bin."[81] In any case, the center continues to expend each year the largest chunk of Massachusetts' Title V allotment, much to the chagrin of other units in the SEA which believe that they need the resources to meet their problems.

In sum, the data processing operation has fallen short of its original goals. Implementation has been marked with major problems, many beyond the division of research's control. The program implemented has been basically an extension, refinement, and expansion of the pre-1965 data collection operation. Current operations are a far cry from "bridging the gap between research and development, dissemination and evaluation," referred to in the 1965 Title V application. At the same time, however, if the research division is contrasted with other departmental units, the quality of its staff and the high morale are impressive. Moreover, despite its problems, the data bank operation is reasonably well developed and important. It provides a foundation for serious excursions into research and evaluation if and when the resources--both human and fiscal--become available.

Regional Education Centers: Two regional education centers were proposed the first year as a pilot project. According to the Title V application, their purpose was to provide field leadership to school districts in curriculum development, teaching techniques, and instructional materials. They were to be staffed by a regional director, a secondary school specialist and an elementary school specialist. To supplement this small staff, colleges and universities would be called on "for the dissemination of innovative practices, for research functions, for curriculum enrichment and other consultative purposes."[82]

The regional centers were to have a professional library, an equipment demonstration center, and a teletype hookup with departmental headquarters. Finally, the project was to be evaluated annually and, according to the first application, "a major study is contemplated at the end of three years to determine the effectiveness of the experiment." In short, the centers were designed to provide convenient instructional services in those areas of the state far away from the Boston-based SEA.

In 1971, five regional centers provided assistance to local schools across the state. Services included aid in the development of local curricula guides, workshops on instructional methods, and surveys and evaluations of school districts. The centers also housed small professional libraries and provided access to the ERIC [Educational Research Information Center] system.

Implementation of the regional centers, however, has been marred in several specific areas.* First, the project got off to a late start, like the data processing operation. Staff was not hired until the second year and the centers were not fully staffed until the third.[83] Second, the proposed involvement of the centers with colleges and universities apparently has not taken place. Regional personnel have worked almost exclusively with local schoolmen. Third, the anticipated annual evaluations of the pilot project and the three year major evaluation promised in the first application for funds never have been carried out, except in an informal fashion. Indeed, one long-time regional director stated that he was not even aware that a three-year evaluation had ever been contemplated.[84] Apparently evaluation has been limited to informal monitoring of feedback from the field where the centers have been generally well received.

Finally, the teletype hookup with departmental headquarters has never been implemented. Interestingly, three different SEA officials attributed this failure to lack of resources.[85] As I pointed out earlier, federal resources in fact were allowed to lapse each of several years. The teletype hookups made an interesting proposal in the first Title V application but the impetus to ever follow through was lacking.

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*Some recent improvements will be discussed at the end of this section.

At a more general level, it appeared in 1971 that the centers had not yet left the pilot stage. Rather than evaluating the two original centers and refining their instructional services, three additional ones were established. As a consequence, the original centers have been operated with essentially the same staff size and in the same fashion as when they started, with little direction or instructional assistance from departmental headquarters.[86] Moreover, regional field services were much the same as those provided by the SEA central staff. School visitations were made at the request of local school districts with no system of priorities to make the best use of limited resources. Indeed, the only decentralization has been the geographical location of this assistance; decentralization of decision-making power or program administration has not taken place.

This is not to say that the centers failed between 1965 and 1971; they provided some useful services in previously neglected sections of the state. But the centers' major role was not in the area of instruction. According to one top SEA official, the centers had another important function which was not spelled out in the original application: to provide the SEA with "eyes and ears" in the field.[87] Hence, the regional directors have spent a large part of their time acting as departmental ambassadors to the schools with the role of interpreting departmental policies, reacting to local crisis, and spotting potential problem areas. While this has been helpful to the SEA, it has seriously curtailed the development of the centers' role in instruction.

More recently, there are signs that the SEA is reevaluating the regional center operation, focusing on ways to enhance the centers' role. As part of this, control of regional operations has been transferred from the division level to the Commissioner's office with a full-time coordinator. Also, a sixth center opened in 1972 on a Boston area college campus. Its aim is to increase departmental involvement in urban school problems. These three developments--exploration of the centers' role, expansion into Boston, and attempts at greater regional coordination--suggest that the regional offices may finally evolve beyond the pilot stage, and may be more than independently-operated appendages out in the field.

Expansion of departmental operations: Aside from the Data Processing Center and the regional centers, Massachusetts' first-year application identified a number of other specific areas that needed strengthening, with consultative services to local schools accounting for most of the proposed positions. This part of Massachusetts' proposal, as noted earlier, made up roughly a fifth of the proposed Title V budget for the first year. In 1971, support for supervision of instruction accounted for about fifteen percent of Massachusetts' Title V resources.[88]

The proposal called for subject matter specialists in art, music, English, dramatics, economics, conservation, and health and safety. It also called for a public information officer, elementary guidance personnel, staff to work on teacher placement, an intercultural education specialist, and a systems analyst to upgrade business practices. In addition, an Office of Urban-Metropolitan Education, and an Office of Humanities were proposed.

The problems of implementation were similar to those encountered with the Data Processing Center and the Regional Education Centers. Once again, no one was hired until the second year, when five of the proposed seventeen professional positions were filled. Interestingly, those hired were all subject matter specialists who went to work for the Division of Curriculum and Instruction. Despite this growth in staff, the basic problems in this division have remained throughout the years. Gibson evaluated the instructional services operation in 1970:

> There is remarkably little overall supervision of service performance in the Department, no real planning for the carrying out of services, very little evaluation of the impact of services on school achievement of students, and not nearly enough feedback for service improvement.[89]

The Title V job categories which would have been totally new to the SEA--systems analysis and intercultural education, for example--were not filled. Also, the new Offices of Humanities and Metropolitan-Urban Affairs never moved beyond the drawing board.

In short, the state's objectives for this Title V project have been met only partially. Those proposals which might be categorized as "new" were not implemented and the standard way of providing services, school visitations by subject matter specialists, was reinforced.

More recently, however, the SEA has taken a serious look at its services. Commissioner Sullivan noted in 1972: "We're not equipped to provide the state of Massachusetts with subject matter specialists. We're kidding ourselves."[90] As a consequence, the SEA, in what appears to be a sound move, no longer provides assistance in particular subject matter disciplines. Rather, it is attempting to provide more general services to the schools. The same employees, of course, are involved and many continue to be paid from Title V resources.

This discussion of the three original projects and their continued support over the years tells us how most of Massachusetts' Title V has been expended, but it does not answer other important questions. Why did the SEA choose these particular projects for funding? Were such alternatives as long-range planning considered? Was there a thorough review of the Department's activities and needs? Was there a weighing of alternative means to reach organizational goals? In other words, how did the SEA reach its Title V decisions?

IV. The Title V Decision-Making Process

That USOE tried hard to have SEA's choose projects only after careful analysis of all their problems is beyond dispute. Within a few months of ESEA's passage in 1965, USOE had developed a self-analysis form to be filled out by each SEA. USOE viewed the document as essential "in conducting the kind of serious introspective examination that will lead to significant improvements and refinements"[91] in SEA activities. Each state was asked to rank seventy-five departmental activities according to the current status of the activity, its need for improvement, and its priority in terms of needed support.

If the allocation of Title V resources were based on a thorough review of Massachusetts' needs, then one would expect a close relationship between the rankings in the self-analysis document and the projects chosen for funding. To the contrary, there seems to have been little relationship at all. While half the Title V funds were budgeted for the Data Processing Center, the need for data processing was ranked "3"--medium priority--on a ranking from one to five. At the same time, twenty-two items were given a higher priority for immediate funding.[92] Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that most of these higher ranking items, including statewide planning, were never seriously considered in the actual decision-making process. Focusing on planning, one SEA official noted: "My guess would be that we had a Commissioner at that time who was pretty self sufficient as far as planning or evaluation was concerned.... Planning was not the fetish it is today."[93]

Although it was filled out in good faith, the self-analysis apparently had little direct impact on the decision-making process. If anything, it helped sharpen preconceived notions about ways to expend the resources. Deputy Commissioner Thomas Curtin described the role of the self-analysis in Massachusetts' Title V deliberations:

> Commissioner Kiernan and I had always met periodically with all of the Directors. As a group we had lived with the problems of the Department needs and priorities over a long period of time. We were acutely aware of our weaknesses. We hardly needed a self-evaluation to tell us those.[94]

And as another 1965 staffer put it, "It was a rare thing if a director didn't fire his needs up [to the Commissioner]."[95] In short, top management "knew" the departmental needs before the passage of Title V and before the self-analysis form was completed.

How, then, were the initial decisions actually made?

Deputy Commissioner Curtin was designated Title V coordinator by Commissioner Owen B. Kiernan on May 20, 1965, a little over a month after ESEA was signed into law.[96] To help him in the development of project proposals, Curtin assembled a small group of top departmental officials. In addition to Curtin, the group consisted of Everett Thistle, then director of the Division of Elementary and Secondary Education; Gerald F. Lambert, Special Assistant to the Commissioner for Federal-State Relations; and Raymond Dower, director of the Division of Research and Statistics. This selection seems reasonable. Thistle's division had responsibility for implementing ESEA and Lambert's job dealt with federal programs. The reason for Dower's involvement is less clear, although he was the director of one of the five new divisions established under the Willis-Harrington reforms.

The exact details of what followed are simply not available. There is no written record and the memories of those involved are somewhat hazy. Nonetheless, it is possible to sketch the broad outlines of the decision-making process. Apparently several meetings* were held to discuss the best ways to use the Title V resources, with Commissioner Kiernan providing regular input as well as reacting to suggestions. Since the SEA reorganization in 1965 had not been followed with funds for implementation, Title V provided a "golden opportunity" to implement the Willis-Harrington Act. This was viewed as "completely within the bounds of Title V."[98] The three projects just discussed in detail emerged from these meetings as the Department's plan for using Title V.

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*For example, a meeting was held in Topsfield, Massachusetts on June 9, 1965 to discuss the allocation of resources.[97]

The reasons behind the Title V allocation decisions varied somewhat from project to project. In the case of the data processing operation, Dower had worked out a detailed plan prior to Title V for the expansion of his statistics office. The plan was reasonable, and he had close ties at the top of the SEA. Dower and his staff were considered a "way-out front group"[99] that should be given the opportunity to expand their small operation. As one official said, "We had already committed ourselves to statistics under Title X [of NDEA]."[100] In addition, it was incumbent upon the SEA to do something with its new Division of Research and Development.[101] Title V provided the means.

As with the plan for data processing, the regional education center concept was an idea in search of resources. According to Commissioner Kiernan, the SEA had tried for about four or five years prior to the passage of ESEA to persuade the legislature to fund the regional center concept.[102] Unsuccessful in these efforts, the idea was simply taken "off the shelf" when Title V became available.

The centers were viewed as a high priority for several reasons. Top management believed that they could provide some needed assistance in the remoter sections of the state. Indeed, the Commissioner and other top officials had been "catching flak" from the field because of the absence of departmental services.[103] Funding the centers, then, not only was responsive to a pressing problem, but reduced the "heat" on the SEA. And as with the data processing operation, the implementation of the centers concept was responsive to the recommendations of the Willis-Harrington Report.

Finally, it is not altogether surprising that the third project mainly called for additional subject-matter specialists who would spend their time visiting schools; this was the standard operating procedure for providing instructional services in 1965. In the eyes of top management, existing gaps needed to be filled. According to one official involved in the initial Title V decisions, the process went like this:

> What do we have now? Where are the gaps? What kind of people do we need?... The conscious determination was made to add subject matter specialists in those areas where we didn't have them. I don't think we ever said should we or shouldn't we have them. [There was] acceptance of the fact that we should.[104]

In other words, the gaps were defined as a "need" and there was little consideration of possible alternative ways of providing instructional services to the schools.

All in all, the process apparently was fairly cut-and-dried since the major SEA needs were known prior to ESEA. One official noted: "We had things thought through before Title V about where the Department ought to be going. When money [Title V] came along, we had to fit the ideas to the available funds."[105] This "fitting," according to one 1965 staffer involved in the process, resulted from "give and take" with the allocation of dollars depending partly on who "yelled the loudest," and "who was championing what particular cause."[106]

The Title V allocation process, then, was not the result of a "rethinking" of the Department's mission or the development of projects in line with overall departmental goals. Top officials "knew" their needs without going through a new self-analysis or relating them to abstract agency objectives. Solutions were taken "off the shelf" when Title V became available. Given the "need" for the funded activities, it is more understandable why a project such as setting up a planning office apparently was not seriously considered. Not only was it not a pressing problem in the short run, but also the notion of planning did not have a strong advocate among those making the Title V decisions.

In making these points, I do not mean to imply that the Title V decision-making process smacked of backroom dealing or that the officials involved shirked their responsibilities. Rather, I am suggesting that the decisions grew out of a process which basically took the existing programs of the Department as a "given." Title V was then divided up, partly as a result of competition for funds, to meet those pressing problems facing the agency, as viewed by those making the decisions. It should be emphasized that this process is consistent with the notions from organizational theory set forth in Chapter I.

V. Conclusions

At the time that Title V resources first became available to the Massachusetts Department of Education, it was a weak agency in need of substantial change, and was undergoing a major reorganization recommended by the Willis-Harrington Report. Title V seemed to provide the potential for significantly improving the agency's operations and leadership. But this has not been the case.

Title V was used mainly for projects designed to meet the more visible pressing problems identified by the Willis-Harrington Report and long recognized by the SEA--the need for research and regionalization. Progress in implementation, however, has been slow with most of the Title V resources used for the continuing subsidy of these and other projects established in the first two years of the Title V program. (A small part of the remaining Title V has been used as a contingency fund to meet emergencies.) Moreover, in implementing these projects, there is little evidence that the SEA went beyond traditional recruitment circles for staffing. For example, all of the twelve professionals hired for the first four regional centers "either came from other jobs in the Department or from small superintendencies or principalships in small Massachusetts school districts."[107]

The result is not surprising. Title V has mainly funded the extension and expansion of the Department's traditional modes of operation. This is conspicuously true in the case of the smallest first-year project--instructional services to the schools. The data processing operation also represents a natural expansion from the calculator to the computer, with the same primary focus on simple statistics. And, finally, if one examines what the professionals in the regional centers do (providing services to the schools), then it is clear that the centers have basically provided more of the same. Those items calling for newer thrusts for the SEA--for example, research, or an Office of Metropolitan-Urban Affairs--have yet to materialize. Old-wine-in-new-bottles has been the Department's major response to the Willis-Harrington suggested reforms.

Moreover, while these discrete projects have provided some useful services (and could provide the base for significant improvement), they have been little more than "add ons" or appendages to the on-going activities of the SEA. These Title V expenditures have had no visible impact on the policy positions taken by the agency, on decisions affecting the allocation of resources, or on changing the overall operations or mission of the agency. Besides pumping out endless statistics, for example, the computer could have had a significant impact in the modernization of the financial management procedures of the agency. The computer has yet to be utilized in automating the Department's hand-kept accounts. As a result, Massachusetts' 1970 Title V annual report is fairly candid when it states: "While the funds have been significant in the total effort of the state educational agency, these funds [Title V] have not caused significant changes in programs or operations." (Emphasis added.)

But the implementation of Title V has not taken place in a vacuum, as I have emphasized throughout this chapter. Indeed, the SEA has been long plagued with severe external problems, hamstringing attempts to achieve a position of leadership in the state. First, the legislature simply has not looked to the SEA to play a leadership role. Once the 1965 reforms were passed, for example, things seemed to return to business as usual between the General Court and the SEA; only limited funds were provided to implement the departmental reorganization. Also, the reforms apparently were not followed by any sustained legislative pressure or support for the SEA to undergo significant change. In fact, between the 1965 Willis-Harrington Report and the 1970 Gibson Report, there seems to have been little legislative interest in what the SEA was doing, except when it created problems for a legislator's constituents. Even today there are few signs that the legislature plans to abandon its role as the state board of education. Long concerned with state educational policy, a respected legislator summed up the Department's leadership problem succinctly: "I don't know if the functions of the Department have been ever spelled out to the legislature.... Nobody pays too much attention to education at the state level."[108]

A second major external problem has been created by the Office of Administration and Finance which has severely constrained departmental operations with its rigid requirements, long delays, and bureaucratic red tape. Finally, the SEA operates in a state where the tradition of local school control influences both what is expected of the SEA and the tasks it can perform. Local control has meant a limited role for the SEA at best.

But not all the blame for the absence of progress in Massachusetts can be laid at the doorsteps of the legislature, or the Office of Administration and Finance, or the cherished tradition of localism. To be sure, I have pointed to basic problems within the agency hampering SEA operations. But the internal problems go even deeper than outmoded managerial procedures. In the Massachusetts SEA, it is not unusual to hear discussions of "empire building,"[109] "massive lack of communication,"[110] "fiefdoms,"[111] "jockeying"[112] for position, and "cronyism."[113] In fact, the quote from Elliot L. Richardson about

Massachusetts politics in the introduction to this chapter may apply in large measure to the operation of the SEA. That is, "friendships and enmities, loyalties and feuds, courtesies and slights" appear to play an important role in determining what tasks the SEA performs and who performs them. Of course, these are common plaints expressed by observers and employees of any active organization. Nevertheless, after visiting nine SEA's as a part of this study, I am left with the distinct impression that these internal problems are found in the extreme in Massachusetts.

All in all, the SEA was poorly managed and weak in 1965 and, six years later, it still is plagued by outmoded procedures, abnormal internal problems, the absence of a clear sense of direction, and only limited influence with the state legislature.[114] A long-time observer of the SEA accurately summed it up this way: "The Department has improved considerably, but they have so many problems that it is unbelievable."[115]

But all is not gloom at departmental headquarters. Long preoccupied with leading the fight for racial balance in the schools, Commissioner Sullivan turned more attention in the last year or so to the mundane tasks of shaping up an ailing bureaucracy. Several changes have been made which could have important consequences for the SEA in the long run. Recruitment procedures have been improved; this coupled with an unusually "good" job market has allowed the SEA to pick and choose among job applicants. Also, an attempt has been made to improve the Department's overall operation; to this end, it was reorganized in the Fall of 1971. The Department's urban orientation also has been expanded, most notably through the establishment in 1972 of a regional office in the Boston area. Finally, the Board of Education itself has established a set of fourteen educational imperatives for the Bay State; these are thought to be the first step toward a master plan for Massachusetts education.

While these changes and others appear to be important steps in the right direction, not enough time has passed to weigh their effect on actual organizational behavior. What's more, matters currently are in a state of suspended animation with the unexpected resignation of Commissioner Sullivan in the summer of 1972. These changes might indicate, however, that the SEA is ripe for some significant improvements. Indeed, Ian Menzies (co-author of The Boston Globe articles which sparked the formation of the Willis-Harrington Commission a decade ago) recently made this point in an August, 1972 article, ironically entitled "Crisis grows in education":

> The Willis-Harrington study was a landmark effort...but perhaps because the study was as sweeping and appeared so definitive everyone sat back feeling that osmosis would complete the task....
>
> Perhaps...the resignation of Neil V. Sullivan as Massachusetts Commissioner of Education is opportune as it reopens the entire question of whether or not the state is succeeding in taking the visionary leap into 'Education 1990', the declared objective of the Willis-Harrington team.[116]

Whether significant change indeed takes place will depend on the now-unknown plans of the governor and his new Secretary of Education (a post created under the 1971 reorganization of state government); on the interest of a new commissioner in accelerating the changes initiated by Sullivan; on the willingness of the legislature to give the SEA some room to maneuver; and on public and interest group pressure for greater state leadership in education. If political scientist Edgar Litt is correct that a new managerial class is becoming a dominant force in Massachusetts politics, then one product could be a significantly improved Department of Education. But in Massachusetts politics, any prediction is far from certain.

CHAPTER IV

TITLE V IN NEW YORK*

The preceding chapter focused on Title V's implementation in a long-weak SEA operating in a non-supportive political environment. In this chapter, by contrast, I discuss the program's effect in a sophisticated, stable, amply-funded agency with a long history of leadership in education.

I. The Setting

There is an old saying in Albany that New York State government has four branches: the executive, the legislative, the judiciary and the State Education Department.[1] This quip rather neatly depicts the importance of education in New York politics and, more specifically, points to the unique position held by the SEA in state governmental affairs.

There are many reasons for this situation. One of the most important stems from the political autonomy of the state governing body for education, the Board of Regents of The University of the State of New York. Created in 1784, the board is a non-salaried group of fifteen laymen elected by joint ballot of the two houses of the state legislature. The board chooses the Commissioner of Education without confirmation either by the governor or by the legislature, and each year submits its own legislative proposals independent of the governor's program. The most important distinction from other state education boards, however, is that the regents are elected for fifteen year terms, assuring them the opportunity to take stands somewhat free from the fleeting political demands of the day.[2]

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*Throughout this study the term "Title V" refers specifically to section 503 of Title V of ESEA, which provides unrestricted resources to SEA's.

The combination of a nearly two hundred year tradition of leadership, its wide-ranging responsibility as well as prestige, and the long terms of its members enables the Board of Regents to operate more independently than any other government institution in New York State. Indeed, Stephen K. Bailey and his colleagues concluded in a 1962 report:

> The New York Board enjoys independent executive, legislative, and judicial power of such scope as to bring into question its consonance with American constitutional principles of separation of powers and balances.[3]

This independence has enabled the regents to insulate the State Education Department from many of the direct political pressures typical in government. That is not to say that the SEA is unaccountable or unresponsive to political concerns, but rather, that the peculiar status and power of the regents have provided the SEA with room to maneuver and a strong base to deal with day-to-day attempts at political intervention. Unlike many state agencies, for example, the SEA has not always been obliged to "check across the street" with the legislature or the governor before it takes a stand or makes a move. As a result, the SEA has had the freedom to develop and implement programs in an atmosphere rarely found in government.[4]

The Department's relative independence, however, is not sufficient to explain fully either the importance of education in New York government or the Department's national reputation for leadership. New York also has the size and the resources to support strong governmental activity. It is the second most populous state[5] and ranks fourth in per capita income.[6] Furthermore, the resources have been matched with high taxes and the willingness to support expensive state services. No state taxes a higher percentage of its personal income[7] and, if a few small states are excluded, no state spends more per capita for state services.[8]

One consequence of this fiscal effort has been a relatively effective state government. A 1970 study ranked New York second only to California in the quality of its legislature.[9] Even going back a generation, good government clearly has been an important part of the state's heritage, as noted by a 1954 analyst:

> There is probably no other American state today in which competence places so highly as a political value. New Yorkers, with some conspicuous local exceptions, seem convinced that only an efficient government can be effectively responsive...New York was first of the states to adopt a civil service system based upon merit and fitness and has carried budget administration to the point of refinement beyond that of any major American jurisdiction. Probably no other state has coordination between departments and programs institutionalized and developed to a degree comparable to that of New York. The state is one of few places where competent public administration is an effective electioneering argument.[10]

There might be some dispute today about New York standing alone, but one can hardly deny that effective state government has long been part of New York's political fabric.

As part of this generally high level of support for state services, politicians have placed a particularly high priority on education for several reasons. Supporting better schools and colleges has long been good politics in a state placing a high value on an educated populace; many candidates for public office have been elected on platforms advocating increased education expenditures. And along with this general support for education, the SEA which administers a wide variety of state programs, has grown to the point where, as one legislative aid put it, "Education is to the government of the state of New York as defense is to the federal government in terms of expenses, etc."[11]

But probably a more important reason for particularly strong political support for education and the SEA is the united front presented to the state power structure by those arguing for increased aid to education. Started in 1937 and composed of the state's nine major educational groups, the New York State Educational Conference Board has acted as a coordinating coalition designed to stand unanimously behind agreed-upon plans for improving New York education and to submerge differences among competing groups.[12] After visiting SEA's in the sixteen most populous states, Michael D. Usdan reported:

> Although these states all had relatively effective teachers associations, statewide organizations of school board members and administrators, and PTA's, in no state in my estimation was there a cluster of politically sophisticated lay and professional educational leaders comparable to those found in New York.[13]

Not only have these groups joined forces to promote education, but they also have worked closely with New York SEA officials in the development of policies and legislative proposals. Usdan summarizes in 1963:

> ...educational leaders in the state do not limit their activities to the organizations to which they belong. Their influence is far more pervasive than this, not only in their close cooperation with the leadership and members of other statewide organization, but also in their intimate ties, based on mutual goals and respect, with officials of the State Education Department.
>
> This cooperation manifests itself in legislative efforts which are remarkably coordinated. In other words, New York's educational leadership is almost fraternal;... This basic rapport among the leading figures of the various educational organizations is based upon mutual regard and respect for one another as people working for the same cause.[14] (Emphasis added.)

In sum, the power and prestige of the regents, the tradition of well-supported effective government, the faith of New Yorkers in the value of education, the political capital from supporting education, and the symbiotic relationship between the powerful Educational Conference Board and the New York SEA have combined to put a high premium on quality education in New York and to make the SEA a particularly influential agency in state government. Indeed, if SEA's had theme songs, until recently New York's could quite appropriately have been, "Whatever Lola wants, Lola gets."

Times are changing. Several converging forces increasingly are placing the SEA under greater scrutiny and are seemingly diluting its position of influence. Part of this results from the growing uncertainty about education. For years educators have argued that their problems were created mainly by insufficient resources. For years politicians have had faith that more money would result in better schools. Indeed, New York has backed its rhetoric with dollars and has been a leader in supporting education. This faith seems to be eroding. Teacher strikes, campus riots, divisive fights over school decentralization, and the apparent failure to demonstrate school success, particularly with the disadvantaged, all in their way have contributed to a growing disenchantment with educators and their pleas for more money. These factors have led as well to a growing skepticism about departmental requests for expansionary activity. Unlike the past, legislators are beginning to ask for evidence of increased school quality as a result of increased expenditures--before allocating even more money to education. As one legislative aide commented: "We always assumed a cost-quality relationship [in education]. And they [legislators] used to run on it. No more. Now it is a millstone around their neck."[15]

A second related force is the growing fiscal crisis in New York. This is reflected at the local level in taxpayer rebellions. In 1971, 132 out of 679 New York school budgets were turned down by local voters.[16] And at the state level the political consensus in 1971 was that taxes had reached a limit and state services had to be cut. Consequently, the SEA was hit with employment freezes, travel restrictions, and the elimination of about 250 positions from its rosters, including the firing of about fifty people.[17]

This growing fiscal squeeze also has been accompanied by growing professional staffs for the legislature and the Division of the Budget, facilitating day-to-day monitoring of departmental activities. In the past when resources were readily available, the SEA basically received block sums of money with considerable discretion. Departmental activities were overseen by one budget examiner who had responsibilities for other agencies as well. More recently, this one-man operation has been replaced with about seven examiners, and increasingly they are making substantive decisions about line items.[18]

Finally, the coalition of schoolmen and laymen presenting a united program for educational improvement no longer functions effectively. Frederick M. Wirt in a 1972 study of New York noted:

> Like all such coalitions, the ECB [Educational Conference Board] contained potential divisions--which were widened severely by events during the sixties. The growing militancy of the United Federation of Teachers (long only an occasional participant, but most often a critic of the coalition) pushed the State Teachers Association toward enlarged demands. These were increasingly opposed by the School Board Association, whose local members balked at providing larger resources to meet such teacher demands.[19]

Indeed, the power of different interest groups has shifted rapidly during the last few years. In his 1963 study of New York, Usdan pointed to the central role of the Educational Conference Board[20] in the development of state educational policies, while not even mentioning the teachers union. In 1969, only six years later, a survey of more than half of the New York state legislators reached strikingly different conclusions. More legislators (fifty-four percent of the respondents) identified the teachers union as a powerful interest group than any other educational organization. Only five percent of the legislators ranked the Educational Conference Board as a powerful interest group.[21]

All in all, the growing concern about the efficacy of school expenditures, the pressure of fiscal stringencies, and the increased manpower to monitor departmental activities have combined to reduce the

Department's independence and have contributed to a growing ambivalence on the part of some politicians toward the agency. It continues to be highly regarded by many members of the legislature, but an increasing number apparently are concerned with the expense of maintaining its far-flung activities. "The Education Department is not a universally popular unit with the Assembly,"[22] commented a legislative aide. Furthermore, and perhaps most significant, these factors as well as the waning power of the Educational Conference Board seem to have contributed to a shift in the locus of state power in New York education. Looking back over New York education in the last decade, Wirt summarizes the situation in 1972:

> The forum for decisions about school programs and moneys has been altered. That no longer lies in a once monolithic coalition of schoolmen, which first internally resolved conflicts among its parts and then presented the product to a complaisant legislature, while the governor idly watched. Such a description may not have been accurate at any but the briefest times in the past.
>
> As internal divisions among schoolmen became no longer containable, the governor and legislature took on new interests, resources, and direction in shaping school policy. The regents, commissioner, and department officials may well be increasingly professional and competent. Their program interests may be more varied and their innovations broader than in the past or than in other states. But as all programs must ultimately operate with funds, schoolmen must face the constraints and preferences of those who allocate funds. These have increasingly been found across the street from the education buildings in Albany, in the legislature's Victorian rockpile and the executive offices [of the governor].[23]

The long-run consequences of these changes are far from certain.* In the short run, though, the SEA is off the "gravy train"[24] and its influence may well be at a low ebb. And as one SEA official noted, "I see some rough years ahead."[25]

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*Political prognostications are made even murkier by the unknown consequences of the 1972 merger of the New York State United Federation of Teachers and the New York State Teachers Association.

II. The State Education Department

A visitor to the SEA cannot help but be somewhat awed by its size and scope of activity. It is the single largest agency in New York state government with a staff of about 3,700 employees.[26] It is the largest SEA in the country; even the California SEA has only half the number of employees.[27] Its staff is so large that if one were to add together the total number of employees of the seventeen smallest SEA's, the result would still not match the figure for New York.[28] And similarly impressive, the New York State Education Department has more employees than USOE.[29]

The question arises: what does this huge agency do? The answer is that it does practically everything conceivable in education, and more. As New York Commissioner of Education Ewald B. Nyquist likes to say, the agency is concerned with all education from "two to toothless."[30]

Besides its responsibility for elementary, secondary, and higher education, it also is responsible for vocational rehabilitation which in 1971 had a staff of 888 employees.[31] Additionally, the SEA runs the state museum, the state library system, and the Office of State History. It operates a school for the deaf and a school for the blind. It licenses state citizens in twenty-two professions, ranging from landscape architecture to veterinary medicine.[32]

Long recognized as a leader among SEA's in such areas as research and evaluation, the New York agency supports research analyses, compiles studies, and funds experimental research efforts. And, while many other states are struggling with achievement testing, New York is experimenting with other measures of performance, including the development of non-cognitive measures. The direction of the Department's activities as well as the quality of its efforts are sophisticated and impressive.

Size and scope by themselves, of course, are not enough to build an influential SEA. A critical ingredient is the quality of its staff. While the SEA has not been free from manpower problems (which will be discussed later), it has been successful in attracting and holding some outstanding officials, particularly in top management positions. Unlike many SEA's, it has not been hampered by grossly non-competitive salaries. New York State takes effective government seriously, as noted earlier, and has been willing to pay its employees reasonable salaries. A science specialist in New York earns about $16,000 per year, for example, while his counterpart in the neighboring state of Massachusetts earns $12,000.[33]

The absence of political patronage and the opportunity for professional growth also contribute to the Department's reputation as a leader, no doubt facilitating the recruitment of talent. As a result, a 1971 SEA report is probably accurate when it states:

> We have the most comprehensive education department in the nation, with specialists in every field of education. New York's Education Department has long been considered a pacesetter, and many of our staff members are nationally recognized leaders in their fields of specialization.[34]

Departmental influence also derives from the norm of professionalism. The selection of SEA employees is based specifically on their credentials as professional educators, their school experience, and their ability to understand and identify with local problems.[35] Indeed, just as departmental officials have had close ties with their colleagues in the Educational Conference Board on political matters, so too SEA staffers have worked closely with their peers at the local level in the schools. Wirt explains the impact of the norm of professionalism on state-local relations:

> Professionalism characterizes the overall operation of the agency....
>
> Program administrators spend much time consulting with their local school reference group. They rely on consensus and individual school-by-school negotiation, as among peers....
>
> Furthermore, the same personnel, who review and comment on proposals and applications are responsible for site visitation and evaluation. Since they are considered 'professionals'--that is, above any conflict of interest or shortage of objectivity--it is only fitting that they should evaluate as well as allocate.[36]

The norm of professionalism, then, promotes harmony and unity of purpose among individuals sharing similar values, backgrounds, and training.*

Despite the Department's national reputation as a leader and its good working relationships with many local schoolmen, it has not been immune from serious problems or from severe criticism from New Yorkers. A few examples illustrate this point. The SEA has had difficulties in managing the flow of federal funds to local agencies. New York City has claimed an annual interest cost of $200,000 because it was required to borrow money while awaiting its allocation from Albany.[37] Stemming from inefficient SEA management procedures, this problem has been corrected.

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*It also supports a system which tends to be closed to values other than those of professional educators. This negative aspect is discussed more fully in Chapter VII.

A second problem area has been the Department's high vacancy rate. Despite its ability to attract qualified professionals, the SEA has not been notably aggressive in keeping its slots filled. For the last few years the vacancy rate for professionals has remained rather consistently at fifteen percent. SEA officials have been concerned with this problem but it has been easier to identify than to solve, particularly since much of the recruitment is decentralized throughout the agency. Contributing difficulties have been the unavailability of professional educators in the middle of the school year, salary schedules which for a while were not as competitive as now, and officials who could comfortably postpone the filling of vacancies because of the depth of available resources in the agency. The high vacancy rate has now virtually disappeared. Most vacancies were eliminated with the recent cutback in SEA jobs. The remaining job slots have become more attractive because of a pay raise and the nationwide economic recession.[38]

Finally, the SEA is by no means universally viewed as a pacesetter. It has been charged with operating in a vacuum and with poor procedures for the dissemination of information.[39] Indeed, it is viewed with hostility, apathy and cynicism by many "down-state" schoolmen, according to a long-time SEA observer.[40] Staffing the agency mainly with "up-state" schoolmen unfamiliar with the problems of New York City and Long Island gives rise to this observation.

Department officials are aware of this staffing pattern but are not sure of the causes. Departmental salaries, particularly with a recent increase, are reasonably competitive with "down-state" salaries, but apparently many professionals are not eager to move to Albany. In any case, key administrators are concerned with this and other staffing problems. Indeed, it is interesting to note that top departmental managers viewed the recent cutback in jobs as having one beneficial side effect. It allowed them to weed out individuals thought to be relatively incompetent.[41]

So, the SEA has had its fair share of typical bureaucratic problems. On balance, however, it has long had a range and depth of human resources most SEA's would find hard to match. Hence, when ESEA became law the SEA did not need to play "catch-up ball" and build a basic organizational infrastructure. Indeed, according to one official, the SEA by itself, in 1965, had more than half of the subject matter specialists employed by all SEA's in the country.[42] This is impressive for a state with less than ten percent of the nation's 1965 public school population.[43]

Moreover, when ESEA was passed the SEA already was actively engaged in the major areas of concern addressed by that legislation. New York was one of only three states, for example, which had passed legislation geared to the disadvantaged prior to 1965.[44] Also predating the focus of Title III of ESEA on innovation, the SEA in 1964 established a

Center for Innovation. Finally, the SEA for many years has been urging expenditures for early childhood education, long before it became a major goal of educators.

It is within this general context, then, that one has to view the implementation of Title V. When the SEA received its first year Title V apportionment of about $785,000,[45] it was operating in an environment valuing effective government and willing to pay the price to hire competent staff. Education was held in high repute, with the SEA working closely with the Educational Conference Board in developing programs that the legislature supported. The SEA itself was well staffed, stable, highly professional, amply funded, and reputed to be a pace-setter in education. Given these conditions, which might be considered ideal, the question emerges: How did New York expend its Title V funds?

III. Title V's Implementation

During the first five years of Title V, New York was apportioned more than $6 million, an amount exceeded only in California. During these years, New York used this money to fund approximately seventy-five different projects.[46] If nothing else, this indicates a decision not to target resources in one or several areas with the greatest potential for development, as had been suggested by a committee of state schoolmen in 1965.[47]

Before discussing the decision-making process which resulted in the funding of those seventy-five projects, I first intend to describe them briefly, and then offer a series of observations about these expenditures with illustrations drawn from specific Title V projects. In presenting these descriptions, I discuss the first year of the program separately. It was the most interesting year of Title V; after that SEA officials had very little flexibility, in their view, since most of the money was tied up in permanent positions. Also, this approach helps minimize the complexity of describing briefly many of the seventy-five or so projects.

1965-1966: New York funded forty separate projects during the first year of Title V. Twenty-four of these were submitted initially as a single package, with the remaining sixteen trickling into USOE over the course of the year. It is useful to begin by considering the twenty-four original applications as a unit, since they represent the thinking of the Department's top officials on how best to use its Title V funds to strengthen the agency.

The original projects were small in size, ranging from about \$12,000 to \$50,000, with two exceptions.[48] One project proposed \$102,000 for on-site research in the state's six largest cities to gather basic information about the urban school situation. The other proposed \$70,000 for the establishment of two pilot regional offices for educational planning and development. The remaining original projects called for a wide variety of activities. Funds were used to establish several new offices. An Office of Science and Technology was established to act as a coordinating and liaison unit on questions of scientific and technical education. An Educational Exchange and Comparative Education Unit was created, with its main responsibility being to assist foreign visitors to the SEA. A bureau office was established to coordinate the Department's Cooperative Review Service, a program providing assistance in instruction to school districts.

Several projects were designed to strengthen internal SEA activities. Funds were used to expand the statistical operation of the SEA with the aim of developing an Information Center for Education, a disseminating unit for statistical information. Another project proposed several new approaches to staff development, including exchanges with other education agencies. Extra staff was proposed for the Office of Business Management and Personnel to fill jobs from picking up mail to recruiting. A new slot was created for an Assistant Commissioner for Research and Evaluation,* and it was also proposed (but later cancelled) that Title V be used to hire an additional Associate Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner to reduce the growing workload of the Commissioner of Education and the Deputy Commissioner. Finally, one project called for the hiring of a professional staffer to be concerned solely with long-range SEA planning. (This project was not funded until 1967--with state resources.)

A third category of projects in the first go-round was designed to provide basic consultative services. A consultant was hired to work with schools in recruiting Peace Corps returnees for teaching. These activities later were carried out by a new Office of Volunteers in Public Service. Consultants were also hired to help disadvantaged students seeking a college education, to assist colleges in making use of various programs of student financial aid, to provide technical assistance for teacher education, and to aid local schools in the development of projects to be funded under Title III of ESEA (supplementary educational centers and services).

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*It is interesting to note that this new position led to a promotion (and a raise) for a departmental employee. In fact, his job was filled by a subordinate and the latter's job was filled by still another subordinate.[49] What's more, the creation of the bureau office for the Cooperative Review Service, mentioned above, similarly led to an internal promotion and a raise for its new director.[50] This use of Title V resources, however, seems to have been more the exception than the rule.

Resources also were used to pay for studies of data processing, in-service training of teachers, home study programs, and the impact of the state's regents examinations. Finally, several miscellaneous activities were supported: the development of a humanities curriculum, in-service training for school administrators, and the provision of museum services to schools.

As time passed, it became clear that these twenty-four original projects would not expend all the money originally budgeted for them. Obstacles in getting projects off the ground in 1965 were created by the delay of the congressional appropriation until September, by the difficulty in finding the right people for the new positions, and by the need for state clearance of "classification and compensation."[51] Consequently, some of the activities originally proposing new staff were switched to contracts as the end of the fiscal year approached. Also, sixteen additional projects were approved, half of which called for contract studies: a state plan for integration, an analysis of cost data reporting on school buses, a review of financial aid programs for college students, a study of acoustics in school buildings, and a management review of the Division of Professional Licensing Services. Finally, there was QUEST, a contract to develop a standard format for ad hoc questionnaire construction.

The remaining eight projects funded the first year also covered a variety of subjects. Resources were used for a reading conference, regional institutes on the problems of the emotionally disturbed, field visits to kindergartens, and a conference on employee relations in the public schools. The latter led to an Office of Employer-Employee Relations whose staff members act as brokers in contract negotiations for teacher salaries. Equipment and materials were also purchased, including camera equipment to make a pictorial file of exemplary school facilities, films for in-service training, and a microfiche reader-printer. Finally, a proposal was approved for a trip to India to study scientific training and research. This project was later switched to Ford Foundation funding and Title V was not used for this purpose. In short, New York supported a widely diverse group of projects during the first year with most of Title V finally being used for outside contracts.

1966-1970: During subsequent years, Title V resources have been used largely to subsidize projects previously started. In fact, almost ninety percent of the funds in 1969 either supported Title V projects proposed the first year (fiscal 1966) or activities started previously under NDEA.* Although the data are not broken out as neatly for later years, the same pattern clearly has continued through fiscal year 1972 proposals.[52] Title V, in short, has acted largely as a subsidy for the continuing support of SEA staff.

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*In 1968, the federal funding for SEA supervisory positions under Titles III and X of NDEA was terminated with an equal amount added to the total Title V appropriation. New York switched those previously funded under NDEA over to its Title V account.

After the first year, a number of small additional Title V projects have been funded which resemble the first-year ideas in scope and diversity. More studies have been funded, including a review of continuing education and an investigation of thermal environments in school buildings. Money has also been used for promotional activities. A multi-media presentation was developed to encourage participation in state-supported in-service education, and resources were used to take photographs of federal projects for use in presentations. Finally, activities were funded to develop indicators of educational performance and to hire additional staff for the Office of Long-Range Planning.

General observations: During the course of my investigation, I questioned someone about practically every funded project. Not surprisingly, neither the genesis of the projects nor their implementation consistently matched the problem-free pictures painted in the Title V applications and annual reports to USOE. With a few exceptions, however, most of the projects seem to have been reasonably successful in meeting the often vague objectives set out in the applications for funding; some are rather impressive. In this sense, Title V has strengthened the New York SEA.

There are several reasons for this success. As mentioned earlier, the SEA is able to attract and to hold a reasonably talented staff which takes its responsibilities seriously. Another is that the agency follows well-developed procedures--for example, need to justify projects, state clearance of jobs and pay rates, budget controls--which are designed to prevent misuse of funds. Finally, another important reason is that almost none of the projects called for fundamental organizational change, freeing implementation from many normal bureaucratic entanglements.

Because of the reasonable success of most projects, I will not explore each one's implementation. Rather, I will focus mainly on the nature of the projects, on their common characteristics and, in the next section, on how and why they were proposed in the first place. This effort is meant to demonstrate the close correspondence between the theoretical notions set forth in Chapter I and the actual behavior of the New York SEA in implementing Title V. But before turning to these matters it is important to discuss briefly the two largest original projects. Both demonstrate how plans can be sidetracked during implementation.

The urban education project called for $102,000 the first year mainly to gather basic information about education in New York's six (later eight) largest cities. The project was designed to provide a factual base to "support recommendations to the Commissioner of Education for modifying the organization of the State Education Department to deal more directly and effectively with the problems of urban education."[53] Instead, the funds were used in Buffalo and Rochester for the "development of plans for quality desegregated education...."[54] These studies were undoubtedly useful, but it is fairly clear that they played little role in the subsequent establishment of an Office of Urban

Education or in what the office does with its time and resources. In short, it appears as if Title V was partially diverted from the original objectives to meet what was viewed as a higher priority need, namely plans for desegregation in two cities.

The other large project, calling for two regional offices and eventually six across the state, was amended shortly after it was proposed. Why this happened is not clear. According to two top SEA officials, several members of the Board of Regents were concerned about potential "competition" in the field if the SEA were decentralized. Local educators could turn to a regional office for information and advice rather than ask the regent from that area, thus challenging the regent's hegemony in his section of the state.[55] Another SEA staffer argued that in opposing the regional centers several regents were reflecting the concern of local schoolmen about SEA intrusion on local turf.[56] In any case,[57] local groups were uniting in 1965-1966 to form regional bodies with resources from Title III of ESEA, thus making Title V supported centers somewhat duplicative. As a result, the Title V funds were diverted to a series of small grants to these locally-formed regional bodies to provide liaison services for the SEA. The hoped-for decentralization of the SEA--the idea behind the original regionalization proposal--has never been implemented, despite its description in early 1965 as "our biggest project in our plan to use Title V funds."[58]

Aside from the gap between original goals and implementation in these two large projects, common characteristics of several New York Title V projects bear mention. The absence of thought-out priorities by those administering the individual projects seemed to be typical. Several examples help make this point. As mentioned earlier, funds were used to establish an office for coordinating the Cooperative Review Service (CRS), an activity providing comprehensive consultative services on instruction to school districts. Since the program began in 1961, CRS has provided services each year to about thirty school districts.[59] At this rate, it would take approximately twenty-five years to visit all the school districts in the state, without time for follow-up assistance. Since CRS has many more requests than can be filled, some system is needed for choosing among school districts. In practice this entails visiting those districts (or nearby districts) which results in CRS having an "impact" upon the greatest number of students. Factors such as relative need, wealth, or the availability of local resources are not considered. "There really is no attempt to eliminate a school district because of its resources,"[60] commented the CRS bureau chief. This absence of need criteria has led to a CRS visit to Great Neck, one of the wealthiest school districts in the state and in the nation. "Everyone needs it,"[61] explained the former CRS director.

This virtual absence of priorities continues despite the establishment of a Title V-funded office to coordinate overall CRS activities, despite criticism of CRS in the 1961 Brickell report on the SEA,[62] and despite a 1966 study which explicitly recommended "establishing a priority system for providing direct departmental assistance to those districts needing it most."[63] The existing method is not considered unsatisfactory and therefore it is continued.

Another example of absence of priorities is found in the Title V project supporting field trips to innovative out-of-state programs. Funding decisions are handled basically on a first-come, first-served basis, until the money runs out each year.[64] Apparently no attempt has been made to think through alternative methods of distribution which may possibly result in better utilization of funds.

These examples of activities supported by Title V apparently are not exceptions to typical departmental behavior. A bureau chief in a subject matter area, for instance, stated that while it would be impossible to provide services to all New York schools, his staff will visit any school regardless of need if services are requested.[65] In short, the consideration, establishment, and implementation of priorities other than on the simplest grounds does not seem to take place. Current standard operating procedures seem satisfactory, and little thought apparently is devoted to the exploration of improved methods. As a result, the impact of many Title V projects has been less than optimal.

Let me be more specific about a possible alternative. It is conceivable, for instance, that the CRS leadership could work out a system for ranking school districts according to need. Criteria such as wealth, reading scores, number of disadvantaged students, and so forth could be utilized. Guided by a ranking, priorities for CRS services could be established. While it may be politically unwise to refuse to visit a school district which has requested services, the visit could be delayed until needier districts had been served. Furthermore, those districts needing attention and not requesting the service could be encouraged to ask for a CRS visit. Of course, administrative judgment would remain the key ingredient in making a choice among districts; too rigid adherence to priorities in some cases could do more harm than good. Nevertheless, by raising the level of consciousness about the need for more thought-out priorities, it is possible that the CRS activities could have a more beneficial effect.

Another characteristic of many New York Title V projects was the absence of clearly stated objectives for the different activities. In some cases the applications for federal funding were unintelligible. For example, one New York application approved by USOE concluded:

> The Office of ______________ can hardly launch pilot programs without incurring a charge of partiality to city of area chosen. Its planning is an operational procedure.[66]

These sentences defy interpretation.

Still another characteristic of Title V's implementation phase was the virtual absence of formal procedures for evaluating Title V activities. The little evaluation taking place was essentially informal, involving an intuitive assessment of the man on the job and the general reaction to the program in the field. The evidence suggests no attempts to make go/no-go decisions on Title V projects. For example, federal funding for SEA personnel supported by Titles III and X of NDEA was terminated in 1968 with an almost equal amount added to New York's Title V appropriation. Personnel previously funded under NDEA apparently were switched automatically to the Title V account without any formal evaluation of this use of Title V resources.

Another example involves the Office of Volunteers in Public Service which continues at about $50,000 annually even though the problem it was mainly designed to meet--a shortage of teachers and a plethora of returned Peace Corps volunteers looking for jobs--is no longer a problem. No doubt, the division in which the office operates is not anxious to give up the Title V resources. For the last two years, in fact, the funds have been used for other activities in the division with the office director devoting only part-time to the volunteer projects.[67] In both examples, the activities have continued without any formal evaluation.

While better evaluation seems desirable, one must wonder about its limits. The SEA does have a unit for evaluating departmental programs. Interestingly, it has never recommended that a program be terminated. "It's hard to identify a program that doesn't meet some kind of need somewhere,"[68] noted one SEA staffer responsible for evaluating departmental programs. Also, there is another important reason for questioning the limits of organizational evaluation. In the eyes of departmental officials, removing staff from the payroll is simply not an available option, even if legal constraints do not stand in the way. "Almost the last thing you drop are people,"[69] stated a key SEA staff- That is, the SEA has not fired staff except under extraordinary circumstances, as was the case during the recent manpower cutback. Consequently, departmental constraints on firing employees and reluctance t- declare a colleague's program a failure mean that once a program is funded it is likely to continue, with or without evaluation.

A final characteristic of Title V's implementation was that problems were encountered when projects called for changes in bureaucratic procedures. This is exemplified by New York's staff development proposal--one of its more impressive efforts, at least on paper. The bulk of the money was to be used for employee exchanges with other institutions. For instance, a departmental employee might work for a time with a private testing firm or a professor might join the SEA staff. In fact, none of the funds was used for this purpose. The employee exchange idea was never implemented mainly because of the bureaucratic red tape created by attempts to switch individuals among agencies. The problems were not unsurmountable, but the project administrator did not have the time to solve them.[70] Consequently, the course of least resistance was followed and virtually all the money was expended on another part of the Title V proposal providing funds for employee travel to educational innovations in and out of the country. As mentioned earlier, the type of bureaucratic problem just described was not common to Title V projects since most of them were of an "add on" variety and did not require significant changes in bureaucratic procedures.

In addition to the foregoing discussion of the characteristics of the Title V's implementation, several other observations grow out of an examination of New York's Title V efforts. First, Title V was used for virtually anything and everything. Studies, new units, conferences, expansions of existing programs, and so forth were all funded. Projects supported activities at the preschool, elementary, secondary, and higher education levels. Funds also supported museum education programs and the study of the Department's responsibility for licensing different professions. In these various projects, most of the money was used for staff salaries (sixty-nine percent in 1970).[71] To be sure, if a project could be justified on its own merits, independent of the relative merits of other projects, it was apparently eligible for SEA approval. Departmental officials clearly interpreted the Title V mandate in the broadest possible terms. The question of Title V priority setting, springing from this observation, will be treated in the following section on Title V decision-making.

A second observation is that most of the projects funded over the years appeared to be simple expansions and marginal adaptations of ongoing activities designed to meet pressing problems, with old ideas frequently taken "off the shelf." The personnel office needed more recruiters. Title V was used. The museum wanted to expand its education program. Title V hired new staff. There was a backlog of teacher certificates to be typed and sent out to applicants. Title V funded a project called ATTAKCERT to hire office staff for twelve weeks. The supply of state-supported in-service education resources exceeded teacher demand. Title V was used for a multi-media presentation to promote the departmental activity. The Fiscal Crisis Task Force, formed because of state aid cutbacks, needed to "build the case for additional funds."[72] Title V was used for a comparative study of the cost of education in New York and six other states.

These are not isolated instances. Indeed, at least half the initial projects funded in 1965 and still funded in fiscal 1972 clearly fall into the category of expansion and marginal adaptation of ongoing activities to meet pressing problems.[73] A few examples from this group help make the point. The College Committee on the Disadvantaged started in 1964 needed a full-time staff and publication of a report. A Title V project was designed to meet this need. The Cooperative Review Service started in 1961 had a large backlog of unfinished reports. Title V funded a unit. Staff of the Division of Higher Education needed help in advising colleges about the new sources of student aid. Title V funded a position.

In addition, several of the new units created with Title V resources and still funded today were largely responsive to the immediate needs of the day as contrasted with an assessment of long-range needs of education in the state. For example, one reason for establishing the new Education Exchange and Comparative Education unit reportedly was to remove an irritant. The SEA had many foreign visitors with no one responsible for making necessary arrangements. Burdensome details ended up being discussed at departmental cabinet meetings. Through a Title V project this responsibility has been delegated.[74] Another example is the Office of Employer-Employee Relations. It was created in anticipation of the about-to-be-passed Taylor Act, authorizing collective bargaining for all public employees.

Finally, two of the other offices still supported in 1971 by Title V were old ideas funded with the new Title V resources. Title V was used to facilitate the development of an Information Center on Education, a notion conceived several years before ESEA. Previously proposed in 1964,[75] the Office of Science and Technology also was responsive to an immediate need. According to a justification for the Office: "Unless we increase our own attention to these matters [science and technology], functions of an educational nature will go by default to other agencies outside of the Department. Some already have."[76]

In short, a striking number of Title V projects were designed either to put out small fires, to avoid them in the immediate future, or to fund previously conceived ideas. There is little evidence that the advent of Title V resulted in a rethinking of agency priorities or generated much original thought about the long-term needs of the SEA. Stated differently, U. S. Commissioner of Education Keppel's hoped-for "thorough overhaul" did not take place.

A third observation is that the SEA seems inclined to meet new problems with small new units. As one SEA official put it, "The history is that if there is a problem in the field then a new bureau is formed."[77] It is interesting to note, however, the size of the offices created and maintained by Title V. The largest, the Office of Employer-Employee Relations, has only three professionals. The smallest, the Office of Volunteers in Public Service, never has had more than one professional. Currently it is staffed only on a part-time basis. The commitments in the different areas, therefore, do not seem to be more than token. For example, if the SEA were committed to doing something in the area of science and technology, one might reasonably expect more than the current effort--one professional working full time and another part time. In short, there seems to be a preoccupation in New York with doing something in every area, a "cover all bases" philosophy of operation; one staffer called it an "obsession."[78] This is not to say that what is being done is not useful, but rather, that a characteristic of the Department's organizational culture seems to be a concern with an unflagging appearance of leadership in every area as much as a concern with a record of solid achievement. This observation is not altogether new. In his 1961 study of the SEA, Henry M. Brickell commented on the general problem:

> It is sometimes charged that the State Education Department is too large.... The Consultant counters with another observation based upon information gathered during the survey: The Department is too small--for the job it is attempting.... It assumes that it is performing functions which it cannot perform; it promises aid which it cannot give.[79]

Finally, Title V in New York has been used to a considerable extent for rather mundane projects (e.g., filling personnel gaps), as contrasted with efforts designed to bring about significant organizational change. It should be noted that there is nothing wrong with such expenditures; they often are necessary to keep an organization operating. But Title V was used as well for a number of rather inconsequential programs; for example, taking photographs of federally supported programs or spending $25,000 to produce a guide on thermal problems in schools. However, there is a partial explanation for these expenditures which should be mentioned. Many of these rather inconsequential projects were funded toward the end of the fiscal year. The alternatives were to let the federal money lapse or to support them; naturally the latter was chosen. But the lapsing of funds does not provide a full explanation by any means. In fact, my two examples were funded early in the year, long before lapsing funds became an issue.[80]

IV. Title V Decision-Making Process

New York's Title V expenditures raise a number of questions. What decision-making process led to the funding of forty projects the first year, and approximately seventy-five during the first five years? How were these particular projects chosen? What was the nature of the planning activities? What impact did USOE have on priorities?

As mentioned in earlier chapters, USOE officials were concerned about how the new money would be expended. Hoping that SEA's would use the resources to meet their highest priority needs, USOE asked each of them to go through a self-assessment process, ranking its areas of greatest need and its priorities for spending. This self-assessment document was filled out by the chief budget officer (also the Title V coordinator) in New York's SEA. Basing the rankings on his general knowledge of departmental needs and priorities, he did not believe that this "horrendous" self-assessment "had any significant impact" on the Title V decision-making process.[81]

Title V planning in New York was delegated to Deputy Commissioner (and now Commissioner) Ewald B. Nyquist. In February of 1965, two months prior to the passage of ESEA, he wrote a memorandum to departmental cabinet officers soliciting ideas--

> ...along any one or all of three lines:
>
> (1) Where do we have gaps in our internal staffing which need to be repaired such that significant gains would be made in carrying out the functions of the Department in creative ways?
>
> (2) What operational programs can you think of, either expansion of existing ones or the establishment of new ones which, if we have available funds, in greater measure would enable us to make significant differences in the field as far as leadership function of the Department is concerned?

> (3) What do you think the Department needs to add which will help it in performing planning functions looking toward the future in known or unknown areas of importance to the Department? This is primarily a long-range planning function.[82]

Although Nyquist hoped for "creative" projects, no one was precluded from submitting proposals and any justifiable activity in effect was eligible for funding. As one 1965 staffer put it, "In almost any bureaucracy when money becomes available it is put up for competition, as was done here."[83]

A routine procedure was then followed for developing proposals. Lower units of the agency were informed of Title V's availability. Ideas were solicited once more with virtually no constraints. Rough proposals were generated at all levels of the bureaucracy, and made their way through channels to the desks of the Department's assistant and associate commissioners. At this point the proposals allegedly were appraised with appropriate ones passed on to the Title V coordinator. In the meantime a more informal process apparently was taking place. Telephone calls, a quick discussion over lunch, a word or two after conferences supplemented the "through channels" formal procedures. For instance, the director of the Title V-supported Office of Science and Technology stated that he approached the Commissioner directly to suggest Title V expenditures for that proposed new office.[84]

Approximately thirty to forty ideas emerged from this process, including those of the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. The key SEA administrative officers then formed a committee to consider the ideas. Deputy Commissioner Nyquist acted as chairman. What exactly transpired in the subsequent Title V meetings is not entirely clear;

memories have faded and detailed minutes were not taken, as far as I know. Nonetheless, several interviewees painted the following approximate picture. The rationale for various projects and the logistics of implementing them were discussed, with funding decisions ultimately made by Nyquist. It was suggested that his decisions probably were influenced by his own roster of departmental needs, by the persons advocating a particular project and, in general, by his judgments about whether particular proposals made sense.[85]

Various criteria emerged from the early discussions which reportedly also helped in making these Title V decisions. According to an internal memorandum, these criteria were:

> 1. To procure staff for various functions for which it would be difficult or impossible to secure State funds.
>
> 2. To take care of immediate needs for which State funds are not now available, nor might they be even after April 1, 1966. [i.e., the state's new fiscal year.]
>
> 3. To promote innovative changes within and outside the Department.
>
> 4. By definition of the ESEA, to stress primarily elementary and secondary education, but to consider strengthening any function of the Department for which an imaginative proposal was submitted.[86] (Emphasis in original.)

Indeed, one state budget official noted: "We have found that the SED [State Education Department] has used Title V funds for things that they couldn't get state aid for."[87]

All in all, there is little evidence of conflict in these meetings since enough money apparently was available to fund most of the major ideas. After several meetings and review with the Commissioner, twenty-four projects were chosen. Most of the other proposals were not turned down, but simply postponed. After the ideas were agreed upon, a list of Title V priorities was established which in effect listed the areas covered by the proposals. The agreed-upon projects then were submitted to the Board of Regents and later to USOE for what appears to have been little more than *pro forma* approval.

This first submission of ideas was supplemented with new proposals when it became clear later in the year that all the Title V funds would not be expended. A memorandum once more went out to the cabinet, stating: "The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to ask you to submit new proposals or revive old ones which we could not approve for the first submission." There were no restrictions on proposals except the following: "Incidentally, I can tell you in advance that we will disapprove of any proposal which cannot be implemented within this Federal fiscal year."[88] (It should be mentioned that SEA freedom to use up its apportionment during the course of the year was one of the most liked characteristics of Title V, as explained by a New York staffer: "Title V was flexible in that funds were available anytime during the fiscal year--not true with state funds.")[89]

Since the first year, however, flexibility in establishing new projects has been seriously curtailed. Permanent positions established under Title V have forced departmental officials, in their view, to expend a large amount each year for the continuing subsidy of original projects. Also, despite the growth in Title V appropriations, the new money has been needed mainly to pay normal salary increases and unexpected fringe benefit costs for Title V staffers,[90] and to cover the cost of programs switched to the Title V account.[91] Consequently, the solicitation of the bureaucracy for ideas has been much less in subsequent years than during the first. New projects have been approved by the Deputy Commissioner without fanfare. "There wasn't very much [money] to make noise about,"[92] noted a SEA staffer.

What emerges, then, can be described as an agency-wide competition for funds with most of the original proposals receiving support. While there was some hope for long-range activities, most of the projects, as discussed earlier, were designed to meet pressing problems. In fact, one top 1965 official said that he "was disappointed"[93] with the lack of serious attention given to the proposals by the departmental assistant and associate commissioners. It appeared to him as if they simply passed on virtually all the proposals generated below without adding their own priorities or culling out poor proposals. After the first year, the flexibility all but disappeared with Title V used largely to pay the continuing cost of permanent staff positions.

Furthermore, the evidence suggests that choices were avoided in 1965, whether consciously or unconsciously, by spreading the ample resources among competing proposals. Organizational tranquility also was maintained with each of the major units of the agency sharing a part of the funds. On this latter point, two of the original projects were for the Office of the Commissioner, two were for the Office of Business Management and Personnel, three were for elementary and secondary education, seven were related to higher education, three were for the Center for Innovation, four were for research and evaluation, one was for the Office of the Associate Commissioner for Finance, and one was for the state museum. In setting forth their organization theories, James G. March and Herbert A. Simon could have been describing the 1965 situation in New York when they said:

> Organizations functioning in a benign environment can satisfy their explicit objectives with less than a complete expenditure of organizational 'energy'. As a result, a substantial portion of the activities in the organization is directed toward satisfying individual or subgroup goals.... When resources are relatively unlimited, organizations need not resolve the relative merits of subgroup claims. Thus, these claims and the rationalizations for them tend not to be challenged;...[94]

But March and Simon point out that when money is tight, as is currently true in the SEA, the situation changes: "...as resources are reduced (e.g.,...after a legislative economy move in a governmental organization), intergroup conflict tends to increase."[95]

In short, Title V was spread over the SEA in a scatter gun fashion. There is little evidence of an attempt to define the abstraction "strengthening", or of any significant effort to rethink agency priorities and use Title V for long-term efforts to improve the SEA. Rather, Title V supported a series of _ad hoc_ projects mainly designed to meet pressing problems through the expansion and marginal adaptation of ongoing activities.

The issue of priorities, however, has not been limited to Title V activities. For example, the McKinsey and Company consulting firm, in a $100,000 study, reported in 1966:

> In our study of the Department, we were unable to find any organized, department-wide system of priorities to guide the overall allocation of scarce resources to ensure their most effective use. This, of course, does not mean that judgment and selectivity are not used in making decisions within the Department. But, it does mean that the evaluation process is not comprehensive enough to identify the parts of the educational systems that are most in need of departmental attention.[96]

Top agency officials have been concerned not only with the problem of priorities but also with the overall issue of improving the quality of organizational decision-making. This concern has resulted in significant steps recently in the planning area in an attempt to improve the allocation of scarce resources.

In the following section, I discuss these planning efforts for several reasons. One is that the Office of Long Range Planning is partly funded with Title V resources. A second reason is that if Title V funds were to be substantially increased, any change in the pattern of Title V expenditures might be related to the efforts of the departmental planners. Finally, it seems important to describe one of the more sophisticated examples of SEA planning, particularly since a $10 million federal program of comprehensive educational planning is expected to be funded as part of the fiscal year 1973 budget.*

V. Priorities and Planning

In 1967, the Commissioner established the Office of Long Range Planning for "the sole purpose of insuring that information was available to him in order that they [departmental officials] could make better decisions.'[97] For the first few years most of the effort focused on the implementation of the PPB (Program-Planning-Budgeting) system, instituted by the state in 1964. A comprehensive study of these activities through 1968 concluded that while there had been "significant accomplishments in institutionalizing the system,"[98] PPB did not have any "significant impact on organizational behavior, nor did it change the way in which resource allocation decisions were made within the Department."[99] The study attributed this failure to the way the system was implemented. Too much attention was devoted to the "informational elements of PPB over the production of analytic studies"[100] and too little attention was paid to the preparation and involvement of the departmental personnel in the change process.[101]

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*Comprehensive educational planning is discussed in detail in Chapter VII.

Aware of these problems, departmental officials have been working toward strengthening the planning procedures. An important part of this activity has been the further development of formal procedures for the generation of agency priorities.[102] The process begins in the fall with departmental personnel offering ideas about problem areas needing priority support. Supplemented by suggestions from the field, these different views are weighed and sifted at the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Through the coordination of a Planning Group for Elementary, Secondary and Continuing Education, for example, eighteen priority work areas were selected in 1969.[103] Such suggestions and others from different parts of the agency filter up to the Commissioner where his priorities are added and others deleted. Several months later, after preliminary analysis of these problem areas and after consultation with the Board of Regents, a final listing of both short- and long-term agency priorities is published. The purpose of this document is to guide decisions about the allocation of scarce resources by providing the framework for the annual development of the budget and of legislative proposals.

This process of establishing priorities, however, is just a part of the Department's overall planning operation. In fact, a major shift since 1969 has been away from departmentwide PPB activities toward emphasis on detailed problem or issue analysis. That is, planning concentrates on the analysis of broad issues such as drug education, helping the handicapped, or equalizing educational opportunity. The issues given the most attention are derived mainly from the departmental priority statement.

The SEA is quite explicit in what it currently means by planning, defining it as: "'providing the decision-maker with all the pertinent information that he needs to make rational decisions and helping him formulate action strategies for implementing these decisions'."[104] "Rational" means that decisions are based on a needs assessment, problem and constraint identification, establishment of objectives, and "programming out alternative programs and determining which are most cost-effective."[105] The planning activities, then, are meant to design the best cost-effective solutions to problems in all areas, but with the spotlight on priority issues identified by the SEA.

This current focus on problem analysis also has been accompanied since 1969 by greater involvement of all levels of personnel in the process. SEA officials explicitly do not view planning as centralized "plan-making" but strongly believe that if better decisions are to be implemented then planning must be decentralized with planners working "cheek to jowl"[106] with the program managers responsible for administering any new efforts. The reason for this approach has been stated simply:

> For only those plans will get acted upon which have the commitment of those who must carry them out. And the best way, we believe, to gain that commitment is to have people make their own plans. This means that line managers cannot depend upon a specialized planning office to make their plans for them. If they do not plan, planning does not get done.[107]

Consequently, the major roles of the central Office of Long Range Planning are to monitor the decentralized planning operations, to work toward the internalization of the "rational thought processes" by the professional staff and, more generally, to help develop the tools of planning throughout the SEA. Furthermore, the long-term goal of the office is to move the agency away from primary concentration on immediate issues toward the consideration of longer-range problems. Or, as one official described it, "to be proactive rather than reactive."[108]

New York's planning endeavor appears rather sophisticated. The materials describing its activities and hopes are characterized by the latest ideas of professional planners: systems analysis, cost-benefit analysis, PPB, flow charts, PERT, program analysis reviews, Delphi techniques, simulation, organizational development, contextual mapping, and so forth. Moreover, the influence of microeconomic theory with its concern with the value of efficiency is ever-present. Documents discuss "greatest marginal effectiveness" and constant reference is made to "efficiency and economy." Every attempt apparently is being made to explore and utilize the best ideas available. The SEA on paper, then, probably has one of the most impressive planning operations among SEA's.

In implementing the procedures, however, the SEA is still a long way from achieving success. There is little evidence of changes in resource allocations that would not have taken place in the absence of these planning efforts. On the other hand, an official argued that the general level of dialogue about problems and issues has become more sophisticated and the procedures have had some impact on internal decision-making. He pointed out, though, that it is a long frustrating process to get officials to internalize the rational thought processes.[109] Indeed, sufficient time probably has not yet passed to evaluate fairly the recent emphasis on problem analysis and "cheek to jowl" involvement of personnel in the process.

However, it is possible to raise some questions about the departmental priorities. An examination of the fiscal 1972-73 priority statement of the SEA shows that they "cover the waterfront."[110] At least seventy-five different priorities range from humanizing education to drug education to better use of technology.[111] Given their number, diversity, and frequent vagueness, it is hard to conceive how a budget-minded legislature could or would support them on more than a token basis. The fact that there are so many, however, is not altogether surprising. After all, priority setting is as much a political process as it is an educational one, and the demands of different individuals and groups can often be met by including their concerns. Nonetheless, imperfect as it may be, the very exercise of consciously establishing priorities may well be an improvement over the past.

In any case, it is obviously impossible to assess the impact of these new planning procedures on Title V since they were not instituted until after the crucial first-year Title V decisions. But these planning procedures do hold out the hope, if not the current reality, of better decisions in the future. The efforts, then, might have important consequences for Title V if additional resources become available. This is particularly true today with the shortage of state funds for new endeavors.

VI. Conclusions

This discussion of the implementation of Title V in New York is revealing. It shows what happened in one state when a large, affluent, sophisticated SEA received a sizeable amount of unrestricted resources ($785,000 the first year). Several points deserve elaboration. Perhaps most important, Title V was not viewed in New York as a cohesive program with overall objectives or an overall design to achieve dramatic organizational change. While New York's top management hoped that projects would address long-term needs, by and large Title V apparently was viewed by the bureaucracy as a stringless pot of money to fill in gaps, expand existing operations, and meet pressing problems. Vague notions of developing "leadership" were never defined or explored.

These findings should not be surprising upon reflection. After all, common sense as well as organizational studies suggest that it would be unusual for most program managers to search for basic reforms in their own operations, unless prodded. Like all of us, bureaucrats are constrained by habit and think in terms of perpetuating existing structures and how things can be improved to better achieve their goals. And quite naturally any improvement "strengthens" the agency. In a SEA like New York's with its history of developing new approaches, this "hard" thinking about improvement allegedly goes on all the time. Why should an increase in its budget of less than five percent produce "harder" thinking, leading to much more than the marginal improvement of what already exists?

Hence, given an agency virtually without major overall problems, with no conscious set of priorities, and a new source of discretionary resources, what did it do? The Department followed routine procedures by putting the funds up for agency-wide competition. It should be noted that following these procedures does allow ideas to surface and, perhaps more important, it invovles the egos and energies of a large number of staff members in the decision-making process and in the distribution of the wealth.

A consequence of such procedures is that Title V strengthened the SEA on an ad hoc basis in many discrete areas, and many of these efforts were impressive. On the other hand, Title V did not have any noticeable impact on the way the SEA goes about its business, hires staff, or makes its decisions. New York did not use the money for fundamental reform and none took place. More specifically, the funds were used largely to put out small "brush fires", to facilitate growth of ongoing activities, to meet needs in the middle of the budget cycle, to fund small items that the state would not support, or to add small offices. But once established, there has been a tendency to fund these projects from year to year, turning Title V largely into a subsidy program. A departmental publication on federal reform efforts of the '60's nicely describes part of the outcome:

> *New Federal funds were used to add new programs to the existing structures. One result was that the rest of the system was left relatively unaffected. Since it was easier to add on a new program than to remove or change an old one, another result was that too little of the problem-solving skills, and too little of the energy that could be developed by the use of funds by the innovators, went into dealing with the basic structure of the system. However, many of these 'add-ons' have proved to be valuable and will be used in future development.... Insufficient attention was paid in the 1960's to such critical factors as namely, individual and institutional behavior.*[112] (Emphasis in original.)

Furthermore, the Department's influence with the state legislature seems to be on the wane, despite the agency's growth in size and budget, and despite the addition of a number of new programs since the passage of ESEA in 1965. Those things that the federal government can provide (financial and technical assistance) do not appear to be the main determinants of SEA influence, at least in New York's case. Local factors such as a growing disenchantment with education, the nature of the state's political power structure in education, and a statewide fiscal crisis appear to be much more important. SEA influence, in short, seems to depend on state and local factors which the federal government cannot control.

Aside from the ways in which Title V has strengthened the New York SEA, several other findings need mention. Title V decisions in New York were accountable to no one outside the SEA; little wonder departmental leaders are keen on this kind of support. The governor's office and the Division of Budget have had virtually no effect on the expenditure of funds other than the approval of staff positions and pay rates. The legislature has paid little attention to the program. As a SEA official commented, "Title V is not cleared across the street. We just file our applications [with USOE]."[113] This is now changing with the growth in staff for the central budget office and the legislature, and with the scarcity of state resources.

It also is obvious that USOE has had little impact on New York Title V decisions. As stated earlier, the self-assessment was viewed as an irritant and it apparently did not influence SEA policy. But this absence of impact also applies to USOE approval of projects. USOE just does not have much leverage over New York because of the state's size, reputation, and strong representation on both the Senate and House Education Committees. "If the New York Commissioner of Education is willing to sign his name," stated one long-time USOE staffer, "well it becomes a question of whether it's a violation of the law."[114] A second reason for the absence of federal leverage was made clear when USOE officials raised questions about Title V expenditures in New York concerned mainly with higher education, rather than elementary and secondary education. The General Counsel's office of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ruled that the expenditures were consistent with the broad and vague language of the law and therefore had to be allowed.[115] As a result, Title V in New York is an example of a bureaucracy to bureaucracy program with the recipient accountable to no one. As a general principle, this absence of accountability raises questions about the proper management of public funds.

What emerges in New York, then, is a program (Title V) with vague goals of "strengthening" the agency and developing "leadership" which has been treated not as a single unit to maximize change, but as a supplemental resource to be divided up to meet a series of separate problems mostly of an immediate nature. While some may criticize the SEA for its planning and priority procedures, this outcome raises more fundamental issues about how organizations behave when provided with unrestricted resources. The literature on organizational theory, cited in Chapter I, suggests that organizations would use the money mainly for expansionary activity to meet pressing problems. The interesting point is that the New York SEA, even with its tremendous resources and relative freedom from political pressure, was no exception. If this is the case among the best of organizations, then it raises serious questions about what we can expect in organizational change as a consequence of providing free resources. While money may be a necessary condition for significant organizational change, it is by no means sufficient.

CHAPTER V

TITLE V IN SOUTH CAROLINA*

Belmont Plantation is a 6,000-acre game management area near the Savannah River. Operated by the state and supported by taxes, for many years it has been used for quail and deer hunting by those who matter in South Carolina. When recently asked why members of the judiciary were invited to hunt, the plantation director replied, "So they can be informed of what we're doing. They're interested in good government."[1] Had such activities been publicly reported a decade ago, the disclosure would have been thought in bad taste and the incident quickly forgotten. Not so in South Carolina today. Belmont is front page news and has created a minor scandal.[2] This example epitomizes the atmosphere of change enveloping the state; vestiges of the past remain, but no longer do they go unchallenged.

A poor and conservative state historically, South Carolina has indeed undergone significant change in the last few years. Demands for economic progress and social equality, reapportionment and massive federal assistance have all challenged traditional South Carolinian ways. And as the state has changed rapidly, so too has the State Department of Education. A weak, fragmented and poorly staffed agency, the South Carolina SEA received its Title V apportionment just as it began to come under sustained pressure for improvement in the wake of these economic and social changes. This chapter, then, unlike the previous two chapters, describes the strengthening of a SEA in a state in transition.

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*Throughout this study the term "Title V" refers specifically to section 503 of Title V of ESEA, which provides unrestricted resources to SEA's.

The chapter begins with an exploration of the forces shaping traditional South Carolina politics and describes departmental activities within this context. Then, to emphasize the extent and nature of the organizational change, I describe the SEA in 1971. Next, I identify those key factors, particularly focusing on Title V, both in and out of the SEA, which help to explain the rapid organizational change. Finally, I assess critically the impact of these changes.

I. Traditional Politics

South Carolina has long been dominated by what politicians like to call "legislative government";[3] the real power in the state has rested in the legislative branch (the General Assembly). Having little formal power, governors cannot succeed themselves and have no executive budget. Many of the key executive agency heads are either appointed by the legislature or elected by the people. Furthermore, the legislature has long been extremely conservative, placing low priority on governmental programs.[4] Not surprisingly, the result has been a generally weak and ineffective governmental bureaucracy. An analyst's description of the executive branch in 1944 is probably accurate for the period prior to the '60's:

> Doubtless the overwhelming majority of the voters of the State are mildly in favor of good government in the abstract, but few indeed seem to realize that sound and efficient government comes through constructive planning and constant and concerted action.... From the very beginning they [South Carolinians]

> have been willing to sacrifice efficiency for insurance against tyranny.... As a result the structure of the government of South Carolina is so cumbersome and disjointed that responsible administration in many departments is utterly impossible.[5]

Several factors help account for this inefficiency and deemphasis on governmental action. One outstanding cause has been the Barnwell Ring which has largely controlled the legislature for more than forty years.* Led by legislators from rural Barnwell County, these men "with a large stake in the established order...are keenly conscious of their state role in the defense of the status quo...."[7]

More generally, legislative strength and administrative weakness can be traced back to South Carolinians' bitter reaction to the widespread corruption during the Reconstruction period following the Civil War. A political analyst noted that "from Wade Hampton [1876] onward, it was accepted as an article of faith among South Carolinian political leaders that the least expensive government was the best government."[8]

A third contributing factor to governmental inaction has been the clubbish mentality which has permeated the behavior of South Carolina's white leadership and continues to some extent today. The Belmont Plantation example illustrates this phenomenon. Everyone who was anyone in this small state seemed to know everyone else. They worked together as gentlemen, as if conforming to unwritten rules which strongly discouraged offensive or controversial behavior. Outsiders were distrusted and the emphasis was on maintaining the status quo. Above all, members of the club were polite. This clubbish atmosphere combined with a well-engrained concern with doing things the "right" way led white South Carolinians to place a high premium on avoiding open conflict, maintaining stability, and moving forward slowly and cautiously...with style and grace.*

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*It is interesting to note that V. O. Key stated in 1949: "South Carolinians make much-to-do about the Barnwell Ring, which is, of course, only a transient grouping. Its members are growing old...."[6] Indeed, twenty-three years later the same leaders of the Barnwell Ring are still in power. They are now really old and ill, and increasingly they are being challenged by younger urban legislators seeking their day in the sun.

Underlying the clubbish mentality, the Barnwell Ring, and legislative strength was yet another factor, probably more important, which helps explain the weakness of South Carolina government in grappling with statewide problems. Describing the "politics of color," V. O. Key wrote in 1949:

> South Carolina's preoccupation with the Negro stifles political conflict. Over offices there is conflict aplenty, but the race question muffles conflict over issues latent in the economy of South Carolina. Mill worker and plantation owners alike want to keep the Negro in his place. In part, issues are deliberately repressed, for, at least in the long run, concern with genuine issues would bring an end to the consciousness by which the Negro is kept out of politics. One crowd or another would be tempted to seek his vote.[9]

Issues in South Carolina were clouded by the politics of race. The style of politics and the politics of style shunned controversy. The legacy of the Reconstruction imparted a conservative view of state intervention in social problems. And the conservative Barnwell Ring dominated the legislature-controlled government. These forces provided the framework in which the SEA operated prior to the advent of Title V in 1965.

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*There have been exceptions. "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman and Cole Blease were vocal, controversial politicians who took on the establishment. By and large there has been a distinct tendency to abide by the gentlemanly rules of the game.

II. The Traditional State Education Department

School desegregation had been a fear of South Carolinans for several years prior to the landmark 1954 Brown decision. In fact, an Educational Finance Commission was created in 1951 to build new schools for Negro children reportedly as a tactic to delay desegregation.[10] This probably was the most significant new education endeavor during the twenty-year term (1946-1966) of Superintendent of Education, Jesse T. Anderson. Perhaps the second most significant educational effort during the Anderson regime was a drive to improve the quality of technical education. The General Assembly in 1961 established the Technical Education Committee to train workers in order to attract industry to South Carolina.[11] In both these endeavors, it is important to note that the legislature bypassed the SEA and established separate agencies. This helped assure that the legislature, not the independently elected State Superintendent of Education, had control over these new units.

Other than these two educational efforts, little attention was paid to upgrading schools while Anderson was in office. Considering the "politics of color," it would have made little sense for the SEA to spotlight serious deficiencies in Black schools or become involved with desegregation. Also, in keeping with the clubbish mentality, Superintendent Anderson was not disposed to behave controversially or to alter the status quo. Rather, he used the SEA to provide services to his constituency, mainly the county superintendents of schools. (One observer described Anderson as a "better politician than a superintendent."[12]) The period of Anderson's superintendency, then, was not one of bustling activity for the SEA.

In keeping with the generally weak executive branch and the state's aversion to big government, the SEA was fairly small in size. In 1965, it had some seventy professionals among a total staff of 166.[13] Furthermore SEA salaries were grossly non-competitive with those for other education professional positions in the state.[14] The Superintendent's annual salary in 1965 was $15,000, while his chief deputy for instruction earned less than $11,000 per year.[15] One consequence was that the SEA tended to attract either young professionals seeking a vantage point to view the statewide job market, or worn out schoolmen, often political supporters of the Superintendent, who viewed the SEA as a resting place before their formal retirement. Intermixed with these extremes were a number of dedicated and competent professionals who believed that the SEA provided the best forum for helping children. The overall result was a low quality, transient staff with political considerations generally counting as much as professional credentials.

The Department's style of operation reflected its size and political constraints. The agency was loose and informal with little sense of urgency or clear direction; one observer described it as a "foot on the desk operation."[16] Each division director had wide latitude in carrying out his responsibilities, that is, as long as his activities did not create political problems for the Superintendent.

Most departmental efforts were directed toward administering state aid programs to local schools. About sixty percent of public education financing in 1965 came from the state level.[17] As a result of a program started in 1924,[18] most of this money supported teacher salaries. The second major effort was in vocational education, emphasizing the traditional areas of agriculture, home economics, and trades and industries. Finally, the SEA certified teachers, accredited schools, and provided limited instructional services to those schoolmen requesting assistance.

In sum, Jesse T. Anderson's SEA was in tune with the times and the demands of the day. It handed out money and passively provided services to schoolmen, generally keeping local superintendents happy. And when education-related problems did develop (such as the need for more technically trained workers), the SEA was bypassed by the General Assembly. One observer commented succinctly: "It was a calm government in a fairly calm time."[19]

III. The State Education Department in 1971

The State Education Department changed significantly between 1965 and 1971. The changes are manifested in its current size, activities, style of operation, and in the way top management views the Department's role in improving education. More specifically, the SEA is larger, more businesslike, and less passive.

The SEA currently has a staff of some 450--almost three times its size in 1965.[20] It is tightly organized, and closely controlled by top management. Informality and professional independence have been greatly reduced through management by objectives, work plans, bi-weekly reports, and what one departmental employee labeled "wall to wall administration with accountability."[21]

The Superintendent's salary is double that of six years ago and his chief deputies earn $22,000 a year.[22] While middle management salaries are still not competitive with local wages, the gap has narrowed considerably. Also, the current Superintendent apparently is not using job vacancies to build a political constituency. The emphasis seems to be on the selection of the most competent professionals both from in and out of the state, thus enhancing the Department's reputation. These factors, combined with the effects of the nationwide economic recession, have resulted in a low turnover rate and an easier time in recruiting qualified employees.[23]

Perhaps most important, departmental attention seemingly has shifted from maintenance of the status quo to a focus on the future. The SEA currently is implementing comprehensive five-year plans pegged to eleven specific objectives adopted by the State Board of Education. These plans for 1975 include such things as cutting by half the number of school dropouts, improving student performance in basic skills, installing a statewide kindergarten system, and so forth. To develop these objectives and plans, the SEA has created a new Division of Planning and Administration headed by one of three deputy superintendents. The division includes new offices for research and planning, and a new Data Information Center. All rely heavily on sophisticated computer equipment and modern methods of management and planning.

Departmental leaders also are conscientiously working toward a changed relationship with local schools. The intent is to shift away from the provision of services at the request of schoolmen toward the exercise of leadership through persuasion. For example, departmental specialists traditionally have visited individual schools. Currently, more of their time reportedly is devoted to the development of plans and materials, and to efforts designed to persuade schoolmen to implement the eleven Board objectives.

In sum, the SEA has undergone several important changes. It is larger, more professionally staffed, leadership rather than just service oriented, more tightly organized, and working toward the implementation of concrete objectives within specified periods of time. What's more, there seems to be a new consciousness among the top SEA executives about the importance of long-range planning, rational decision-making and the uses of research, information, and feedback from evaluation in decision-making.

Given this contrast between the "old" and the "new" SEA, what remains is to describe the major elements contributing to these changes and to assess their meaning and implications. The next section highlights chronologically certain political, economic, and departmental factors playing an important role in remolding the SEA, paying particular attention to an explanation of Title V's role. Later in the chapter, I critically evaluate some effects of these changes.

IV. The SEA in Transition

The calm days dominating Anderson's tenure were coming to an end by 1965 Demands for change were growing. Some of this change was inspired by Ernest F. (Fritz) Hollings who was elected governor in 1958. He provided personal power and charisma to offset the formal limits of his office. As a political analyst noted:

> ...his four-year term was marked by vigorous leadership in which the state's traditionally conservative power structure accepted his progressive ideas and began to discard old ways of doing things.[24]

Hollings set out to develop South Carolina's economy; only one state had a lower per capita income.[25] This emphasis on economic growth was continued by his successor, Donald S. Russell, as well as by Robert E. McNair who became governor in 1965. Most important, McNair believed that economic progress was closely tied to school improvement, stating:

> Education through its own excellence must create a source of human productivity which will surpass all other resources in guiding us to a new day of economic prosperity...*the key to our state's entire future lies in its ability to develop fully its entire human potential.*[26] (Emphasis added.)

Hence, changing the passive and political SEA into an active instrument of state leadership was viewed by the chief executive as crucial to South Carolina's future.

In addition, the "politics of color" was challenged as never before. Growing black awareness buttressed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act made it clear to South Carolinians that desegregation was coming closer to reality. Although resistance continued, inequalities in schooling could no longer be easily ignored.[27] "The Civil Rights Act lifted the lid and made for changes," remarked one observer. Finally, ESEA was enacted in April of 1965, providing some $20 million for South Carolina schools,[28] almost tripling the federal contribution to the state's school expenditures.[29] This legislation focused attention on the disadvantaged and on the deficiencies of South Carolina schooling.

These factors combined to trigger demands for solutions to problems that had been building for years. Widespread illiteracy, an undeveloped economy, and the highest failure rate on the Armed Forces Qualification Test[30] were but a few indices of South Carolina's difficulties State leaders, who for so long had been so busy keeping the Blacks down, began to turn their attention to pulling the state up.

In the midst of this ferment, a respected school administrator, Harris Marshall, joined the SEA in the summer of 1965 to take charge of implementing the new ESEA programs. He was assisted in these efforts by two departmental supervisors, Donald C. Pearce and William Royster, who apparently were intrigued by the potential of ESEA and simply made themselves available. This small group took the initiative while Superintendent Anderson and many departmental officials apparently remained less than ecstatic about the new federal aid to education. "Traditionally, South Carolina has distrusted federal aid...,"[31] stated one writer.

Marshall had at his disposal about $160,000 in administrative funds from Title I of ESEA (aid to the disadvantaged), $30,000 from Title II (textbooks and library resources), and about $160,000 from Title V, for a total of $350,000.[32] This represented an almost forty percent increase in the administrative budget of the SEA.[33]

With this much additional money, basically two courses of action were open to the SEA. One possibility was to set up comprehensive offices with large staffs for administering Titles I and II, reserving only Title V for generally strengthening the agency. A second course was chosen. A small office was established to administer ESEA funds with primary reliance on other areas of the SEA for needed technical support and subject matter expertise. This approach purportedly was designed to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts within the agency. It also was aimed at preventing what apparently had happened with federal vocational education funds: the establishment of a powerful departmental empire responsible only to itself and its constituency. The unified small-office approach had another advantage as well. It left uncommitted a considerable amount of Title I administrative funds which could be utilized to meet other departmental needs. Some money was used to hire professionals in positions at least indirectly related to Title I, and some was used simply to raise existing staff salaries.[34] This left Title V for those new departmental activities least related to Title I's administration.

Seven projects were funded the first year by Title V. The first decision was to use part of the Title V resources, combined with administrative funds from Titles I and II, to establish a so-called Office of PL 89-10.* The function of the office was to coordinate federal programs, to act as liaison with the federal government, to process applications for federal funds, and to monitor local projects. As noted earlier, the office had a small staff and relied on other units of the agency for professional help in carrying out its duties. Title V was used mainly to pay part of the salaries of Harris Marshall and Donald C. Pearce (the coordinator of the new office). Under the rubric of this project, funds also were expended during the course of the year to hire a public information officer. This total project accounted for about ten percent of the first year (fiscal 1966) Title V budget.[35]

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*PL 89-10 is the legal designation for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the tenth public law enacted during the 89th Congress.

Besides this activity which was described as "the most pressing and immediate need of the State Department of Education,"[36] Title V also focused on several other problems. One was the Department's inability to meet the growing demand for timely information, or to respond to the increasing requests for SEA services to schools. According to South Carolina's first Title V application:

> Three school districts from one county have requested a survey [an SEA analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of a school district] for the current year...[and] many school districts are interested in programs of innovation but need assistance....[37]

Lacking an adequate staff, the SEA used Title V funds for the establishment of a new Division of Research, Experimentation, and Surveys. It was hoped that the office in part would be somewhat research-oriented, but its real purpose was not to explore esoteric research questions. Rather, the office's main role was to respond to requests for quick information about educational problems and to conduct the desired surveys. The money was budgeted for the salaries of four professionals. This was the largest Title V project, accounting for about one-third of the first year Title V budget.

The third block of funds went to the Director of Teacher Education and Certification who needed resources for the in-service and pre-service training of teachers. The State Board of Education had passed a regulation in 1963 requiring courses in reading and mathematics for elementary school teachers by July 1, 1966.[38] Although few teachers met this requirement, virtually nothing had been done to implement the Board regulation. The absence of funding by the General Assembly was given as the reason.[39] Using the state's Educational Television System for broadcasting,* a Title V project called for the production of videotapes for instruction. A second part of this project was designed to train driver education teachers. The legislature had just passed a law awarding schools fifteen dollars for each pupil completing an approved course in driver education. The availability of this incentive provided a new demand for certified teachers. Hence, the SEA ran a "crash program"[40] to train the needed personnel. Title V was specifically budgeted to supplement by $3,000 the Teacher Education Director's regular salary of $8,000, to provide a raise for the assistant project director, and to hire two additional professionals to coordinate videotape development.[41] The teacher education projects accounted for about one-fourth of the first-year Title V budget.

The director of the Division of Instruction also needed resources. He wanted more manpower to meet the "constantly increasing" demands for services. His proposal called for an assistant director for the division to assume "routine administrative duties," freeing the director for "policy development in the area of instruction." The proposal also called for a curriculum coordinator to meet "the ever-increasing need for upgrading curriculum materials." Finally, the director proposed the addition of two elementary school supervisors. Only one in ten elementary schools was then accredited and the demand for state analyses of individual school reports "has doubled for 1965-1966."[42] These proposals from the Division of Instruction accounted for about one-fourth of the fiscal 1966 Title V budget.

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*It seems curious that an undeveloped state like South Carolina would have a well-funded ETV system. It may not be a coincidence that the system was run by the son-in-law of Edgar Brown, the "dean" of the Barnwell Ring.

The fifth project also was designed to aid the schools. The establishment of a free statewide test scoring service was proposed. Any school district administering standardized tests could submit answer sheets to the SEA for scoring. The main purpose was to free up time for school guidance counselors who were then hand-scoring the tests. It also was believed that machine scoring might encourage more testing at the local level as well as provide the SEA with some useful data. Funds were budgeted for the purchase of scoring equipment and the hiring of two non-professionals to score the tests. This activity accounted for about ten percent of the fiscal 1966 Title V budget.

Toward the end of the first fiscal year, it became clear that Title V resources would be left over since all the budgeted positions had not been filled. In an effort to "wash out"[43] the money, two additional projects were funded. The first created a materials center for the Department's professional staff. Title V was used for the purchase of equipment and printed materials. The second end-of-year project was a one-shot curriculum development project designed to prepare, up-date, and print a variety of curriculum guides. The Title V application pointed out that "guidelines have been revised according to the availability of funds rather than the need for revision...[and] progress has been halted due to the unavailability of state funds."[44]

So Title V funded a wide variety of activities the first year ranging from driver education to the establishment of a new research office. Despite this variety, however, the projects shared certain common characteristics. First, the projects were mainly responsive to pressing problems faced by the SEA, as contrasted with the development of long-range strategies. Even the research office which appears more developmental than the other projects largely grew out of short-term demands on the SEA for more information and more surveys. Second, these demands were met for the most part by hiring more SEA staff to expand SEA services to the schools. These activities were added on top of the existing SEA structure with little change in the traditional modes of operation. Finally, the activities started by the major Title V projects (the first four mentioned above) have been extended and expanded over the years, accounting for most of the Title V expenditures in fiscal 1971.[45] In short, Title V was mainly used for the expansion and marginal adaptation of SEA services to meet short-run demands on the agency.

Given the variety and nature of these Title V projects, the questions become: Were these expenditures part of some overall plan for improvement? Were the decisions influenced by USOE's self-assessment document? Were alternative projects considered? Just how were the decisions made?

Title V decision-making: Since 1965 the SEA has "packaged"[46] part of its federal administrative funds. That is, Titles I and V of ESEA have been lumped together to meet departmental needs but separated on paper to meet federal bookkeeping requirements. More specifically, departmental officials decided what was needed in the agency and allocated funds accordingly. It then became a matter of accounting to label the desired efforts with the most appropriate categorical funding source. Generally, the most flexible money (Title V) was saved for those activities least related to Title I.

Because the SEA adopted this approach, an analysis of the allocation decisions ideally would focus on all the federal administrative funds packaged in 1965. The precise details on how these decisions were made, however, are not obtainable. Several important participants have died, others were unavailable for comment, and others still did not or would not remember. Additionally, no written records were kept which could illuminate the procedures followed. Despite these limitations, enough data were available to capture the flavor of the 1965 decision-making process.

The forty percent increase in the Department's budget created a scramble for the new resources. "The money became available," said one staffer, "and everyone wanted in."[47] Pressure built up to raise the low SEA salaries, and many officials wanted new staff to expand ongoing activities. As one 1965 employee put it: "There was an almost overwhelming pressure to add personnel. Almost nobody is ever convinced that he has enough manpower to do the job as he thinks it ought to be done."[48] This pressure was met in part by using Titles I and V for staff expansion and salary supplements.

Not only were many SEA officials keenly interested in the money, but also several state education commissions outside the SEA tried to win a share for their operations. The Educational Television Commission had a proposal, for instance, as did the so-called Interagency Council, the coordinating body for the extra-departmental state education commissions.[49] Not anxious to share its resources, the SEA was able to keep the money within the agency through a combination of delay and support from the State Attorney General.[50]

As to decisions on those activities finally labeled as Title V projects, a few observations are in order. Specific funding decisions apparently were influenced by a variety of factors in addition to the intrinsic value of the separate projects. The champion of the research proposal, William Royster, had just returned to the SEA following completion of research for his doctorate. Working on several special projects for the SEA, he saw the need for a formal staff to meet the growing requests for SEA information. Meanwhile, Superintendent Anderson apparently wanted to use Title V resources to provide more direct services to schoolmen through comprehensive surveys. Conducted the year before, the first such survey had been well received by schoolmen, and three more had been requested. Also, because of a study Royster had just completed which received national recognition, "the boss wanted to give him a promotion,"[51] according to one key SEA official. The outcome--the Division of Research, Experimentation, and Surveys--reflected a combination of ideas. Royster got his staff and promotion, and Anderson got his surveys. When asked how he was able to capture a large share of Title V resources, Royster responded: "I never was bashful about asking the Superintendent for more money. Some were content to let things just rock along and they didn't get much."[52]

The decision to fund the Director of Instruction's project was a foregone conclusion. He was a respected state educator and it would have been difficult to deny him his slice of Title V, even if other projects were thought to be of more value. As one official candidly remarked "You had to satisfy the basic requests of the division heads. Each had his concern for his own area."[53]

Finally, the Director of Teacher Education and Certification used still another technique to secure funds. Approaching friends on the Board of Education for support, he bypassed the Superintendent and Harris Marshall, who was responsible for ESEA planning. This procedure was considered in poor taste and irked Superintendent Anderson, but it apparently did help assure the project's final approval.

The decisions about Title V and other federal administrative funds, then, did not result from a rethinking of priorities, a consideration of all alternatives, or of a formalized decision-making process. They were more the product of an evolutionary process involving extensive competition and bargaining for funds both in and out of the SEA, with the labeling of projects as "Title V" partly a bookkeeping decision to achieve conformity with USOE guidelines. And in this context, USOE's self-analyses apparently did not play a role in the decision-making. A 1965 staffer noted, "It was a damn nice concept. We ran it, then hard-nose realities took over and we put the money where we wanted it to go."[54] In making these points, I do not mean to imply that the funded projects lacked intrinsic merit, but only to suggest that the aura of total rationality depicted in South Carolina's Title V application camouflaged the true nature of the decision-making process.

1966-1967: While the first year of ESEA was dominated by launching the program, the second was marked by changes in the Department's structure and leadership. This was occurring at a most propitious time for education in South Carolina, as pointed out by the Director of Instruction:

> ...let me say that in my more than 45 years of experience, there never has been a time when the climate in support of education was more favorable, when the Legislature, the school districts, and all of the combined elements of state leadership were more concerned with the improvements of education at every level.[55]

The fiscal year began with the merger of both the Educational Finance Commission and the School Book Commission into the SEA.[56] This shift strengthened the hand of the Superintendent by reducing the fragmentation of state educational leadership. It also increased the central staff of the SEA by fifty-four and added 450 field personnel, most of whom worked for the state-run school transportation system.[57]

The most important change during 1966, however, was the turnover in state superintendents of education. Jesse T. Anderson retired after twenty years of service. A long-time school administrator, Cyril B. Busbee, was elected the new Superintendent in a close contest with William Royster, who was head of the Title V-funded research office. So the SEA changed top management at the same time that support was growing for state leadership in education. It was also a time "of social, technological, and economic transition"[58] demanding educational change. Superintendent Busbee wrote:

> South Carolina is rapidly moving from a basically rural, agrarian society to a more urban, industrial-technological society. These cultural and economic changes in South Carolina, by necessity, require adjustments in the system of educating the citizenry of the State.[59] (Emphasis added.)

Also elected in 1966 was Governor Robert E. McNair who viewed education as a top priority.[60] Indeed, in 1968 he was Chairman of the Education Commission of the States. Acting as governor since 1965 when he filled the unexpired term of his predecessor, McNair was able to serve for six years in a state prohibiting a governor from succeeding himself in office. This provided him with valuable extra time to build support for his ideas. His long tenure and persuasiveness, and the legislature's partial preoccupation with reapportionment problems combined to make McNair a rather influential governor by South Carolina standards.[61] As we shall see later, this new executive strength helped Busbee in his attempt to strengthen the SEA.

Immediately after taking office in January of 1967, Superintendent Busbee began to readjust the SEA to fit his plans and style of operation. He found immediate help in an organizational study commissioned by the Board of Education "to be available for the new Superintendent when he assumed office in 1967."[62] The consultants recommended a major reorganization, commenting:

> The organization structure has not been developed specifically to deal with the most important educational problems, but has grown in patchwork fashion as considerable additional personnel resources have been made available....
>
> As a consequence, the Department has had little impact at the local level on some of the most important educational questions facing the State,...[63]

This concern by the Board of Education with internal SEA management was not out of character. A new Board had come into office in July of 1964, following a state constitutional amendment. Now elected by the delegation of General Assembly members for each of the state's sixteen judicial circuits, the Board was mainly composed of respected laymen. Prior to 1964 the Board had long been dominated by schoolmen appointed by the governor. This new group was determined to assert leverage over the SEA and some say they even tried (but failed) to run the agency around Superintendent Anderson.[64] Not surprisingly, the working relationship between the SEA and the Board was less than ideal, a problem which Busbee set out to remedy shortly after taking office.

Furthermore, the new Board was serious about providing state leadership in education, as reflected in its first statement of education philosophy in April of 1967:

> The Board believes that the continuous upgrading of education requires careful planning.... The Board, therefore, believes that there should be a five-year plan for educational improvement developed by the Superintendent and approved by the Board after open hearings on it....
>
> The Board believes that lasting and worthwhile educational development will only stem from broad educational leadership, including realistic appraisal of needs and setting of appropriate objectives and goals.[65]

This statement set the tone for what was to come in the SEA. Activity was to be goal-oriented and future-oriented and the emphasis would be on planning.

1967-1968: The SEA was reorganized eight months after Busbee took office. A Division of Instruction and a Division of Finance and Operations replaced eight divisions and two staff offices previously reporting to the Superintendent. The Division of Research, Experimentation, and Surveys, funded almost exclusively with Title V, became a staff office reporting directly to the Superintendent.[66] Charlie G. Williams became the office director. He was brought to the SEA to replace William Royster who had decided to leave after losing the Democratic primary election to Busbee by a few votes in a runoff. This was to be the first of several moves to consolidate the SEA and to replace Anderson's lieutenants with a new Busbee team.

Another significant step in 1967-68 was to reach into the bureaucracy and select Jesse A. Coles to be Administrative Assistant (for Long-Range Planning) to the Superintendent. Uniquely qualified for the position, Coles had coordinated a multi-state project during the fourteen months prior to his appointment, providing him with the opportunity to study how SEA's ought to be strengthened. This knowledge of the latest thinking was to prove extremely valuable in making departmental improvements.

The hiring of Coles also illustrates Title V's value in South Carolina. After the annual budget had been prepared, Busbee decided that he needed an assistant for planning. Title V was available and it was utilized to pay part of Coles' salary. Similarly, Busbee saw the need to establish a personnel office in the middle of the fiscal year. Title V was available and the position was established. In both cases the slots were filled immediately, thus avoiding not only delay but possible disapproval by the General Assembly. Equally important, Busbee was able to hire any person he wanted without bureaucratic entanglements. There was no civil service, no merit system, and no central bureaucracy with the authority to clear individual qualification or salary rates. While this independence presented a potential for exploitation, it provided an unusual opportunity for a public official to act swiftly in hiring needed personnel.

During his first full year in office, Superintendent Busbee was in the process of reshaping the agency, forming his own team, and working toward the implementation of the Board's long-range planning policy. This activity was taking place in an atmosphere of mutual support among most of those who were influential at the state level. The governor, the Board of Education, and the Superintendent were in close agreement as to the importance of education and the need for strengthening the SEA. While the conservative General Assembly continued to remain less than extravagant in its support, it did not matter much at this point. The new departmental activities (that is, the new staff) were supported largely with federal funds which the legislature did not control. Furthermore, as an elected state official, the Superintendent apparently was not often pressured for patronage appointments by the legislature or the governor's office. Consequently, Busbee had considerable room to maneuver in making changes.

The agency not only took advantage of this freedom for action but sought suggestions for improvement. For instance, Busbee asked USOE to visit the SEA and focus attention on "some of the problems and issues involved in the formulation of a comprehensive educational plan."[67] The USOE report of January, 1968, supported the Board's planning policy: "In order to plan effectively, the State Department of Education should establish a series of short, and long-range goals for the advancement of education in the State."[68] The report also recommended establishing a planning office which "to be effective, must have access to departmental research and have unlimited access to data processing information."[69] Thus, the groundwork was laid for operationalizing the Board's planning policy and for moving toward what the SEA now calls "data-based planning."[70]

It also became clear during the year that a comprehensive assessment of educational needs was required before plans could be developed. Just at the time the SEA was preparing to undertake this task, USOE required a needs assessment under Title III of ESEA and provided the money. Once more timing worked to the Department's advantage. A contract was entered with the University of South Carolina to assess the state's education needs and to begin work on the development of evaluation models "that could be phased eventually into an operational system.. ."[71] Conducted in conjunction with the Department's Title V-funded research operation, this study was later to provide the framework for the Department's planning endeavors.

At the end of the fiscal year the second major phase of the reorganization took place. Jesse A. Coles, Busbee's assistant, was promoted to Deputy Superintendent for Planning and Administration with the research office reporting to him. Meanwhile, Charlie G. Williams, Royster's replacement, became the new Deputy Superintendent for Instruction. Hence, the current organizational structure was set in place with Busbee's men in key spots. It is a highly organized agency with all the units reporting to three deputies who are responsible in turn to the Superintendent. It also is an agency with a major focus on planning.

The changes that took place during these years all pointed to one conclusion--new potential strength for the SEA. The new leadership was geared toward change. The additional federal resources were removed from the control of the traditionally frugal state legislature. Other power sources in the state, notably the governor and the state board of education, had allied themselves with the SEA. The point to be examined, then, is what happened next and how did this new potential strength affect later policy and strategy?

1968-1969: Governor McNair was determined to change South Carolina from a rural, agriculturally-based state to an industrialized, urban one. He talked in terms of shifting from "growth by momentum to development by decision."[72] To provide a blueprint for action, McNair called in a consulting firm, Moody's Investors Service, Inc., to conduct a comprehensive study of the state's growth potential and make recommendations for governmental action. Released in July of 1968, the report pointed to the need for a "quantum leap"[73] forward in education. While pointing to the value of education for the individual, the so-called Moody Report stressed the importance of educational improvement--

> To provide South Carolina with the well-educated labor force that modern business, agriculture, and industry require....
> ... To provide the pool of secondary school graduates who will take advantage in increasing numbers of opportunities for post-high school education, thus providing the skilled workers, the technicians, the managers and the professionals essential to balanced economic growth of high quality.[74]

In other words, economic growth required better trained human talent. Highly touted by the governor, this study provided still another stimulus for educational improvement and state leadership in education. It also provided a rationale for helping Blacks and Whites alike; the economy of South Carolina required it.

During the course of the year, the SEA continued to develop the internal resources needed for planning. An Office of Management Information was set up, for instance, to work toward the "implementation of a comprehensive educational information system to serve the administrative, planning and reporting needs of the department...."[75] Once more Title V was used to defray part of the costs.

Later in the year, the General Assembly joined in support of better education. Governor McNair pointed to the significance of the legislative action:

> We were at another one of those crossroads which our state has faced so many times, and we made what I consider to be fundamental decisions.
>
> The determination was made this year that we would not simply continue to do more of the same; that pattern was leading into serious deficiencies which would slow down the entire economic growth of the state. Instead, this was the year when we began to realize the importance of innovation and adaptibility as a necessary part of educational progress.[76] (Emphasis added.)

It is noteworthy that the fundamental decision made by the legislature in support of innovation was the funding of a pilot kindergarten program. That this was considered a breakthrough demonstrates South Carolina's relative position among the states in educational matters; the majority of states by 1967 already provided funding for kindergarten programs.[77] That funding a pilot project was considered a fundamental innovative decision also indicates just how conservative the General Assembly had been in the past. Economically and socially the state may have been changing rapidly, but when it came to legislative decisions, important progress was marked by small steps. This limitation was not inconsequential since, as one political observer stated, "the legislature calls the shots."[78]

This year, then, was one of progress. It was the year of the widely heralded Moody Report, further organizational refinement, and the first signs of support for educational change by the General Assembly. As in the previous year, all of these factors pointed to new potential strength for the SEA.

1969-1970: While the preceding years of the Busbee Administration were mainly ones of changeover and preparation, this was more a year of fruition. For one thing, the SEA was ready to implement its management information system. Although it lacked the computer hardware to do the job, intervention by the governor enabled the SEA to get a highly sophisticated $1.8 million computer system from RCA.[79] There was a "honeymoon galore"[80] between Superintendent Busbee and Governor McNair, noted one official. For another, the needs assessment conducted by the University of South Carolina was completed in August of 1969. The findings of the needs assessment, the recommendations of the Moody Report, and other data about the state were used in the development of a list of long-range objectives for South Carolina education. These were presented to the State Board of Education and adopted as policy on May 8, 1970.[81] They represented the categorization of what were identified by the SEA as the most pressing educational problems into a manageable number of specific issues.

Eleven specific objectives were adopted for implementation by 1975. These included cutting by half the number of school dropouts, reducing by two-thirds the percentage of students repeating the first grade, establishing a statewide kindergarten program, improving the basic skills of inschool students, and increasing to one-half the percentage of high school graduates entering post-high school training. They also included the provision of adequate educational programs for the handicapped, for those choosing occupational training, and for adults seeking basic and high school training. Several other objectives were related to the provision of adequate school personnel, to a general upgrading and evaluation of the schools, and to the maintenance of at least a defined minimum educational program.[82]

How these particular objectives were chosen from the many needs identified by the Moody Report and the needs assessment is not clear. Interestingly, neither of these studies had recommended the objective for the handicapped. It may not be a coincidence that the decisions about the objectives were being made at the same time political pressure was growing in the state to help handicapped children. In any event, it seems clear that the decisions were based on an assessment of actual educational needs, the political feasibility of various courses of action, and debate among top officials reflecting individual preferences.

Once the objectives were adopted, the SEA was anxious to begin developing the detailed five-year plans to implement them. Federal timing once again was perfect. Funds were received for planning from USOE in July of 1970.[83] Less than two months after the Board had adopted the objectives, then, South Carolina received a grant of $96,000 to establish a planning unit to begin work on the five-year plans. Thus, this period closed with a new management information office, a new set of objectives, and a planning office. The major remaining problem was the development of strategies for meeting the objectives.

1970-1971: The new fiscal year began as the old one ended with a grant from the federal government. South Carolina was one of three states receiving funds to develop a Research Information Unit. Its purpose was to "close the gap between educational research and practice"[84] by providing educators with quick access to research findings. Anyone seeking research information submits a request describing an educational problem. The SEA has access to a national education information system through ERIC (Educational Research Information Center) and other sources; the tapes are on the Department's new computer. The staff retrieves the data and supplies it to the requesting party. It is significant to note that the installation of this retrieval system would have been impossible without the Department's sophisticated computer hardware. The computer would not have been in the SEA without the excellent relationship between Busbee and the governor. And the research office would not have been equipped even to make the proposal had it not been for its large support through Title V.

Much of the year was spent developing the detailed plans for implementing eight of the eleven objectives. Task forces were established made up of six to ten departmental professionals, and review panels composed of local schoolmen approved the plans at several stages. The Office of Planning coordinated the various planning committees.

The products of the task forces were so-called "program documents,"[85] as described in a SEA publication:

> The five-year plan for each major objective details strategies for meeting the specified goal and includes: (1) clearly stated program objectives; (2) procedures for meeting the program objectives; (3) an investment plan; and (4) an evaluation design.[86]

Great pains were taken to set forth program objectives and sub-objectives in "measurable terms."[87] Also, each plan set out detailed activities for the different SEA units. These provide the base for the Department's management by objectives system. Employees are accountable for accomplishing the appropriate activities by a specified time.

The planning documents were completed toward the end of the year and adopted by the Board. The SEA top staff currently is in the process of "selling"[88] the districts on the plans' value. Since local control of the schools remains a cherished tradition in South Carolina, this selling process is required. "The legal structure is toward a high degree of autonomy and independence for local school districts,"[89] remarked one top SEA official. Hence, it is believed that state leverage can be achieved mainly through a good product and friendly persuasion.

This chronology brings the discussion of SEA activities up to date (winter of 1971). I have mentioned those key factors accounting for the Department's growth and change of activity. It would be foolhardy, of course, to believe that each of these factors was totally independent of one another. The SEA undoubtedly made important contributions to Board of Education positions and the Moody Report, for instance, and then turned around and used these very documents to justify departmental action. This is common organizational behavior and the

South Carolina Department is no exception to this practice. The critical point is that the key political and bureaucratic players were on the same team. Educational improvement was viewed as good for politics, as good for economic growth, and as good for social amelioration. Conversely, economic growth and social amelioration were viewed as good for education. And just at times when the SEA could use money, either Title V or some other federal funding source was available. Furthermore, the money could be utilized immediately without overcoming tortuous political clearances or bureaucratic obstacles. In short, conditions approaching the ideal were present for a good administrator to accomplish rapid organizational reform.

Having described these SEA changes, it is now appropriate to discuss specifically how the different Title V expenditures played a role in this organizational development, and to evaluate the consequences and significance of the changes which have taken place.

V. Title V's Impact

Title V currently funds a wide variety of activities. While most of these projects were started in 1965, additional positions have been funded over the years. Most notably, in 1968 the Congress eliminated the appropriation for state administrative staff under Titles III and X of NDEA and added an equal amount to the Title V appropriation. The positions in the South Carolina SEA funded under NDEA were transferred to the Title V account. As a result, practically every major division in the SEA currently receives some Title V benefits mainly to defray salary costs. While it would not be fruitful to examine the unique contribution of each of these Title V-funded positions, it is possible and appropriate to examine the impact of the original projects, particularly since they continue to account for most of the Title V funding.

Three of the original seven projects have been discontinued. At no time did they have a marked impact on the Department's growth. The first, the curriculum writing project, was a one-shot affair. End-of-year money covered the cost of developing and publishing some new curriculum guides. This project was not designed to be continued and it was not. The second discontinued project was the professional materials center. South Carolina's 1968 annual report on Title V stated: "The material center has failed to fulfill original hopes for a central professional staff library serving the needs of all the Departmental staff."[90] A low priority from its start, the center was never staffed and only funded with end-of-year money. One top official attributed its termination to two factors: the person championing the idea left the SEA, and the floor space occupied by the center was needed for other activities.[91]

The third discontinued project was the free statewide test scoring service. It also quickly proved a failure. One top official described it as "poorly planned, poorly conceived and poorly executed." "It took me five years to kill it,"[92] he said. There were problems in providing the service; the scoring equipment was ill-suited for the translation of raw data into meaningful results. Insurmountable problems also developed in getting the hoped-for baseline data. Schools administered different tests at different times to different grade levels, with non-comparable data as the result. The service finally was terminated in fiscal 1969. One official succinctly summed up the general feeling about the project: "It was a turkey."[93]

These three discontinued projects had certain things in common. They were small in size and did not fund any professional positions. Hence, termination did not involve the often difficult problem of releasing professional staff or taking on established bureaucracies.

The four projects started in 1965 and continuing through 1971 have had differing effects on SEA growth, ranging from none to rather significant. The teacher education project trained about 800 driver education teachers and produced videotapes on reading, mathematics and competitive governmental systems. Broadcast over the state's Educational Television System for several years, they recently have been taken off the air. The instructional television unit, a separate part of the SEA, is currently developing new tapes. Nevertheless, Title V funds continue to subsidize the Office of Teacher Education and Certification, paying the salaries of four persons who spend most of their time processing applications for teacher certification. While undoubtedly providing some useful training, this Title V activity has borne little relationship to recent departmental changes. This is particularly true with the current concentration on certification, a long-standing SEA regulatory function.

A second project begun in 1965 and continuing today is the partial funding of the Office of P.L. 89-10--the processing, monitoring, and coordinating office for major federal programs. This unit continues to provide some essential services in the administration of federal projects As a consequence of the 1967 SEA reorganization, however, it is "down-the-line" in the Division of Instruction, rather than at a position in the formal organizational structure which would facilitate its coordinating functions. Since this small unit relies heavily on often-busy professionals from other SEA units in carrying out its responsibilities, this position in the organization has created major coordination problems.[94] Because of the nature of its task, this office has had only an indirect impact on the Department's internal development. Its main contribution has come from its director who worked closely in 1965 with Harris Marshall in setting up different Title V activities, and who also is the Department's Title V coordinator.

A third project continuing from 1965 is the research office. Concentrating almost exclusively on school surveys during its first few years, the office would send as many as fifty departmental specialists to individual school districts to appraise their strengths and weaknesses. While this service was undoubtedly useful (both to the schools and in helping SEA officials work as a team), it was hardly research-oriented Through the years, though, the focus of the office has expanded significantly. Members of the office staff were deeply involved in the 1969 statewide needs assessment, in the development of the eleven Board objectives, and in the implementation of a comprehensive data information system. Indeed, a separate Planning Office and Data Processing Center have spun-off from the research operation, with Title V partly funding the latter. More recently, the research office has been heavily involved with the planning process. "Responsible for implementing the evaluation model for systematically assessing the State System of Education,"[95] the Office of Research specifically--

> ...is responsible for the data base document employed in developing the program document. The data base document identifies appropriate sub-populations and describes their status.... The document also includes...research findings, model programs and innovative ideas that have been field tested.[96]

Title V, then, funded a small office in 1965 which has grown in size, has largely changed its mission, and has been at the heart of departmental planning. Furthermore, the continued Title V funding of the unit ($111,000 in 1971[97]) has supported the manpower to do these jobs as well as allowing the unit to attract additional resources to operate projects such as the Research Information Unit. Indeed, federal funding from a number of programs is largely responsible for the existence of the Division of Administration and Planning. In 1971, federal sources provided all the funding for planning, four out of every five dollars for research, and about half the cost of running the entire division.[98]

The last project started in 1965 and continuing through 1971 provided funds for additional staff for the Division of Instruction. Beginning by paying part of the salaries of four professionals, the project has expanded over the years so that in 1971 twelve positions were at least partially funded from Title V.[99] The importance of this activity to the Department's growth is straightforward. Title V has provided the money to hire the essential human resources for carrying out departmental policy. Many persons involved in the actual development of plans receive part or all of their salary from Title V.

Not only have some of the original Title V projects been extremely helpful to the SEA, the program also has been particularly useful in providing a small amount of resources in the middle of the annual budget cycle when needs developed and state funds were unavailable. As mentioned earlier, Title V was used in this fashion to pay the salary of a new public information officer, to establish a personnel office, and to promote Jesse A. Coles to the position of Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent. Title V continues to fund partially both the public information office and the personnel office. Title V also was used in the middle of fiscal 1971 to purchase $3,000 worth of new equipment, for example, and even to pay $8,000 for some building improvements.[100] A departmental memorandum explained this use: "Each year these unexpected expenditures occur and are paid from whatever source of funds can best carry them."[101] Because Title V is discretionary, it usually is the best source.

The usefulness of constantly available Title V funds is easily understood; the SEA can act without delay as needs arise. Why some Title V is usually available, however, requires explanation. Job vacancies always develop during the year freeing previously budgeted money. Also, money can become available by borrowing it from another federal account which may not be entirely expended before the end of the year. Unlike state money which returns to the State Treasury if not expended for specifically budgeted purposes, Title V can be recycled through the simple submission of an application to USOE. Such applications are rarely questioned and never turned down. Consequently, Title V is flexible enough that any talented finance officer can always "find" a limited amount of Title V resources to meet problems as they arise, even without maintaining a formal contingency fund.

So Title V has had direct and indirect impact on departmental reform. Its most important contribution has been the research office and the general provision of funds for manpower to develop and implement new policy. While Title V itself did not stimulate much new thought about departmental needs, it did allow SEA officials to do what they already believed was needed and to meet pressing problems as they arose, not the following year when state money might, or might not, be available. Indeed, the money is viewed by departmental officials as absolutely essential. One employee went so far as to say, "I believe that Title V is the best thing the federal government has ever done for education."[102]

Before concluding this section two further questions need to be addressed. First, how have Title V decisions been made during the Busbee Administration? Also, if the SEA had relied on state funding, could departmental reform have occurred?

In answering the Title V decision-making question, it must be remembered that the crucial first-year decisions were made during the last days of the Anderson regime. This had the effect of committing most of Title V to the payment of salaries. Once proejcts supporting personnel are established, by and large they are taken for granted each year when a new budget is considered. Consequently, Title V decisions have been limited to a small amount of money not already tied up in salaries.

Most of the Title V decisions are made as part of the annual budgetary process. According to standard operating procedures, different units of the agency decide on their needs and send proposals up-the-line for further consideration. The three deputies match the cost of the desired activities with available state and federal resources. Since requests always outstrip resources, the three deputies reach agreement through a bargaining process. "You know, you give a little and take a little,"[103] said one deputy. Recommendations then are forwarded to the Superintendent. After the allocation decisions are made, programs are matched with the different categorical funds with an attempt to save Title V for more developmental activities. As was true the first year, projects have often been labeled as Title V because of bookkeeping reasons.

These Title V decisions are supplemented by a few made during the course of the year as problems develop and Title V money becomes available. The three deputies generally discuss these problems before making recommendations to the Superintendent. In both cases, during the budget cycle and in the middle of the year, decisions are characterized by competition among the deputies for limited resources with compromises frequently providing the ultimate solutions.

A complete answer to the second question (about whether the state would have funded the organizational change) is impossible since no one knows what might have happened if Title V had not been available. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that an equal amount of funds probably would not have been provided to support the departmental reforms. In 1967, for example, the so-called State Budget and

Control Board* turned down a $48,000 budget request for four additional supervisors for the Office of Research.[104] In 1969, the legislature turned down a request for funds to implement a basic data system.[105] More generally, the legislature has consistently been stingy in meeting requests for additional personnel, as noted in a 1969 SEA statement:

> During the past several years the Department has relied heavily on new Federal programs for funds to provide increased staff positions while receiving very limited support from the State for that purpose. In view of the increased demands on the department for both leadership and services, we are planning to emphasize requests for strengthening the State Department of Education in the 1970-71 budget.[106]

Interestingly, these requests met with only limited support.[107]

In light of this evidence, it seems doubtful that much additional assistance would have been provided if federal administrative funds had not been made available. The SEA undoubtedly would have changed. Indeed, the change in the Department's style of operation is related only indirectly to the availability of new money. But the rate of change and the development of new activities probably would have been severely curtailed. The SEA also would have been more under the thumb of the General Assembly.

VI. The Impact of the Organizational Reform

This chapter has been mainly descriptive up to this point, identifying those factors contributing the most to changes in the Department's structure, style, and activities. The underlying assumption, consistent with the view of writers on SEA's,[108] has been that SEA's should expand their planning activities and should develop specific objectives. It is now possible to go a step further. This section describes some unanticipated consequences of these activities, points to some resistance to change, and examines the output of these efforts--the eleven Board objectives, the plans to implement them, and the more powerful SEA itself.

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*Controlling finances, this group is composed of the Governor, State Comptroller, State Auditor, State Treasurer, and Chairmen of the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee.

This exploration is important for several reasons. First, Title V has played a key role in the Department's development; evaluating the effects of these changes provides still another evaluation of Title V. A second reason is that South Carolina is reportedly one of three states with measurable goals and a master plan for education.[109] The state's experience could provide clues to what might happen in other SEA's following South Carolina's lead. Finally, in fiscal 1973 the federal government is expected to fund a $10 million program of SEA comprehensive educational planning. It therefore seemed important to examine the problems faced by the South Carolina SEA in implementing its planning efforts. (This new federal program is explored in detail in Chapter VII.)

In the case of unanticipated consequences, it is clear that the planning has been accompanied by significant human costs. One byproduct of the highly centralized management, for example, seems to be a slowdown in decision-making. A common plaint is that anything and everything has to be cleared through channels and that even simple decisions often take an inordinate amount of time to make. One SEA staffer put it this way, "You find out by trial and error that you have to clear everything.'[110] As a consequence, SEA staffers sometimes have decided against doing things because of the red tape involved in getting clearance. Furthermore, several SEA specialists at the lower levels of the bureaucracy feel that they must constantly pump out plans to meet requests from above, plans often made with little regard for their professional judgment and interests. "It's just not a human-based organization," explained one official. "I'm glad to see the Department taking some direction but I'm getting kind of bitter about this treadmill kind of operation."[111] While the new planning activities may have created excitement at the top of the agency, that excitement has been matched with equally strong feelings of frustration at the bottom. To be sure, the SEA has yet to find a healthy balance between professional freedom and managerial control.

Besides these internal problems apparently created by centralized management and the pressure for plans, there are also some signs of resistance to change. For example, top departmental officials talk about shifting consultative services away from individual school visitations toward the provision of school district leadership through SEA meetings and regional workshops. Undoubtedly there are fewer school visitations currently than six years ago, but more continue to take place than the departmental rhetoric implies. Many consultants are reluctant to give up the face-to-face meetings with individual teachers and children, and they persist in maintaining the long-established procedures.[112]

These problems of red tape, frustration and resistance are not the only issues raised by the Department's shift toward planning activities. South Carolina's eleven objectives raise fundamental questions about the implicit values and assumptions underlying the choice of objectives for attention by the SEA. The major focus in South Carolina seems to be on using the schools to train productive citizens. For example, the SEA plan to reduce school dropouts quotes from the Moody Report:

> Every boy or girl who drops out of school represents a significant financial drain on the resources of South Carolina.... Retaining youth in school becomes, then, both a safeguarding of past investment and a pledge of future income for the state.[113]

On the other hand, the eleven objectives contain nothing about whether schools should be humane and fun, for example, or whether children should be happy and free. It may be that such objectives are incompatible with the development of skilled workers as well as not being quantifiable. Whether South Carolina's emphasis on training is wrong or right is not the issue. The crucial point is that the choice of emphasis represents a basic expression of values as to the role and function of South Carolina education. Choosing one objective over another reflects the beliefs of certain individuals about what they think is important for children and society. Educational expertise does not help in making these choices.

Not only are the eleven objectives based on implicit value judgments, they also reflect basic assumptions about the educational worth of particular school inputs. For example, one of the objectives is the implementation of a statewide kindergarten program by 1975. The belief is that fewer students would drop out of school if they started earlier.[114] Kindergarten might be worthwhile, but the state plan cites no evidence linking universal kindergarten with the reduction of dropouts. Achieving the objective may make a difference for children and the economy; it may not.

The knowledge base used in the establishment of South Carolina's eleven objectives seems fairly clear. They are largely based on assumptions, intuition, and an unflagging faith in the value of public education. Of course, there is nothing wrong with using intuition, particularly when educational research is unclear and reaches conflicting conclusions. Decisions simply cannot await scientific proof. However, the problem is that the Board objectives and much of the rhetoric surrounding them have glossed over the great uncertainty about educational processes and, perhaps most important, have not dealt explicitly with the role of assumptions and values underlying the choice of objectives. As a result, a side-effect of South Carolina's five-year plans with their specific objectives* and set timetables, I would argue, has been the creation of an unfounded aura of rationality and educational knowledge. In fact, little is known about the relationship between inputs and outputs in education and there are different conceptions of what the schooling process might look like.[116]

South Carolina's experience also raises some fundamental questions about the limits of long-range planning given the realities of government. These questions involve the impact of planning on the decision-making process and on the allocation of scarce resources. The test of long-range thinking, after all, is the extent to which it influences short-term decisions. If it does not, objectives will not be met except perhaps by accident.

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*For example, one sub-objective calls for the reduction of the annual number of dropouts in grade 10 "from 6,221 to 5,288 by the completion of the 1971-1972 school year."[115]

My distinct impression is that South Carolina's long-range objectives have had virtually no impact on departmental priorities. Political and fiscal realities have taken precedence over the Department's long-range efforts. This is best evidenced in the SEA budget request for 1972-73. Although the SEA contends that about ninety-six percent of the total requested increase is directed toward meeting the "Master Plan for Public School Progress,"[117] it is worth examining the actual priorities. More than seventy percent of this increase would be used to raise teachers' salaries. While one of the eleven objectives is to provide adequate professional staff in the schools, it is curious to note that at the time the priorities were being established the plan to carry out this objective was "in the process of being fully studied and developed."[118] At the same time, plans for eight of the eleven objectives already had been specifically worked out. Hence, almost three-fourths of the budget increase would be used to implement a "plan" not yet written.

Further evidence that the planning process has had only limited impact on key budget decisions is found by comparing requests from *before* and *after* the plans. The legislative requests for 1972-73 are strikingly similar to the requests two years earlier before the eleven objectives and plans. Both budgets put top priority on teacher salaries. Both requested funding for the state's kindergarten program, for vocational education, and for adult education.[119] The only request for program funding in 1972-73, not contained in 1970-71, was to hire more teachers for the handicapped. It may not be a coincidence that the South Carolina lobby for the handicapped recently has been growing in power. "We have a real strong association for the handicapped in this state,"[120] said one political observer.

Initially developed in an atmosphere where "the sky's the limit,"[121] the long-range plans have been cut back to meet short-term pressing problems. The political realities of a teachers organization growing more militant,[122] a state government with limited resources, and a traditionally frugal legislature apparently have been major determinants in establishing departmental priorities. "You must necessarily yield to the political picture," said one top official, and "pick grapes where there are grapes."[123]

But planning is not concerned only with influencing funding priorities. It also entails the development of strategies for implementing agreed-upon objectives. The departmental plans are also weak here. The problem stems mainly from the Department's conception of planning. In South Carolina this means essentially plan-making with the role of the Office of Planning one of coordination and monitoring. With little training in planning and under time pressure, departmental officials were called on to develop planning documents. Little attention was paid to problem analysis, that is, questioning basic assumptions, delineating values, exploring alternatives and developing solutions. In short, the focus was on the quick production of a document rather than on the careful analysis of problems.*

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*For a discussion of an alternative (policy analysis) to South Carolina's planning efforts, see the section on planning in Chapter VII.

As a result, the specific activities proposed in the plans appear little different from traditional state services: curricula guides, model programs, in-service training, consultative services, and so forth. The only things really new or different are a first-rate public relations campaign, improvements in data collection, and the format of a long-range plan. The significant change taking place seems to be in form rather than in content.

Given these planning weaknesses and the fiscal and political problems discussed above, it is not surprising that the plans to implement the eleven objectives seem inadequate as well. To illustrate this point it is worth examining as examples the plans for the improvement of basic skills and for dropout prevention programs. The objective of the basic skills plan is to improve measurably the basic verbal and quantitative skills of inschool students by 1975.[124] To accomplish this task, the plan spells out several activities: the preparation of materials, conferences, in-service training of teachers, and the upgrading of local district supervisory personnel. All of this is to be carried without additional cost to the state. School districts have been encouraged to use Title I of ESEA funds to improve basic skills. Interestingly, since 1965 South Carolina has put more Title I money into reading (an important basic skill) than into any other activity. Despite this effort, the SEA is unable to present evidence that this expenditure has had any impact on reading scores. The five-year plan, nonetheless, is based on the assumption that marked progress can be achieved by doing perhaps a bit more of what local schools already have been doing without success.

The other example involves the objective to decrease by half the number of school dropouts by 1975. Not unaware of the complexity of the problem, a SEA brochure describing the plan states:

> Effective changes will involve changing the institution of education itself--the system of education, teaching methodology, curriculum, teacher inservice training programs, and the role of the school administrator. Changes will not be limited to preventing additional dropouts, but will require strategies and programs for improving the effectiveness of the instructional program for all students.[125]

Yet the goal is to be met without additional cost to the state or, for that matter, to local schools. Title I of ESEA is to be redirected to meet this priority, not to mention the basic skills objective discussed above. In addition, public information campaigns, consultative services, in-service training, material dissemination, and even help from the Junior Chamber of Commerce are to be directed toward this objective.[126]

Both these examples highlight the problem: complex educational issues and little knowledge about specific ways of dealing with them. Add to this two new plans with no additional money and the partial redirection of old methods which have not proven themselves in the past, and it is hard not to conclude that Superintendent Busbee is being unduly optimistic when he states: "Our objectives are obtainable, and I believe the program is educationally sound, operationally feasible and economically practical."[127]

Another part of the problem, however, is that several of the objectives may well be met in meaningless ways. For example, part of the dropout objective probably will be met by a new and more precise way of computing the number of dropouts.[128] Part of the adult education objective will be met by increasing by fifty percent the pupil-teacher ratio required before schools receive state reimbursement.[129] The objective to reduce first grade failure could be met if teachers simply reduced the number left back each year. The important question remains: Will all this have any educational value?

So, then, the SEA changes have created some problems and raised some issues about South Carolina's planning. The price of rapid change has been red tape, rumblings, and resistance at the lower levels of the agency. The planning activities have suffered from a reluctance to question basic assumptions, the absence of analysis, and an overselling of the potential impact of the plans on children and the economy. What's more, the SEA has tried to do too much in too short a period of time. That this is true is not altogether surprising. The times are ripe for change in South Carolina and no one knows how long this will last. Also, Superintendent Busbee is an elected official who (along with his top staff) may or may not be in office in a few years. Departmental leaders struck while the iron was hot.

But the planning probably has been useful in several ways. The task forces brought individuals together in teams from across the agency. Some new ideas have become part of the "political conversation."[130] And it may be true, as one key official noted: "Just calling attention to things will help make a difference."[131] Furthermore, that some problems exist in the planning is no surprise. This is the Department's first attempt and rather than seeking perfection, SEA officials decided to get started. The process and plans next time might well be improved. Nonetheless, I am left with certain nagging questions: Will plan-making become simply an institutionalized end in itself and hence a meaningless exercise? Is the sense of purpose generated by a highly publicized plan worth the costs in dashed expectations if an objective (e.g., improved reading) is not met?

This section also raised questions about the underlying values and assumptions shaping the choice of objectives and plans. And finally I have tried to demonstrate that no matter how good a plan might be, its impact will be limited by the political and fiscal realities which control the allocation of public goods.[132] As one political observer noted, "The squeaky wheel gets the grease."[133]

VII. Conclusions

This discussion indicates that Title V was the right program at the right time for the South Carolina Department of Education. The program has provided the core money for the hiring of more and better qualified professionals, and for the development of the basic organizational machinery to do things in information analysis, research, and planning that the SEA was never able to do before. While I have serious misgivings about the Department's planning efforts, Title V has played a crucial role in the development of the SEA.

The basic question is, why has Title V had such a significant impact in South Carolina as contrasted with its impact in Massachusetts and New York, as described in Chapters III and IV?

Unlike these states which were not marked by demands for rapid change, South Carolina received its Title V resources just as the state was undergoing a political, economic, and social transformation in an attempt to meet a backlog of deficiencies. Writing about politics mainly during the '60's, an analyst concludes:

> South Carolina politics was transformed by new forces that left dead or dying the three prominent characteristics that have prevailed since Reconstruction. These were one-party politics designed to unify the white man against the Negro in politics, the policy and practice of excluding the Negro from effective political participation, and a reaction to the waste, graft and mismanagement of Reconstruction that had manifested itself as a reaction against social legislation.[134]

On the economic front, this analyst summarizes:

> In the 1960's, fundamental changes in the state's economic structure featured a dramatic expansion of industrial development and diversification that expanded the economic base built around the textile industry. In that decade, South Carolina attracted $4 billion in new and expanded industrial plants, outstripping the rest of the southeast.[135]

This political and economic ferment, coupled with demands for departmental change and a strong governor who viewed education as central to economic growth, provided SEA officials with the opportunity as well as the necessity to develop a stronger SEA. A new management-minded superintendent, a new team of top aides with technological know-how, a SEA that was "ready to go," and essential federal resources (mainly from Title V) combined to translate the opportunity for progress into action. In short, in the context of pressure and support for SEA change, Title V acted as a facilitator, rather than as a stimulus, allowing the new SEA leadership to put significant changes into effect.

This may be an appropriate time, however, to recall the statement about Belmont Plantation, made at the beginning of this chapter: "Vestiges of the past remain, but no longer do they go unchallenged." The vestiges of the past for education are a strong legislature, a weak SEA and a concern with avoiding controversy, particularly over the issue of race. These are indeed challenged by a new and stronger SEA which has developed objectives and written plans for their implementation.

But even in its challenge, the SEA has done little which is controversial and has been limited by the still-existing political realities of a powerful and conservative legislature. While it is changing and the SEA has grown in influence under Busbee,[136] the General Assembly still calls the shots in South Carolina.

Finally, as my discussion of planning has attempted to show, accomplishing the changes in personnel and administrative apparatus is the easier part in the achievement of state leadership. The more difficult problem is to find ways to develop strategies that will make a difference, to solve the problems of their implementation, and to figure out how planning skills can be realistically used in the essentially political environment governing important educational decisions. It is into this more complicated phase of really testing the limits of leadership that the South Carolina Department of Education now moves.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS*

The preceding chapters described Title V's implementation in three SEA's and examined the different ways in which they were strengthened. To provide needed perspective, attention was focused on Title V's operation within the context of particular SEA's and their political environments. In addition, the role of USOE in administering the program was explored in Chapter II.

In this Chapter, I compare the data from the diverse states studied and draw conclusions about the strengthening of SEA's by Title V. This is followed by an effort to explain why things turned out as they did. In light of these data, I suggest some implications of this study for the way we think about how organizations work, and what we think they should accomplish. The next chapter discusses some alternative courses of action for further strengthening the states.

I. SEA Strengthening

If budget and staff growth are viewed as indicators of "SEA strengthening," then rapid progress has been made since ESEA's passage in 1965. The administrative budgets for all the SEA's nationwide jumped from a 1965 total of $139 million to $298 million in fiscal year 1970, an increase of some 114 percent.[1] The total SEA staffs reportedly have about doubled for the same period, with approximately 22,000 employees working for SEA's in 1970.[2] This growth has allowed SEA's to provide more services and generally to be more visible than was true in the past.

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*Throughout this study the term "Title V" refers specifically to section 503 of Title V of ESEA, which provides unrestricted resources to SEA's.

Approximately fifty-six percent[3] of this budget growth between 1965 and 1970 was funded through federal dollars, with the federal contribution to SEA administrative expenditures rising from twenty-three percent in 1965 to forty percent[4] in 1970.* One-fifth of these 1970 federal dollars came from Title V.[6] SEA budgets and staffs, then, grew dramatically since ESEA's passage, with the federal government playing an instrumental role in both the expansion and continuing operations of SEA's.

In addition to budget and staff growth, several other measures of "strengthening" were used throughout this study. These included Title V's impact on existing or traditional SEA activities, and on the pursuit of new roles (like planning) as was hoped by some of Title V's legislative framers. Also, the past and present capacity of SEA's to influence their state legislatures was explored as a measure of SEA leadership.** Applying these different definitions of "strengthening" to the three states studied in depth, a wide range of Title V outcomes was found from state to state.

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*At the same time, seven percent of elementary and secondary education expenditures came from the federal government.[5] It should be pointed out, however, that the forty percent federal contribution to SEA's resulted largely from their significant administrative responsibilities in carrying out federal categorical programs (e.g., Titles I, II, and III of ESEA).

**These definitions of "strengthening" were set out more fully in Chapter I, pages 13 to 15.

The Massachusetts SEA in 1965 was underfinanced, fragmented, and in a state of flux while undergoing a major reorganization. The SEA operated within a political setting dominated by localism, personal politics, and a generally weak state bureaucracy. Since that time the SEA was strengthened in several ways. Its staff grew from 574 in 1965 to 603 in 1970, with forty-two[7] of these 1970 employees paid through Title V. More specifically, Title V mainly supported the Department's regional centers and more modern data processing system.

While some improvements were made in the discrete areas supported by Title V, progress was slow, with the agency basically doing more of what it was doing prior to ESEA. What's more, the Title V-funded activities had limited visible impact on changing the overall management or leadership orientation of the agency. It was poorly managed in 1965, and in 1971 it was still plagued by outmoded procedures, by abnormal internal problems, and by the dedication of state educators to localism. Finally, an examination of the Department's capacity to exercise leadership with the legislature leads to the conclusion that there was little, if any, change since 1965. The Massachusetts SEA was weak in 1965 and continued to be weak in 1971.

The New York SEA, in contrast to Massachusetts', was considered among the strongest SEA's in 1965. It was large, affluent, highly professional, and by and large a well managed organization. The SEA was part of a political culture supporting disciplined and non-partisan public administration. Between 1965 and 1970 its staff grew from

1,778 to 2,467, with eighty-three of those employed in 1970 paid through Title V. The SEA used its Title V resources mainly to fund a variety of small ad hoc projects with a heavy emphasis on the expansion and marginal adaptation of ongoing activities.

These Title V efforts usually strengthened the discrete SEA subunits that the money was designed to help. But if the projects were "added up" and viewed as a coherent package, they had little visible impact on the overall effectiveness or orientation of the agency; Title V did not affect the SEA in any fundamental way. Services and management were sophisticated in 1965 and the New York Department was as strong, or stronger, in 1971. Perhaps most significant, the Department's capacity to influence legislative priorities appeared to be on the decline, despite the SEA's enhanced size and professional competence.* Strong in 1965, the New York SEA seemed relatively weaker in 1971.

The South Carolina SEA, like the Massachusetts SEA, was a weak agency when ESEA was enacted. It was small, poorly staffed, fragmented, and generally had little visibility in the state. It also was part of a political setting which placed a high premium on maintaining the status quo. Between 1965 and 1971, however, the agency was significantly strengthened in several ways. Its staff grew from 166 in 1965 to 448 in 1970, with thirty-one positions in 1970 supported by Title V. This growth was also accompanied by a notable improvement in the quality of its personnel. Moreover, Title V had an important impact on the agency's overall management and orientation. By providing resources at the right time, Title V (and other federal programs) enabled the SEA to develop the basic organizational machinery necessary to shift from a traditionally passive role toward a purported planning orientation. Finally, the SEA's influence with the state legislature seemed to have increased somewhat as a result of the agency's enhanced professional competence. Consequently, the South Carolina SEA--weak in 1965--was stronger in 1971 in part because of Title V and other federal aid programs.

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*The reasons are discussed later in this chapter.

This review leads to three points deserving particular emphasis. First, the states differed in many important ways in 1965. Six years later, the diversity continued. In fact, one could not visit various SEA's in 1971 without being struck by the differences in their managerial sophistication and competence, in their political influence, and in their bureaucratic and political milieus. Although SEA change took place at varying rates since 1965, the character of each SEA, often rooted in history and tradition, remained distinct. Emphasizing the importance of this obvious conclusion, Daniel Elazar has stated: "...considering the American penchant for focusing on national platterns without considering subnational differences, even the obvious must sometimes be reaffirmed."[8]

The second conclusion is that Title V's impact and SEA "strengthening" varied significantly from state to state. In New York and Massachusetts, the Title V outcome was mainly marginal adaptations of ongoing activities rather than significant changes in procedures, activities, or roles. In South Carolina, on the other hand, marked change took place over the years, largely funded through Title V. Furthermore, an examination of the influence of the SEA's with their legislature, as contrasted with their managerial and service improvements, also revealed wide differences from state to state. Massachusetts was weak in 1965 and remained weak in 1971. New York was among the most influential SEA's in 1965 but seemed to have grown weaker by 1971. South Carolina was weak and appeared to have grown stronger. The relationship between federal assistance and SEA influence was at best inconsistent.

The third point is that Title V did not act as a stimulus for institutional reform. This conclusion is clearly evident in the cases of Massachusetts and New York, but it also holds for South Carolina. Although at first glance it might seem that Title V promoted the SEA changes in South Carolina, in fact the major causes were a new political climate, a statewide thrust for economic development, a strong Governor interested in state leadership in education, and new SEA top management predisposed toward change. In other words, the South Carolina SEA was "ready to change" just after the passage of ESEA, and under these circumstances, Title V resources acted as a facilitator rather than a primary stimulus. Title V funds, then, may have been necessary for some institutional reform, but they were not sufficient, and certainly were not the change agent that some reformers had hoped.

II. Title V Outcomes: An Explanation

What accounts for this disparity in outcomes? Why did Title V not act as a stimulus?

One way to begin to explore these issues is to ask what made the legislative framers of Title V believe that the program would promote institutional reform. Chapter I argued that this hope of Title V's architects was based, at least in part, on a certain assumption about the way Title V decisions should and would be made. That is, the decision process would follow a certain sequence: assessment of needs, definition of "strengthening" and "leadership" in terms of agreed-upon objectives, exploration of alternatives to meet these objectives and, finally, the choice of projects to maximize the overall organizational goal of SEA "strengthening". After the initial decisions were made, presumably the SEA would implement the projects and later use the money for new endeavors as higher priorities developed. In short, Title V decisions would result from a "rational" process and, in turn, the SEA's would behave in a flexible fashion.

To help insure such "quality"[9] Title V decisions and to promote a "thorough overhaul"[10] of SEA's, USOE asked each state to fill out a detailed self-analysis form ranking its priority needs. The consideration of alternatives and choice of projects were meant to flow from this self-analysis exercise.

In fact, reality bore little relationship to the hoped-for decision process. For one thing, interviews with numerous SEA staffers suggest that Title V decisions did not grow out of the sequential process of assessing needs, establishing overall objectives, analyzing various alternatives, and then making a choice. SEA's neither defined "strengthening" nor established general priorities before deciding on specific projects. For another, the self-analysis document seemed to have little impact on the initial Title V decisions. An analyst described what happened in 1965:

> [A USOE official] hoped the review would be characterized by extensive self-analysis with broad involvement of department personnel. However, most departments completed the form in a few days, drawing on a small committee of their top administrators. Many departments did nothing at all until a representative of the United States Office of Education actually hand carried a copy of the evaluation form [the self-analysis] to the state and required them to complete it.[11]

Furthermore, if the evaluation document had played a role in the Title V decisions, one would expect a close relationship between the priorities listed in the self-analyses forms and the actual Title V proposals. This relationship did not exist in the three states studied in-depth.* And an examination of the self-analyses from the fifty states shows that overall planning and evaluation, for example, was ranked the "highest" priority for immediate improvement by more states than any other SEA function.[12] Yet, only two states actually used Title V the first year to set up a planning unit.[13] "It [the self-analysis] was a damned nice concept," a South Carolina SEA official commented. "We ran it, then hard-nosed realities took over and we put the money where we wanted it to go."[14] Title V decisions, then, neither grew out of the self-analysis document nor resulted from a consideration of all possible alternatives to maximize overall organizational goals. The hoped-for decision-making process simply did not take place.

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*It should be emphasized that my argument is not that the self-analyses were filled out in bad faith. Rather, my point is that they were basically irrelevant to the way decisions were made. This point should become clearer when I discuss the decision-making process later in the chapter.

While this suggests that the reformers' assumption about the decision process was not borne out, it remains to explain why this assumption was wrong. Also, it is still necessary to explore the reasons why Title V did not act as a stimulus for basic institutional change.

Several explanations were set forth in Chapter I. When asked to explain why Title V fell short of the reformers' hopes, individuals familiar with the program usually "blamed" someone, some organization, or the circumstances surrounding Title V's implementation. Since the same reasons were given time and again, I characterized these explanations as the "conventional wisdom."

Chapter I also explored a different explanation which saw the "problem' as stemming from the nature of complex organizations. Here the emphasis was on utilizing organizational theory to help understand how organizations work when provided unrestricted resources. In the light of my findings, it is now possible to raise questions about these different explanations. I start by exploring in detail the various "blame" explanations. After that, I examine the fit between the data and my working hypotheses drawn from organizational theory and set forth in Chapter I.

Who is to blame? Blame was placed on USOE. It was argued that USOE officials were not aggressive enough in reviewing individual Title V project applications. As a result, Title V turned into a source of free money for SEA's with little quality control exercised by the federal government.

Chapter II explored federal-state relations in Title V's implementation. I concluded that the program was indeed administered as if it provided free money. The reason, however, was not simply lack of USOE will, but also lack of political muscle; the states called the shots in Title V's administration. But this explains only part of the Title V outcome. An analysis of the behavior of USOE officials does not tell us why states spent Title V as they did, given the availability of free money.

Blame was placed on the Congress. Funds were not appropriated the first year until September of 1965, five months after ESEA was signed into law. What's more, ESEA was a major new undertaking thrust upon the states all at once. This combination of late funding and major new SEA responsibilities in the administration of ESEA, it was argued, created an "emergency situation" and made Title V "preplanning" extremely difficult for the SEA's. Consequently, there was not enough time to devise the best possible Title V projects.*

It is certainly true that late congressional funding and new responsibilities under ESEA caused some serious problems for SEA's in 1965. But two reasons suggest that the shortage of time to prepare Title V projects and the new demands on SEA manpower probably were not the crucial factors affecting the quality of Title V decisions. First, New York began "preplanning" for Title V in February of 1965; the SEA had both the staff and the inclination to start the process even before ESEA was finally signed into law in April. Massachusetts began preplanning in May, and South Carolina began in the summer of 1965. All three SEA's, then, were working on their Title V proposals prior to the appropriation of funds and, in fact, for about six months prior to the submission of projects to USOE. Even with other new responsibilities, half a year would seem sufficient to generate basic ideas to be tailored into final form when the Title V appropriation became available. And, in any case, the SEA's could have changed their Title V projects the second year if they thought the first year decisions were too rushed. There is not much evidence that this took place.

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*Some argue that Title V should have passed the year before ESEA so that the states could have had ample time to prepare for their new responsibilities.

Second, although the states did have an extremely difficult task in implementing ESEA quickly, sufficient human resources seemed available for developing Title V applications in the three states studied in-depth. This was particularly true in New York which had a large and sophisticated staff in 1965. In South Carolina, a new man was hired to coordinate ESEA's implementation, and he had the assistance of several other professionals. In Massachusetts, departmental top staff had a good idea of what was needed by the SEA prior to Title V; the generation of projects did not require extensive manpower. All in all, the argument that Title V would have initiated greater change the first year had there been more time or more manpower is open to question.

Another issue concerning the Congress (as well as the Executive Branch) was the uncertainty of continued funding of Title V projects. This uncertainty, it was argued, inhibited the exploration of fundamental changes, and the targeting of Title V resources in large projects which might be cut off after the first year.

No doubt there was some uncertainty in 1965 about the continued funding of ESEA, but its extent is unclear. On the one hand, ESEA had a five year authorization,[15] the funding for future years was considered "bright",[16] and the states had faithfully received federal vocational education funds each year since 1917. Emphasizing this last point, the former Commissioner of Education in Massachusetts stated that he had little doubt in 1965 that federal funds would continue to flow beyond the first year.[17] On the other hand, one top SEA official in New York thought that uncertainty about future funding was an important issue in 1965 and suggested that this might have affected the Department's willingness to target funds.[18] In retrospect, it is impossible to assess fully the importance of this uncertainty in the minds of those making the Title V decisions. It may have been a factor in some states, but had little effect in others.*

The late congressional appropriation, however, definitely did create significant problems in implementing the initial Title V projects. According to SEA officials, it was nearly impossible to find staff because the school year had begun by the time money was appropriated. Late funding and the subsequent inability to fill job slots may largely explain why twenty-two percent[19] of the Title V funds were not spent the first year, and why approximately forty percent[20] of the first year appropriation was expended on equipment.

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*This avoidance of problems created by funding uncertainty, if it took place, fits in exactly with the principles drawn from organizational theory, which are discussed later in this chapter. That is, organizations, faced with an uncertain future, deal with short-term pressing problems.

While the tardy appropriation helps to explain why SEA's had difficulty hiring schoolmen, it fails to explain why Title V projects for the most part did not propose the hiring of individuals not working in education and, therefore, not tied to the school year. In certain cases, of course, the prohibitive costs of hiring expensive personnel, like economists, may have eliminated the possibility of diversifying SEA staff. But other professionals could have been sought--those trained in management, or public administration, for example--who might have been available in the middle of the school year. I found little evidence that Title V prompted SEA's to recruit outside education circles.

The Congress (as well as the Executive Branch) also was blamed for the failure to increase the annual Title V spending level as quickly as originally anticipated.[21] Presumably if more money had been available then Title V's impact on SEA leadership would have been more visible.*

Although the Title V (section 503) appropriation for fiscal year 1972--$31.4 million--was more than double the initial appropriation in 1966,[22] it was in fact less of an increase than it appears to be.

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*It should be pointed out that this argument is inconsistent with the earlier one which was based on the future uncertainty of Title V funding. Curiously, at least one person made both arguments.

Two federal programs with a combined budget of approximately $7.8 million were merged into the Title V program in fiscal year 1968.[23] Thus, the real difference in annual appropriations between fiscal years 1966 and 1972 was less than $10 million, hardly a huge increase if inflation and salary increases are considered. Nevertheless, Title V's limited visible impact in New York and Massachusetts did not seem to be mainly a function of limited resources or the absence of a "critical mass," although additional money could easily have been expended once the program got off the ground. Other factors--the bureaucratic and political clime for change in both states--were more important in determining the extent of SEA strengthening.

Aside from the Congress and USOE, blame was placed on the states. It was argued that SEA salaries were not competitive with those for other comparable education positions, thus restricting the recruitment of educational leaders. Also, the bureaucratic requirements of central personnel offices often prevented the hiring of the best applicants because they simply lacked the standard credentials.

These factors can be important obstacles to improved SEA operations. Low SEA salaries, for example, were widespread.[24] But the importance of these factors varied among the states. In Massachusetts, low salaries and bureaucratic entanglements were significant stumbling blocks in the implementation of Title V in 1965. In New York, the opposite was true; central office clearance for new staff apparently was of minimal importance and salaries were fairly competitive. In South Carolina, the situation was mixed; bureaucratic entanglements were nonexistent and the salaries were non-competitive. Given these various combinations from state to state, neither central office clearance nor low salaries provides a convincing general explanation of why Title V had a greater impact in South Carolina than in New York or Massachusetts. Competitive salaries and flexibility in hiring staff probably are necessary to develop and sustain a competently-staffed SEA, but they are not sufficient for a position of influence in education. Other factors--local school control, for example--are probably more important.

The states also were blamed for the failure of their legislatures to pick up the cost of projects started with Title V. Here the argument presumably was the same as the one used earlier about the low level of congressional appropriations. That is, if the legislature had picked up the costs, then in effect additional Title V resources would have been available for new SEA activities.

As noted earlier, the main obstacle to reform was not the lack of additional resources. Besides, in the absence of strong legislative support, SEA's theoretically could have raised money to meet new priorities by terminating lower priority Title V projects. In practice, SEA's demonstrated a distinct reluctance to cut off established Title V activities.

Blame for Title V falling short of the reformers' hopes was placed on the weak condition of the SEA's. They were woefully understaffed in 1965, it was contended, and therefore needed to use Title V to fill in "critical gaps in service". This explains why many states focused on short-term projects and on the expansion of existing staffing patterns, particularly by hiring subject matter curriculum specialists. This argument also seems to imply that if "critical gaps" had not existed in 1965, then Title V would have been used to develop long-term leadership strategies.

Certainly many states, including Massachusetts and South Carolina, were sparsely staffed in 1965. The New York SEA, on the other hand, was generally regarded as amply staffed. Yet, New York used Title V funds largely to respond to a series of short-term critical problems, rather than the development of long-range strategies. The example of New York raises two questions. Was the short-term orientation of SEA's in fact a function of how amply a SEA was staffed? What makes a particular project "critical"?

Finally, and perhaps most frequently, blame was placed on the SEA's themselves. They were described as unimaginative, conservative, and backing into the future reluctantly. Indeed, Roald F. Campbell and his colleagues in their 1967 report on Title V expressed concern about SEA behavior which seems to fall into this category:

> In summary, the heavy emphasis upon standard patterns of advising and consulting as a means of implementing the service function seems to indicate that SDE's (especially small and medium SDE's) may not be using Title V funds to explore other possible ways of serving schools. Perhaps SDE's should carry on such exploration more vigorously than they now seem to be doing.[25] (Emphasis added.)

The expansion of traditional ongoing activities, in other words, perhaps resulted from the absence of vigor on the part of some SEA's.

Whether SEA's have been appropriately vigorous or imaginative is not something I explored in any systematic way. However, one must wonder about this explanation. Although blaming the SEA's might be appealing--particularly since there probably is cause in many cases--this explanation hardly rings true for the New York SEA. Its top officials in 1965 were probably as imaginative and vigorous as the leadership of any public agency in the country. It would be difficult to sustain the argument that the New York Department's focus on short-term pressing problems, for example, resulted from an absence of vigor or imagination.

The list of "blames" for Title V not promoting institutional reform, then, includes many factors: lack of USOE aggressiveness; late congressional appropriations; a crisis situation created by implementing ESEA all at once; insufficient time for preplanning; funding uncertainty; slowness of Title V fund growth; low SEA salaries; bureaucratic state governments; the already-existing weaknesses of SEA's; and the alleged ineptitude of some SEA's themselves. These explanations of the Title V outcomes are impressive and appear intuitively reasonable. But a closer examination suggests that these "blames" do not tell the whole story. Different combinations of factors seem important in some SEA s, but not in others. Virtually none of these factors sheds much light on the Title V outcome in New York, with the possible exception of the issue of uncertainty of continued federal funding. Indeed, none of these "blame" explanations offers a comprehensive explanation for the basic question asked earlier: why did Title V not act as a stimulus for change?

The theory: Going beyond the conventional wisdom about Title V problems, another explanation for the Title V outcome was presented in Chapter I. Rather than mainly focusing on the circumstances and assigning blame, this explanation concentrated on what theorists argue are principles of organizational behavior. Four concepts drawn from organizational decision-making theory were stressed as particularly relevant.*

First, it was argued that organizations have distinct cultures which could affect the use of new unrestricted resources. This organizational culture is manifest in a history, traditions, norms, accepted ways of conducting business, and standard operating procedures. "Some states have mores, customs, and traditions which are just as binding as law,"[26] a USOE staffer said.

The three preceding chapters discussed the importance of some of these cultural attributes in determining SEA behavior and leadership. I emphasized that SEA's had their own unique characteristics, and operated within differing bureaucratic and political milieus. Massachusetts, for instance, had a history of weak state bureaucracy; in 1965 there was only limited support for policy-oriented executive leadership in education. Going back to the days of the Reconstruction, South Carolina had a history of avoiding centralized governmental action; the state moved forward slowly and cautiously. In 1965, New York had a history of professionalism and a reputation as a leader among the states; it was far ahead of most others when Title V became available and was inclined to implement programs which appeared innovative. These historical factors helped determine both how Title V would be spent and how much the resources would change the SEA's.

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*These are spelled out in more detail, with reference to the literature, in Chapter I, pages 22 to 28 .

Tied to these historical considerations were certain traditions which played a significant role in the development of SEA leadership. Local school control was an example of a tradition important in all three states, particularly in Massachusetts. Attitudes toward localism strongly constrained SEA activities in working with local schoolmen and in their attempts to gain more influence. One observer of SEA's explained the problem this way:

> It [tradition of localism] is one of the key cultural differences between education and other major state services. Its essence is to challenge *any* state rule or regulation as an *incursion* on local responsibility. You don't find that kind of challenge in most other state agencies' work--or at least not that noticeable challenge. Consider, then, the consequences of such challenges--how *timid* it makes already diffident SEA officials.[27] (Emphasis in original.)

Standard operating procedures are another important part of an organization's behavior patterns. The most obvious example in 1965 was the method for providing SEA instructional assistance to the schools. Usually upon request, SEA subject matter consultants would "make the rounds" visiting schools to provide technical assistance in instruction. This simply was the accepted approach for providing services to schools.

Another example shows how standard operating procedures can turn into mindless habits. The Campbell Report describes the routine procedure for collecting books in one SEA:

> This SDE [State department of education] maintains a collection of all text books used in the public schools of the state. A section of the school code requires all publishers who sell books to school districts within the state to forward to the SDE a copy of each book. When the person in charge of the collection was asked the purpose of this regulation, the respondent quoted the appropriate section of the school code. Apparently, there is no examination of the content of the texts by anyone in this SDE. The respondent showed no concern about the time consumed gathering what must be considered a largely useless collection. The law requires the books to be collected; therefore the books will be collected. The idea that the law might be in need of revision did not enter into this individual's conception of the job.[28] (Emphasis in original.)

The organizational cultures of SEA's, then, provided the general framework--differing from state to state--within which Title V and other federal programs attempted to bring about change. Built up over time and possessing an enduring character, organizational attributes helped to determine the way in which SEA's would react to federal assistance. In short, Title V was not placed on clean slates in 1965.

A second theoretical concept helps to explain why organizational programs and procedures often continue with only gradual change. Theorists argue that organizations do not constantly search for better, or the best, ways of doing their job; procedures that "work" and are thought to be "good enough" are acceptable. Search for new departures takes place only when the existing practices are thought "unsatisfactory".

This organizational attribute, combined with the 1965 standard operating procedure of providing subject matter assistance to schools, helps to explain the "overmuch attention"[29] concentrated on hiring additional subject matter consultants with Title V money. School visitations were the accepted practice and taken for granted in discussions about additional services for the schools; alternative procedures were rarely, if ever, considered since the existing practices were not thought "unsatisfactory".

This failure to explore alternative ways to provide services was most clearly exemplified in the statement of a Massachusetts official. The Title V decision-making about instructional services to the schools reportedly went like this:

> What do we have now? Where are the gaps? What kind of people do we need?... The conscious determination was made to add subject matter specialists in those areas where we didn't have them. I don't think we ever said should we or shouldn't we have them. [There was] acceptance of the fact that we should.[30]

This suggests that the absence of SEA vigor in exploring alternatives, referred to earlier, may have had as much to do with typical organizational behavior as with the peculiarities of particular SEA's or their top management.

A third concept drawn from organizational theory is that organizations minimize uncertainty in allocating staff time as well as new money. That is, the tremendous uncertainties associated with unclear future events are avoided by concentrating organizational energies on short-term pressing problems where the issues are clearer and operations therefore are less uncertain. As a result, organizations seem to behave like "fire companies" moving from crisis to crisis extinguishing small "brush fires", rather than implementing long-range plans.[31]

While these three theoretical concepts provide some sense of the general constraints on organizational activity and change, more needs to be said about the specific resource allocation decisions and the ways in which they were made. Crucial to an understanding of the decision-making process is the concept of an organization as a coalition of subunits with different demands and goals which often are in conflict. Although most SEA employees may be educators, anyone visiting a SEA would quickly discover--as one might well expect--that different subunits of educators are concerned with different problems. The officials working in school accreditation, for instance, are more dedicated to that activity than, for example, to the development of mathematics curricula. This competition-oriented conception of an organization leads to the expectation that Title V decisions would be characterized more by informal bargaining for funds than by a calculated choice to meet agreed-upon organizational goals and priorities.

Four concepts drawn from organizational theory, then, are particularly important in explaining the implementation of programs providing free money. Organizations have unique cultures which have a significant bearing on the way new money is utilized. Organizations typically choose programs that are "good enough" rather than searching for the "best". Complex organizations avoid uncertainty, which means that they side-step unclear future events and expend their energies on short-term pressing problems. Different organizational units normally have conflicting goals which often can lead to competition for new resources. Based on these concepts, five working hypotheses were derived and set forth in Chapter I. It is now possible to evaluate these expectations (underscored) about the use of Title V.

First, one would expect competition for the funds, with the money distributed to satisfy the interests of important elements in *the organization, rather than the targeting of funds according to an abstractly determined set of agreed-upon priorities.*

This working hypothesis was basically borne out, but the nature of the competition and the extent to which the interests of important subunits were satisfied varied somewhat from state to state. In New York, the advent of Title V resulted in an invitation to the professional staff for ideas on how to expend Title V. Virtually all SEA subunits were eligible for funds including those concerned with higher education and the state museum. Decisions were made by a group of top New York administrators in a series of meetings. Most of the suggestions from across-the-agency were funded with apparently little conflict since the total requests for funding closely matched New York's Title V apportionment. The proposals were simply stapled together.* Indeed, this pattern may help explain why some 900 Title V projects were approved nationwide the first year.[33]

The working hypothesis was similarly borne out in South Carolina, but apparently with more open and vigorous competition. Indeed, there was a scramble for the money with the competition extending even to education units outside the South Carolina SEA, such as the Educational Television Commission. The decisions evolved from a process of

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*It is curious to compare the New York process with that reportedly used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. According to Enthoven and Smith: "...the JCS is supposed to integrate these independent service parts [budget requests]. But history has repeatedly shown that a committee like the JCS does not act this way. If not forced to make hard choices between Service interests, the JCS staples together Service requests."[32]

"give and take" extending over a period of months, with the money divided among those key subunits and employees seeking their fair share.

In Massachusetts, on the other hand, the money was not spread evenly across the SEA. There was no general invitation to the staff for ideas and apparently less staff involvement than in the other two agencies. Competition for resources took place in the sense that different subunits, as a normal process, had kept the departmental top management informed of their needs for additional resources. Decisions were made by the Commissioner, who basically "knew" his funding priorities, with some input from a small group of advisors. Essentially Title V was allocated by proceeding down the already-existing shopping list of needs.

Although the process differed somewhat from state to state, three common characteristics were particularly important. As mentioned earlier, the funds were not targeted according to some abstractly determined set of agreed-upon priorities. Discussions of Title V allocations apparently proceeded from _specific_ activities (e.g., an additional specialist or a new curriculum guide) to general priorities (e.g., enhancement of SEA leadership in instruction), _not_ the reverse. Abstract priorities were established only after the project decisions were made.

A second characteristic common to the three states was that specific projects by and large were considered not because the SEA's had been stimulated by Title V to undergo a thorough review and therefore were searching everywhere for the best alternatives, but chiefly because different subunits were already--prior to Title V--predisposed toward certain additional activities and thought they fit within the broad and vague notion of "strengthening" the agency.[34] In fact, heavy emphasis was placed on activities which the state legislatures had not funded, or probably would not fund. In many cases, projects were simply taken "off the shelf" when Title V became available. Hence, Title V may have been viewed by some in Washington as a vehicle to get SEA's to rethink their priorities and institute reform, but within the agencies it was more often viewed as a supplemental resource to be tapped to meet existing subunit priorities, whatever they might be.

A final common characteristic was the importance that a "need" have an advocate. One must wonder, for example, whether Massachusetts would have allocated more than half its Title V resources to the research office if there had not been a highly regarded employee arguing the case. It is doubtful that part of Title V would have been used in New York to set up an Office of Science and Technology had the "need" for one not been advocated by a high-level staffer. Similarly, one must wonder whether a research office even would have been initiated the first year in South Carolina had an aggressive employee not fought for it. A USOE official captured the flavor of how things appear to have worked:

> There are certain needs and certain people espouse those needs. And whether you like it or not those people with the best reasons and the best arguments will be likely to have their arguments accepted. You'll find the demands of people in the state, pressure groups, the demands of the governor, the legislature. All of these affect decisions....[35]

Or, as another USOE official described the use of Title V by SEA's:

> They used it where they had the most screams for help. ... Every little department in each State Department of Education wanted their own part of the money. To keep peace in the family the Commissioners probably doled out the money that way.[36]

Finally, referring to Title V, a Rhode Island SEA staffer made this important point succinctly: "It's the old adage of the squeaky wheel."[37]

What this implies, of course, is that if the cast of characters in SEA's had been different in 1965, then the discrete projects and each unit's share of resources likely would have been somewhat different.[38] Or, to put it another way, personal preferences, as contrasted with abstract notions of need, apparently were important in deciding how the money was initially expended. In making this point, my intention is not to castigate the soundness of the proposed projects or to question the motives of those arguing for additional resources. Rather, I am simply trying to emphasize that "needs" must be articulated if they are to be met with action. And in the normal situation where there are more "needs" than available resources to meet them, a persuasive advocate can play an important role. Aaron Wildavsky has clearly depicted the way this advocacy behavior might appropriately be viewed:

> The notion that administrators go around telling each other (or believe in secret) that the purposes for which they request funds are not valid but that they want the money anyway in order to advance themselves and build empires is not worthy of consideration. It would be exceedingly difficult to keep people in an organization if they could not justify its purposes to themselves.... Attempts to reduce a complex distributive process like budgeting to the terms of a western melodrama...do away with the great problem of deciding upon expenditures advocated by officials who are sincere believers in their proposals, knowing that not all demands can be satisfied.[39]

The second working hypothesis was that Title V would be expended mainly to meet pressing problems through the simple expansion of existing modes of operation. Entirely new priorities, like planning, would rarely be established.

Despite the wide diversity among SEA's and their Title V projects, this working hypothesis is supported by my data. Specifically, the initial Title V projects were budgeted mainly to meet a series of *ad hoc*, short-term problems, as contrasted with the development of long-range strategies. The major emphasis of these projects was on the expansion and marginal adaptation of ongoing activities, as contrasted with the development of significantly different approaches or new SEA roles. For example, only two states used Title V the first year to establish planning offices; and, interestingly, in at least one of these states, there was local pressure to do so.[40]

Moreover, even the new research office in South Carolina and the new regional offices in Massachusetts were designed mainly to provide additional staff to do more of what these SEA's were doing prior to ESEA. The hopes of the legislative framers for institutional reform were met primarily with "more of the same".

These findings are consistent with the notion that organizations do not search for alternatives to maximize short- and long-term organizational goals, but rather, move from crisis to crisis in an effort to avoid uncertainty. This organizational attribute was cleverly portrayed--in jest, but with a ring of reality--in a notice posted in the Colorado office of a prominent SEA staffer. It read:

> NOTICE
>
> THE OBJECTIVE OF ALL DEDICATED DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE TO THOROUGHLY ANALYZE ALL SITUATIONS, ANTICIPATE ALL PROBLEMS PRIOR TO THEIR OCCURRENCE, HAVE ANSWERS FOR THESE PROBLEMS, AND MOVE SWIFTLY TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS WHEN CALLED UPON....
>
> HOWEVER....
>
> WHEN YOU ARE UP TO YOUR ASS IN ALLIGATORS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO REMIND YOURSELF THAT YOUR INITIAL OBJECTIVE WAS TO DRAIN THE SWAMP.[41]

It is particularly noteworthy that even the rich and amply staffed New York SEA behaved in this fashion. A striking number of its Title V projects appeared to be short-term reactions to snapping alligators.

If organizations--large as well as small, rich as well as poor--typically act to avoid uncertainty, as organizational theory contends and my data suggest, then it should be less than surprising that Title V was largely used to react to a series of short-term problems. And if organizations typically behave according to standard operating procedures and traditions, then it should also not be surprising that the short-term problems were met for the most part with the marginal adaptation of ongoing activities.

The third working hypothesis was that standard procedures for recruiting personnel would not be affected by the availability of new resources.

Title V appears to have had little direct impact on changing the caliber or kind of SEA employees. Hiring procedures were not altered as a result of these unrestricted federal resources. This finding is consistent with those of the Campbell Report authors who expressed concern about the use of Title V for the "perpetuation and reification"[42] of 1965 hiring practices.

At the same time, however, it is my impression that the quality of SEA personnel in some states is improving, but for reasons other than the stimulus of Title V. While I have not explored this issue fully, the reasons include the increased importance of some SEA's (e.g., in South Carolina); more interesting positions in SEA's with their new responsibilities in administering different federal programs; and a larger pool of potential SEA employees because of a nationwide economic recession and a growing oversupply of professional educators. In any case, these factors, rather than the stimulus of a new program (Title V) meant to stimulate a "thorough overhaul" of SEA's, probably account for the improvements that seem to be taking place in some SEA's.[43]

Fourth, organizational stakes would carry funded projects beyond the point where benefits outweigh costs; projects tend to become permanent.

Once staff positions were filled for the original Title V projects, the jobs by and large have continued to be funded from year to year. As a result, the original flexibility of Title V was short-lived; the program largely turned into a subsidy program for projects designed to meet 1965 needs. Title V "became a generalized administrative support program," a USOE official said. "It simply did not succeed in focusing on changing leadership in its broadest terms."[44]

This finding, combined with the earlier point that the initial projects probably would have taken a somewhat different form had there been a different cast of characters in 1965 arguing their own needs, leads to a curious result which neatly pierces the aura of rationality surrounding organizational behavior. In the words of Richard M. Cyert and James G. March: "The 'accidents' of organizational genealogy tend to be perpetuated."[45]

But not all of Title V resources were tied up in permanent staff positions. The three SEA's studied in depth used a small portion of the money in effect as a contingency fund to meet crises as they arose. In fact, this was accomplished in part without a formally earmarked fund. Job vacancies freed previously budgeted resources for new activities, and other budgeted items often were not spent completely during the year. Consequently, Title V frequently was available to meet the cost of small new endeavors in the middle of the fiscal year.

What should be emphasized here was the sequence of events leading to these Title V expenditures. A need developed within the SEA. Then an appropriate funding source was sought. Since Title V was the most discretionary source of funds available to SEA's, it could support activities which could not appropriately be funded through other more restricted federal categorical aid programs.[46] Also, Title V could be used to pay expenses when state funds were not budgeted for that purpose. What this meant, of course, was that projects were simply labeled as a Title V effort because of the money's availability.

That some SEA's used Title V in this fashion should not be surprising. As an experienced government hand said: "Every level of government I've ever been involved with has had a slush fund. How it works depends on the ingenuity of the finance man."[47]

As was true the first year, then, Title V over the years did not act as a stimulus for new approaches; the program lost its identity as a federal effort designed in part to foster reform. It largely became a subsidy for ongoing SEA operations, with a small part usually available to respond to minor crises as they emerged.

Fifth, SEA goals and activities would change slowly over time as a result of experience. Dramatic change usually would result from heavy pressure from outside the organization.

The preceding three chapters set out those factors which help to explain the varying impact of Title V--and, more generally, the federal presence--on the different SEA's. This evidence supports the working hypothesis. The Massachusetts SEA had just undergone a legislature-ordered reorganization when Title V first became available in 1965. But this was not followed by strong pressure for continued SEA improvement. Little significant change took place in the programs of the agency; in the bureaucratic procedures for hiring staff; in the "religion of localism" with its emphasis on an insignificant role for the SEA; or in top leadership (until a new commissioner joined the agency in 1969). Consequently, organizational boxes were shifted but little else happened, perhaps until very recently. Since 1965, then, the SEA changed somewhat but continued in 1971 to be a second-class citizen in Massachusetts education.

When Title V reached New York, by contrast, the SEA was a stable, well financed, sophisticated organization and not under significant pressure to institute any major organizational changes. The New York SEA used Title V to make a series of marginal improvements, with the agency changing slowly over the years. The advent of Title V certainly did not precipitate any "thorough overhaul" or reevaluation of its needs or direction. As to New York's declining influence with the legislature, this seemed to be highly related to a fiscal crisis in New York state government, to a growing disillusionment with the requests of educators, and to the demise of a reportedly once-monolithic and respected school lobby at the state level. These forces took their toll on the New York SEA despite the high competence of its professional staff.

In South Carolina--the state that changed the most--the convergence of several forces were crucial. Probably most important, extensive and sustained pressure for departmental change built up outside the agency. This pressure combined with a new team of change-oriented officials, and the absence of bureaucratic and political roadblocks to implementation provided the ideal milieu for unrestricted resources to be of help. Under these circumstances, Title V played an important role in facilitating those changes the SEA wanted to institute. To be sure, the importance of the timing of Title V cannot be overemphasized. Had Title V come five years earlier, for instance, the program probably would have had only marginal impact; the agency had not yet reached the point where substantial change was demanded or possible. So, then, only South Carolina among the three SEA's studied in-depth was under sustained pressure to change rapidly; and only it did so.

The extent of Title V's success, therefore, depended mainly on local, as contrasted with federal, factors. And these factors--economic changes, state fiscal problems, political shifts, a breakdown in traditions--were beyond significant manipulation by the federal government. More than that, even if the conditions were "right" for strengthening a SEA's management and professional competence, this was far from a guarantee of a new or sustained position of influence with the legislature. This suggests that federally-initiated reform is extremely complicated and difficult to accomplish. It depends on a wide variety of local circumstances which can change in an unpredictable fashion. Pouring free money into this political and bureaucratic mix will likely result in more of the same, unless the money is the only missing ingredient--probably not the typical situation. Money is just not the key to reform that some would like to believe.

This discussion goes a bit further than the earlier conventional wisdom explanations. Two caveats need emphasis, however. The fit between the theory and my data is not perfect. Some projects, for example, were not simple responses to short-term problems. Also, I would not contend that providing strong leaders with unrestricted resources could not bring about significant change in a way inconsistent with the theoretical propositions (e.g., in the absence of external demands for change). However, based on my data, I suspect that Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn are correct when they state:

> Though organizations are always in some degree of flux and rarely, if ever, attain a perfect state of equilibrium, major changes are the exception rather than the rule. . . .
>
> Our reading of organizational history...argues the primary role of external forces in major organizational change.[48]

In short, the theory suggests typical institutional tendencies rather than precise predictions for all organizations.

These caveats notwithstanding, the theory does add an important missing dimension to the discussion of the Title V outcomes. Major constraints having little to do with the conventional wisdom--but enduring attributes of organizations--have been overlooked in explaining the impact of Title V.

It is paradoxical, but the underlying reason why Title V did not act as a stimulus for institutional reform may have as much to do with the way complex organizations typically behave with free money as with questions of inadequate planning time, unimaginative SEA chiefs, and so forth. Or, to state this argument differently, suppose conditions in 1965 had been closer to an ideal situation: ample time for developing proposals, no other new programs to implement, competitive SEA salaries, and no central office clearance of staff. I suggest that the chief focus even under these conditions might still have been on greasing squeaky wheels through marginal adaptations of existing operations. And in the long run, major SEA change probably would have been dependent upon pressure for improvement from outside the organization.

III. Implications

This discussion suggests that a major problem in 1965 was the way the reformers thought about organizations and how they change. As discussed earlier, they seemed to think that Title V decisions would grow out of a "rational" process and, in turn, SEA's would change in a flexible manner. Or, stated differently, the reformers seemed to assume that SEA's would act the way one expects a rational individual to act (i.e., by proceeding sequentially from general goals to the exploration of alternatives, to the choice of specific activities.)*

This assumption typically underlies efforts to explain as well as predict organizational action. After a comprehensive analysis of the issue in the literature on foreign affairs, Graham T. Allison concluded:

> Each [analyst] assumes that what must be explained is an [government] action, i.e., behavior that reflects purpose or intention. Each assumes that the actor is a national government. Each assumes that the action is chosen as a calculated solution to a strategic problem. For each, explanation consists of showing what goal the government was pursuing when it acted and the action was a reasonable choice, given the nation's objectives....
>
> ...to explain an occurrence in foreign policy simply means to show how the government could have chosen that action.[49]

In other words, Allison concluded that analysts assume "governmental behavior can be most satisfactorily understood by analogy with the purposive acts of individuals."[50]

In education, the Campbell Report on Title V followed the same tradition, by first examining what states did with the money, and then trying to find rational explanations for their actions:

> Why SDE's of different size would define 'strengthening leadership resources' in different ways is hard to explain. It may be that smaller SDE's are highly conscious of the fact that there are subject areas in which they do not provide consultation and materials; thus, they are moving to meet a deficiency. This hypothesis is strongly supported by our case studies. Larger SDE's may feel that their service programs are adequate, and that other kinds of leadership activities are needed.[51] (Emphasis added.)

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*Whether individuals actually do behave in this fashion is a separate question which is not explored in this study.

The puzzle facing the Campbell Report authors was the different patterns of Title V expenditures in states of different size. To explain this situation, they seemed to put themselves in the place of the organizations and ask the natural question: how would we have proceeded? If one assumes that SEA's made decisions the same way that a purposive individual would decide (i.e., by proceeding sequentially from general agency goals to specific projects), then an explanation for a particular pattern of expenditures is found by reversing the sequence. That is to say, given certain projects, one tries to define the organizational goal and then show that the specific projects represent calculated choices flowing from this goal. According to the Campbell Report, the "reason" why the different SEA's spent Title V differently, therefore, seems to be found in the differing definitions of the goal--"strengthening leadership resources".

But this created a problem. As the Campbell Report notes, it was "hard to explain" why different SEA's defined the goal of "leadership" differently. Perhaps the reason it was hard to explain is the misfounded assumption that SEA's made their Title V decisions by engaging in goal-directed behavior (starting with an internally agreed-upon definition of the goal of leadership). My investigation suggests that Title V decisions were mostly the result of competition among different units for the support of specific activities, or the result of pre-existing priorities, with the definition of "strengthening leadership resources" emerging only after the decisions were made. In effect, the goal of Title V was "discovered" at the end of the decision process by assigning general purposes to the discrete Title V projects and then labeling the aggregation--"strengthening leadership resources". This suggests that to explain "why" different agencies spent the money differently does not require a search for general, agreed-upon goals, but rather an analysis of the internal workings of the SEA, with a focus on different SEA units, standard operating procedures, traditions, short-term problems, and the priorities of those individuals with access to the decision-making arena. From this point of view, the Campbell Report authors thought about the problem in the wrong way and looked in the wrong place for answers.

Finally, the argument that we conceptualize organizational action the way we think about purposive individual behavior is not limited to the Title V reformers, foreign affairs analysts, or the Campbell Report authors. Writing in 1971 about the problem of changing schools, Seymour B. Saranson stated:

> Good ideas and missionary zeal are sometimes enough to change the thinking and actions of individuals; they are rarely, if ever effective in changing complicated organizations (like the school) with traditions, dynamics, and goals of their own. To change complicated settings requires, initially at least, a way of thinking not the same as the way we think about changing individuals....
>
> In short, the problem has resided not only 'out there' in the schools, but in the ways in which we have been accustomed to thinking about what it was that needed to be changed.... In situations of failure or crisis it is much easier to project blame outward than it is to implicate our way of thinking and their consequences for our actions.[52]

Policy-makers and analysts alike, then, seem to base their expectations about organizational change on the assumption that organizations behave the way we expect goal-directed individuals to behave. This failure to distinguish between the individual and the organization as units of analysis may be a major barrier to an understanding of organizational change. In fact, my study suggests that the assumption of purposive organizational behavior is wrong, and leads to unrealistic expectations and confused analyses.

All of this has implications for the way we think about how organizations work, and what we think they should accomplish. It implies that thinking about organizational change the way we think about individuals is bound to be ineffective. Instead, reform efforts must deal explicitly with the enduring attributes of organizations: traditions, norms, and standard operating procedures; subunits with conflicting goals and expansionary tendencies; a preoccupation with short-term pressing problems; search procedures that accept solutions that are "good enough" rather than optimal; and activities that outlive their usefulness. These complexities are overlooked if we conceptualize organizational behavior as analagous to the acts of purposive individuals.

This, in turn, seems to lead toward low expectations for quick reform. After all, the theory suggests that organizations usually move slowly. But this does not necessarily have to be so. Organizations do change and they might be improved if their workings were better understood.

In the meantime, however, if my working hypotheses do, in fact, help to predict organizational behavior, then one should recognize the incompleteness of explanations of Title V problems which simply assign blame to historical circumstances, or particular organizations or officials. This does not mean that USOE, SEA's or their officials are free from responsibility for their actions, but rather, that the causes of problems with Title V reform involve more than individual culpability.

This discussion seems particularly relevant today, in view of growing support for various programs of unrestricted federal assistance, such as revenue sharing and general aid to the schools. Behind this approach lies the notion that public institutions are not "working" because of problems created by rigid categorical programs, the absence of local flexibility to maneuver, and "strangulation by Federal red tape."[53] The hope for reform rests on the same basic assumption as Title V: institutions provided the freedom to plan for their needs, will develop rational and flexible strategies for institutional reform.* This assumption is clearly illustrated in President Nixon's message to the Congress on Education Revenue Sharing:

> The time, energy and imagination needed to bring educational reform is frequently drained off into what is essentially non-productive effort to qualify for Government grants. Yet, at the same time, rigid qualifications for grants frequently stifle creative initiative....
>
> Educational planning is made difficult because of the fragmentation of grants...[and] the present fragmented procedures virtually eliminate any possibility of preparing a comprehensive coordinated program....
>
> Education Revenue Sharing would revitalize the relationship between the Federal Government and State and local governments. It would stimulate creativity and new initiatives at State and local levels....
>
> Under this proposal for Education Revenue Sharing, States and local schools districts would be given far greater flexibility than is presently the case in deciding how funds should be spent.... This would enhance flexibility in the application of funds for education, and permit the States to make substantial adjustment in their education plans as their educational needs require.[54]

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*Of course, current proposals for general assistance, as with Title V in 1965, are multi-purpose. Other purposes include simple fiscal relief, providing additional services, sharing in rising costs, and political decentralization

Not only is the basic assumption the same as with Title V, but the outcome may well be similar. If my working hypotheses fit the use of Title V by SEA's, then they may similarly apply to the way state bureaucracies would use free money provided through revenue sharing, or how school systems would use general aid. In both cases, I would expect the new money to be used to grease squeaky wheels, or to support pre-existing priorities, and to be distributed usually on the basis of intra-organizational competition, not planning. I would expect that, once begun, the flow of new funds would be used to continue the projects first established, with basic organizational change resulting from extra-organizational pressure, not the free money. Hence, just as the hopes of the Title V reformers were somewhat dashed by the realities of organizational behavior, so too may be the hopes of the current exponents of institutional reform through general assistance.

CHAPTER VII

NOTES ON ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

The preceding six chapters described Title V's implementation in several states and examined the nature of federal-state relations in the program's administration. One question remains: what might the federal government do to strengthen SEA's further? To help answer that question, this chapter explores the consequences of adopting various courses of action.

I begin by dealing with the conventional options available to the federal government. The first section explores the two major ways to provide SEA's with financial assistance: general aid and categorical aid. I also examine grant consolidation as another device to change the delivery of federal resources to SEA's. The second section discusses the use of federal regulations as a means to encourage the states to follow federal priorities, and the third section examines alternative ways to provide technical assistance to SEA's.

I also focus on more controversial approaches for dealing with the states. Challenging the assumption that all the states should be treated basically alike, the fourth section discusses ways to treat the states in a differential fashion: bypassing some states in the administration of federal programs, providing concentrated technical assistance in some SEA's and not in others, and utilizing incentives. The fifth section explores several devices to make education bureaucracies more accountable to governmental leaders, to the clients of federal programs (e.g., the poor), and to the public in general.

The sixth section focuses on SEA planning since the proposed federal budget for fiscal year 1973 contains $10 million to initiate SEA comprehensive educational planning. I explore the comprehensive approach and suggest as an alternative what I have called "policy analysis." The final section briefly summarizes my own judgments about the best alternatives to meet the most often-discussed federal objectives for strengthening the states.

Before looking at the alternatives, it is important to mention two arguments which challenge the idea of any direct focus on SEA's. The first argument suggests the abandonment of any further plans to strengthen the role of the states in education. While many believe that stronger state leadership is an important step to educational improvement, others simply view it as a threat to localism and diversity. For example a dissenting opinion in the 1972 final report of The President's Commission on School Finance contended that "a massive buildup of State activity in education may be a serious threat to the autonomy of the local school board...."[1] Curiously, this dissenting opinion was written by a former member of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education--the group which oversaw the federal investment in SEA's between 1965 and 1970.

The second argument suggests that even if one agrees that the states ought to be strengthened, it is far from clear that concentrating exclusively on SEA's is the "best" way to accomplish this goal. Even though this was the basic assumption behind the Title V legislation, other units of state government could be assisted instead. For example, federal funds could be directed to state legislatures, perhaps to hire professional staff for their education committees, or funds could be channeled to governors rather than to chief state school officers who are, in many cases, politically independent.* Merely mentioning these arguments suggests their value and the need for careful exploration. This task will be left to others, however, since the main concern of this study is SEA's.

The picture painted in this chapter is not Pollyannish. One reason for this has to do with organizations, and how they make decisions and change. I have pointed to various enduring attributes of organizations inhibiting rapid reform, and have documented their existence. Organizations do change. But for the most part, they change slowly. They simply are not the flexible instruments that some people seem to assume.

A second reason is due to differing views of how SEA's ought to change. The abstract goal "SEA strengthening" means different things to different people. For some, it means better instructional services. For others, it means enhanced planning capacity. For still others, it simply means more resources to meet problems as they come along. For most individuals interested in strengthening SEA's, these objectives are all desirable, with conflict arising only over the assignment of priorities.[3]

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*Chief state school officers are appointed by the governor in only four states. They are appointed by a state board of education in twenty-six states and are elected by popular vote in twenty states.[2]

Similarly, there are conflicting views about the appropriate federal role in dealing with the states. Some think that the federal government ought to establish priorities and aggressively implement them.[4] Others assume that the states are primarily responsible for education and by and large should be free from federal priorities.[5] These conflicting views are reflected politically in the ambiguous laws Congress writes, in the willingness of Congress to intervene in the administrative process, and in USOE's limited influence with the states.[6] The result is that no change is conceived or implemented in a uniform way.

It makes sense, then, to explore various alternatives for federal action in light of these problems. This entails questioning assumptions, highlighting choices, specifying trade-offs, and exposing political and organizational problems. This approach reflects my belief that intelligent decisions about the implementation of particular alternatives cannot be made without understanding their probable consequences. And in the case of changing complex organizations in a complicated political environment, simple relationships do not exist.

I. Financial Assistance to SEA's

There are essentially two ways to provide substantial federal assistance to all SEA's: general aid and categorical aid. The former is defined as unrestricted money, allowing SEA's maximum flexibility in meeting their own priorities. The latter is defined as earmarked money made available to SEA's to promote particular federal priorities.*

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*Of course, many pieces of legislation cannot easily be classified as general or categorical; they contain elements of both. For the sake of clarity, I focus on the "pure" approaches and the basic differences between them.

Since grant consolidation is often mentioned as another way to provide SEA's with greater flexibility in allocating resources, this approach also is examined in this section.

General aid: The most straightforward way to increase the level of general assistance to SEA's would be to expand Title V, since the program provides aid with virtually no strings attached. Based on this study of Title V in nine states, I would expect approximately the following result from such an expansion. The additional resources would be used mainly to meet short-term pressing problems, or preexisting priorities, by expanding ongoing activities. A small part of the new funds, however, might well be used as a contingency fund to meet minor crises as they developed during the year (e.g., payment of rent, or employment of a short-term consultant).* After the initial decisions, the new money would mostly support the continued operation of those activities first established. Hence, the flexibility provided by the new resources would not last much beyond the first year, unless appropriation levels continued to rise.

The impact of these Title V-supported activities would vary from state to state. Dramatic SEA change usually would be dependent upon extra-organizational pressures which are largely beyond federal control (e.g., demands resulting from changing state politics, or from a breakdown in state traditions). The example of South Carolina in Chapter V, where broad SEA change was more a product of a changing political environment than Title V dollars, illustrates this point. More typically, additional Title V resources would simply raise the level of SEA general operational support. Chapters III and IV on Massachusetts and New York exemplify this conclusion.

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*Experience with Title V could result in one change, however. SEA's might be somewhat more reluctant to use Title V to hire permanent staff since the money becomes frozen from year to year. Sixty-nine percent of Title V in 1970 supported staff salaries.[7] Contracts, consultants and other short-term projects might receive more attention.

Two points need emphasis, however. First, I am not suggesting that major change through general aid is impossible in the absence of external pressure. It probably can take place in the long run under certain conditions, as described by Graham T. Allison:

> Existing organizational orientations and routines are not impervious to directed change. Careful targeting of major factors that support routines--such as personnel, rewards, information, and budgets--can effect major change over time. But the terms and conditions of most political leadership jobs--short tenure and responsiveness to hot issues--make effective, directed change uncommon.[8]

In this sense, general aid can provide an exceptional leader with some long-run flexibility.

It also should be emphasized that there is nothing inherently wrong with using general aid (Title V) initially to increase staff levels to meet short-term problems and then to continue to subsidize these additional activities. By doing so, SEA top management can meet the needs of key individuals in the organization (e.g., a bureau chief who argues that he needs more staff), and of important groups in society (e.g., schoolmen who desire more service, or legislators who want particular action). Through this process of responding to internal and external demands, the SEA is better able to meet articulated needs, to keep the organization afloat, and to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of its constituencies. These are not trivial matters, particularly for those on the state firing line.

However, general aid typically would not fulfill several federal objectives often associated with this approach. First, the expansion of Title V would not promote a rethinking of priorities, a thorough overhaul of programs, or basic institutional change. An explanation for this I have argued, must take into account the limits created by particular enduring attributes of organizations: organizational culture (a history, traditions, norms, and standard operating procedures); subunits with conflicting goals and expansionist tendencies; competition for funds; an orientation toward internal and external crises; search for solutions that are "good enough" rather than optimal; and the continuation of projects once established. Normally, the realities of organizational life would lead to a pattern of "more of the same."

A second objective associated with Title V is enhanced SEA leadership. If by that is meant the development of political influence with the legislature,* as contrasted with better management or services, then it is questionable whether this objective would be met in most states. It seems based on a misconception of the way organizations grow in power. I would argue that each SEA operates within political, bureaucratic and cultural constraints which reflect underlying forces within a state and set limits on SEA influence.[9] If a shift in these forces happens to favor a stronger political role for SEA's, then additional money could be extremely useful. But more money and more staff by themselves probably would not significantly alter the balance of power within a state.

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*Various definitions of strengthening (and leadership) were set forth in Chapter I, pages 13 to 15 .

Two qualifications bear mention. First, one can imagine the existence of considerable slack between the influence exerted by a SEA and what the existing political forces would allow. Even in the absence of pressure to narrow that gap, a combination of aggressive SEA leadership and unrestricted resources could result in significantly enhanced political influence for a SEA. Second, my statement about the independent impact of money may only be accurate within certain limits. If, for example, the budget of a SEA were quadrupled in size and the salaries of its employees doubled, then this massive infusion of money by itself, in the absence of external forces, could possibly alter the agency's political influence simply because of its new visibility.

It is noteworthy that the states in my sample did not seem to fit either of these qualifications and, to the extent that they portray reality, I suspect that the SEA's involved represent exceptions to the general rule. To repeat from Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn: "Our reading of organizational history...argues the primary role of external forces in major organizational change."[10]

A third often-mentioned objective of general assistance (i.e., revenue sharing) is to return "power to the people" by aiding those governments (state and local) closest to grass-roots problems.[11] This objective seems to assume that "the people" have greater control over those units of government proximate to them, rather than in Washington. It also seems to assume that "the people" are relatively homogeneous in their ability to influence political and organizational decision-making. But who are "the people"--state bureaucrats, interest groups, the poor? While this investigation of Title V is not broad enough to evaluate fully the assumptions behind this objective, my data do suggest that they may well be wrong.

SEA Title V decisions were not based on a comprehensive assessment of the educational needs of "the people" in general. Rather, decisions were made largely in response to the expressed needs of SEA staff advocating certain positions, or in response to particular pressures on the agency. Stated differently, needs were not defined in the abstract, but by individuals and groups with access to the decision-makers. If additional money were made available, these individuals and groups would probably express demands for their share of the new funds. (Few groups seem to believe that they have enough money to do their jobs properly.) But there is little reason to believe that general aid would enable those people who were previously unable to advocate their needs to do so, unless there was a massive infusion of money. In this sense, "power to the people" probably would turn out to be power to the people who already have power.* This lesson, of course, is not lost on those seeking governmental help; they usually deal with the level of government providing access and support. Civil rights leaders and urban mayors, for instance, typically have made their pilgrimages to Washington, not to their state capitols.

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*Once more one can conceive of exceptions. For example, if reformers assumed power as the new money became available, then they might be able to direct part of the funds to groups usually unable to argue their needs successfully.

Aside from the substantive merits of Title V in meeting certain objectives and not others, there also could be an important political reason for considering the program's expansion. Title V can be used by SEA's, subject to virtually no federal accountability, for the support of activities which their often tight-fisted legislatures refuse to fund. This explains in part why the chief state school officers have been particularly anxious to expand the program--their only source of discretionary resources. This interest of the chiefs was made clear in a 1971 memorandum from U. S. Commissioner of Education Sidney P. Marland, Jr. to HEW's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget. Appealing the HEW decision to reject his request to increase Title V funding by $10 million in fiscal year 1973, Marland justified the expansion:

> The Chief State School Officers have established the addition of funds to Title V-A* as their highest Federal legislative priority. It is essential that this deeply felt need of the State educational leaders be met.[12]

Since the chief state school officers are a moderately powerful educational constituency, an expansion of Title V might serve the political purpose of gaining needed support if new federal initiatives were contemplated in education. As discussed in Chapter I, winning support from the chiefs for the entire 1965 ESEA package was one of the original purposes of Title V.

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*In 1970, two new parts were added to the Title V legislation. At that time, the original Title V program became Title V-A.

Expanding Title V, then, could have some political advantages as well as raising the level of general operational support of SEA's. On the other hand, expanding Title V would not usually promote institutional reform or lead to significant changes in SEA leadership. Indeed, the flexibility of general aid turns out to be short-lived, with projects continued once they are established. While organizations do change over time, major progress is usually associated with extra-organizational pressure, not free money. And these pressures (e.g., changes in state politics) are usually beyond significant manipulation by the federal government.

Grant consolidation: In addition to general aid, consolidation of various categorical aid programs for SEA's has been suggested as another way to provide SEA's with greater flexibility. Instead of each SEA receiving separate funding for the administration of Titles I, II, and III of ESEA, for example, USOE could give each SEA a single block grant to meet its responsibilities. Such consolidation, it is argued, would reduce red tape and unnecessary duplication, would lead to significantly improved planning, coordination and management, and would provide more creative and flexible organizational responses to state and local problems.[13]

While reduction in paperwork is a laudable objective in itself, I suspect that consolidating categorical programs, at least in the short run, would not typically promote any significant SEA change or result in new organizational flexibility. The basic reason is the same as that given for the absence of flexibility with general aid: once the initial allocation decisions are made, the resulting projects tend to continue to absorb the funds from year to year.

In the case of categorical aid to SEA's, the initial decisions are made by federal legislation and the resources are used mainly to pay the salaries of employees in different SEA subunits. In order for consolidation to result in significant change, either staff would have to be fired and new staff hired, or existing staff shifted around and given new responsibility. The former course is considered anathema by SEA's, and the latter would be strongly resisted. After all, each subunit would have a stake in maintaining its share of federal resources to meet its priorities whether or not federal funds were consolidated. Furthermore, consolidation would not provide these subunits with powerful new incentives to plan better or to coordinate their activities with other subunits of the SEA. While it would not be impossible for SEA top management to reallocate consolidated federal funds, the organizational costs would typically provide a strong disincentive.

One illustration from Title V's history exemplifies what might be the short run response of SEA's to new flexibility as a result of grant consolidation. In 1968, the $5.5 million budget for Title III of NDEA (which supported SEA subject matter specialists) was merged with the budget of Title V of ESEA,* in part to provide greater flexibility in meeting SEA priorities. The new money in the Title V budget, like Title V itself, could have been used to meet virtually any SEA need.[14]

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*Title X of NDEA was also merged into Title V, but for the purposes of this argument I will consider only Title III.

If the new flexibility were exploited, one would not expect the new money to continue to support subject matter specialists over the years. But as far as one can tell from USOE's nationwide data, roughly ninety percent of the new money in the Title V account was used to support "services for improvement of instruction" (basically subject matter specialists).[15] Before the merger, twenty-three percent of the total Title V expenditures in 1967 supported activities in this category.[16] After the merger, the figure jumped to thirty-four percent in 1968.[17] Most important, two years later, in 1970, after time for SEA's to rethink their priorities, support for "instructional services" continued to account for thirty-four percent[18] of Title V expenditures.* In other words, the consolidation of Title III into Title V seemed to result mainly in a bookkeeping change. Title III subject matter specialists were switched to the Title V account.

In the long run, however, grant consolidation could lead to some SEA priority changes, particularly in those federal programs challenging state and local priorities, and not having established political constituencies. The scenario might go like this. Job vacancies over time could free funds previously committed to a program's administration. These vacancies would reduce the number of internal advocates for the continuation of the program. In the absence of a vocal external constituency, it would be easy to reallocate the uncommitted funds to higher SEA priorities. Title I of ESEA (aid to the disadvantaged) is probably a good example of such a low priority program in some states.[19] In these cases, of course, federal officials would need to evaluate their support for such shifts in emphasis and their options for dealing with them.

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*It is worth pointing out that at least two states (Colorado and Massachusetts) no longer provide subject matter assistance to schools. Instead, these SEA's use their instructional staff for "general" assistance. Had Title III not been merged with Title V, this change would have been limited to those staffers paid through the flexible Title V resources. The flexibility resulting from the merger, then, has made some differences in these states, but they are exceptions to the general pattern.

Grant consolidation, then, might make sense if justified on the basis of an expected reduction in red tape and duplicative paperwork. But if grant consolidation is adopted because of expected organizational flexibility, its proponents are likely to be disappointed. Consolidation usually would not result in significantly enhanced management capability, planning, or in a shift in internal resource allocations with the possible exception of the gradual reduction of support for those federally initiated activities considered particularly low priorities by the SEA.*

Categorical aid to SEA's: At the other end of the spectrum from general assistance is so-called categorical aid. That is, the

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*There also are other problems in consolidating grants. As Joel S. Berke and Michael W. Kirst point out: "...since each federal category is some congressman's footnote in history and some OE bureaucrat's base of expertise, fragmentation is extremely difficult to overcome."[20]

Congress authorizes funds for named categories of activity. Title III of NDEA supported SEA subject matter specialists in "critical" areas of instruction, for example, and Title X of NDEA was designed to improve the statistical operations of SEA's.

The objections to this time-worn approach are many and familiar, but several are worth repeating. First, categorical aid is usually accompanied by reports, regulations and red tape. And to make things worse, categorical programs often overlap, supporting the same activities and requiring the same information. Duplicative paperwork and programs ought to be reduced, as noted earlier, not because the result would be significantly greater organizational flexibility, but because they frequently serve no useful purpose. A second and more fundamental objection is that once established, categorical aid programs develop a constituency and produce evidence to justify their continuation. The result is that forces are generated that tend to perpetuate programs without regard to their continued usefulness.[21] As discussed earlier, Title V projects also exhibited this characteristic.

Finally, implicit in the categorical aid approach is the view that federal officials should decide how SEA's should change. Not surprisingly, many people disagree with this imposition of federal priorities. As one SEA official wrote in 1972:

> The role of the Federal Government, then, is not one of setting national priorities and dictating programs for states and local school districts, but rather one of facilitating those programs that states and local school districts determine to be appropriate.[22]

On the other hand, categorical aid does have several advantages over general aid. First, it can to some degree stimulate the states to move in prescribed directions. While Title V for the most part did not promote new SEA roles, new kinds of staff, or the development of long-range projects, categorical aid could provide such a stimulus through the incentive of earmarked money. In fiscal year 1970, for example, each SEA received $96,000 from USOE for SEA planning. As a result, practically all the SEA's established planning offices,[23] something most of them had not done with Title V resources despite years of gentle persuasion by USOE.[24]

Categorical aid to some degree can also stimulate the creation of new constituencies for SEA's and in that sense result in "power to the people " For example, Title I of ESEA focused national attention on disadvantaged children. Prior to ESEA's passage, only a handful of projects specifically designed for these children were in operation and only three states had passed legislation geared to their needs.[25] As a result of Title I, SEA's currently seem to be a bit more responsive to disadvantaged children and their parents, than they were in the past.[26] If one defines "the people" as the disadvantaged, then categorical aid (not general aid) resulted in some "power to the people."

There are limits, however, on how far and fast the federal government can promote change in the states through the categorical aid approach. For one thing, SEA's could refuse to accept federal dollars if the requirements were too severe. Martha Derthick describes how this fact is translated into congressional action:

> Congress has generally performed the function of finding the terms on which grant programs may win the widest possible acceptance while safeguarding certain basic federal interests. That Congress is highly sensitive to state and local interests means that the terms it settles on are in important respects highly permissive ones. Congressmen see to it that, for state governments, the ratio of benefit to cost in grant programs is high enough to be attractive.[27]

For another, the categorical aid approach probably would not be any more successful in promoting basic institutional change or in enhancing SEA leadership (i.e., influence with the state legislature) than the general aid approach. As noted earlier, those factors (e.g., changes in state politics) determining basic reform and SEA leadership are usually beyond significant manipulation by the federal government.[28]

Aside from these limits on categorical aid, organizational factors can create what might be called an implementation gap, that is, a gap between what is expected and what actually happens in the states. This implementation gap varies from program to program, depending largely upon the differences between established procedures in SEA's and the proposed new procedures. For example, if a program was designed to add a new variety of subject matter specialists (e.g., environmental educators) to the rosters of SEA's, then a categorical program would be a useful device. The new specialists would be hired and integrated into the existing SEA procedures for providing services to schools. The implementation gap would be small.

But if the objective were to stimulate SEA's to change their planning procedures, the gap would be much greater, with the establishment of a planning office only a first small step. What can happen in such cases is that the categorical assistance establishes an organizational "add on", that is, an organizational unit is added on top of the SEA without affecting the agency's existing operation and procedures.[29] As noted in Chapters III and IV on Massachusetts and New York, this phenomenon also occurred in the implementation of Title V.

A second cause of the implementation gap is political. If a federal priority is clear (e.g., the addition of SEA history specialists) and if a SEA agrees with it, then the program would be implemented, subject to the organizational difficulties discussed above. But clarity of purpose is not a hallmark of most federal laws. Rather, they commonly contain ambiguous goals, vague phrases, and conflicting priorities. These features are often necessary to build a coalition of support for a particular piece of legislation. Diverse interests join forces with each group hoping that its priorities will be met during the implementation phase.[30] What this means, of course, is that the normal organizational and managerial problems of implementing legislation are complicated further by the continuous political process of defining and redefining during implementation the legislation's "real" intent.[31] And in education, if federal and state interpretations of the law conflict, the states have the political muscle to dilute federal priorities either through political intervention in the federal administrative process or by ignoring federal priorities during implementation. For example, disagreeing with some federal priorities embodied in Title I of ESEA (aid to disadvantaged children), some states have resisted their implementation.[32] Also, as discussed in Chapter II, there has been substantial political intervention in the federal administration of Title V.

In sum, categorical aid creates burdensome red tape, tends to establish programs that perpetuate themselves, and does not promote institutional reform or SEA leadership. On the other hand, categorical aid can act as a stimulus for SEA change and can contribute to the formation of new SEA constituencies. But there are serious limits on the effects of such assistance. These are caused by the need to "buy" SEA participation in federal programs, and the organizational and political barriers to the implementation of federal priorities in education.

Concluding observations on financial assistance: General aid and grant consolidation are designed to provide SEA's with flexibility in the allocation of resources. But as we have seen, flexibility in the funding source does not necessarily lead to greater organizational flexibility in the recipients. Categorical aid is designed to promote federal priorities, but as we have seen these priorities can be diluted during implementation if they interfere with existing SEA procedures and priorities. Furthermore, both general aid and categorical aid frequently fall short of their expected outcomes for the same reasons: both generate forces that can lead to the continuing subsidy of activities that outlive their usefulness; both can lead to organizational "add ons" that do not affect SEA behavior; neither approach necessarily leads to significantly improved planning or coordination.

This suggests that neither general aid nor categorical aid works the way their proponents say they work and, in fact, these seemingly different approaches turn out to be much more alike than some people seem to think. This is not to say that they are interchangeable--general aid can provide an exceptional leader with some long-term flexibility, and a categorical program can act to some degree as a stimulus.* But it is to emphasize that switching from one approach to another probably would not result in dramatic change. Viewed in this light, the current federal penchant to make summary judgments among policies on the basis of whether they are "general" or "categorical" seems somewhat myopic. Categorical aid is a somewhat better approach for some things, and general aid is somewhat better for others.

In deciding on appropriate federal action, rather than thinking about problems in terms of different types of aid, it would make more sense to adopt a pragmatic approach. That is, attention should be focused initially on the gap between desired and existing activities, and only secondly on the way the money would be delivered. If the SEA's were already doing something that federal officials wanted to help along, then it might not be necessary to go through all the rigamarole of setting up a narrow categorical aid program. This probably would be the case if the SEA's had the required technological know-how, if the desired activities were part of SEA standard operating procedures, if the subunits responsible for the proposed activities had enough political clout within the SEA's to control the funds, and if the proposed activities had a political constituency in the field. But if these conditions did not obtain, then a categorical program would make more sense, although there often would be serious organizational and political problems during implementation.* Of course, there is still another consideration which may take precedence in deciding which course of action is preferable: one's view about which level of government should call the shots in strengthening the states.

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*Also, categorical aid can play an important symbolic role by demonstrating the federal government's commitment to grapple with certain problems.[33]

All in all, one probably should expect no more than gradual change over time as a result of either general or categorical aid, with the difference in direction reflecting whether state or federal priorities are paramount. While dramatic SEA change is possible, it normally would result from external pressures on the agencies from basically local forces (e.g., change in state politics). Hence, additional federal resources may be necessary to support rapid SEA change, but the money is not sufficient.

II. Federal Regulations

A second conventional approach for dealing with the states is through the imposition of federal regulations. Designed to make the legislative intent of a statute explicit, regulations generally take the form of detailed requirements to be met during a federal program's implementation.

The difficulties with this approach are legion: red tape, multiple and conflicting requirements, design problems, and questionable impact on program implementation. Alice M. Rivlin has described the disillusionment of those reformers who had great hopes during the '60's for this method of federal intervention:

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*As we shall see later in the discussion of differential treatment, these decisions are further complicated by the wide differences among the states.

> I, for one, once thought that the effectiveness of a program... could be increased by tighter management from Washington. Something was known about 'good practices,' or effective ways of reaching poor children; more could be learned and transmitted to the local level through federal guidelines and regulations and technical assistance. As knowledge accumulated, the guidelines could be tightened up, and programs would become more effective.
>
> This view now seems to me naive and unrealistic. The country is too big and too diverse, and social action is too complicated.[34]

I agree with Rivlin's overall assessment. Too much was expected from regulations. Nonetheless, they can foster gradual change, subject to the same organizational and political limitations discussed in the earlier section on categorical aid. For example, in 1971 USOE promulgated regulations requiring parent advisory councils in the implementation of Title I of ESEA. These councils currently are being established across the country. While I do not mean to imply that the regulations were self-executing or that the councils will necessarily accomplish what is intended, these councils would never have been set up had USOE not required them.[35] In short, regulations can be useful but limited devices for moving the states toward the adoption of federal priorities.

Regulations can also take the form of management standards, with the receipt of additional federal resources contingent upon their implementation. This approach, recently under discussion in USOE, needs exploration.

Reflecting frustration with the pace of SEA change since ESEA's passage, a USOE internal document noted in 1972:

> Most state education agencies lack the management capability to administer Federal funding programs in line with reasonable management standards. Despite significant gains in this respect, efforts since 1966 by ESEA's Title V and related ESE [elementary and secondary education] programs largely have not as yet altered this basic condition.[36]

"Tough"[37] standards were suggested for a variety of areas ranging from personnel management, to accounting, to program planning and evaluation.[38]

While the need for improved SEA management seems clear,* standards would probably create more problems than they would solve. On the positive side, it would seem reasonable to require standard ways for collecting and reporting data on SEA operations (e.g., number of professional staff, or SEA administrative expenditures). This would be particularly useful in making accurate comparisons among the states, something USOE currently is unable to do.[39] Also, it would seem reasonable to develop standards in those few areas where conventional practices are well developed and accepted (e.g., internal accounting or auditing procedures). But even here standards could create problems if they were in conflict with existing state requirements. The result could be the creation of parallel "state" and "federal" procedures within a single state agency.[40]

Probably in most management areas, standards would be a decided backward step for several reasons. First, the state of the art is simply too primitive in areas such as planning or evaluation to impose detailed standards. Instead, incentives are needed to explore different approaches to see what works and under what conditions. (Alternative models of planning are discussed more fully in a later section on SEA planning.) Second, it is difficult to conceive how standards covering such things as the development and execution of SEA policy could come to grips with the complex organizational processes described throughout this study. How, for example, would one standardize the bargaining among different SEA subunits over conflicting goals? The likely result would be the ineffective imposition of "rational" procedures on inadequately understood organizational processes.

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*It is worth noting, however, that some SEA's probably are better managed than USOE.

But there is still another fundamental obstacle which prevents the effective implementation of standards. Frequently, a problem which is thought to be susceptible to improvement through better management will turn out to be more a political problem than a managerial one. For instance, it may seem desirable to establish standards governing SEA monitoring of local Title I of ESEA projects. But major deficiencies in this area probably have more to do with the politics of state-local relations and the tradition of localism than with strictly managerial issues. In such cases, management standards are not needed, but rather, politically astute SEA staffers (as many of them are) who can operate effectively within the existing constraints. Simply declaring a political problem to be a managerial one and treating it that way would not solve anything.

Finally, besides these objections to management standards, there is also a fundamental question of values which lies at the heart of any efforts at standardization. To the extent that USOE was successful in imposing standards on SEA's--not an impossibility over a long period of time--the diversity among the SEA's and the values they serve could be greatly curtailed. In her study of federal-state relations in the implementation of welfare policy, Martha Derthick cogently points out the choice involved:

> In order to facilitate the realization of federally prescribed ends the federal government promoted the professionalization of state and local personnel. To the extent it succeeded in this and in enhancing the role of professionalized administrators in state and local decision making, the range of values expressed through governmental action in the society as a whole diminished; insofar as actions approached the norms stipulated by professional values, pluralism was sacrificed.[41]

If pluralism is an important value, as many argue, and if one of the virtues of the federal system is that it indeed fosters pluralism, then the effects of its reduction should be considered before wholesale efforts are made to standardize the states.

In summary, regulations tied to categorical programs may be an important step to prod the states to follow particular federal priorities. But their implementation can be seriously diluted by political and organizational problems. A basic question is whether regulations are worth their costs in red tape, duplication, and the imposition of federal values on the states. In the case of management standards, such regulation probably makes sense in those few areas where procedures are well developed and seem to work. But even here potential benefits need to be weighed against the possible costs of having SEA's meet conflicting federal and state requirements. In most management areas, standards would probably be a mistake. Besides possibly stifling innovation, management standards do not usually come to grips with the underlying organizational and political complexities of administering federally-initiated education programs.

III. Technical Assistance

The provision of technical assistance is the third conventional approach used by USOE in dealing with the states. This assistance essentially takes two forms. First, continuing efforts are made to help SEA's review and understand their responsibilities in the administration of federal programs. USOE holds conferences and workshops, and develops written materials to explain federal application forms, regulations, report requirements, and pending and existing legislation. Since constantly changing legislation and paperwork are enduring features of the grants-in-aid system, keeping SEA's up-to-date on the latest USOE and congressional initiatives is a time-consuming process.

A second device for providing technical assistance to SEA's, and USOE's most ambitious effort, is the so-called state management review (SMR) which began in 1966.[42] According to USOE policy, each SEA is to be visited once every three years by a team of nine to fifteen USOE officials in an effort to improve state management of federal programs.* Spending a week in each agency, the USOE teams focus on seven areas: planning, project administration, evaluation, dissemination, management information, personnel management, and financial management. After the visit, USOE issues a SMR Report summarizing its findings and conclusions, and makes recommendations in each management area.[44]

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*It should be noted that no SMR's have been conducted since June of 1972. Why they were stopped is not clear, although it may be related to the high cost of sending large USOE teams to the states and to the shuffling about of personnel in the USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. In any case, according to the division director, SMR's may be started again.[43]

The SMR seems to be a useful, although expensive, device for USOE officials to keep in touch with state officials and activities, and for SEA's to get helpful advice if they want it. With fifty states, it is not surprising that some states in fact do seek advice (e.g., South Carolina), while others (e.g., Massachusetts) have tended to ignore the SMR recommendations. Still others (e.g., New York) already know just about what they want to do and apparently view the SMR's as not particularly useful.[45] But as a former SEA official pointed out: "Even if one doesn't need 'advice', it is good politics to seek a little now and then!"[46]

Two problems with the SMR's bear mention at this point. First, a visit to each state just once every three years hardly appears to be a serious attempt on USOE's part to provide technical assistance; some states have serious management deficiencies that could profit from considerable more attention. To help solve this problem, USOE could significantly step up the frequency of the SMR's to those states needing assistance. Perhaps some states ought to be visited as often as once a year. This, of course, would require a much greater allocation of expensive USOE manpower.

A second problem with the SMR approach, however, would not be solved by such an expansion. Specifically, the SMR approach assumes that USOE has the management capability to offer assistance to other agencies of government. While USOE does have considerable expertise in some areas, any visitor to this constantly reorganized agency would soon recognize that it is not exactly a management powerhouse. Hiring and holding the top experts in a field is difficult for any government agency.

Two alternatives designed to deal with this problem by tapping extra-governmental expertise merit brief consideration. First, USOE could provide each SEA with a pot of money earmarked for a variety of technical assistance activities (e.g., in-service training of SEA officials, or the hiring of short-term management consultants). The availability of money might provide SEA's with an incentive to seek outside advice on modern management practices. This could result in the adoption of new procedures if the SEA were so inclined. From the federal perspective, however, this approach might be undesirable if the SEA's decided to expend the money on management priorities that differed from USOE's priorities.

A second extra-governmental approach would be for USOE to contract directly with universities or recognized consulting firms to provide nationwide technical assistance to SEA's. Funds might be used for the in-service training of SEA employees, for management appraisals of SEA operations, for consulting services, and so on. This approach has the advantage not only of tapping recognized outside talent, but also of opening up some SEA's to suggestions from managers whose background is not simply limited to educational matters. It has the disadvantage, however, that such efforts can result in the issuance of "on-high" pronouncements without any follow-up to assist in the implementation of recommendations. This problem would be somewhat alleviated, perhaps, if follow-up activities were specifically part of the contract with the outside organization, or if USOE assumed the monitoring responsibility itself.

In short, the alternatives for providing technical assistance to SEA's are not limited to existing in-house procedures. While the SMR's provide a useful device to maintain USOE contact with the states and in some cases offer helpful advice, it probably would make sense to expand the opportunities for extra-governmental strengthening of SEA management capability. If technical assistance to SEA's is a USOE priority, then greater use of contracts with appropriate universities and consulting firms is an approach which particularly deserves detailed exploration.

IV. Differential Treatment of the States

The conventional approaches discussed in the last three sections treat the states as if they were all basically alike. Although some SEA's receive more federal assistance than others (usually based on comparative population measures), each SEA receives its share of resources, purportedly complies with uniform regulations, and undergoes a USOE state management review every three years. But this study has emphasized that SEA's vary enormously in their professional competence, managerial sophistication, and political influence. This gap between current federal policy and existing conditions in the states suggests that USOE should treat SEA's differentially. Since this idea is growing in currency among writers on governmental affairs,[47] an exploration of the limits of this approach seems important.

One application of differential treatment would be to bypass weak SEA's in the implementation of federal programs (and regulations) while providing strong SEA's with considerable leeway. The purpose of this bypass would be to increase the effective administration of federal programs and also to reward particularly capable SEA's with extra freedom to maneuver without federal interference. A second application of differential treatment would be in the area of technical assistance. USOE could ignore altogether or spend less time with managerially sound SEA's while concentrating its resources in those SEA's needing the most help. The objective would be to maximize the efficient use of USOE's limited pool of technical assistance manpower.

A third way to treat the states differentially involves the provision of incentives--a SEA would be rewarded if it performed beyond expectations. Alice M. Rivlin argued the need for this approach in 1971:

> . . . reward those who produce more efficiently. Free to vary the way they spend the money as long as they accomplish specified results, recipients of federal grants could be rewarded for producing beyond expectations. This procedure would liberate them from the straitjacket of input controls and promote vigorous and imaginative attempts to improve results,...[48]

Each of these three potential applications of differential treatment encounter similar implementation problems. To begin with, treating the states differentially means that USOE, in effect, would be required to say that one state is better than another. Making this choice is not the problem--each Title V program officer, for instance, already has his own list of "good" states. The problem is making this choice publicly.

For example, if USOE officials decided to spend three times as much technical assistance time in Massachusetts as in New York, by clear implication USOE would be declaring that Massachusetts needed more help than New York and therefore was a weaker state. In the view of a Title V program officer, this qualitative judgment not only could embarrass Massachusetts SEA officials but also could badly damage USOE's working relationship with all the states.

This problem of making qualitative judgments about organizational performance would also apply to the administration of incentives, or to a law providing a bypass. In each case, USOE officials would be required to say that one state is better than another. In the absence of quantitative measures, and particularly if the dollar stakes were high, such differential treatment would be avoided.

A second obstacle to differential treatment is political. Although this approach conceivably could result in more effective administration of federal programs, another value--equity of treatment--probably is a more powerful determinant of a legislator's position. One could easily imagine, for example, a congressman's reaction upon learning that his state was too weak in the eyes of USOE bureaucrats to administer program X, or that his SEA was not good enough to win a large incentive which a neighboring state had won. Unless differential treatment were based on some agreed-upon criteria, there would be continued political pressure to treat the states equally, giving each its share of the rewards. And if each did win its equal share, then the incentive program would dissolve and closely resemble the old stand-by--categorical aid.* If the stakes are high, in short, qualitative judgments usually will not be made by bureaucrats or accepted by the Congress.

An attempt could be made to design specific quantitative data for measuring organizational performance. These data could be used by USOE officials in making objective decisions about differential treatment. I suspect, however, that an attempt to design such quantitative performance measures for SEA's probably would be a fruitless exercise. Besides the normal problems of measuring the output of public agencies and the "success" of federal programs marked by ambiguous and conflicting purposes, matters are even more complicated with SEA's since they are primarily concerned with providing inputs to other agencies (schools) rather than achieving particular measurable outputs themselves. Short of devising quantitative indices not really reflecting SEA performance, it is hard to conceive how these obstacles could be overcome.

Possibly a more promising way to increase the viability of differential treatment would be to first undertake a broadscale study of

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*One additional problem with incentives should be mentioned. To the extent that incentives can be implemented, they will reward those acting according to the desired behavior. This probably would be those states that were already stronger. Thus, incentives quite easily could widen the gap between the weakest and the strongest SEA's.

SEA's to evaluate their performance according to agreed-upon qualitative criteria. For example, criteria could be developed to measure the performance of SEA personnel offices, or of SEA accounting procedures, or of the SEA implementation of particular federal priorities. SEA's could then be ranked from one to fifty (i.e., from the "strongest" to the "weakest") on the basis of performance in specific areas. Such a ranking could conceivably provide USOE with the comparative data to respond in a differential fashion. USOE might concentrate technical assistance on those SEA's at the bottom of the list, for instance, or bypass altogether those SEA's ranked low in their capability to administer particular federal programs.

There are several precedents for such a study. In 1971, the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures ranked each state legislature according to five different measures: functionality, accountability, information handling capability, independence, and representativeness.[49] Also, at a different order of magnitude, states have long been ranked according to such quantitative measures as expenditures per pupil, median school-years completed, and so on.[50]

In order for such a study of SEA's to be undertaken, it probably would have to be conducted by a group outside the government; it is highly unlikely that USOE would engage in such an activity for fear of embarrassing the states. The research also would have to be conducted by a respected and authoritative group in order to develop legitimate findings. Under such conditions, it is possible that USOE could act in a differential manner without being held responsible for the adverse publicity received by some SEA's.

This suggestion, of course, is beset with problems. A ranking of SEA's would probably be viewed as a ranking of chief state school officers, thus possibly creating unnecessary divisiveness among the states. Instead, SEA activities might be grouped in quartiles or quintiles, rather than ranking them from the "best" to the "worst". Also, devising non-controversial and still meaningful criteria for ranking different state activities, while allowing for diversity, would test the ingenuity of any group. It simply may not be possible. But even if it were possible, the ranking study would be expensive and require frequent up-dating. Even with that, it is far from certain that USOE or Congress would make decisions based on the qualitative findings of an outside group, regardless of how authoritative it may be. Despite these potential problems, a ranking of SEA's seems worthy of further exploration. If nothing else, it could direct public attention to the extensive and important differences among the states, and possibly even provide an incentive for low-ranked SEA's to improve their operations.

The potential of different treatment, then, seems much more limited than some analysts seem to think. The political and bureaucratic obstacles are formidable in the absence of quantitative measures of institutional performance. And I am not at all optimistic about their development, at least for SEA's. A ranking of SEA's, however, might provide some qualitative data, which conceivably could lead to differential treatment. A first step would be to contact extra-governmental organizations (e.g., foundations) that might be willing to fund such a ranking study. In the meantime, USOE could be encouraged to explore differential treatment on a limited scale to see how far it is possible to go before encountering serious political and bureaucratic objections.

V. Governmental Accountability

In the preceding sections, one recurring theme particularly stood out: the political obstacles to the imposition of federal priorities on the states. USOE has limited capacity to hold the states accountable for the implementation of federal directives. In this section, I explore this issue further and suggest some ways to deal with it. This section also considers a broader spectrum of accountability issues of current concern: how to make federal and state bureaucracies more accountable to governmental leaders, and to the public in general; and how to make federal education programs more accountable to their intended beneficiaries.

Three premises underlie this discussion of accountability. First, accountability is not possible without candid and independent analyses of governmental action. Second, information by itself is usually not enough to stimulate change--sources of countervailing power are required not only to generate information but also to provide ongoing follow-up and, sometimes, political pressure. Third, external pressure is a particularly effective device to stimulate organizational change.

The problem: Four interrelated factors suggest the need for greater accountability. As mentioned above, there is limited atate accountability to the federal government in the administration of

Title V. Control runs from the state to the federal level of government, not the reverse.[51] Although this can be explained in part by USOE's limited legal authority under Title V, a similar pattern has been identified in the administration of Title I of ESEA which provides USOE with considerable authority to exert influence. Deviations from Title I can often continue unchecked as pointed out in a 1972 USOE-commissioned report:

> Clearly violations of Title I regulations and criteria have continued since 1969 in at least 37 states and this situation cannot be explained away either in terms of the newness of the Title I program or the short time available to adapt management systems to its requirements. After six fiscal years of Title I funding, the program has not yet been implemented nationally as intended by Congress.[52]

The result is limited USOE influence in the implementation of federal programs which, in turn, can lead to limited state accountability to particular groups that federal legislation is designed to help (e.g., the disadvantaged).[53]

A second reason for greater accountability also grows out of the nature of federal-state relations in education. As demonstrated in Chapter II, USOE officials strive for "good working relationships" with SEA's, and rarely if ever go beyond gentle persuasion. This approach partly reflects USOE's recognition that a more aggressive stance could be politically dangerous, if not impossible. Good relationships also maintain a feeling of comaraderie among officials frequently sharing similar training, public school experience, and values. The result is that USOE officials make every effort to avoid embarrassing state officials; problems are worked out quietly through bureaucratic channels without public debate.

The problems that can be created by this mode of intergovernmental relationships are well illustrated in USOE's state management review (SMR) procedures, discussed earlier. After a review is completed, USOE publishes a so-called SMR Report on the SEA. Although perhaps not intentionally, these public reports can be misleading to the unwary reader. They appear to be an independent assessment of SEA activities by USOE. In fact, USOE's recommendations are usually worked out ahead of time with SEA's,[54] and the written reports are couched in antiseptic phrases designed to avoid offending state officials. (Indeed, one USOE official called them "white-washes.")[55] As a result, SMR Reports tend to accentuate the positive and to play down the negative. Agencies facing major problems appear to be in fairly good shape.[56] That USOE would want these reports to be innocuous is understandable; maintaining good relations with the states is important if USOE is to maintain its access. What this SMR problem suggests, however, is the need for more independent and candid evaluations of SEA activities.

A third accountability problem, closely related to the one just described, involves the upward flow of information through bureaucratic channels to top governmental officials. Anthony Downs has argued:

> Each offical tends to distort the information he passes upward to his superiors in the hierarchy. Specifically, all types of officials tend to exaggerate data that reflect favorably on themselves and to minimize those that reveal their own shortcomings.[57]

Independent sources of information could be one step toward holding lower levels of the bureaucracy accountable for their actions.

Finally, I have argued that a mechanism such as Title V does not necessarily stimulate SEA's to be accountable "to the people."

Those individuals and groups with access to SEA decision-makers use their leverage to divide the pie among themselves. This would not be a problem if all segments of society had equal access to SEA's, but this is not the case. James B. Conant made this point clearly in an uncharacteristically harsh evaluation of SEA's in 1964:

> The major weakness of all of the state departments of education I have encountered, with perhaps one or two exceptions, is that they are too much a part of the educational establishment. That is, I found many of these agencies . . . to be little more than the 'willing tools' of the interests and clientele, particularly the education association . . . . A grave shortcoming of our educational leadership at the state level, in my opinion, is often its unwillingness or incapacity to respond to forces outside the establishment. These agencies seldom solicit the opinions of educational experts or critics who are not associated with public schools or professional education, and in those rare instances when they do ask the advice of 'outside' experts, I suspect it is largely for symbolic purposes.[58]

After examining eleven SEA's, Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst concluded in 1972 that Conant's assessment of the political orientation of SEA s "appears still true today."[59] Although I examined this facet of SEA behavior only in passing, my data support the overall conclusion that SEA's seem primarily accountable to their professional peers.

In sum, the limited accountability of the states to USOE and to the intended recipients of federal programs, the absence of independent appraisals of SEA activities, the general problem of information flow to top governmental officials, and the closed nature of SEA's to groups other than professional schoolmen all suggest the need for building greater sources of accountability into the education delivery system.

Some alternatives: There are several ways to pursue a greater level of accountability. Depending upon which agency is being held accountable to whom and for what, the alternatives can be placed in three basic categories: intra-governmental devices (i.e., efforts within federal and state executive branches); publicly supported quasi-independent approaches (e.g., advisory councils for federal programs); and independent entities receiving no public support (e.g., "Nader's Raiders").

One intra-governmental device would be designed for governmental leaders concerned about the flow of bureaucratic information. They could establish independent evaluation units within their agencies reporting directly to them. This approach was used in the early days of the Peace Corps and the Office of Economic Opportunity by agency boss, Sargent Shriver. Jack Gonzales and John Rothchild explain:

> The idea was to establish an independent reporting outfit, completely separate from the normal chain of command, to roam the field, find out what was going on, and report directly back to Shriver. The chain of command could be dragged in later to argue and explain itself, but the evaluation reports wouldn't be filtered through it.[60]

Although this idea may be appealing on its face--Gonzales and Rothchild claim that it was used successfully by Shriver--it is not at all clear that the morale problems it could create within an agency would be worth the benefits in extra information. It is also not clear what other side effects such an approach might produce.[61] Nonetheless, the approach probably could generate some useful information and therefore might be explored, at first, on a limited scale.

A second intra-governmental approach would be to expand the role of the HEW Audit Agency, and of similar bodies at the state level, to include a greater responsibility for program oversight. HEW Audit reports tend to be much more straightforward than USOE's SMR's.[62] Since auditors do not have program administration responsibility, they are not required to maintain "good working relationships" with the states.

As part of their new responsibility, these audit agencies could be called upon to conduct "performance audits." That is, they would assess the performance of SEA's in the implementation of federal programs. Describing this "idea whose time has come," a 1972 article in the Harvard Business Review put it this way:

> The need in the public sector is not much different from that in corporations: an independent appraisal of management's performance by some formally constituted small group on which an unorganized body of constituents (taxpayers or stockholders) can depend....
>
> This includes quantitative analysis but the real intent is to develop qualitative judgments about the effectiveness of policies and actions.[63]

It is important to note the emphasis placed on qualitative judgments. As noted earlier, I am not at all optimistic about the development of quantitative measures of SEA performance. Their absence, however, should not stand in the way of performance audits--competent analysts can make sound and fair judgments about management performance in the absence of quantitative data. As a 1970 article entitled "Putting Judgment Back into Decisions" reported:

> ...informed managers still rely much more on qualitative than quantitative criteria in appraising performance, even when quantitative measures are available and in use. Furthermore, those managers who use more subjective data tend to agree more with one another than those who depend on highly quantified information.[64]

While performance audits seem promising as a way to get independent assessments of SEA activities, there is at least one major problem. Although it has no program responsibility and does not need to please a constituency in the field, the HEW Audit Agency is responsible ultimately to the HEW Secretary who, in turn, is politically accountable for his Department's activities. If performance audits should create too much political heat, they would be brought under political control. Nonetheless, I suspect that there is enough slack in the existing system to permit a greater number of candid evaluations than currently are conducted.

Going beyond the collection of information and the issuance of reports, the expansion of countervailing power within the bureaucracy provides a third way to achieve a higher level of intra-governmental accountability. At the federal level, for example, the oversight responsibility of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) could be expanded to monitor USOE activities and proposals more closely. Or, if the objective were to encourage USOE to pay additional attention to certain groups (e.g., the poor), then an appropriate unit outside USOE (e.g., the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)) could be expanded to maintain pressure on USOE. To support similar sources of countervailing power at the state level, federal funds could be granted to the central budget offices of states to help them develop the capacity to oversee SEA activities. In each of these examples, the constant monitoring of one unit of government by another could conceivably lead to better justifications of expenditures and, perhaps, to better resource allocation decisions.

In the case of publicly supported but quasi-independent approaches, there are several devices deserving brief discussion. First, the General Accounting Office (GAO) could be expanded to conduct performance audits. Indeed, GAO is currently moving in this direction through the development of greater analytic capability.[65] Since the agency is relatively independent (its director serves a fifteen year term and reports to the Congress),[66] GAO has more room to maneuver than its counterpart at HEW. Nonetheless, it also would be subject to political discipline if it should become too aggressive.

A second alternative would be to require each SEA, as a condition for receiving federal funds, to undergo an annual performance audit conducted by some recognized extra-governmental organization (e.g., a university or a consulting firm). These analyses might be conducted in place of HEW performance audits. To help insure independent reports, the auditor might be chosen by the governor rather than the chief state school officer. While this selection process probably would increase the chances of an objective assessment of SEA activities, opposition to the whole idea by SEA officials probably would be a major obstacle. For one thing, the impact of performance audits might not be to improve SEA operations but simply to make state officials more defensive about everything they do. For another, negative reports on SEA activities could have political repercussions in budget-minded legislatures. And in some states, governors could use the performance audit as a political weapon against independent chief state school officers. Nevertheless, this approach on balance seems to be worth detailed exploration as a way to enhance the critical assessment of SEA activities in administering federal programs.

A third possible way to use public funds to promote SEA improvements would be through the use of federal research money. That is, the federal government could fund studies designed to evaluate the SEA implementation of various federal programs. Public disclosures of research findings, as with the performance audits, might act as an incentive for change. Once more, however, there is the problem of following up reports with activities designed to see that recommendations are implemented.

This leads to several examples of publicly-supported, quasi-independent bodies designed to monitor continuously governmental activity and to bring pressure to bear for change. The OEO legal services program represents one such model. Lawyers have brought suits or threatened legal action in an attempt to encourage governmental agencies to pursue certain priorities.[67] A second model might be federal program advisory councils. This approach is worth considering in some detail since councils are a widely used device.

At the federal level, the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education could be reactivated. (The Advisory Council, established in 1965, was abolished in 1970 along with several other councils as part of a consolidation move.[68] This group advised USOE on the state administration of several federal programs.) A new council conceivably could oversee the sizeable federal investment in SEA's (forty percent of SEA expenditures in 1970),[69] act as a watchdog in the implementation of federal programs by USOE, make public reports critically evaluating USOE's activities, and prod federal officials to go beyond gentle persuasion in their efforts to improve the management capability of SEA's. The council, in short, might adopt the role of a non-hostile critic. In turn, USOE officials, under pressure from the council, perhaps could act more aggressively without threatening their working relationship with the states.

The major problem with this approach is that advisory councils may not be able to play much of a critical role. After studying twenty-six councils and other bodies advising USOE, HEW, and the White House between 1966 and 1969, Thomas E. Cronin and Norman C. Thomas concluded:

> ...Washington officials, whether in Congress or the executive branch, should recognize the tendency of present educational advisory councils to be representatives of elites rather than the mass public and to perform supporting and legitimizing as well as advisory and critical functions. Yet few of the administrators or researchers currently on the advisory roles are likely to be severely critical of current USOE operations or officials--excepting, of course, in their pleas for expanded funding of existing programs and for more research money. The critic's role needs both greater cultivation and greater reward. The question remains: How can we design advisory councils that can attract and keep knowledgeable and autonomous members?[70] (Emphasis in original.)

To improve the chances of such a council playing the critic's role, it would need both an independent staff and budget which were large enough to monitor day-to-day USOE activities and to contract for outside studies. (The Advisory Council on State Departments of Education was staffed entirely by USOE.) To avoid entrenched ideas, these staff positions might also be limited to five years in duration. And in the words of Cronin and Thomas, the council:

> ...should seek to recruit a substantial number of council members from the ranks of teachers, administrators, parents and students who are not 'plugged in' to the major interest groups, prestigious universities, and foundations that constitute the education 'establishment'.[71]

Non-educators familiar with the problems of managing complex organizations could also be added to the list.

It is not at all certain, however, that these changes could be made. Under most circumstances, it does not seem reasonable to expect either executive branch officials or congressmen to support the appointment of council members taking "potshots" at federal programs. But if these changes were made, a federal advisory council probably would be a modest way to raise the level of critical assessment both of USOE's activities and of the implementation of federal programs.

Similarly, advisory councils might be established at the state level to oversee the implementation of particular federal priorities which might conflict with state priorities. For example, a state advisory council on Title I of ESEA, composed of parents of Title I (educationally deprived) children, could potentially pressure SEA's to implement this federal priority. It also might encourage SEA's to be more responsive to the needs of the disadvantaged, rather than responding almost exclusively to the needs of their professional peers. In order for such a council to have even a modest impact, however, it would need an independent staff and budget like its counterpart at the federal level, and ways also would have to be devised to protect against "stacked" membership. (Elections or some variant of random selection could be used.) Once more, strong SEA opposition to such a proposal might be expected.

It is important to note that all the preceding suggestions have two things in common: implementation depends on public subsidies and the council members, or those conducting studies, would be chosen by public officials, with the possible exception of elected council members. For both these reasons, some questions inevitably could be raised about the independence of these activities from governmental influence. Probably more important, however, is the basic issue of how long the federal government could be expected to support activities criticizing its own programs. It could well be that if these groups did what I have suggested, they would sow the seeds of their own destruction.

This leads to another way to build greater accountability into the system, that is, through the creation of some private non-governmental research/action agencies. David K. Cohen contends that such organizations

> ...could deal with a variety of outcomes, at different times, and with different emphases. Their purpose would not be to insure performance in some mechanically rigorous sense, but to create incentives and constraints by political and administrative pressures.[72]

An independent agency could conduct research on the responsiveness of SEA's to particular minority groups. Or, the organization might try to exert pressure to have a SEA move in a particular direction (e.g., establish a program of bilingual education). Or, the agency might attempt to organize parents to seek a greater say in state education policy. "Nader's Raiders" provide one model for these activities. Through their reports and pressure tactics they have attempted to make government and industry more responsive to consumers.[73] The major problem with such an enterprise would be to find a source of funding. Foundations would seem to provide the most likely source of support, although they too can be held politically responsible for their activities through revisions in the tax code affecting their tax-exempt status.

This discussion suggests just some of the many problems in developing governmental accountability in education. Nevertheless, I would suggest that there is room for improvement and the vehicles discussed in this section seem worthy of detailed exploration: agency evaluation units, expansion of federal and state audit agencies to conduct performance audits, development of intra-governmental sources of countervailing power, expansion of GAO, independent performance audits conducted by extra-governmental units, research on SEA's, expansion of legal service programs, a new use of advisory councils, and independent research/action agencies. These approaches hold out the possibility of improving somewhat the implementation of categorical aid programs, of making USOE and SEA's perhaps more responsive to the public and governmental leaders, and more generally, of building into the education delivery system more independent and candid analyses of USOE and SEA operations.

VI. Planning

The preceding section examined ways to make education bureaucracies work better by increasing external accountability. This section is also concerned with improved governmental operations, but the focus is on ways to change SEA's from within in order to improve their capacity to make and implement better decisions. I begin by describing one version of planning--comprehensive planning--and by pointing to some problems with this approach, or at least as it has been articulated by some of its proponents and practitioners. This is considered in detail since a $10 million comprehensive planning program for SEA's is expected to be launched as part of the fiscal year 1973 federal budget.[74] I then set out the characteristics of what, in my judgment, would be a "good" planning operation. I have labeled this version of planning "policy analysis" since that rubric best fits my conception of what planners should mostly do with their time--analyze policies rather than generate plans.

It should be emphasized, however, that I am less concerned with the labels attached to different versions of planning than with the actual components of a planning operation. Indeed, the distinction I have made between "comprehensive planning" and "policy analysis" is somewhat artificial--neither approach is clearly defined and certain elements of what I call policy analysis, others would simply call good planning. Bearing this in mind, however, the labels are useful for distinguishing, at least in education, the emphases of two different conceptions of the planning process.

Comprehensive planning: In 1970, the Congress authorized a new program of grants to state and local agencies* "to enhance their capability to make effective progress, through comprehensive and continuing planning and evaluation, toward the achievement of opportunities for high-quality education for all segments of the population."[75] The development of comprehensive plans to meet state education goals was viewed as a way to use "all available funds with maximum efficiency and effectiveness."[76]

The need for comprehensive planning, and the hopes for it, were described this way in 1971:

> If the purposes and goals of education are to be articulated, understood, achieved, evaluated, and changed as needed, then no level, agency, group or program can be considered in isolation. All of these need to be organized to facilitate coordination and strengthen the whole.... The best hope for avoiding chaos and possible disaster is through a process of enlightened systematic, comprehensive and continuous planning...for improvements that are demanded and vigorously supported by a majority of the citizens in each state and community.[77]

This conception of planning in education needs to be examined in terms of its real objectives. If the purpose of comprehensive planning were to collect raw data about statewide education (e.g., parent preferences, and long-range population trends), or to involve citizens in the discussion of education's goals, or to better integrate the operations of different SEA subunits, or to create task forces to consider different policies, then comprehensive planning probably would be of some value. Even if its purpose were to provide

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*This program, Title V-C, was added to the ESEA legislation by P.L. 91-230 on April 13, 1970. At the same time, the Title V program discussed throughout this study became Title V-A.

SEA's with the resources to respond to growing demands for planning and "efficiency and effectiveness" comprehensive planning would make sense; independent of its direct impact on decisions, the mere existence of modern planning paraphanalia might have short-term symbolic value with legislatures and other state groups. But if the purpose of comprehensive planning is to enhance SEA leadership or to affect significantly the allocation of educational resources, as the rhetoric of the legislation and of some of its proponents suggests, then I suspect that these planning efforts will be a failure.

Exploration of five problems with comprehensive planning, as currently conceived, will suffice to demonstrate the reasons for my skepticism. The first issue concerns the meaning and applicability of the notion of "comprehensiveness". Apparently the term has two meanings, as illustrated in a USOE definition of comprehensive education planning in 1971:

> Planning which involves:
>
> 1. Consideration of all relevant factors;
> 2. Participation of all agencies and persons who should contribute to the development of a given plan;
> 3. Intensity and sophistication of planning; and
> 4. Long range planning.
>
> Broader coverage--not simply piecemeal planning--but comprehensive coordination of the whole educational enterprise--including non-formal education--so that its various levels and parts will grow in balance, thereby avoiding serious wastes and maximizing education's contribution to national development.[78] (Emphasis added.)

In other words, all alternatives and sources of information are considered before individual decisions are made, and comprehensive planning is concerned with all facets of education.

While it might seem desirable to consider comprehensively all the alternatives for a wide range of education programs, it is questionable whether it is possible even to consider individual programs in a comprehensive fashion. In his classic article, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," Charles E. Lindblom has argued persuasively that it is humanly impossible to be comprehensive. Information is always limited and man lacks the human capacities to calculate the consequences of all alternatives.[79] In fact, clarion calls for government officials to be comprehensive probably create more problems than solutions. Aaron Wildavsky has put the problem in clear perspective:

> All that is accomplished by injunctions to follow a comprehensive approach is the inculcation of guilt among good men who find that they can never come close to fulfilling this unreasonable expectation. Worse still, acceptance of unreasonable goals inhibits discussion of the methods actually used. Thus responsible officials may feel compelled to maintain the acceptable fiction that they review (almost) everything, yet when they describe their actual behavior, it soon becomes apparent that they do not.... The vast gulf between the theories espoused by some...and their practice stems, I believe, from their adherence to a norm deeply imbedded in our culture, which holds that the very definition of rational decision is comprehensive and simultaneous examination of ends and means.[80]

A second problem with comprehensive planning in education is a preoccupation with the production of plans. Several examples illustrate this point. Identified as a leader[81] for its comprehensive planning, the Utah SEA reports:

> An important product to come out of planning efforts during the grant period will be a master plan for public education in Utah.... The master plan should forecast requirements and recommendations determined necessary for significant statewide improvement of educational experiences of children, rather than an extension of the present level of learning opportunities....[82] (Emphasis added.)

Also, the 1970 planning legislation called for the development of "long-range plans" to meet "area-wide goals"[83] of a state. As one USOE official put it: "What we are leading them [SEA's] into is the development of a state plan for education."[84]

I am not suggesting that it is a waste of time to describe on paper what a SEA unit does and what it hopes to do in the future. But when the focus is on the development of plans within a limited time period, and the emphasis is on comprehensiveness (i.e., covering a wide range of activities), what can easily happen is that busy program managers, faced by continuing crises, simply go through the ritual of developing plans without engaging in much new or hard thought. This was evidenced in South Carolina. Even though the SEA established priorities, the agency still seemed primarily concerned with the quick development of planning documents rather than the careful analysis of problems. Their planning efforts glossed over the great uncertainties associated with education processes and did not deal explicitly with values and assumptions. As a result, the change that took place was more in form than in content.[85]

But even when comprehensive planning in education focuses on hard thinking about problems, the suggested processes leave something to be desired. Basically, planning is viewed as a "rational", sequential process of assessing needs, establishing goals and objectives, exploring alternatives, implementing choices and following up with evaluation.*[86] In fact, USOE has argued that it is "essential to formulate immediate and long-range goals as an early step in the program planning process."[87] And other proponents of comprehensive planning have argued that: "clarification of values or objectives is distinct from and usually prerequisite to the empirical analysis of alternative policies."[88] Indeed, more than half the states have established abstract state-wide goals for education, many in recent years with the encouragement of USOE.[89]

The question is whether this goal-setting process means anything. Charles L. Schultze has pointed out the difficulties:

> We simply cannot determine in the abstract our ends or values and the intensity with which we hold them. *We discover our objectives and the intensity that we assign to them only in the process of considering particular programs or policies.* We articulate 'ends' as we evaluate 'means'....
>
> In short, ends are closely intertwined with means, are subtle, complex, constantly being discovered, and are usually in conflict with one another. Moreover, the most obvious fact of political life is that individuals and groups differ widely from each other in the values they hold and the intensity with which they hold those values. If the articulation of a multidimensional set of objectives is difficult for a single individual or group, it is infinitely more difficult for the body politic. Value conflicts arise from the immediate self-interest of various groups.... Other conflicts arise because different groups have quite different visions, in an altruistic sense, of the 'good society.'[90](Emphasis in original.)

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*It is noteworthy that the decision process resembles quite closely the one Title V's legislative framers hoped the state would follow in making Title V decisions. Five years later, rather than implicit assumptions about the way decisions should be made, the legislation was specifically designed to institutionalize those "rational" planning procedures.

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In other words, a separate goal-setting process seems to have little bearing either on the way public policy objectives are set or on the way solutions are discovered in the face of real problems.

Another problem with comprehensive plans involves the implementation process. This facet of planning is often limited to a discussion of the logistical problems in amassing resources and finishing tasks by certain fixed times. A USOE document on comprehensive planning sets forth his narrow conception of implementation:

> When the program approach has been decided upon, the final design and implementation phase is entered. The use of techniques such as Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) or Work Flow diagramming is highly recommended. Even the most highly skilled program managers find the detailed task identification and scheduling aspects of PERT to be extremely valuable.[91]

While these techniques may be useful under some circumstances, it is hard to conceive how broadscale comprehensive planning could have much of an effect unless it dealt explicitly with those organizational attributes identified in this study: norms, traditions, and standard operating procedures; subunits with conflicting goals and expansionist tendencies; search for solutions that are "good enough" rather than optimal; a preoccupation with short-term problems; and so on. These organizational attributes are never discussed by writers on comprehensive planning in education.

Finally, it is difficult to imagine how comprehensive plans could have much of an impact unless they were specifically woven into the budgeting and political process.[92] As we have seen, this was not the case in South Carolina. When their plans came face to face with the political process, fiscal and political realities took precedence over the Department's five-year plans. But what is even more striking is that political considerations are hardly dealt with in the literature on comprehensive planning in education. To be sure, one proponent has gone so far as to contend:

> In some states, there seems to be a tendency for the governor or certain members of the legislature to develop and want to impose their own solutions for education problems. This attitude can be understood in states in which the state education agency has neglected or failed to provide the leadership and services that are essential to plan needed improvements in education, but should be considered indefensible if recommendations submitted by any state education agency on the basis of carefully developed plans are ignored.[93]

I would suggest that this conception of the non-political nature of important allocation decisions is simply naive.

In sum, there seems to be a preoccupation with the mechanics of preparing plans as if they could be developed and implemented independent of political and organizational processes. If this version of planning is put into practice, I suspect Wildavsky's observations about the failure of economic planning also will be applicable to long-range comprehensive planning in education:

> Despite the absence of evidence on behalf of its positive accomplishments, planning has retained its status as a universal nostrum. Hardly a day goes by in some part of the world without a call for more planning as a solution to whatever problems ail the society in question.... Advocates of plans and planning, naturally enough, do not spend their time demonstrating that it has been successful. Rather they explain why planning is wonderful despite the fact that, as it happens, things have not worked out that way. Planning is defended not in terms of results but as a valuable process. It is not so much where you go that counts but how you did not get there. Thus planners talk about how much they learned while going through the exercise, how others benefited from the discipline of considering goals and resources, and how much more rational everyone feels at the end.[94]

Despite the problems cited, efforts will continue to be made to implement comprehensive planning. Its underlying conception of the way the world should work is appealing and many thoughtful individuals believe that this version of planning ought to be tried. What is likely to happen is that comprehensive planning will be modified and adapted to meet SEA needs, bending to the realities of organizational life and politics. (In fact, some practitioners of planning no doubt are familiar with some of the problems discussed above and, in practice, if not in their rhetoric, have made adjustments.) Perhaps comprehensive planning will even be abandoned, although that is unlikely in the short run since its implementers will have a stake in its continuation. In any case, it seems doubtful that comprehensive planning in education, as presently conceived, will have more than a marginal effect on SEA leadership or the allocation of educational resources.*

Policy analysis: As an alternative, I would suggest that SEA planning efforts emphasize what I have labeled "policy analysis". This version of planning would entail the persistent challenging of assumptions, the explicit discussion of values, and the exploration of various alternatives in an effort to arrive at improved policies. While modern technologies of planning would be used to the extent feasible, the main concern would be with asking good questions. In this process, policy objectives would be continually weighed and modified as a consequence of the exploration, and a recommendation of the analysis conceivably might be to scrap a particular policy because of faculty assumptions.

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*There will appear to be exceptions. For example, legislators might adopt planning goals to meet their own political ends which happen to be congruent with those of a SEA. But this is simply smart politics, not an example of planning having an impact on the allocation process.

Unlike comprehensive planning in education, policy analysis would not be primarily concerned with the development of planning documents, but rather with figuring out how to improve particular state policies. Problem areas might include the equitable distribution of school aid to localities, or a reworking of state programs for the disadvantaged, or exploring alternative ways of providing instructional services to the schools. The emphasis is problem-solving, not plan-producing.

And as part of this conception of planning, policy analysis rejects the sequential process of establishing abstract goals and then proceeding to the selection of an optimal alternative. Instead, policy analysts would explore "the interaction of ends and means in order to help the decision-maker formulate his objectives for purposes of decision."[95] Alain Enthoven has described this conception of planning:

> [Analysis is] a cycle of definition of objectives, design of alternative systems to achieve those objectives, evaluation of the alternatives in terms of their effectiveness and costs, a questioning of the objectives and a questioning of the other assumptions underlying the analysis, the opening of new alternatives, the establishment of new objectives, etc.[96]

Not only would the planning be concerned with the analysis of policy alternatives, but it must also be laced with tenacious attention to the organizational (as contrasted with simply logistical) problems of implementation. That is, the enduring attributes of organizations discussed throughout this study must be dealt with explicitly. Otherwise, the policy analysis recommendations probably would suffer the same fate as a comprehensive plan imposed upon a bureaucracy: little or no change. Graham T. Allison has described the implications of this orientation:

> . . . the crucial questions seem to be matters of planning for management: How does an analyst or operator think about moving from the preferred solution to the actual governmental action? Among the questions that an analyst concerned with this gap must consider are: Is the desired action on the agenda of issues that will arise in the current climate? If not, can it be forced onto the agenda?... Which players will have to agree and which to acquiesce? What means are available to whom for persuading these players? Is the desired action consistent with existing programs and SOPs [standard operating procedures] of the organization that will deliver the behavior? If not, how can these organizational procedures be changed?...
>
> For the argument is not simply that analysis needs to be extended beyond the identification of preferred solutions to implementation. It is also that ways must be found of *inserting organizational and political factors into the initial analysis*, into the selection of the preferred alternative.[97] (Emphasis in original.)

As can be seen, this conception of planning not only views analysis as the main concern of planners, but also views analysis as a complicated, time-consuming and expensive process. There is simply no way that a SEA would have the resources to attack each year all (or even most) of the problems or policies of the agency. This suggests an emphasis on detailed analysis of a limited number of policies, perhaps no more than three a year, rather than the superficial consideration of a large number of SEA programs. It should be emphasized, however, that the limits on comprehensiveness, articulated by Lindblom and noted earlier, would still hold in the case of these limited analyses. But by concentrating efforts in only a few areas, problems could be explored in greater depth.

This analysis of only a few problems each year raises the question of what should be analyzed. These decisions are crucial since certain policies simply are more susceptible to improvement than others. Targets of opportunity would need to be sought, with political considerations specifically built into these decisions. Allen Schick explains:

> Planning must be opportunistic and episodic, taking its cues and clues from wherever they come: expiring legislation, a new department head, changes in federal grant policy, shifts in public opinion, policy signals from the governor, a crisis, breakthroughs in technology. Most of these are nonroutine events, and few can be programmed in advance.[98]

This orientation toward policy analysis suggests that it is particularly important that the analysts not all be professional educators. The reasons for this have nothing to do with the competence of educators, but with potential problems which might be created by the shared values and background of individuals in the same profession. Richard M. Cyert and James G. March describe this general phenomenon:

> When a business firm hires an accountant, a dietician, a doctor, or a sanitary engineer, it hires not only an individual but also a large number of standard operating procedures that have been trained into the new member of the organization by outside agencies. One of the important consequences of professionalization in general is that extragovernmental groups have the responsibility of providing task performance rules for the organization.[99]

If a major goal of analysis is to challenge assumptions and to emphasize the value implications of various alternatives, a cadre of noneducators might be particularly able and willing to fulfill this role.

Finally, a successful planning operation, whether it be policy analysis or some other variant, would probably be marked by two other characteristics. First, planning would be useless unless top management supported it, and unless the planners had access to the decision-making arena to advocate their recommendations. Second, those involved in the implementation of a particular policy should participate in the development of recommendations. The purpose would not be to make program operators "feel" involved, but to obtain a realistic picture of potential implementation problems. One product of this participation might be a decision not to pursue further the contemplated change because of minimal chances for its success.[100] Of course, this emphasis on participation could create difficult problems for non-operating agencies such as SEA's. It suggests that SEA policy analysts work closely with state administrators on the implementation of SEA policies, and work with school representatives and perhaps others (e.g., parents and students) in the consideration of specific local policies.

This conception of planning, then, is different in some fundamental ways from comprehensive planning in education, as outlined by some of its proponents. It emphasizes analysis of policies rather than plan making. It limits its focus to a few policy areas rather than covering a wide range of SEA programs. It chooses priorities on the basis of susceptibility to change rather than as a result of an abstract goal-setting process. It deals specifically with political and bureaucratic problems as part of the analysis rather than apparently assuming that the policies will be adopted and implemented. It expects modest change in a few areas rather than new SEA leadership or dramatic progress in education at large.

Policy analysis, in short, is designed to work within human, political, and organizational constraints, with the hope that a SEA would become somewhat more reflective about decisions and their implementation, and about the barriers to change created by what I have called the enduring attributes of organizations. This, in turn, might possibly lead to better decisions and also, perhaps, to a somewhat more flexible use of general assistance.*

These suggestions for increased attention to analysis, like many suggestions in this chapter, are not without problems. For one thing, analysis, as described above, is more a form of art than a science; few SEA's have either the depth of resources or salaries to attract the analysts that are around. For another, policy analysis assumes a policy orientation on the part of the SEA's. As we have seen, some states (e.g., Massachusetts and Tennessee) seem to subordinate policy considerations to personal relationships. Also, the suggestion that some analysts should come from outside the ranks of professional educators will fall on many deaf ears, and not altogether without reason. The wider the differences in background, career lines, and values, between a policy analyst and SEA staff, the more difficult it might be for them to work together constructively.

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*Among the nine states I visited as part of this study, New York's planning operation came closest in resembling what I have called policy analysis. While some might criticize the New York SEA for what appears to be limited planning efforts, its approach, in my judgment, is rather sophisticated and appropriately low key.

But there is an even more fundamental issue which lies behind the current concern with planning. In emphasizing its importance, the managerial values of "efficiency and effectiveness" are paramount. The main goal is reform of the decision process to achieve more units of "output" for each unit of "input". Edgar Morphet and his colleagues have expressed this concern clearly in 1971:

> ...there is a pressing need for more rational decision making in education, as well as in other areas of public life. *Rational* in this context should be interpreted as a logical analysis that emphasizes the systematic application of the elements of efficiency and effectiveness in planning as opposed to intuition and experience alone. The task in education appears to be one of combining products and services in such a way as to maximize educational outcomes for a given level of resource input. In essence, it is a continuing attempt to bring about more 'output' per unit of 'input'.[101] (Emphasis in original.)

Implicit in this goal of efficiency is the pursuit of what might be called the middle-class conception of the purposes of government. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson have described it this way:

> The logic of the middle-class ideal requires that authority be exercised by those who are 'best qualified', that is, technical experts and statesmen, not 'politicians'. The logic of the middle-class ideal implies also...master planning...[and] particular regard for the public virtues of honesty, efficiency, and impartiality....[102]

If policy analysts are concerned with the explication of values in their work, should they not also explicitly think about the value implications of their conception of government and its role? A different conception of government, for example, might stress greater citizen participation in government as an end in itself (e.g., by employing less expert lower- and middle-class workers), even if the result might be less efficiency in achieving some other objectives. And, at bottom, it is useful to recall that as important as efficiency and effectiveness may be, they are not the guiding values for executive branch activities under our system of government. As Mr. Justice Brandeis emphasized "the doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Constitution in 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power."[103]

Thus, the suggested focus on analysis should be viewed in the spirit in which it is offered. In no way is it a panacea, or without its problems. It represents a "better bet" than comprehensive planning as a way to improve both the resource allocation process and program delivery system.

If the federal government wanted to stimulate the adoption of analysis in SEA's, several courses of action are open. First, the 1970 legislation authorizing comprehensive planning does mention analysis, in passing, as a component of the comprehensive approach. Federal regulations and guidelines could place special emphasis on these activities in an effort to develop analytical capability in the states. This might have some impact, if backed up by conscientious USOE efforts to implement it. A second possibility would be to amend the 1970 legislation, earmarking a certain percentage of the planning funds specifically for analytic activities. Finally, another approach would be to use Title V special project money (section 505) to help develop some workable SEA analysis models over the next few years.

In all three cases, of course, the impact of an analysis unit would be limited by those political and organizational factors, discussed earlier, which act as barriers to the implementation of categorical aid programs.

VII. Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has explored various approaches which the federal government might follow to strengthen SEA's. These have ranged from conventional options (financial assistance, federal regulations, and technical assistance) to approaches that are more controversial (differential treatment and governmental accountability). I also have explored various conceptions of planning. Although I have only skimmed the surface in many areas, the hope is that the discussion will stimulate serious thought about the consequences of adopting various courses of action. At this point, it might be useful to recapitulate briefly some of the suggestions explored in the chapter. Rather than a summary of them in terms of various options, they are listed in terms of the most-often discussed federal objectives.

If the overall objective of federal policy were to strengthen the states in education, then the first question is whether it makes sense to focus exclusively on SEA's. The possibility of broadening the effort to include other units of state government (e.g., state legislatures, governor's offices, and central budget offices) should be explored. Having decided for the purposes of this study that SEA's are the target of attention, the appropriate course of action depends largely on what federal officials mean by the vague objective "SEA strengthening".

If the federal objective were to enhance SEA leadership (i.e., by developing increased influence with state legislatures), or if the objective were to stimulate basic institutional reform, then these objectives probably ought to be reevaluated. This type of change seems to depend primarily on state and local forces over which the federal government has little control (e.g., a breakdown in traditions, or a shift in state politics). If these forces happen to favor rapid SEA change, then additional federal resources can help facilitate the reform. But absent an infusion of aid so massive as to be improbable, federal assistance by itself probably would not be sufficient to accomplish these two objectives.

If the objectives of federal assistance were more modest (and realistic), then several alternatives are available. If the objective is to share in the costs of SEA operations or provide chief state school officers with some flexibility, then general aid (Title V) is probably the appropriate vehicle, although unrestricted resources result in considerably less flexibility in the recipient organization than is commonly assumed. Similarly, grant consolidation would not facilitate significantly greater organizational flexibility.

If, on the other hand, the federal objective were to foster specific changes in SEA's (e.g., the adoption of new SEA roles, or the hiring of professionals from outside the field of education), then categorical aid would probably be the best approach, although there can be serious problems in implementation when federal priorities conflict with SEA procedures or priorities.

If the federal objective were more effective SEA administration of federal and state programs, or better decisions about the allocation of resources, then additional unrestricted resources are not called for at this time. SEA staffs and budgets roughly doubled between 1965 and 1970, with more than half of this increase resulting from Title V and other federal dollars. The basic question is how much is enough? In the absence of major new responsibility for the administration of federal programs, approaches other than providing SEA's with more unrestricted resources probably make more sense. I would support categorical aid for planning. A modest program to develop SEA policy analysis, however, seems to be a better bet than efforts to implement a full-blown model of comprehensive planning in education. Furthermore, I would suggest the exploration of contracting with extra-governmental bodies (e.g., universities, or consulting firms) to step up the level of technical assistance to SEA's.

If the objective were to make more effective use of limited federal resources, then one possible approach would be to treat the states differentially through incentives, bypassing weak SEA's in the administration of federal programs, and spending different amounts of technical assistance time in SEA's. Although this approach has recently been advocated by several analysts of governmental affairs, I am not very optimistic about its successful use. It would create formidable bureaucratic and political opposition in the absence of agreed-upon criteria as a basis for making decisions. One possible way to develop these criteria, however, would be through an extra-governmental study of SEA's ranking their performance in a variety of areas. This might supply the comparative data to facilitate some applications of differential treatment.

If the federal objective were to make education agencies more accountable to various interests (the public, governmental leaders, clients of federal programs, and so on), then what may be needed is the development of extra-agency sources of independent information and the institutionalization of countervailing power. Depending on which agency is being held responsible to whom for what, several possibilities deserve full exploration: agency evaluation units, performance audits, expansion of legal service programs, a new use of advisory councils, and independent research/action agencies.

Having discussed various alternatives and matched them with a variety of federal objectives in strengthening the states, several observations need highlighting in conclusion. The obvious difficulty in devising workable "next steps" is instructive. It demonstrates that federally-initiated reform of complex organizations like SEA's is extremely difficult. This results in part because we simply do not understand the ways in which organizations work, particularly when they are provided with unrestricted resources. This study is meant as a small step in providing the descriptive data necessary to reach such an understanding.

Reform is also difficult because there are differing opinions about how SEA's ought to change and about which level of government should make these decisions. And these conflicting views are faithfully reflected by the Congress in the ambiguity of its laws and its inclination to intervene in the administrative process. Finally, federally-initiated reform is particularly difficult in education because of the strong tradition of localism which inhibits aggressive central governmental action.

Indeed, the history of federal efforts to strengthen SEA's provides a curious twist reflecting the difficulty of institutional reform. At its inception in 1965, Title V provided general assistance for SEA's while most other federal programs were categorical in nature. Seven years later, in 1972, frustration with the government-wide use of categorical aid had led to an increased reliance on general aid (e.g., revenue sharing) as a way toward institutional reform of state and local governments. Ironically, during the same period, between 1965 and 1972, the pendulum was swinging in the opposite direction with SEA's; there was increasing interest in categorical aid (planning) and in the possible imposition of federal management standards. This vacillation between different approaches highlights the limits of federally-initiated governmental change. While some approaches seem better than others for making gradual progress, there are no simple ways for the federal government to promote rapid governmental reform in the states.

NOTES

NOTES: CHAPTER I

AN OVERVIEW

1. Section 501(a) of P.L. 89-10, April 11, 1965.

2. National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1971 (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, Research Division, 1971), p. 49.

3. Report of the President's Task Force on Education, John W. Gardner, chairman (Washington, D. C.: 1964), pp. 68, 71. (Typewritten.)

4. For some examples of the rhetoric supporting the notion of general assistance, see: President's Message to the Congress on Education Revenue Sharing, April 6, 1971; President's Message Relative to the State of the Union, January 20, 1972; and Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st session, on the subject of General Revenue Sharing, June, 1971. Also, the fiscal year 1973 budget of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare emphasized the theme of "institutional reform." Special Revenue Sharing in Education was considered a "major initiative" in achieving this goal.

5. Francis Keppel, "What We Don't Know Can Hurt Us" (A speech by the U. S. Commissioner of Education before the Council of Chief State School Officers, November 10, 1965), p. 7.

6. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, before the General Subcommittee on Education on H. R. 2361 and H. R. 2362, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 1st session. Testimony of U. S. Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel, January 22, 1965, pp. 103, 108.

7. This account and quote came from Samuel Halperin, USOE Assistant Commissioner for Legislation and Director of the Office of Legislation in 1965. He was a key activist in the development and passage of ESEA. Also, see: Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968), p. 58. On the other hand, former Commissioner Keppel, reacting to a draft of this chapter, commented: "I agree that educational politics were an ingredient but I'm not sure how important. Certainly, it was not the major motive in pushing for Title V. My basic reason is stated on page 4 [of this final version]."

8. Section 507 of P.L. 89-10.

9. Section 505 of P.L. 89-10. This fifteen percent set aside was reduced to five percent in 1968 by P.L. 90-247, January 2, 1968.

10. This part, section 503 of P.L. 89-10, was increased from 85 percent to 95 percent of the Title V appropriation in 1968. At the same time an amendment was added to Title V requiring that at least 10 percent of section 503 be made available to local school districts for their strengthening. This "flow through" provision was repealed shortly thereafter. Consequently, my description of section 503 will not make reference to the "flow through" funds.

11. Section 502(a)(1) of P.L. 89-10. This allocation formula was later amended as follows: Up to 2 percent of the 95 percent for section 503 was reserved for the outlying territories. From the remainder, 40 percent was divided among the states in equal amounts. The remainder was apportioned among the states (including the District of Columbia) based on their relative number of public school pupils.

12. Section 503(a)(1) through (10) of P.L. 89-10. This list in the law was later amended to include two other examples: programs to encourage the use of auxiliary personnel in the schools, and projects to help insure that the benefits of preschool education were not lost.

13. Keppel, Hearings before the General Subcommittee..., op. cit., p. 104.

14. Ibid. p. 103.

15. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D, Table 4. Also see the table in Appendix B.

16. Ibid.

17. Bailey and Mosher, op. cit., p. 140.

18. Keppel, Hearings before the General Subcommittee..., op. cit., p. 105.

19. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation.

20. Ewald B. Nyquist, "State Organization and Responsibilities for Education," in Emerging Designs for Education, ed. by Edgar L. Morphet and David L. Jesser (Denver: Designing Education for the Future, an Eight State Project, May, 1968), p. 147.

21. Keppel, Hearings before the General Subcommittee on Education..., *op. cit.*, p. 124.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 105. "...no department has an organizational unit engaged in overall planning."

24. For more details on what was thought to be the functions of SEA's in the early 1960's, see: Council of Chief State School Officers, *The State Department of Education* (Washington, D. C.: Council of Chief State School Officers, 1963).

25. Francis Keppel, *The Necessary Revolution in American Education* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 81.

26. Keppel, Hearings before the General Subcommittee on Education..., *op. cit.*, p. 105.

27. *Report of the President's Task Force on Education*, *op. cit.*, pp. 69, 72.

28. Keppel, Hearings before the General Subcommittee on Education..., *op. cit.*, p. 134.

29. Roald F. Campbell, Gerald E. Sroufe, and Donald H. Layton, eds., *Strengthening State Departments of Education* (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, the University of Chicago, 1967), pp. 74-75.

30. Nyquist, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

31. Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, *Focus on the Future: Education in the States: The Third Annual Report of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 5-6.

32. U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1969*, Report No. 91-634 on H. R. 514, 91st Congress, 2nd session, 1970, p. 50.

33. Letter from Harry L. Selden, Chief, Policy and Procedures Staff, USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation, February 4, 1972, p. 2.

34. While the Campbell *et al.* study, *op. cit.*, did gather some data on Title V through *visits* to three states, most of the analysis was based on data supplied by USOE and also by the chief state school officers in thirty-nine states who responded to a questionnaire.

35. This phrase comes from the original statute, Title V of P.L. 89-10: TITLE V - GRANTS TO STRENGTHEN STATE DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION.

36. It is interesting to note that a 1967 study did examine local school superintendents' perception of the leadership of SEA's. The study concluded:

> "For the most part superintendents in our sample perceive state departments of education as primarily regulatory, rurally-oriented, politically dominated, unreliable and ineffective....
>
> In all but three of the 22 state departments of education studied, the leadership of the state department of education is judged to be inadequate. The state departments of education are generally labeled as weak, especially in the area of planning, development and research."

Keith Goldhammer, *et al.*, *Issues and Problems in Contemporary Educational Administration* (Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, 1967), pp. 87, 88.

37. David K. Cohen, *et al.*, *The Effects of Revenue Sharing and Block Grants on Education* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Graduate School of Education, October 31, 1971), p. 157. (Mimeographed.)

38. Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, *Reinforcing the Role of States in Education: The Second Annual Report of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education* (Washington, D. C. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 45.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

40. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D, Table 3.

41. Interview with USOE official, 1972.

42. Section 503 of the 1965 ESEA sent to Capitol Hill by the Administration required the states to match from their own sources one-third to one-half the cost of Title V projects.

43. Interview, Samuel Halperin, *op. cit.*, 1972.

44. Keppel, "What We Don't Know...," *op. cit.*, p. 5.

45. Keppel, Hearings before the General Subcommittee on Education..., *op. cit.*, p. 104.

46. Bailey and Mosher, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

47. Keppel, "What We Don't Know...," op. cit., p. 8.

48. Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, Improving State Leadership in Education: An Annual Report of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 9.

49. Ibid., p. 9.

50. Ibid., p. 9. Also, as further evidence, the federal applications for Title V funds required each SEA to describe its planning activities, list its "major needs", and set forth the "steps and improvements which should be taken to meet the needs listed."

51. Former Commissioner Keppel, upon reading an earlier draft of this chapter, wrote at this point: "I agree with your conclusion--at least as best I can remember. Hope was springing up all over in those days!"

52. This view was expressed in 1972 interviews at the U. S. Office of Management and Budget and in USOE (in units other than the Division of State Agency Cooperation). This view also has been expressed in the literature. For example, see several quotes in Chapter I of this study. Also, see: James D. Koerner, Who Controls American Education? A Guide for Laymen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 79-117.

53. An expression used by a USOE official to describe the way he thought others viewed the Chiefs. Interview, 1972.

54. According to Samuel Halperin, op. cit. Also, the 1965 ESEA postponed for two years the matching provisions contained in the original bill sent to the Congress. The 1966 ESEA Amendments dropped the provision altogether.

55. Interview with official in the U. S. Office of Management and Budget (formerly the Bureau of the Budget), 1972.

56. Interview with official in the USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation, 1972.

57. The problems mentioned in this paragraph are frequently cited. For example, see the reports of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, op. cit.

58. Interview with USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation staffer, 1972.

59. Interview with several USOE officials, 1972.

60. Interview with former top official of USOE, 1971.

61. Interview with USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation staffer, 1972.

62. Interview with USOE official, 1972.

63. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (2nd ed., New York: The Free Press, 1957); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958); Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963); Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964); Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966); Seymour B. Saranson, The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971); and John Steinbruner, The Mind and Milieu of Policy Makers (Tentative title of unpublished manuscript).

64. Allison, ibid., p. 85; Katz and Kahn, ibid., pp. 446-449.

65. Saranson, op. cit., pp. 227-228.

66. March and Simon, op. cit., p. 141.

67. Ibid., p. 141. Also, Steinbruner, op. cit., takes this notion of not searching for optimal solutions a step further. He has developed a so-called "cybernetic" paradigm to explain these search and choice procedures. Readers interested in the details of Steinbruner's intriguing argument are referred to his forthcoming study.

68. Simon op. cit., p. xxiv, emphasis in original.

69. Ibid. p. xxvi.

70. Cyert and March, op. cit., pp. 118-119.

71. Ibid. p. 119.

72. Ibid., p. 43; Allison, op. cit., p. 76.

73. Cyert and March, ibid., pp. 30-33.

74. Allison, op. cit., p. 76.

75. Cyert and March, op. cit., pp. 270-271.

76. Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 17.

77. March and Simon, op. cit., pp. 123, 126.

78. Allison, op. cit., pp. 144-184; March and Simon, ibid., pp. 130-131.

79. Allison, ibid., pp. 144-184.

80. Ibid., pp. 154, 166-167.

81. Ibid., pp. 166-167.

82. March and Simon, op. cit., p. 173.

83. Allison, op. cit., p. 154.

84. Ibid., pp. 168-169.

85. Cyert and March, op. cit., pp. 36, 99.

86. Ibid., pp. 107-110.

87. Allison, op. cit., on page 181 has spelled out the problems involved:

> "Information about the details of differences in perceptions and priorities within a government on a particular issue is rarely available. Accurate accounts of the bargaining that yielded a resolution of the issue are rarer still. Documents do not capture this kind of information. What the documents do preserve tends to obscure, as much as to enlighten. Thus the source of such information must be the participants themselves. But, *ex hypothesis*, each participant knows one small piece of the story. Memories quickly become colored. Diaries are often misleading. What is required is access, by an analyst attuned to the players and interested in governmental politics, to a large number of the participants in a decision before their memories fade or become too badly discolored. Such access is uncommon. But without this information, how can the analyst proceed? As a master of this style of analysis has stated, 'If I were forced to choose between the documents on the one hand, and late, limited, partial interviews with some of the principal participants on the other, I would be forced to discard the documents.' The use of public documents, newspapers, interviews of participants, and discussion with close observers of participants to piece together the bits of information available is an art."

NOTES: CHAPTER II

TITLE V AS GENERAL AID: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS

1. Section 504(a) of P.L. 89-10, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.

2. Section 119.3(b)(1) of Code of Federal Regulations, Title 45, Chapter 1, Part 119, September 9, 1965.

3. This account is based on interviews with Emerson J. Elliott, U. S. Office of Management and Budget (formerly the Bureau of the Budget), March 2, 1972, and Samuel Halperin, USOE Assistant Commissioner for Legislation and Director of the Office of Legislation in 1965. Also, see: Stephen K. Bailey and Edith F. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968), p. 58. Furthermore, former Commissioner Francis Keppel, reacting to a draft of this section, noted:

   > "On this possibility [i.e., increasing the chance of reform through USOE approval of projects], as you may guess, I was in disagreement [with BOB] on two grounds: 1) The USOE bureaucracy was not capable--and might never be capable--of handling the program; 2) The effect would be to weaken the State EA's."

4. Section 509(a) of P.L. 89-10.

5. Former Commissioner Keppel, reacting to a draft of this action, commented:

   > "As nearly as I can recall, the administrative policy of 'deference,' 'cooperation,' and politeness with the states was recommended by [Deputy Commissioner] Wayne Reed and approved by me. But it never was my intention that it replace a review program of state plans: but rather that it smooth the relationships that would later become difficult for policy reasons."

6. USOE, "Discussion Paper Concerning State Education Agency Development" (Washington, D. C.: USOE, November 24, 1965), p. 4. (Typewritten.)

7. Interview with Robert L. Hopper, June 30, 1972.

8. USOE, Reinforcing the Role of States in Education: The Second Annual Report of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 29.

9. The observations in this paragraph and the two preceding paragraphs are based on interviews in 1971 and 1972 with several individuals who administered Title V in 1965 and 1966.

10. Interview with Title V Director, Harry L. Phillips, July 21, 1972.

11. Interview with USOE official, June 5, 1972.

12. It should be pointed out that these findings are neither unique to Title V nor new in intergovernmental relations. Indeed, Senator Edmond Muskie (Democrat, Maine) has characterized intergovernmental relations "as almost a fourth branch of government," but one which "has no direct electorate, operates from no set perspective, is under no special control, and moves in no particular direction...." (As quoted in Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 139.) Furthermore, more than thirty-five years ago, the foreword to V. O. Key's, The Administration of Federal Grants to States, noted:

> "The simple faith in the efficacy of federal supervision as a means of improving administration is also jarred by Dr. Key's finding that in some instances the federal officials are, in fact, largely dominated by state officials and interested organizations, and that control runs from the state to the federal agency rather than the other way. Under these circumstances, the degree of federal administrative supervision is determined largely by state officials."

V. O. Key, The Administration of Federal Grants to States (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1937), p. xii.

13. This point was made independently by at least four interviewees in USOE.

14. Interview with Harry L. Phillips, June 7, 1972.

15. Interview with former Title V official, June 6, 1972.

16. Interview with Title V official, 1971.

17. Interview with former Title V official, June 7, 1972.

18. Interview with Title V official, 1971.

19. Interview with former Title V official, June 30, 1972.

20. Interview with Title V official, June 7, 1972.

21. Interview with Title V official, March 1, 1972. Title V Director, Harry L. Phillips, in a letter to me, dated August 4, 1972, provided a more detailed interpretation of USOE's limited authority. It read:

> "[The law when] literally translated means that virtually any activity in a State educational agency that makes a significant contribution to strengthening its leadership resources or its ability to participate effectively in meeting the educational needs of a State qualifies. Consequently, the disapproval authority...must be hinged on the leadership and educational needs issues. Following such logic to its extreme, implies that the Federal Government must exercise responsibilities which are prohibited in Section 422, P.L. 91-230 [i.e., prohibition against federal control] as well as being an original provision of P.L. 89-10."

22. USOE, "Position Paper Concerning the Office's Future Role and Relationships with Large City School Districts and State Education Agencies" (Washington, D. C.: USOE, August 25, 1965), p. 4. (Typewritten.)

23. See Bailey and Mosher, _op. cit._, pp. 1-71. It also should be emphasized that each education law contained a provision specifically prohibiting federal control of education.

24. _Ibid._ p. 58.

25. U. S. Congress, House, _Congressional Record_, 89th Cong., _1st_ sess. March 26, 1965, 6128.

26. For example, according to the Study Commission, Council of Chief State School Officers:

> "In carrying out the provisions of Title V it is strongly recommended that the following general principle continue to be observed by the U. S. Office of Education: 'Educational services provided by the Federal government should be of such character and be performed in a manner to insure that the administration and operation of the education program in each state will remain the primary responsibility of the state'."

Study Commission, Council of Chief State School Officers, "Report of Committee on Evaluating State Departments of Education," October 27, 1965. (Typewritten.)

27. Interview with former Title V official, June 6, 1972.

28. Interview with Title V official, 1971.

29. Bailey and Mosher, op. cit., p. 142.

30. Interview with former Title V official, June 26, 1972.

31. Interview with Title V official, March 1, 1972.

32. This point and much of the argument that follows has been drawn (and adapted) from: Jerome T. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Education Reform," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February, 1971), 35-63.

33. Morton Grodzins, The American System: A New View of Government in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 274.

34. Former Commissioner Keppel, reacting to a draft of this chapter, commented about the virtual impossibility of cutting off Title V funds:

> "Good point--and one that I did not understand adequately at the time. I suppose the general euphoria of new Federal activity and leadership was at work too!"

NOTES: CHAPTER III

TITLE V IN MASSACHUSETTS

1. See, for example: Murray B. Levin, The Compleat Politician: Political Strategy in Massachusetts (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1962), and Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961).

2. Elliot L. Richardson, "Poisoned Politics," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 208, No. 4 (October, 1961), p. 78.

3. Levin, op. cit., p. 70.

4. Edgar Litt, The Political Cultures of Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1965), pp. 178-179. It should be emphasized, however, that things may be changing. In May, 1971, the state government was reorganized. 173 units reporting directly to the governor and 1?2 other subunits were replaced with nine "super agencies". The impact of this reorganization is yet to be determined.

5. Interview with Robert Jeffrey, Massachusetts Title I of ESEA Director.

6. Laurence Iannaccone, "The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in Massachusetts," in Joel S. Berke and Michael W. Kirst (eds.), Federal Aid to Education: Who Benefits? Who Governs? (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, forthcoming), p. 198. (Page proofs.)

7. National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1971 (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, Research Division, 1971), p. 30.

8. Ibid., p. 52.

9. Ibid., p. 49.

10. Ibid., p. 59.

11. Richard H. de Lone, Massachusetts Schools: Past, Present and Possible, Annual Report: Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education (Boston: Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education, January, 1972), pp. 5-6.

12. Litt, op. cit., p. 205.

13. Ibid., p. 208.

14. Ibid., p. 3.

15. de .one, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

18. Benjamin Willis and Kevin Harrington, *Report of the Special Commission Established to Make an Investigation and Study Relative to Improving and Extending Educational Facilities in the Commonwealth* (Boston, Mass.: House Document No. 4300, June, 1965), p. 153.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

20. Lawrence Kotin, "Equal Educational Opportunity: The Emerging Role of the State Board of Education," *Boston University Law Review*, Vol. 50:211 (Spring, 1970), p. 213.

21. John S. Gibson, *The Massachusetts Department of Education: Proposals for Progress in the '70's* (Medford, Mass.: The Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs, Tufts University, September, 1970), p. 95.

22. National Education Association, *Staff Salaries, State Departments of Education, 1969-70* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, Research Division, 1970).

23. Data supplied by the Massachusetts Department of Education Research Division. Not only are salaries low in comparison with similar position at the local level, but the Massachusetts SEA salaries cannot even compete with those for the same work in some other states. A science specialist in the Massachusetts SEA earns an average of about $12,000, for instance, while in the New York SEA the same position pays about $16,000 (see *Staff Salaries...*, *op. cit.*, pp 46, 47).

24. Gibson, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 139. "During the 18 months between July, 1968, and January, 1970, there were 59 resignations by professional staff of the Department, usually for higher paying and more prestigious positions in public schools or other educational agencies. Most of these people were promising young educators with about 14 to 16 months of service, just the kind of men and women so desperately needed to give the Department the thrust it requires."

26. John C. Kraskouskas, "Those Persistent Problems in the Department of Education," *The Massachusetts Teacher* (March, 1971), p. 19.

27. Gibson, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

30. Interview with Massachusetts legislator, August 31, 1971.

31. James A. Buckley, "A Study of the Professional Staffs of the New England State Departments of Education" (Cambridge: Harvard Graduate School of Education, unpublished special qualifying paper, 1969), pp. 20-24. (Typewritten.)

32. David J. Kirby and Thomas A. Tollman, "Background and Career Patterns of State Department Personnel," in Roald F. Campbell *et al.* (eds. , *Strengthening State Departments of Education* (Chicago: Midwest Administrative Center, University of Chicago, 1967), p. 39.

33. See, for example: Edgar L. Morphet, *et al.*, *Planning and Providing for Excellence in Education* (Denver: Improving State Leadership in Education Project, 1971).

34. Gibson, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

35. Iannaccone, *op. cit.*, pp. 207, 208. (Page proofs.)

36. de Lone, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

37. Gibson, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

38. Interview with Massachusetts legislator, March 14, 1972.

39. Interview with SEA employee, March 27, 1972.

40. Interview with SEA employee, March 27, 1972

41. For example, A USOE study of the Massachusetts SEA explains the problem:

> "While the recruitment effort over the past two years has indeed been successful, it must be recognized that the job market has been very favorable and that many employees may be using the department for training purposes rather than as career employment."

USOE, "Report of the Management Review of Federal Programs in the Massachusetts Department of Education" (Washington, D. C.: USOE, State Management Review, April 26-30, 1971), p. 76. (Typewritten.)

42. Kraskouskas, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

43. Interview with SEA official, May 22, 1972.

44. Gib on, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

45. de one, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

46. Interview with state official, May 5, 1972.

47. Iannoccone, *op. cit.*, p. 200. (Page proofs.)

48. de one, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

49. Data gathered from annual Title V project applications which are submitted to USOE for approval.

50. Budget data supplied by the SEA.

51. Interview with SEA official, May, 1972.

52. Drawn from FY 1971 budget materials of the SEA.

53. Drawn from FY 1972 budget materials of the SEA.

54. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "Report of Review of Grants Awarded to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under Title V, Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965" (Washington, D. C.: HEW Audit Agency, December, 1969), p. 2. (Typewritten.)

55. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

56. Richard Devon Hibschman, "The Effects of Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 on the Massachusetts Department of Education: An Examination and Analysis" (Cambridge: Harvard Graduate School of Education, special qualifying paper, May, 1969), pp. 38, 39. (Typewritten.)

57. "Report of Review of Grants...," *op. cit.*, p. 10.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

59. Jerome T. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Education Reform," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February, 1971), p. 54.

60. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "Follow-up Review of Prior Audit Findings Reported to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965" (Washington, D. C.: HEW Audit Agency, April, 1972), p. 11. (Typewritten.)

61. Letter from Neil V. Sullivan, Massachusetts Commissioner of Education, to Leon Lessinger, Associate Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education, USOE, January 7, 1970, p. 4.

62. "Report of the Management Review...," op. cit., p. 49.

63. Willi and Harrington, op. cit., p. 141.

64. Hibschman, op. cit., p. 30.

65. Interview with former SEA employee, May 9, 1972.

66. Based on SEA budget data.

67. FY1966 Title V application.

68. Objectives taken from prospectus for A Center for Research and Development, submitted by the Massachusetts SEA to USOE on October 15, 1965.

69. Interview with SEA official, 1971.

70. "R & D Budget by Objectives," Massachusetts Department of Education, FY1971, p. 3.

71. "R & D," Massachusetts Department of Education, Bulletin No. 1, 1967, Revised 1969.

72. Memorandum to Commissioner and Cabinet from James F. Baker, Assistant Commissioner, May 18, 1971.

73. "Report of Review of Grants...," op. cit., p. 17.

74. Interview with the Director of the Research Division, 1971.

75. "Follow Up Review of Prior Audit...," op. cit., p. 7.

76. USOE, "Report of the Management of Federal Programs in the Massachusetts Department of Education" (Washington, D. C.: USOE, State Management Review, May, 1968), p. 9. (Typewritten.)

77. Interview with the Director of the Research Division, 1971.

78. "Report of the Management Review...," 1971, op. cit., p. 52.

79. Data supplied by Division of Research.

80. Interview with SEA official, 1971.

81. Interview with a Massachusetts legislator, August 31, 1971.

82. Fiscal 1966 Massachusetts Title V Application.

83. See Massachusetts Title V Annual Reports.

84. Interview with SEA official, 1971.

85. Interviews with SEA officials, 1971.

86. On this last point see Gibson, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

87. Interview with SEA official, 1971.

88. Based on departmental budget data.

89. Gibson, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

90. Interview with Commissioner Sullivan, May 24, 1972.

91. USOE, "Resources of State Education Agencies: Report of Program Analysis," Part IV (Washington, D. C.: USOE, 1965), p. 5.

92. USOE, "ESEA - Title V: 1965 Report of Program Analysis by State" (Washington, D. C.: USOE, 1965). (Computer printout.)

93. Interview with SEA official, March 10, 1972.

94. Hibschman, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

95. Interview with former SEA official, May 9, 1972.

96. Information drawn from the files of Deputy Commissioner Thomas J. Curtin. Account of meeting with former Massachusetts Commissioner Owen B. Kiernan, May 20, 1965.

97. Memorandum from G. F. Lambert to Deputy Commissioner T. J. Curtin, on "Report of Meeting at Topsfield, June 9, 1965 with reports to utilize all Massachusetts allotments under Title V Public Law 89-10," June 22, 1965.

98. Interview with SEA official, May 22, 1972.

99. Hibschman, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

100. Interview with SEA official, October 15, 1971.

101. Willis and Harrington, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

102. Interview with former Massachusetts Commissioner of Education Owen B. Kiernan, June 5, 1972.

103. Hibschman, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

104. Interview with SEA official, March 10, 1972.

105. Interview with SEA official, March 10, 1972.

106. Interview with former SEA official, May 31, 1972.

107. Hibschman, op. cit., p. 53.

108. Interview with Massachusetts legislator, March 14, 1972. Also, in the case of the Department's power with the legislature, see: Iannaccone, op. cit., p. 208. (Page proofs.) "More than 600 bills concerning education were submitted to the General Court in 1970. Twenty-one of these came from the MDE. In 1969, the department submitted sixteen, ten of which were killed. The department's win/loss is about 50 percent, the same percentage as before the reorganization."

109. Iannaccone, op. cit., p. 209. (Page proofs.)

110. Interview with state official, May 5, 1972.

111. Interview with SEA official, March 27, 1972.

112. Interview with SEA official, May 11, 1972.

113. Interview with state official, May 5, 1972.

114. The Massachusetts SEA was provided the opportunity to respond to the penultimate draft of this chapter. Since I suspect Massachusetts officials would disagree somewhat with my final conclusions, as they did with the draft, it seemed appropriate to set forth their views. A December 15, 1971 letter from Everett G. Thistle, Deputy Commissioner, noted:

> "From my point of view, as one who has lived through the frustrations and the successes of the Title V experience, the available facts would yield a much different report. As a result of Title V, many positive forward steps have been taken despite the difficulties encountered. Judgments have been made. Planning and evaluation have taken place. The leadership and service to local districts provided by the Department in 1971 is much different and much more positive than it would have been in the absence of Title V. There is no denying that there has been need for improvement along the way. There is also no denying that improvements have been made and continue to be made."

115. Interview with long-time observer of SEA, June 5, 1972.

116. The Boston Globe, August 1, 1972, p. 17.

NOTES: CHAPTER IV

TITLE V IN NEW YORK

1. Saying was referred to by two New York state officials in interviews on July 26, 1971 and August 12, 1971. More specifically, the point has been made this way:

   > "The State Education Department is the administrative arm of The University of the State of New York. The University of the State of New York is a system of educational government, not an operating institution of higher learning. The State Constitution guarantees its existence as a separate, nonpolitical corporate entity and as a fourth branch of government."

   This quote is excerpted from a speech delivered by then New York Deputy Commissioner of Education Ewald B. Nyquist, "Tentative Plans for Strengthening the New York State Education Department" (March 19 1965), p. 2.

2. New York State Education Department, *On the Job in the State Education Department* (Albany: The State Education Department, Bureau of Personnel, 1967), p. 1. For a discussion of the role of the Board of Regents, also see: Michael D. Usdan, *The Political Power of Education in New York State* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1963).

3. Stephen K. Bailey, *et al.*, *Schoolmen and Politics: A Study of State Aid to Education in the Northeast* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962), p. 27.

4. This discussion is based on interviews, Usdan, *op. cit.*, and Bailey, *et al.*, *ibid*.

5. National Education Association, *Rankings of the States, 1971* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, Research Division, 1971), p. 7.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

9. Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, *Report on an Evaluation of the 50 State Legislatures* (Kansas City, Mo.: Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, 1970), p. 29.

10. Lynton K. Caldwell, *The Government and Administration of New York* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), p. 13.

11. Interview, August 13, 1971.

12. Usdan *op. cit.*, pp. 29-33.

13. Michael D. Usdan, "The Political Power of Education in New York State A Second Look" (New York: Central School Boards Committee for Educational Research, 1967), p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

14. Usdan, 1963, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 28.

15. Interview, August 12, 1971.

16. The State Education Department, *Inside Education* (Albany: State Education Department, September, 1971), p. 7.

17. Speech by Commissioner of Education Ewald B. Nyquist, May 4, 1971, p. 1.

18. Interview with New York State budget examiner, September, 1971. The same point was made by a top SEA official in an interview on August 11, 1971.

19. Frederick M. Wirt, "The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in New York," in *Federal Aid to Education: Who Benefits? Who Governs?* ed. by Joel S. Berke and Michael W. Kirst (Lexington, Mass.: Heath forthcoming), p. 334. (Page proofs.)

20. Usdan, 1963, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

21. Mike M. Milstein and Robert E. Jennings, "Perceptions of the Educational Policy-Making Process in New York State: Educational Interest Group Leaders and State Legislators" (Annual Conference, American Educational Research Association, February 4-7, 1971), p. 17 (Mimeographed.)

22. Interview, August 12, 1971.

23. Wirt, *op. cit.*, pp. 341, 342. (Page proofs.)

24. Expression used by top manager of SEA to describe the Department's former success in getting funds for almost all reasonable requests, August 12, 1971.

25. Interview, August 13, 1971.

26. State Education Department, "State Education Department Personal Service Status Report," May 14, 1971. (Typewritten.)

27. U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *State Departments of Education and Federal Programs: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1970* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 12. (The tables from which these figures are drawn apparently do not include SEA staff working in the area of vocational rehabilitation.)

28. *Ibid.*

29. Data supplied by Harry Phillips, Director of USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation.

30. Nyquist, "Tentative Plans...," *op. cit.*, p. 2.

31. "State Education Department Personal Service Status Report," *op. cit.*

32. State Education Department, *The New York State Education Department: 1900-1965* (Albany: State Education Department, Division of Research, November, 1967), p. 36.

33. National Education Association, *Staff Salaries, State Departments of Education, 1969-70* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, Research Division, 1970), pp. 46, 47.

34. The State Education Department, *Redesign: Annual Report, 1970-71* (Albany: State Education Department, 1971), p. 27.

35. Wirt, *op. cit.*, p. 344. (Page proofs.)

36. *Ibid*, pp. 345-347. (Page proofs.) Wirt points out, however, that other parts of the SEA (e.g., the research and evaluation units) identify with institutions of higher education as their reference groups, rather than local schoolmen.

37. USOE, "Report of the New York State Education Department Management Review," May 12-16, 1969, p. 27. (Typewritten.)

38. Interviews with SEA personnel officer, July 27, 1971, and SEA administrative officer, August 12, 1971.

39. "Report of the New York State Education Department Management Review," *op. cit.*, p. 22.

40. Interview, September 2, 1971.

41. Interviews, July 27, 1971, August 11, 1971, and August 12, 1971.

42. Interview with SEA personnel officer, July 27, 1971.

43. U. S. Office of Education, *Digest of Educational Statistics* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 22.

44. U. S. Office of Education, *Title I/Year II, The Second Annual Report of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, School Year 1966-67* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 120.

45. See Appendix D for annual apportionments.

46. It is worth noting that I arrived at this figure by going through all the applications for Title V support since 1965. SEA officials had only the vaguest notion of the total number of projects funded.

47. "Establish broad general categories rather than a host of isolated projects," cautioned a group of SEA officials in 1965. "Strengthening Educational Leadership Resources of State Departments of Education, Implementing Section 503, P.L. 89-10," 1965, p. 3. (Typewritten.)

48. The description of projects that follows is based on the official applications submitted to USOE by the New York SEA.

49. Interview, August 11, 1971.

50. Interview, July 27, 1971.

51. That is to say, the SEA had to clear new jobs and pay rates with a central agency of the state executive branch. This, of course, provided a check on departmental activities.

52. This observation is based on data supplied by the New York SEA.

53. Fiscal 1966 Title V Application to USOE, No. 1T, p. 1.

54. Fiscal 1966 Title V Annual Report to USOE, No. 4A, p. 2.

55. Interviews on September 13, 1971.

56. Interview, August 13, 1971.

57. This discussion of regional centers illustrates the difficulty in finding out what really happened in 1965, particularly when an event involved sensitive internal politics. One device used to check my interpretations of the data and to collect additional details was to send to each SEA studied in-depth the penultimate draft for comment. The hope was that this process would result in a more accurate description of Title V's implementation. This proved to be a futile effort in New York, as illustrated by the following exchange of letters:

"October 4, 1971

"Dr. Ewald B. Nyquist
"New York State Education Department
"Office of the President of the University
and Commissioner of Education
"Albany, New York 12224

"Dear Commissioner Nyquist:

"Enclosed is a draft of my findings on Title V in New York. I am sending it to you now, although I have not quite finished with it, to give you ample opportunity to react to my thinking at this time. Moreover, I am anxious to change the document in any way which could lead to a fairer, more accurate description of your Title V activities. Hence any evidence to counter any of my assertions would be greatly appreciated.

"In reading this draft, it would be helpful to think of it in the context of the likely final report. This case study probably will be one of several chapters describing Title V in different education agencies. It will be preceeded by a chapter explaining my methodology and criteria for evaluation -- along the lines of my proposal which I previously sent to you -- and followed by my conclusions and recommendations.

"I look forward to your comments and those of your staff. And again, I am grateful to you for all your help on my project.

"Cordially,

"Jerome T. Murphy
"Project Director

"P.S. I would appreciate it if your secretary could drop me a note saying that the draft 'made it through the mail'."

"Monday
"December 20
"19 71

"Mr. Jerome T. Murphy
"Project Director
"Center for Educational Policy Research
"Harvard University
"Graduate School of Education
"24 Garden Street
"Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

"Dear Mr. Murphy:

"Some time early in October you sent me a draft of your report on the State Education Department, and you asked for my reactions. My general dismay at the report was so extensive and my criticisms so many, that I found it difficult to find time to write you in detail.

"From my viewpoint there are many errors and misimpressions, and I can't help but feel that the whole report is colored by a bias [sic] position. Finally, the technical detail of your approach leaves something to be desired.

"Faithfully yours,

"Ewald B. Nyquist"

"December 29, 1971

"Dr. Ewald B. Nyquist
"New York State Education Department
"Office of the President of the University
and Commissioner of Education
"Albany, New York 12224

"Dear Commissioner Nyquist:

"Thank you for your December 20th letter commenting on my draft which describes Title V's implementation in the New York State Education Department.

"When I mailed you the draft on October 3, I tried to make it clear that it was not the final version and that I would make any necessary changes. In my letter of October 3, I stated: 'I am sending it to you now, although I have not quite finished with it, to give you ample opportunity to react to my thinking at this time. Moreover, I am anxious to change the document in any way which could lead to a fairer, more accurate description of your Title V activities.'

"In your response of December 20th you say that the draft contains 'many errors and misimpressions' but you don't tell me what they are. You criticize the 'technical detail' of the report without being specific. Finally, you state that 'the whole report is colored by a bias position' but don't explain the nature of this bias. If you think I am biased, it is extremely important for me to know how.

"In fairness to you, to me, and to the Department, this matter ought to be resolved. Perhaps the best way to do so would be for me to visit the Department to meet with members of your staff to discuss your reaction to the draft. I am willing to come at any time at your earliest convenience.

"I look forward to hearing from you.

"Sincerely yours,

"Jerome T. Murphy
"Title V Project Director"

"Tuesday
"January 11
"19 72

"Mr. Jerome T. Murphy
"Project Director
"Center for Educational Policy Research
"Harvard University
"Graduate School of Education
"24 Garden Street
"Cambridge Massachusetts 02138

"Dear Mr. Murphy:

"This will acknowledge your letter of December 29, 1971, which has been received during Commissioner Nyquist's absence from the office. It will, of course, be brought to his attention as soon as he returns.

"In the meantime, I have reread the Commissioner's letter to you of December 20, and I have discovered that it contains two typographical errors. The second paragraph should read as follows:

> "'From my viewpoint there are many errors and misimpressions, and I can't help but feel that the whole report is colored by a biased position. Finally, the clinical detail of your approach leaves something to be desired.'

"Sincerely yours,

/S/ Jean Harn

"Secretary to the
Commissioner"

"February 25, 1972

"Dr. Ewald B. Nyquist
"Commissioner of Education
"New York State Education Department
"Albany, New York 12224

"Dear Commissioner Nyquist:

"Last October I sent you a copy of my draft report on the implementation of Title V of ESEA in New York. On December 20 you sent me your general reactions. On December 29 I wrote asking for the opportunity to visit the Department to meet with members of your staff and discuss specific criticism. (A copy of my earlier letter is enclosed.) I have not received a response.

"I am now going into the final stages of preparing my report on Title V for HEW and would again like to ask if it would be possible for me to visit with you or members of your staff to discuss any factual problems you have with my draft.

"I look forward to hearing from you.

"Sincerely yours,

"Jerome T. Murphy
"Title V Project Director"

I never received a response from the Commissioner to my letters of December 29, 1971 and February 25, 1972.

58. Nyquist, "Tentative Plans for Strengthening...," *op. cit.*, p. 5.

59. Fiscal year 1969 Title V annual report.

60. Interview, August 11, 1971.

61. Interview, July 27, 1971.

62. Henry M. Brickell, *Organizing New York State for Educational Change* (Albany: State Education Department, December, 1961), p. 43.

63. McKinsey and Company, Inc., "A Program for Strengthening the New York State Education Department," August, 1966, pp. 4-12. (Typewritten.)

64. Interview with personnel officer, August 11, 1971.

65. Interview with SEA bureau chief, September 13, 1971.

66. Fiscal 1968 Title V Application No. 5-36. My purpose is to illustrate the lack of clarity in a Title V application, not to pick out a particular office for criticism. Hence, the office has not been identified.

67. Interview, July 28, 1971.

68. Interview, August 11, 1971.

69. Interview, August 11, 1971.

70. Interview, August 11, 1971.

71. U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *State Departments of Education...*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

72. William C. Enderlein (ed.), *Comprehensive Planning in State Education Agencies* (Moorestown, N. J.: Communication Technology Corporation, 1969), p. 19.

73. Based on data supplied by the New York SEA.

74. Interview, August 11, 1971.

75. Vernon Ozarow, *The Role of the New York State Education Department in Science and Technology* (Albany: State Education Department, April, 1968), p. 53.

76. Ewald B. Nyquist, "Proposals for Using Funds Under Title V-ESEA," September 20, 1965, p. 3. (Typewritten.)

77. Interview, July 27, 1971.

78. Interview, August 11, 1971.

79. Brickell, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

80. The observations in this section were based mainly on six days of interviewing and a careful reading of New York"s Title V applications and annual reports on individual projects submitted to USOE.

81. Interview, August 12, 1971.

82. Memorandum from Ewald B. Nyquist, to departmental cabinet members (and others reporting to him), February 9, 1965, p. 1.

83. Interview, July 27, 1971.

84. Interview, August 11, 1971.

85. Interviews, August 11, 1971 and September 13, 1971.

86. Nyquist, "Proposals for Using Funds...," *op. cit.*, p. 1.

87. Interview, August 13, 1971.

88. Memorandum from Ewald B. Nyquist, to cabinet (and others reporting to him) on Title V ESEA Proposals, February 10, 1966.

89. Interview, July 26, 1971.

90. Interview, August 11, 1971.

91. I am referring to the supervisory positions under Titles III and X of NDEA.

92. Interview, August 12, 1971.

93. Interview, August 12, 1971.

94. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 126.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

96. McKinsey and Company, Inc., *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4, 3-5.

97. State Education Department, "Planning for Education," undated, p. 6. (Typewritten.)

98. Moshe Shani, "Administrative Considerations in a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System: The Case of the New York State Education Department" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, June, 1970), p. 2 of summary.

99. *Ibid*., p. 2 of summary.

100. *Ibid*., p. 238.

101. *Ibid*., p. 228.

102. This description is based on a July 27, 1971 interview and correspondence from Gerald L. Freeborne, Director of Educational Planning, New York SEA, September 3, 1971.

103. Enderlein, *op. cit*., p. 23.

104. "Planning for Education," *op. cit*., p. 1.

105. *Ibid* , p. 1.

106. Interview with top departmental official, August 11, 1971.

107. Norman D. Kurland, "Changing a Larger State Education Department," (New York State Education Department, February 17, 1971), p. 6. (Typewritten.)

108. Interview, July 27, 1971.

109. Interview, July 27, 1971.

110. Expression used by interviewee, August 12, 1971.

111. Memorandum from Gordon M. Ambach, New York SEA, Deputy Executive Commissioner, to Cabinet (and other top officials) on Regents Program Priority Statement for FY 1972-73, May 28, 1971. (Typewritten.)

112. Norman D. Kurland, "The Progress of Educational Planning at the State Level Including the Role of Title V-505 Workshops January 1969 to January 1970," in *Comprehensive Planning in State Education Agencies*, ed. by Enderlein, *op. cit*., p. 13.

113. Interview, July 26, 1971.

114. Interview, July 21, 1971.

115. Memorandum to Dr. Melvin E. Engelhardt, Chief Instructional Programs Section, Division of Plans and Supplementary Centers, Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education, USOE, from Harry J. Chernock, Assistant General Counsel for Education, on ESEA Title V--Eligibility of New York State Department of Education proposed projects dealing with higher education," May 15, 1970. (Typewritten.)

NOTES: CHAPTER V

TITLE V IN SOUTH CAROLINA

1. *The State*, Columbia, South Carolina, October 28, 1971, p. 16-A.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 16-A.
3. V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 150.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 150-155.
5. W. H. Callcott (ed.), *South Carolina: Economic and Social Conditions in 1944* (Columbia, S. C.: The University of South Carolina Press, 1945), p. 141.
6. Key, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
8. Author asked not to be identified. Unpublished manuscript on South Carolina politics. p. 37 of draft. (Typewritten.)
9. Key, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
10. Frank M. Kirk, "South Carolina," in *Education in the States: Historical Development and Outlook*, ed. by Jim B. Pearson and Edgar Fuller (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1969), p. 1129.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 1130.
12. Interview with state official, November 19, 1971.
13. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D.
14. While I was unable to uncover precise comparative figures, several interviewees made this point.
15. Data supplied to USOE in 1965 as part of SEA self-analysis of resources.
16. Interview with SEA official, September 27, 1971.
17. Jesse T. Anderson, *Ninety-Seventh Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Education: State of South Carolina, 1964-1965* (Columbia, S. C.: State Department of Education, 1965), p. 88.

18. Callcott, op. cit., p. 197.

19. Interview with former state official, October 27, 1971.

20. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D.

21. Interview with SEA official, September 27, 1971.

22. It is interesting to note that prior to a recent pay increase for all the state constitutional officers, including the Superintendent of Education, Superintendent Busbee's deputies were paid a higher salary than Busbee.

23. According to the SEA Director of Personnel, the turnover rate in 1971 was about seven percent of the professional staff. He pointed out, however, that when jobs begin to open up again at the local level, problems of turnover and recruitment would probably increase markedly because SEA salaries remain non-competitive.

24. Unpublished manuscript, op. cit., p. 83 of draft.

25. Data supplied by USOE References, Estimates, and Projections Branch.

26. Remarks by Governor Robert E. McNair to the Conference of School Administrators, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, July 21, 1969, pp. 2, 4. Also, McNair's view that better education and strong state leadership were particularly important to the development of South Carolina was stressed in an interview with a top aide of the former governor, October 27, 1971.

27. Interview with SEA official, November 19, 1971.

28. Jesse T. Anderson, Ninety-Eighth Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Education: State of South Carolina, 1965-1966 (Columbia, S. C.: State Department of Education, 1966), p. 110.

29. Ibid., p. 108. The federal contribution rose from 6.07% in 1964-65 to 15.08% in 1965-66.

30. Data supplied by USOE References, Estimates, and Projections Branch.

31. Kirk, op. cit., p. 1130.

32. Anderson, Ninety-Eighth Annual Report..., op. cit., p. 110.

33. According to USOE, the South Carolina SEA in 1965 had an administrative budget of about $900,000 for activities related to elementary and secondary education. See Appendix D.

34. Precise data for the first year were unobtainable. However, several persons independently confirmed the practice of using federal monies to supplement SEA salaries. The rationale was that higher salaries were needed to compete with school districts for the best people available. Imprecisely marked budget sheets seem to indicate that $160,000 of Title I administrative funds were used for salary supplements in FY 1968. In 1969, however, the General Assembly passed a uniform compensation act for state employees. Apparently the earlier practice of supplementing salaries helped the SEA win a reasonable salary schedule under the new law.

35. This percentage (and the percentages for each of the other projects described in this section) indicates the amount originally budgeted for this activity. As such, the percentages are a reflection of top management's priorities. Since Title V projects were not fully implemented the first year, the percentages do not reflect actual expenditures.

36. South Carolina fiscal year 1966 Title V application.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Interview with former SEA official, October 27, 1971.

41. South Carolina fiscal year 1966 Title V application.

42. The quotes in this paragraph come from ibid.

43. Interview with SEA official, September 27, 1971.

44. South Carolina fiscal year 1966 Title V application.

45. This is based on an examination of the fiscal year 1971 South Carolina SEA budget.

46. Interview with SEA official, September 27, 1971.

47. Interview with SEA official, October 26, 1971.

48. Interview with SEA official, September 27, 1971.

49. This statement is based on draft proposals in the files of the South Carolina SEA Title V director.

50. Reportedly the State Attorney General's office ruled that the SEA was the only legal recipient of the Title V resources.

51. Interview with former SEA official, October 26, 1971.

52. Interview with William Royster, November 19, 1971.

53. Interview with former SEA official, November 19, 1971.

54. Interview with SEA official, February 25, 1972.

55. Cyril B. Busbee, *Ninety-Ninth Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Education: State of South Carolina, 1966-1967* (Columbia, S. C.: State Department of Education, 1967), p. 34.

56. Anderson, *Ninety-Eighth Annual Report...*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

57. Cresap, McCormick and Paget, "State of South Carolina, State Board of Education, Proposed Organization of the State Board of Education and State Department of Education," Chicago, April 1967, Exhibit III-3. (Typewritten.)

58. Busbee, *Ninety-Ninth Annual Report...*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

60. Interview with an aide to the governor during his administration, October 27, 1971.

61. Several interviewees independently made this point.

62. Cresap, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, Introduction.

63. *Ibid.*, p. III-10.

64. Interviews with several SEA officials, Fall, 1971.

65. South Carolina State Board of Education, "Statement of Educational Philosophy," adopted April 7, 1967, p. 2.

66. Memorandum from Cyril B. Busbee, State Superintendent of Education, to Deputy Superintendent, Directors and All Personnel, September 11, 1967.

67. USOE, 'Review of the South Carolina Department of Education" (Washington, D. C.: USOE, State Management Review, January 1968), p. 1. (Typewritten.)

68. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 3. Emphasis in original.

70. South Carolina Department of Education, *A Planning Model for Operationalizing Long-Range Educational Objectives* (Columbia, S. C.: South Carolina Department of Education, August, 1971), p. 2.

71. South Carolina Department of Education, "The Evaluation of Public Education in South Carolina, An Interim Report to the Office of Research," August 25, 1969, p. 1. (Typewritten.)

72. Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Campus Facilities Associates, *Opportunity and Growth in South Carolina, 1968-1985* (New York, July 30, 1968), p. 5.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

75. Cyril B. Busbee, *101st Annual Report For the Year Ending June 30, 1969* (Columbia, S. C.: South Carolina Department of Education, 1969), p. 27.

76. "Remarks by Governor Robert E. McNair...," *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 2.

77. National Education Association, *Kindergarten Education in Public Schools, 1967-68* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, Research Division, 1968).

78. Interview with SEA official, November 19, 1971.

79. Several interviewees made this point independently.

80. Interview with SEA official, October 28, 1971.

81. South Carolina Department of Education, *A Planning Model...*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

82. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

83. At that time, each SEA received a grant of $96,000 from USOE to improve its planning. The money came from Section 402, Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1967.

84. State Department of Education, *RIU: Research Information Unit* (Columbia, S. C.: State Department of Education, Office of Research, November 1970), introductory letter.

85. South Carolina Department of Education, *A Planning Model...*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

88. Interview with SEA official, November 19, 1971. But another interviewee on November 19, 1971 pointed out that local superintendents "run their damn schools and if you get out of line they let you know it.... [The SEA] can only move as far as the local people will let you move."

89. Interview with SEA official, November 19, 1971. Also, it is noteworthy that local control is strong in South Carolina even though the State picks up about sixty percent of the total cost of public elementary and secondary education. The SEA acts as a funnel for funds, exercising little discretion over local expenditures.

90. South Carolina fiscal year 1968 Title V annual report.

91. Interview with SEA official, October 28, 1971.

92. Interview with SEA official, October 28, 1971.

93. Interview with SEA official, September 27, 1971.

94. USOE, "Report of the South Carolina Department of Education Management Review" (Washington, D. C.: USOE, State Management Review, March 24-28, 1969), p. 23. (Typewritten.)

95. State Department of Education, *A Planning Model...*, *op. cit*., p. 13.

96. *Ibid* , pp. 15-16.

97. Data supplied by the South Carolina Department of Education.

98. *Ibid*.

99. Data from the Department's 1971 budget for Title V. Part of this growth can be traced to the termination of the funding of Title III of NDEA (referred to earlier in the text).

100. Data from the Department's 1971 budget for Title V.

101. Memorandum to Charlie G. Williams, Deputy Superintendent of Instruction, from Donald C. Pearce, Director, Office of Public Law 89-10, September 8, 1971, p. 1.

102. Interview with SEA official, October 26, 1971.

103. Interview with SEA official, October 26, 1971.

104. Correspondence from Stuart R. Brown, Acting Director, Division of Research, Experimentation, and Surveys, to Cyril B. Busbee, State Superintendent of Education, January 31, 1967.

105. USOE, "Report of the South Carolina Department of Education Management Review," *op. cit*., p. 45.

106. *Ibid*., pp. 51-52.

107. Interview with Director of Department's Office of Finance, October 26, 1971.

108. See, for example: Edgar L. Morphet, et al. (eds.), Planning and Providing for Excellence in Education (Denver, Col.: Improving State Leadership in Education, 1971).

109. South Carolina Department of Education, "Education '75. We Can Begin Now" (Undated brochure).

110. Interview with SEA official, October 28, 1971.

111. Interview with SEA official, October 28, 1971.

112. Several interviewees made this point independently.

113. As quoted in State Department of Education, "Reducing Dropouts in South Carolina Public Schools," 1971, p. 3. (Brochure.)

114. South Carolina Department of Education, "A Five Year Plan to Implement A State System of Kindergarten Education in the South Carolina Public Schools," 1971, p. 46.

115. South Carolina Department of Education, "A Five-Year Plan to Reduce the Number of Dropouts in the South Carolina Public Schools," 1971, p. 4.

116. See, for example: Christopher Jencks, et al., Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972), p. 256.

117. South Carolina Department of Education, "Education '75...," op cit.

118. State Department of Education, "1972-1973 Justification," p. 31. (Typewritten.)

119. For the 1970-71 legislative proposals, see: Busbee, 101st Annual Report..., op. cit., p. 5.

120. Interview with state official, November 19, 1971.

121. The atmosphere depicted by this phrase was described in an interview with a SEA official, October 27, 1971.

122. In 1970, South Carolina teachers in an unprecedented move went out on strike for a day. In 1971, the state association for teachers asked the national headquarters of the National Education Association to investigate teaching conditions in the state.

123. Interview with SEA officials, November 19, 1971.

124. South Carolina Department of Education, "A Five-Year Plan to Improve Basic Verbal and Quantitative Skills of Students Enrolled in the South Carolina Public Schools," 1971, p. 1. More specifically, the objective is to reduce each year by 4,000 the number of students scoring in the lowest quartile and to affect the movement each year (except for the first year) of an additional 2,000 scoring below the national fiftieth percentile to the next higher quartile.

125. South Carolina Department of Education, "Reducing Dropouts...," op. cit., p. 6.

126. South Carolina Department of Education, "A Five-Year Plan to Reduce the Number of Dropouts...," op. cit.

127. South Carolina Department of Education, "1972-73 Justification," op. cit., p. 29.

128. This point was made independently by two separate interviewees on October 26, 1971. Of course, the development of improved methods for collecting data is to be applauded. A problem will arise only if the "paper" reduction in dropouts is claimed as educational progress for the state.

129. South Carolina Department of Education, "Five Year Plan to Increase the Enrollment of South Carolina Adults in Basic and High School Programs," 1971.

130. Interview with SEA official, November 19, 1971.

131. Interview with SEA official, October 28, 1971.

132. In a letter dated February 4, 1972, Jesse A. Coles, Deputy Superintendent for Administration and Planning, commented on this section on planning as contained in the penultimate draft of this chapter:

> "After reading and rereading the section, I am convinced that my reaction is more discomfort than disagreement. However, there are two points that do not seem to reflect our situation fairly. Our basic approach has been to embrace the longstanding general goals of the system of education and to focus the efforts of the Department toward attacking the more obvious deficiencies within this framework. On this basis we have viewed our efforts to date as a beginning point, improvable with experience and evaluation. Our decision to approach planning in this manner was not casual but rather a studied and deliberate one. For several years we have observed governmental units attempt the deductive approach to planning--beginning with a search for philosophical generalities--and fail! ... You overlook the built-in safeguards in

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(Continued)
a system of public education. In our situation we are ultimately accountable to the public in several ways. The State Superintendent is elected, the State Board of Education must approve our efforts, and finally, the Legislature provides both law and funding to govern our actions. Simply, through this process of approval or disapproval the public does and will establish the basic objectives of education. To summarize, your report seems to condemn our planning as 'full of sound and fury signifying nothing' while it offers no constructive alternatives. Conversely, we contend that our planning efforts simply aim to direct resources toward selected critical needs and that these efforts and the assumed educational goals underlying them are subject to evaluation and control by the public."

133. Interview with state official, November 19, 1971.

134. Unpublished manuscript, op. cit., p. 37.

135. Ibid., p. 80.

136. This point was made independently by a legislator, a former SEA official and SEA officials in interviews on October 26, 1971 and November 19, 1971.

NOTES: CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

1. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D, Table 2.

2. USOE, State Departments of Education and Federal Programs: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 2, 10. The text on page 2 reads: "As nearly as can be reckoned from the inconsistent systems of reporting among the SEA's, they have by now about doubled their staff." It should be pointed out that this "doubling" estimate is inconsistent with USOE's official data. Appendix D, Table 1 shows 14,720 SEA employees in 1965 and 21,697 in 1970. When asked about this discrepancy, USOE officials referred me to a footnote to the above quote which states:

   > "Some SEA's have responsibility for all levels of education, and report as personnel those concerned not only with elementary and secondary education but with higher, vocational, adult, and other, as well; in some States there are separate agencies for the several levels. Some SEA's include in their reports the staffs of special schools operated by the States, as well as of State-run libraries and museums."

   This explanation was supplemented in a letter from Harry L. Phillips, USOE Title V Director, October 18, 1972, which noted:

   > "Due to the fact that in 1969-70, the National Education Association did a comprehensive survey of the staffing of SDE s the Title V reporting system was adjusted to relieve States of the problem of allocating non-professional services among the various functional and object classifications called for in the Title V reporting system. Verification of the FY-'70 personnel data on page 10 of the report [cited above] was not attempted. Consequently, transition errors may have occurred."

   Neither of these explanations answers the original question. Nevertheless, USOE continues to maintain that SEA staffs have doubled between 1965 and 1970. In my judgment, USOE's data on the States generally are not very reliable and comparisons among States ought to be viewed with some skepticism. In the absence of other sources of data, however, the doubling figure is the best available informed guess.

3. This percent is based on the data in Table 2, Appendix D, which was supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation.

4. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D, Table 2.

5. National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1971 (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, Research Division, 1971), p. 49.

6. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D, Table 3.

7. The staff sizes in 1965 and 1970 were supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D, Table 1. As mentioned earlier in note number 2, these official figures ought to be viewed with some skepticism. The data on 1970 employees paid through Title V came from U. S. Office of Education, State Departments of Education..., op. cit., p. 8. Similarly, the equivalent data on New York and South Carolina set forth later in the text came from the same sources.

8. Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), p. 22.

9. Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968), p. 140.

10. Frances Keppel, The Necessary Revolution in American Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 81.

11. Richard D. Hibschman, "The Effects of Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 on the Massachusetts Department of Education: An Examination and Analysis" (Cambridge: Harvard Graduate School of Education, Special Qualifying Paper), pp. 10-11.

12. U. S. Office of Education, "ESEA--Title V: 1965 Report of Program Analysis by Program Function" (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Office of Education, 1965), p. 010. (Computer printout.)

13. Letter from Harry L. Selden, Chief, Policy and Procedures Staff, USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation, February 4, 1972, p. 2.

14. Interview with South Carolina SEA official, February 25, 1972.

15. The law authorized a five year program, but specific dollar amounts were authorized only for the first year. Thus, the legislation had to be amended in 1966 to write in additional authorization figures.

16. "Strengthening Education Leadership Resources of State Departments of Education: Implementing Section 503, P. L. 89-10" (Washington, D. C.: Memo prepared by Committee of State Officials, 1965). Page 7 reads: "Future projections for Section 503 of Title V, P. L. 89-10 appear bright. Funds in addition to the $17 million available for fiscal 1966 are needed and anticipated for 1967, 1968, and subsequent years to meet more adequately the needs of the state."

17. Interview with Owen B. Kiernan, June 5, 1972.

18. Interview with Gordon M. Ambach, Executive Deputy Commissioner of Education, New York State Education Department, 1971.

19. Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, *Reinforcing the Role of States in Education: The Second Annual Report of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 14.

20. Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, *The State of State Departments of Education: The Fourth Annual Report of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 9.

21. It was never made clear in 1965 what the appropriation levels would be in future years, but the prevailing assumption was that the appropriation levels for all parts of ESEA would steadily grow. This assumption was proven false as the costs of the Viet Nam War started to rise.

22. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D, Table 4.

23. Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, *The State of State Departments...*, *op. cit.*, p. 9. The two federal programs were Titles III and X of the National Defense Education Act which supported SEA supervisory staff.

24. I was unable to find a recent nationwide study which compared salaries of various SEA officials with the salaries of those in comparable positions outside the SEA. However, several studies provide strong evidence that SEA salaries typically are not competitive. See: National Education Association, *Staff Salaries, State Departments of Education, 1969-1970* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1970); Council of Chief State School Officers, "Memorandum No. 8-72, Salary Comparisons [of Chief State School Officers with other comparable positions]." (Washington, D. C.: Council of Chief State School Officers, February 7, 1972); Virginia Department of Education, "A Comparative Study of Professional Salaries: State Departments of Education, State Universities

(Continued on the following page)

24 (Continued):

and School Divisions. A Report to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction" (Richmond, Virginia: Division of Educational Research and Statistics, State Department of Education, July, 1971).

25. Roald F. Campbell, *et al.*, eds., *Strengthening State Departments of Education* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, Midwest Administration Center, June, 1967), p. 69.

26. Interview with USOE official, March 2, 1972.

27. Comment on an earlier draft of this chapter by Ray Rothermel, July, 1972.

28. Campbell, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

30. Interview with Massachusetts SEA official, March 10, 1972.

31. Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 119.

32. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 335-336.

33. Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, *Reinforcing the Role of States...*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

34. For the same notion in another context, see Cyert and March, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

35. Interview with USOE official, March 1, 1972.

36. Interview with USOE official, June 26, 1972.

37. Letter from Rhode Island SEA staffer, April 4, 1972.

38. See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Borwn and Company, 1971). Allison makes the point this way on page 174: "The peculiar preferences and stands of individual players can have a significant effect on governmental action."

39. Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p. 168.

40. See the discussion of Title V in Texas in Appendix C.

41. This notice was found during a visit to the Colorado SEA in December, 1971.

42. Campbell, _et al._, _op. cit._, p. 75.

43. These impressions are based mainly on interviews with SEA officials, USOE officials, and a variety of other observers of SEA's.

44. Interview with USOE official, 1972.

45. Cyert and March, _op. cit._, p. 34.

46. That is to say, one way to avoid "audit exceptions" from federal auditors was to use categorical programs only for those activities clearly related to the programs' purposes, and using Title V for those expenditures that did not fit any of these categorical programs.

47. Interview with Texas SEA official, December 8, 1971. The interviewee said that the Texas agency, like other governmental units, did have a slush fund, but that Title V was not used for that purpose.

48. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, _The Social Psychology of Organizations_ (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 446, 449.

49. Allison, _op. cit._, p. 13.

50. _Ibid._ p. 3.

51. Campbell, _et al._, _op. cit._, p. 68.

52. Seymour B. Saranson, _The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change_ (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), pp. 213, 229-230.

53. Charles B. Saunders, "Education Revenue Sharing: An Essential Reform" (An address by the Deputy Commissioner for External Relations, USOE, at the Annual Convention of the American Association of School Administrators, February 16, 1972), p. 15. (Xeroxed.)

54. U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Domestic Council, Executive Office of the President, "Excerpts of the President's Message to Congress [on Education Revenue Sharing], April 6, 1971," in _The Right to Learn: President Nixon's Proposal for Education Revenue Sharing_ (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 2, 3, 5. (Education Revenue Sharing would consolidate thirty federal aid categories into five general areas of support.) Other examples of the assumption that flexible money leads to planning and flexible programs can be drawn from the Sanders speech, _op. cit._

(Continued on the following page)

54 (Continued):

> "The developing Federal role requires a more rational policy for aid to education, and the consolidations and simplification of existing programs is an essential precondition...." (p. 3);
>
> "...the unnecessary rigidities and complexities of the [categorical aid] structure increasingly act as obstacles rather than incentives for effective use of Federal funds." (p. 4);
>
> "...fragmentation, of course, only diminishes the possibility of comprehensive, coordinated educational planning at the State level." (p. 9);
>
> "Careful planning would be facilitated because the Federal appropriations would come in a lump sum, one year in advance." (p. 13).

Inherent in these quotes seems to be the assumption that if somehow red tape and paperwork were removed, then education agencies would plan comprehensively and respond flexibly to the problems of education.

NOTES: CHAPTER VII

NOTES ON ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

1. President's Commission on School Finance, Schools, People and Money: The Need for Educational Reform, Neil McElroy, Chairman (Washington, D. C.: President's Commission on School Finance, 1972). The dissenting remark was made by Bishop William E. McManus on page 95. Three of the remaining seventeen members of the Commission concurred with Bishop McManus' dissenting opinion.

2. Data supplied by Harry L. Phillips, Director, USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation, January 12, 1973.

3. These observations are based on interviews with federal and state officials conducted as part of this study.

4. See, for example: Ruby Martin and Phyllis McClure, Title I of ESEA: Is It Helping Poor Children? (Washington, D.C.: Washington Research Project and NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., December, 1969).

5. Several interviewees reflected this point of view. Furthermore, this general thrust underlies the rhetoric supporting general revenues sharing, and special revenue sharing in education. See footnote number four in Chapter I.

6. Jerome T. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Education Reform," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February, 1971), 35-63. Also, see the discussion in Chapter II of this study.

7. U. S. Office of Education, State Departments of Education and Federal Programs: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 8.

8. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 94-95. Some evidence on the short tenure of many chief state school officers is found in Council of Chief State School Officers, "Record of Tenure of Chief State School Officers" (Washington, D.C.: Council of Chief State School Officers, January, 1972). (Typewritten.) This document shows that the number of chiefs who had been in their jobs for less than five years was thirty-three in March of 1970, forty-one in March of 1971, and thirty-eight in January of 1972.

9. For a brief, general discussion of this point, see Alan K. Campbell, "Breakthrough or Stalemate? State Politics," in The State and the Urban Crisis, ed. by Alan K. Campbell (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 201.

10. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 449.

11. For this notion of "power to the people", see U. S. President, The State of the Union, January 25, 1971.

12. Memorandum from S. P. Marland, Jr., Commissioner of Education to Mr. Charles Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Budget, on 1973 Budget Allowance, October 4, 1971, p. 1.

13. For some of the rhetoric used to justify the consolidation of federal education programs in general, see: U. S. President, Message to the Congress on Education Revenue Sharing, April 6, 1971.

14. Memorandum to Chief State School Officers from Harold Howe, II, U. S. Commissioner of Education, on Proposed Changes in Appropriations to Affect Three Programs, April 28, 1967.

15. This estimate is based on data in U. S. Office of Education, The State of State Departments of Education (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 9, 11. In 1967, 23% of $18.7 million was expended for "services for improvement of instruction." That equals $4.3 million. In 1968, 34% of $25.3 million was expended in the same category. That equals $8.6 million. The difference, $4.3 million, represents the additional amount spent in this category in 1968. At the same time, through the merger of Title III of NDEA, $5.5 million was added to the Title V account. Eighty-five percent of that, or $4.7 million, was available for Title V (section 503). $4.3 million divided by $4.7 million results in "roughly ninety percent." This is a rough estimate because it is possible, although unlikely, that the increased expenditures in the "instruction" category could have come from changes in Title V expenditures having nothing to do with the merged Title III of NDEA, or from the money previously budgeted for Title X of NDEA. The data I gathered from on-site visits, however, indicate that for the most part the subject matter specialists were simply switched to the Title V account. The estimate is a rough one also because in 1968 the formula for apportioning funds among the states was being changed. This meant that although the total fiscal year 1968 appropriation for Title V was the same as the combined total for Title V of ESEA, Title III of NDEA, and Title X of NDEA for fiscal year 1967, some individual states had to make adjustments because their combined total in fiscal 1968 was less than it was for the three separate programs in fiscal 1967. Consequently, the transfer of the Title III subject matter specialists to the Title V account was more complicated in some states.

16. Ibid.

17. *Ibid.*

18. U. S. Office of Education, *State Departments of Education and Federal Programs...*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

19. Joel S. Berke and Michael W. Kirst, "Intergovernmental Relations: Conclusions and Recommendations," in *Federal Aid to Education: Who Benefits? Who Governs?*, ed. by Joel S. Berke and Michael W. Kirst (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, forthcoming), p. 387. (Page proofs.)

20. *Ibid.*, p. 384. (Page proofs.)

21. For examples of the complaints about these characteristics of categorical aid, see the documents cited in footnote number four in Chapter I.

22. Letter from James P. Costa, Director, Federal Relations and Programs Branch, Nevada Departments of Education, April 13, 1972, p. 4. Also, another example helps make the point. Commenting on some draft tentative findings of this study, Richard A. Gibboney, former Chief State School Officer in Vermont commented: "States are unique organisms influenced greatly by past history. No program from Washington is going to erase this--or should."

23. Letter from Harry L. Selden, Chief, Policy and Procedures Staff, USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation, February 4, 1972, p. 2.

24. According to Burton D. Friedman and Laird J. Dunbar, *Grants Management in Education: Federal Impact on State Agencies* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1971), p. 40,

> "The early visits [by USOE after the passage of ESEA], it has been suggested by some SEA officials, were combined with what appeared to be an uncommonly 'hard sell' of the idea that there should be a separate planning unit component in each SEA,..."

25. Murphy, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

26. For example, see the still-secret report of the HEW Task Force on Title I of ESEA, 1970. In section 106, it states that "Title I has influenced states to expand their own contribution to compensatory education from $2.7 million in 1965-66 to $198 million in 1968-69."

27. Martha Derthick, *The Influence of Federal Grants: Public Assistance in Massachusetts* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 197.

28. A recent study of federal categorical aid in six states reached basically the same conclusion. See: Michael W. Kirst, "Who Governs?", in *Federal Aid to Education...*, *op. cit.*, p. 65. Kirst notes:

> "The sanctions and incentives available to the federal government are insufficient to alter drastically the traditional pattern of state education policy. Federal money can be considered a stream that must pass through a state capitol; at the state level, the federal government is rarely able--through its guidelines and regulations--to divert radically the stream or reverse the current. Consequently, the specific political context in each of the six states needs to be carefully examined by the reader. Yet, over a long period of time, federal administrators and guidelines have a perceptible impact on state policy, providing the federal objectives are not changed."

29. See footnote 112 in Chapter IV.

30. Derthick, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

31. I have spelled out this point in more detail in the administration of Title I of ESEA. See: Jerome T. Murphy, "The Education Bureaucracies Implement Novel Policy: The Politics of Title I of ESEA, 1965-1972," in *Policy and Politics in America*, ed. by Allan P. Sindler (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, forthcoming, 1973).

32. See Martin and McClure, *op. cit.*; Murphy, *ibid.*; and Michael J. Wargo, *et al.*, *ESEA Title I: A Reanalysis and Synthesis of Evaluation Data from Fiscal Year 1965 Through 1970* (Palo Alto, Calif.: American Institutes for Research, March, 1972).

33. Also, if one goes beyond the consideration of categorical aid to SEA's and includes aid to localities, then categorical aid can also play an important role in how money is distributed *within* states. Reflecting their concern with the intrastate allocation of federal funds (with the exception of Title I of ESEA which distribut[illegible] funds down to the county level by formula), Berke and Kirst conclude:

> "While recommendations for untied block grants in education are popular in Washington, as this is written, the principal authors of this volume oppose such aid. We believe that the record of the states as discussed in our research does not warrant confidence that the allocation of federal funds will be any more rational or equitable than it has been in the past."

Berke and Kirst, "Intergovernmental Relations...," *op. cit.*, p. 404. (Page proofs.)

34. Alice M. Rivlin, Systematic Thinking for Social Action (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 123-124.

35. See discussion of this point in Murphy, "The Education Bureaucracies...," op. cit.

36. U. S. Office of Education, "Consolidation of Administrative Funds in Elementary and Secondary Education" (USOE Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education, unsigned, undated (circa June, 1972)), p. 1. (Typewritten.)

37. Ibid. p. 2.

38. U. S. Office of Education, "Proposed BESE [Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education] Action Steps" (USOE Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education, unsigned, undated (circa June, 1972)), p. 1. (Typewritten.)

39. For examples of some of the many problems with USOE official data on SEA's, see footnote two in Chapter VI.

40. Friedman and Dunbar, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

41. Derthick, op. cit., pp. 234-235.

42. Memorandum to Chief State School Officers from Harold Howe, II, U. S. Commissioner of Education, on Items for Interest and/or Action of Chief State School Officers, July 5, 1966. This memorandum described USOE's "program review visitations", begun in fiscal 1966, which later were refined and called "state management reviews".

43. Interview with Harry L. Phillips, January 8, 1973.

44. U. S. Office of Education, State Departments of Education and Federal Programs..., op. cit., pp. 16-19.

45. These observations are based on interviews with SEA officials in these three states.

46. Comment of Ray Rothermel upon reading a draft of this section, 1972.

47. Several examples of recent interest by analysts might be useful. According to Sundquist:

> "Given this diversity, the advantages of state participation can be maximized and the disadvantages minimized only if the federal government can adopt a differential approach, working through some states and bypassing others in the same

(Continued on the following page)

47. (Continued):

> program. To make such an approach possible, federal-state relations have to be converted from a *legal* concept, in which the states collectively negotiate in the legislative and administrative processes for rights and powers that all of them then possess, to an *administrative* concept, in which the federal government exercises *judgment* as to how much reliance can be placed upon each state and reaches an individual understanding with that state governing federal-state administrative relationships. At present a state that raises its level of competence substantially above that of its sister states notices no difference in its treatment by the federal departments. But under a differential approach a state that established a strong department of community affairs, for example, could be granted more authority over federal aid projects, perhaps through informal devices whereby its advice was systematically sought and heeded." (Emphasis in original.)

James L. Sundquist, *Making Federalism Work* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 271.

According to Seidman:

> "Federal regulations generally do not discriminate between the most competent and the least competent State and local governments. Rather than devise our regulations for the lowest common denominator of governors and mayors and States and cities, it would be preferable to provide for direct Federal administration in those instances where it could be demonstrated that State and local administration could not meet established standards of competence, honesty, and fairness."

Harold Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 281.

According to Kirst:

> "*A differential approach to state governments* could supply another potent sanction.... A differential approach would permit USOE to work through the 'good' states and bypass the 'bad' ones for a period of time." (Emphasis in original.)

Michael W. Kirst, "Delivery Systems for Federal Aid to Disadvantaged Children: Problems and Prospects," in U. S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, October 7, 1971, p. 8669.

(Continued on the following page)

47. (Continued):

According to Berke and Kirst in a section entitled, "Federal education policies should emphasize differential administration":

> ". .administrative practices in which one set of regulations cover a variety of practices are doomed and...more flexible approaches are needed. Flexibility would permit administration by state education departments capable of supervising and guiding their LEA's [local educational agencies], or if the state department were incapable, such flexibility would enable a program to be administered directly by the local district. Anarchy is inconsistent with responsible government, yet anarchy is what characterizes the administration of many federal programs. Certainly, the U. S. Office of Education is not equipped to administer federal aid programs for the entire nation, but it could develop a capability to conduct them better than they are now being done in many states. And that, we contend, is little more than their basic responsibility."

Berke and Kirst, "Intergovernmental Relations...," op. cit., p. 402. (Page proofs.)

It is noteworthy that none of the above quoted analysts followed his endorsement of differential treatment with an analysis of the political or bureaucratic obstacles to the implementation of the idea.

48. Rivlin, op. cit., p. 127.

49. Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, Report on an Evaluation of the 50 State Legislatures (Kansas City, Mo.: The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, 1971).

50. National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1971 (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, Research Division, 1971). This publication is updated each year.

51. This was explored in depth in Chapter II.

52. Wargo, et al., op. cit., p. 62.

53. Martin and McClure, op. cit., and Murphy, "The Education Bureaucracies...," op. cit.

54. Friedman and Dunbar, Grants Management in Education..., op. cit., p. 41.

55. Interview with USOE official, August 17, 1972.

56. The observations in this paragraph are largely based on my examination of SMR Reports in light of visits to particular states.

57. Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 77.

58. James B. Conant, *Shaping Educational Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 37.

59. Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, *The Political Web of the American Schools* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), p. 119.

60. Jack Gonzales and John Rothchild, "The Shriver Prescription: How the Government Can Find Out What It's Doing," *The Washington Monthly* (November, 1972), p. 34.

61. Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

62. This is based on my reading of numerous audit reports and SMR's on SEA operations and comparing them with what I found upon visiting the agencies.

63. Frazar B. Wilde and Richard F. Vancil, "Performance Audits by Outside Directors," *Harvard Business Review* (July-August, 1972), pp. 112, 113. Also, the General Accounting Office has come out with a publication describing ways to judge performance of federal programs. See: General Accounting Office, *Standards for Audit of Government Organizations, Programs, Activities and Functions* (Washington, D. C.: General Accounting Office, 1972).

64. Larry E. Greiner, *et al.*, "Putting Judgment Back Into Decisions," *Harvard Business Review* (March-April, 1970), p. 59.

65. Aaron Wildavsky, "The Self-Evaluating Organization," *Public Administration Review* (September/October, 1972), p. 515.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 515.

67. For example, in education, the OEO-funded Harvard Center for Law and Education has monitored the implementation of Title I of ESEA and has participated in several law suits challenging the expenditures of Title I funds.

68. U. S. Office of Education, *State Departments of Education and Federal Programs...*, *op. cit.*, p. iii.

69. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D, Table 3.

70. Thomas E. Cronin and Norman C. Thomas, "Educational Policy Advisors and The Great Society," *Public Policy*, Vol. 18 (Fall, 1970) p. 686.

71. *Ibid.* p. 686.

72. David K. Cohen, "Social Accounting in Education: Reflections on Supply and Demand," *Proceedings of the 1970 Invitational Conference on Testing Problems--the Promise and Perils of Educational Information Systems*, Educational Testing Service, 1971, p. 14.

73. See, for example: Ralph Nader and Donald Ross, *Action For A Change: A Student's Manual For Public Interest Organizing* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971).

74. In 1970, Public Law 91-230 added a Part C to the Title V legislation which called for a program of "Comprehensive Educational Planning and Evaluation." No funds were requested by the Executive Branch for this program until the fiscal year 1973 budget. At this writing, however, the budget has yet to pass the Congress and there is speculation that perhaps the program will not be funded. It also should be noted that beginning in fiscal 1970 each state received $96,000 for comprehensive educational planning under the terms of Section 402 of Public Law 90-247. Through Section 402, the states have started to gear up for comprehensive planning.

75. Section 531(a) of Public Law 91-230, April 13, 1970.

76. U. S. Office of Education, "Program Development Manual: Grants to State and Local Educational Agencies for Comprehensive Planning and Evaluation" (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Office of Education, September 11, 1970), p. 1. (Typewritten.)

77. Edgar L. Morphet, *et al.*, eds., *Planning and Providing for Excellence in Education* (Denver, Col.: Improving State Leadership in Education, 1971), p. 44.

78. U. S. Office of Education, "Report of the Management Review of Federal Programs in the Massachusetts Department of Education" (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Office of Education, April 26-30, 1971), p. 123. (Typewritten.)

79. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XIX (Spring, 1959), p. 84.

80. Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 149-150.

81. Morphet *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

82. U. S. Office of Education, *State Departments of Education and Federal Programs...*, *op.cit.*, p.92. Also, see: U.S. Office of Education, "Application for Grant for Comprehensive Planning and Evaluation, Title V, Part C, Public Law 89-10." It seems clear that USOE views planning in large part as plan-making. For example, on page five of this application form, "Master Plan" development is listed as an example of an appropriate Title V-C expenditure.

83. Section 533(a)(2) of Public Law 91-230, April 13, 1970.

84. Interview with USOE official, June 15, 1972.

85. This is discussed in detail in Chapter V.

86. For an example of this, see: U. S. Office of Education, "Program Development Manual...," *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

88. Morphet *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

89. Interview with Harry L. Phillips, Director, USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation, January 12, 1973.

90. Charles L. Schultze, *The Politics and Economics of Public Spending* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 38, 42. It should be pointed out that this quote is taken from a section of the book where Schultze is describing Charles E. Lindblom's notion of "muddling through." But it is clear that, on this point, Schultze agrees with Lindblom. On page 64, Schultze states:

> "It is a perfectly valid point that values are discovered not in the abstract but during consideration of specific programs, and that values held by advocates in the political process are generally quite vague and unspecified."

Also, for another clear discussion of the problems with establishing goals in education, see: Educational Testing Service, *State Educational Assessment Programs* (Princeton, N.J.: Educational Testing Service, 1971), pp. xvii-xviii.

91. U. S. Office of Education, "Program Development Manual...," *op. cit.*, p. 25.

92. This observation may not apply to those SEA's which take existing objectives and budget allocations as a "given", and then try to maximize the use of resources within these constraints.

93. Morphet, et al., p. 50.

94. Aaron Wildavsky, "Does Planning Work?", The Public Interest, No. 24 (Summer, 1971), p. 96.

95. Clay Thomas Whitehead, "Uses and Limitations of Systems Analysis," P-3683 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1967), p. 91. (Processed.) As cited in Schultze, op. cit., p. 65.

96. Alain Enthoven, "Operations Research at the National Policy Level" ((unpublished transcript of an address at the Operations Evaluation Group Vicennial Conference, Washington, D. C., May, 1962), cited by Whitehead, ibid., p. 44). As cited by Schultze, op. cit., p. 65.

97. Allison, op. cit., p. 286.

98. Allen Schick, Budget Innovation In the States (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 208-209.

99. Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 105.

100. For a discussion of this point, see: Seymour B. Saranson, The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), p. 217.

101. Morphet, et al., p. 87.

102. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 330. At this point in their book, the authors were talking explicitly about the change from an immigrant ethos to a middle-class ethos in city government.

103. Cited in Seidman, op. cit., p. 27.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

STUDY ADVISORY PANEL*

Joel S. Berke
Syracuse University Research Corporation
Syracuse, New York

Roald F. Campbell
Fawcett Professor
Educational Administration
The Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio

Donald M. Carroll, Jr.
Assistant Commissioner for Basic Education
Pennsylvania Department of Education
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Mr. James P. Costa, Director
Federal Relations and Program Branch
Nevada Department of Education
Carson City, Nevada

Jack Culbertson
Executive Director
University Council for Educational Administration
Columbus, Ohio

Daniel J. Elazar
Director, Center for the Study of Federalism
Temple University
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Rodolfo A. de la Garza
Resource Specialist for Parent-School Community Involvement
Southwest Educational Development Laboratory
Austin, Texas

Richard A. Gibboney
Associate Professor of Education
Graduate School of Education
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

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*Advisory panel members are listed with their affiliation at the time they participated in this study. Several have subsequently changed positions.

Richard P. Gousha
Superintendent of Schools
Milwaukee Public Schools
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Samuel Halperin
Director, Educational Staff Seminar
Washington D. C.

Bishop William E. McManus
Director of Catholic Education
Archdiocese of Chicago School Board
Chicago, Illinois

Carl L. Marburger
Commissioner of Education
New Jersey Department of Education
Trenton, New Jersey

Edgar L. Morphet
Project Director, Improving State
  Leadership in Education
Denver, Colorado

Ewald B. Nyquist
Commissioner of Education
New York State Education Department
Albany, New York

Arthur R. Pontarelli
Assistant Commissioner
Rhode Island Department of Education
Providence, Rhode Island

Gerald E. Sroufe
Executive Director
National Committee for
  Support of the Public Schools
Washington, D. C.

APPENDIX B

THE METHOD OF THE EXPLORATION

Three concerns were particularly important in determining the basic approach for conducting this study. First, descriptive data about the way complex organizations (SEA's) "work" were in short supply. Second, even less was known about the way complex organizations respond to unrestricted aid (Title V). Third, a full understanding of Title V's impact was impossible, in my view, without an exploration and comparison of the organizational and political environment of SEA's. To deal with these concerns, the comparative case study approach made the most sense. Indeed, it seemed particularly appropriate since previous Title V reports have collected sufficient nationwide quantitative data to make another such investigation somewhat superfluous.[1]

In choosing this approach, however, I was in full agreement with the 1971 observation of Graham T. Allison:

> Most theorists have little respect for 'case studies'--in large part because of the atheoretical character of case studies of the past. But the only substitute for detailed examination of particular events and problems is construction of theory in the absence of specific information. What we need is a new kind of 'case study' done with theoretical alertness...on the basis of which to begin refining and testing propositions and models.[2]

This study was conducted with "theoretical alertness" in the hope that the working hypothesis drawn from decision-making theory and set out in Chapter I would indeed be further tested and refined.

Data collection: Interviews in nine states and Washington, D. C. provided the main source of information. However, both the number and type of individuals interviewed varied somewhat from state to state. Typically, I spent most of my time interviewing a wide variety of current and former SEA officials, ranging from the chief state school officer to Title V project directors to sundry other staffers familiar with the program's impact and with recent changes in the SEA. Furthermore, state legislators, legislative staff, staff of executive offices, academicians, schoolmen, and knowledgeable citizens were interviewed. In Washington, interviews were conducted with Title V administrators in USOE, congressional staff, and former federal employees intimately involved with Title V's design, passage and implementation.

Virtually all the interviews were conducted by the writer. While this approach limited the number of individuals who could be interviewed, it acted as a built-in control to assure comparability of values, perceptions, and data analysis from state to state. The interviews were conducted between the Spring of 1971 and the Summer of 1972.

Not all nine states received equally intensive treatment. At least six days were spent in those states studied in-depth and reported on in Chapters III, IV and V. Prior to the first visit, I read everything available about the SEA, Title V, and the state politics of education. I then spent a day or two interviewing a variety of officials about Title V's impact, and collected state documentation about the program and its implementation. This information was digested prior to the second visit which lasted about three days. At that time, detailed and specific questions were asked about Title V; the decision-making process; SEA change; and the relationship of the SEA to other agencies such as the legislature, central budget office, USOE, and the schools.

Also, open-ended questions were asked and tangential issues often explored to gather information that went beyond the data sought by the specific questions. On this point, I agree with the approach followed by Stephen K. Bailey and his colleagues in their 1962 study of state school aid in eight states: "The authors hold firmly to the belief that sophisticated social analysis must in part reflect the accidental insights of unstructured interviews and the higher reason of intuitive synthesis."[3]

After the second set of interviews a first draft was written. In this process, "holes" were discovered which formed the basis for further questions during a third visit to the state being studied. Also, an attempt was made to interview top-level officials last so that specific questions could be asked about data collected earlier while interviewing lower-level employees. Scheduling problems, however, did not always permit this desirable procedure.[4]

In the other six states (reported on in Appendix C), my visits to the SEA lasted one or two days. I mainly explored how Title V was expended and asked questions about the Title V decision-making process. I also sought evidence about the impact of the Title V projects on SEA operations. Because these visits were short, I was unable to assess fully the overall changes since 1965 in these SEA's, or the role of Title V in bringing these changes about.

Finally, interviewees were usually promised anonymity to assure candid replies, particularly since many of the questions dealt with sensitive issues of state politics as well as the internal politics of the SEA. As a result, only a few of my sources are identified by name.

Anyone with a scholarly interest in pursuing this matter further is welcome to examine my interview data which are on file at the Harvard Center for Educational Policy Research.

Aside from the interviews, the official files of USOE and the SEA's, statistical reports, newspapers, SEA newsletters, congressional hearings, library materials (books, monographs, articles, and dissertations) and a variety of other sources were examined. In addition, a perspective and "feel" for a SEA and its environment were gained in the process of roaming around the halls, and talking with everyone available from top officials to secretaries and janitors.

Two other methods were used to gather additional data and to check my interpretations. First, SEA officials in each of the three states studied in-depth were provided with the penultimate draft on Title V in their state. Officials in two of the three states (Massachusetts and South Carolina) responded with detailed comments. Second, I was assisted by an informal Advisory Panel (see Appendix A) composed of individuals familiar with Title V, SEA operations, state politics, or all three. Advice was solicited on the study's research design and the selection of states to be studied. The advisory panel members also were asked to react to a summary of tentative findings. Their advice was extremely helpful, and I have tried to reflect their concerns in the final report. Needless to say, I take full responsibility for the findings and conclusions.

Selection of the states: Objective background variables were identified which reasonably could be expected to differentiate SEA's and their experiences with Title V: geographic region; state share of total educational expenditures; urbanization; size of first-year (fiscal 1966) Title V apportionment; percentage increase in SEA budget resulting from the first-year Title V grant; and method of selecting the chief state school officers (CSSO's). States were chosen to avoid a sample biased on these variables.

This method for selecting states was chosen for three reasons. First, I wanted to gauge how well particular working hypotheses drawn from organizational theory (and set out in Chapter I) predicted the way complex organizations (SEA's) utilized unrestricted federal aid (Title V). It thus made sense to choose SEA's which differed along a number of variables so that my conclusions would not be limited to a particular set of SEA's facing the same kind of problems in the same setting. Second, this study is exploratory. Independent of the theory's application, it seemed important to examine various problems and Title V projects in different kinds of SEA's. Third, random selection seemed inappropriate since the number of states which could be visited was small and the study was non-statistical in nature. Nine states were chosen: Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas. All in all, the limited number of SEA's visited and the "newness" of applying organizational theory to public institutions should underscore two points: no claim is made about the representativeness of the sample, and any generalizations that are made are necessarily tentative in nature.

The following table shows the distribution of background variables for the nine states studied.

BACKGROUND VARIABLES IN NINE SELECTED STATES

(Ranking of States in Parenthesis)

State	Region[1]	1970 Size of SEA (total employment)[2]	1971 State Share of Educ. Revenues[3]	1969 % Pop. Urban[4]	1966 Title V Apportionments[5]	1966 Budget Increase from Title V[6]	CSSO Selection[7]
Colorado	W	203 (34)*	30% (37)**	75% (12)**	$204,123 (29)*	15% (29)**	SBE***
Kansas	MW	195 (35)	31 (36)	64 (27)	[illegible],803 (28)	25 (8)	SBE
Kentucky	S	516 (13)	55 (12)	47 (42)	245,145 (22)	9 (43)	Elected
Maryland	NE	377 (19)	35 (29)	72 (18)	260,971 (20)	16 (25)	SBE
Massachusetts	NE	603 (11)	22 (46)	82 (5)	317,262 (12)	5 (48)	SBE
New York	NE	2,467 (1)	48 (17)	84 (4)	784,668 (2)	4 (50)	SBE
South Carolina	S	448 (15)	62 (7)	42 (44)	238,401 (23)	26 (7)	Elected
Tennessee	S	426 (16)	47 (18)	54 (37)	289,119 (15)	10 (41)	Governor
Texas	SW	831 (7)	49 (15)	79 (7)	639,131 (3)	18 (20)	SBE
Mean (USA)	--	423	--	--	280,601	11	--
Median (USA)	--	291	41	71	229,000	16	--

Notes: *1 is the largest.

**1 is the highest.

***SBE means the State Board of Education.

Notes: (Continued)

[1] James S. Coleman, *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966). Coleman's classifications of Northeast, South, Southwest, Midwest and West were used, though with some qualms with the designation of "south" for Kentucky and Tennessee.

[2] Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation.

[3] National Education Association, *Rankings of the States, 1971* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, Research Division, 1971), p. 49.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[5] Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Council of Chief State School Officers, Untitled Brochure (Washington, D. C.: Council of Chief State School Officers, 1971).

APPENDIX B

NOTES

1. See the five annual reports on Title V of ESEA put out by the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education (they are listed in the Bibliography). Also, see: Roald F. Campbell *et al*., (eds.), *Strengthening State Departments of Education* (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1967).

2. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 273.

3. Stephen K. Bailey *et al*., *Schoolmen and Politics: A Study of State Aid to Education in the Northeast* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962), p. xiv.

4. Lewis A. Dexter, *Elite and Specialized Interviewing* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

APPENDIX C

TITLE V IN SIX STATES

Appendix C

Title V in Tennessee

The most striking characteristic of the Tennessee Department of Education was the appearance of homogeneity of its staff. Everyone in a position of authority seemed to be old, tired and a former administrator in the Tennessee public schools. Indeed, I asked the personnel officer to direct me to a top manager who was below forty years of age; he was unable to do so.[1]

This pattern in part reflected SEA recruitment procedures. Hiring staff from outside the state apparently required SEA officials to prove to the "powers that be" that no Tennessee citizen was available for the position.[2] This pattern also reflected the staffing of the SEA through political patronage. Under Tennessee law, not only the chief state school officer but the entire SEA staff served at the governor's discretion. Governors in the past apparently exercised this discretion by appointing political friends to SEA jobs.[3]

Another distinctive characteristic of the Tennessee SEA was what might be called its pre-bureaucratic mode of operation.[4] Formal rules and regulations, fixed channels of communication, and a preoccupation with efficiency simply seemed foreign to the agency. Rather, there appeared to be a personal (as opposed to policy) orientation which cut across formal organizational channels. Who one knew and how well one was liked seemed to be as important, or perhaps more important, than what one knew.[5]

Of course, youth is not synonymous with effectiveness, political patronage does not necessarily lead to incompetence, and a personal orientation is not necessarily bad. But it is clear that the Tennessee SEA is the antithesis of what is generally thought of as a "good government" executive agency--for example, the New York SEA. Indeed, the contrast between the pre-bureaucratic, political and personal orientation in Tennessee and the professional, technocratic, policy-oriented approach in New York could hardly be more pronounced. But the contrast is also revealing, particularly if one imagines putting the Tennessee SEA in New York and vice versa. The result would be somewhat similar to switching the U. S. Marine Corps with the Italian Army; there would be culture shock in both countries. That is to say, the Tennessee SEA in the New York political environment would be ineffective. But likewise the New York SEA in Tennessee also would be unable to operate. This suggests that the striking characteristics of the Tennessee SEA discussed above were no more than reflections of general features of Tennessee's political environment. This suggests further that these characteristics were probably more necessary for effective SEA operation in Tennessee than at first might appear obvious.

Things may be changing, however. After fifty consecutive years of Democratic rule, a Republican governor was elected in 1970. Pledged to work toward greater effectiveness in state government, he also expressed a particular interest in education.[6] Moreover, the governor in 1971 appointed a business executive to be the new Commissioner of Education, and reportedly the new agency boss made it clear at the outset that he would not tolerate political patronage in his agency.[7] Whether the Commissioner will be able to buck the long tradition of using the state executive as a manpower program for political cronies remains to be seen.*

Title V expenditures: Tennessee's initial apportionment of \$289,000[8] was budgeted for a variety of activities across the agency. The projects called for a personnel manager, a coordinator of federal-state relations, and a public information officer. The Division of Instruction was expanded to include specialists in industrial arts; in business education; in health, safety, driver education, and physical education and recreation; in elementary and secondary education; and in curriculum planning and development. Also, funds were budgeted for technical assistance to schools in finance and business management, in school plant planning and management, and in pupil transportation. Finally, funds were budgeted for the rental of a computer and the purchase of other data processing equipment.[9] In fact, the SEA later spent about \$300,000 of Title V end-of-year money--more than their entire first year apportionment--for the purchase of a computer.[10]

Over the years, Title V was used almost exclusively for the continuing subsidy of projects started the first year. The only major new Title V activities were begun in 1968, after the federal appropriations for Titles III and X of NDEA (which supported SEA positions) were terminated. The SEA positions were switched to the Title V account.[11]

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*In late 1972, a year after my visit to the Tennessee SEA, the new Commissioner resigned.

The latest available breakdown of funds shows how the money was spent in fiscal 1971: $23,000 for the Division of Personnel; $26,000 for the Office of State-Federal Programs; $154,000 for the Division of Instruction; $39,000 for the Division of Schoolhouse Planning and Pupil Transportation; $42,000 for the Division of Public Information; $98,000 for the Division of Finance and Administration; $109,000 for the Division of Statistical Services; $35,000 for the Division of Technical and Field Services; and $12,000 for Teacher Education and Certification. Also, $6,000 of the 1971 apportionment of $544,000 was left unearmarked, apparently to meet needs as they developed during the year.[12]

In sum, Title V was spent initially to fill in personnel gaps in traditional SEA programs across the agency. Since that time, Title V was used mainly to continue to subsidize these additional SEA slots, with virtually all the divisions of the agency receiving their share of the funds.

Title V decision-making: Tennessee apparently reached its initial Title V decisions somewhat similarly to the process followed in New York. Division directors and area specialists were asked to come up with suggestions for strengthening the agency. Different ideas reportedly were assigned priorities since the requests for Title V funding apparently exceeded the available resources.[13]

The laundry list of ideas was discussed at several meetings, with major focus on short-term pressing problems across the agency. As one SEA staffer put it: "Title V was used to take nails out of shoes."[14] Title V also was viewed as a source of "benevolent blackmail."[15]

That is, Title V could be used to start some services that the state had not funded. Later, Title V funding could be terminated, it was hoped, thus forcing the state to pick up the costs. By and large, Title V continued to subsidize the projects emerging from these initial decisions.

During this initial process, a USOE official spent approximately two weeks in Tennessee assisting in the development of projects. He was very helpful in pointing out management deficiencies, according to a SEA staffer, but "didn't dictate how the money ought to be spent."[16] This help included the writing and rewriting of some Title V application forms, and the giving of advice on others. "After I wrote mine," said one SEA official, "I was asked to rewrite it and put it in language that the 'feds' wanted."[17] So, the SEA spent the money as it pleased, with help, but not direction, from USOE.

In sum, the Title V decision process apparently was marked by competition for the funds among virtually all SEA units. There was no attempt to define "strengthening" or to establish general, agreed-upon goals to guide the decision process. Different units worked to win a share of the funds to expand their existing activities, and to meet their pre-existing priorities.

Concluding observations: Title V's chief benefit to the Tennessee SEA was the provision of general operational support. This permitted the SEA to hire and continue to support staff to improve internal SEA operations and to expand services to schools. In 1970, Title V paid the salaries of forty-seven SEA employees.[18] Despite this federal assistance, however, it was my impression that the SEA had not changed very significantly since the advent of Title V. It seemed to be rocking along, providing more services to local schoolmen.

Appendix C

Title V in Kentucky

The most striking thing about the Kentucky Department of Education was that nothing particularly striking stood out. It impressed me as a fairly quiet, slow-moving agency, generally staffed by competent, if not colorful, professional educators. Their main concerns seemed to be regulation and the provision of traditional services, upon request, to their professional peers at the local level.

As with many other SEA's, the Kentucky agency had an assortment of personnel problems. For one thing, the chief state school officer was elected for a four-year term, but could not succeed himself.[1] While this protected somewhat against an entrenched agency boss, it also inhibited continuity of state educational leadership. For another, the SEA apparently operated on the "buddy system". That is, local schoolmen who were friendly with top departmental managers reportedly had access to jobs, even though the agency worked under a merit system.[2]

A third problem resulted from low salaries which made it extremely difficult for the SEA to attract and hold competent employees. About one out of every five professionals left the agency each year for new jobs.[3] What's more, since local teachers' salaries were low, it would have been considered impolitic for an elected chief to seek higher SEA wages without winning higher local salaries at the same time.[4] But this salary problem was less of an obstacle in 1971 than it had been in the past. As in several other SEA's visited, the number of educators seeking SEA employment had increased recently, apparently as a result of the nationwide economic recession.

Despite these personnel problems, the SEA appeared reasonably stable. Several top officials had worked there for many years even with the frequent turnover of chiefs. No doubt, this was possible in part because a change in chiefs did not also mean a change in the political party affiliation of the SEA leader; as long as anyone could remember, the agency had been headed by a Democrat.[5]

So, the Kentucky SEA seemed to be a rather nondescript unit competently providing traditional services to local schoolmen in a routine way. If there was a lot of activity at the state level in education, it did not seem to be taking place at the SEA, or at least while I was visiting the agency.

Title V expenditures: Kentucky's first year apportionment was budgeted for sixteen activities across the SEA.[6] The projects called for seven professionals in general administration, including a professional librarian, and a public information officer; staff for the collection and dissemination of statistical data; a purported researcher; four professionals "to achieve a better balance in consultative services among all areas of instruction";[7] and additional staff to provide services in school lunch programs, in facility planning, in finance, and in other aspects of administration. Money also was budgeted for a personnel officer, a legal-legislative program, and several other miscellaneous activities.[8]

Once these original projects were started, they absorbed the Title V resources from year to year. As Kentucky's fiscal year 1971 Title V application stated:

> All Title V projects for 1971 are continuation activities. For all practical purposes, goals and objectives, project design, and types of activities were determined for most projects in the first year of operation--1966.[9]

Aside from these continuing expenditures, part of Kentucky's Title V apportionment was also used in effect as a contingency fund to meet small crises as they developed during the year. For example, late in fiscal year 1971, a "critical need for expanding the state-wide testing program"[10] developed because the SEA test-scoring service was extended to cover non-public school children. To pay for the needed new test-scoring equipment, the SEA searched for an appropriate funding source. Since Title V provided unrestricted resources, it apparently was viewed as most appropriate. In order to "free necessary Title V funds to prevent serious cutbacks in state-wide testing programs for public and non-public schools,"[11] the cost of a regionalization study was switched from the Title V account to another funding source.[12] An amendment was then submitted to USOE explaining this new Title V expenditure.[13] (USOE rarely, if ever, questioned these amendments.)[14] Consequently, Title V resources were used to pay for this unexpected contingency in the middle of the budget cycle. The test-scoring project was simply labeled as a Title V activity.

In sum, Title V was mainly used the first year to meet pressing problems by the expansion and refinement of ongoing activities across the agency. These activities ranged from consultative services to schools, to internal administrative improvement, to providing school bus driver training. "The early effort was to shore up programs which had been deficient for fifty years," one SEA staffer said. "We strengthened those struggling units that needed help."[15] Or, as another SEA official put it, "We first had to get our staff in order. We had to have this before we could do things like planning."[16] After the first year, the money was used mainly as a continuing subsidy for the original projects, with a small amount apparently reallocated to meet crises as they emerged.

Title V decision-making: Kentucky's Title V decision process appeared to match closely the one followed in New York. Different units of the agency were asked to make suggestions for strengthening the agency, with ideas filtering up through the bureaucracy. A series of meetings were then held to reach allocation decisions. A SEA document describes the SEA planning for Title V in 1965:

> The Executive Cabinet composed of the superintendent, deputy superintendent, and four assistant superintendents provided the nucleus for formulating policy and planning procedures. Planning proceeded from the basic organization unit--the division, with director and staff planning together, to meetings of directors with assistant superintendents, and to the Executive Cabinet for policy determination and priorities where required. The program envisioned by divisions called for an overall budget approximately three times greater than the first-year appropriation.[17] (Emphasis in original.)

In other words, different units of the agency apparently defined "strengthening" in terms of specific unit needs, rather than the SEA initially establishing agreed-upon goals for the agency.

In the face of requests exceeding the available Title V resources, the SEA purportedly established criteria to guide the Title V decision-making. They included:

> (1) stage or level of development of existing programs and services, (2) extent to which specific improvements are needed, (3) adequacy of budget over and above expansion needs to establish

> new programs and services to fill in gaps in a comprehensive program, and (4) availability of key personnel at mid-year and under existing salary limitations.[18] (Emphasis added.)

Within the bounds of these criteria, different units of the agency apparently competed for their share of the funds, mainly by arguing their case for additional activities. "I've gotten my proportionate share,"[19] one division director said. The result was sixteen projects which were designed chiefly to meet the staffing needs of the different units across the agency.

Concluding observations: As in other states, Title V provided the Kentucky SEA with a source of general operational support which was mainly expended on salaries. In 1970, ninety percent of Kentucky's Title V funds were used to pay the salaries of forty-six employees.[20] These employees provided a variety of useful services across the agency. In this sense, Title V strengthened the agency. On the other hand, Title V was not used in a coordinated way to bring about any fundamental change. The SEA was able to offer more services as a consequence of federal monies, but its mode of operations and its orientation toward regulation and service continued to be rather traditional. In short, the agency was bigger, perhaps better, but not much different as a result of Title V.

Appendix C

Title V in Colorado

An understanding of state education policy in Colorado would be incomplete without considering the role of the legislature. Perhaps better than any other governmental unit, it reflected the growing concern in Colorado with holding schools accountable for the efficient expenditure of education funds. Indeed, with this concern in mind the legislature passed three laws in 1971. The Comprehensive Educational Planning Act was "intended to stimulate long-range planning in school districts."[1] The Educational Accountability Act was designed to encourage local districts to achieve measurable objectives.[2] And the Program Planning, Budgeting, and Evaluation System Act (PPBES) was meant to "tie together the planning and the accountability act."[3] It was contended that "the public will be getting more for its education dollar"[4] if these laws worked.

The legislature was not only concerned with local efficiency, but also with squeezing more output from the SEA at minimum cost. Indeed, for years the legislature reportedly preaced the commandment: "Thou [the SEA] shalt not go over eighty-five state-supported professional positions."[5] Since ESEA's passage in 1965, in fact, only one additional state-supported SEA professional position had been authorized by the legislature.[6] Furthermore, in an attempt to gain greater leverage over SEA programs, the legislature in 1970 established procedures for appropriating federal, as well as state, dollars.[7] "Some elected official ought to be responsible for how it [the SEA] is funded,"[8] a legislative aide said.

The legislature also demonstrated its concern with SEA costs by commissioning the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) to conduct a comprehensive study of agency operations.[9] The 1971 SRI Report concluded, among other things, that "the Department's performance in its chosen role is irrelevant to the educational needs of Colorado's students";[10] that the SEA was ineffectively manned, being "heavily staffed with professional educators, even in those positions of a purely internal-administrative nature";[11] and that the SEA was not an appropriate agency for providing direct services to schools (e.g., instructional consultation).[12] In an effort to implement SRI's recommendations, one house of the legilature slashed the SEA budget by about $[illegible]00,000. But before the appropriation bill passed, the funds were restored.[13]

The legislature, then, was actively engaged in the formulation of state educational policy--beyond the normal concern with state aid to the schools. Moreover, it kept a close eye on the SEA and did not support expansionary activities. While this active legislative involvement reflected a concern with efficiency and accountability, it also seemed to mirror the existence of poor communication and even hostility between the SEA and the legislature.[14] To say the least, the Colorado SEA did not operate in a vacuum at the state level.

Aside from legislative pressure, the Colorado SEA also faced its fair share of other problems. Its salaries were not competitive, often as much as $2,000 below those at the local level for the same kind of work.[15] This helped to explain the annual SEA turnover rate of about one out of five employees.[16] Also, SEA operations were handicapped by civil service regulations governing the employment of support personnel. Even if a typist was able to start immediately, for example, it could take four to six weeks to clear the appointment. "The civil service requirements have outlived their usefulness,"[17] one SEA staffer said. Finally, Colorado's strong tradition of localism constrained departmental activity. As one official put it: "The state is absolutely locally controlled."[18]

Despite this bleak tale, the Colorado SEA has flourished and in some ways appeared to be a rather impressive organization when I visited it. Projecting what might be described as a frontier town atmosphere, the agency was lively, open, informal and bubbling with activity. The staff seemed generally competent and anxious to explore ways to improve services and, not incidentally, to please the legislature.

Moreover, in the absence of state support for expansionary activity, the agency's aggressive boss, Byron W. Hansford,* sought foundation and federal funds to improve the organization's operation, apparently with some success. Indeed, in 1970 fifty-eight percent of the Department's administrative expenditures came from the federal government, with almost one-third of these federal funds coming from Title V.[20] Given this concern with change and the absence of state support, it was little wonder that federal aid, particularly unrestricted resources from Title V, was viewed as essential.

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*Hansofrd resigned in 1971. Several interviewees suggested that he had not succeeded in selling his ideas to the legislature and was frustrated by its lack of support for SEA programs.[19]

Title V expenditures: Colorado's Title V apportionment was budgeted for at least thirteen projects the first year, with nine of them initially submitted to USOE as a package.[21] These projects called for a consultant on data processing to improve the use of statistical data; an editor to produce SEA publications; the expansion of the Department's so-called research program; a consultant in the field of accreditation; a specialist in the problems of the gifted and creative; a consultant on urban education; a specialist in health, physical education, safety and driver education; a specialist in instructional materials; and, finally, an accountant to assist in improving fiscal management. Also, four more projects were submitted to USOE later in the year. They supported a study of financing public education; a study of student teaching; a study of feasible programs for the "Boards of Cooperative Services;" and staff improvement activities.[22]

Most of the money, then, was budgeted the first year to fill in a variety of personnel gaps across the agency. But fifteen to twenty percent of the Title V resources was kept "flexible", according to one top SEA official.[23] That is, not all of Title V was tied up in salaries, thus providing the agency with a continuing source of discretionary funds to meet needs as they developed.

One such need was in the area of planning. During the second year of Title V (in December of 1966), the Colorado SEA used part of its "flexible" Title V resources to establish a new Office of Planning Services.[24] Although the precise stimulus for this new departure is not entirely clear, one analyst, Arthur P. Ludka, suggested the importance of three factors. First, a project, "Designing Education for the Future," pointed to the need for long-range planning. This was funded through the special projects section of Title V (section 505).[25] Second, "each state agency was required to become concerned with planning"[26] because, beginning in 1966, the Governor's Budget Office required state agencies to submit five-year operational plans. Third, legislators believed "that cost-effectiveness analysis should be applied to the programs supported by the state."[27] Ludka concluded: "The internal and external forces affecting the department, in composite fashion, served to 'set the stage' for an educational planning system to evolve."[28] Under these circumstances, Title V (section 503) acted as a facilitator, rather than a primary stimulus, in meeting this immediate need for a planning office.

In addition, part of the money which was initially kept flexible apparently was used to meet small problems as they developed during the year. Title V is a slush fund around here,"[29] one SEA staffer noted. But, over the years, most of the Title V flexibility disappeared as the money increasingly was used for the continuing support of SEA positions In 1971, almost all of Colorado's Title V apportionment was used for salaries and related ongoing expenditures, with the funds spread across the agency in the following way: $50,000 for field representatives who visit schools across the state; $43,000 for the planning office; $20,000 for the assessment and evaluation office; $2,000 for a youth-community relations office; $89,000 for the improved learning unit which conducted workshops with local schoolmen on the learning process; $73,000 for management services; $55,000 for public information activities; and $84,000 for the unit concerned with teacher certification.[30]

So, then, Title V was used initially to fill in gaps, and, the second year, to get the SEA planning office off the ground. Since that time, Title V has been used mainly as a source of general operational support for a variety of SEA units.

Title V decision-making: The initial process for reaching Title V decisions in Colorado apparently closely resembled the process followed in New York. That is, the bureaucracy was solicited for ideas, with the money in effect put up for agencywide competition. "Every person in the Department was asked to submit suggestions for the Department,"[31] a key staffer commented. In a series of meetings, top management apparently reviewed the different suggestions which filtered up to them as part of this process. When asked how the projects were finally agreed upon, one high-level official responded: "There was trading off here and trading off there."[32] In short, decisions apparently resulted from a competition and bargaining process.

Concluding observations: Since so much seemed to be going on when I visited the Colorado SEA, it was difficult in a short time to distinguish motion from change. Hence, the observations that follow about SEA activities and the role of Title V are necessarily quite tentative.

The two most important changes that took place in the Colorado SEA since 1965 probably were the reorientation of SEA services to schools, and the purported development of comprehensive SEA planning. Each deserves brief discussion.

In 1970, SEA top officials apparently decided to terminate subject matter assistance to local schools. The specialists were replaced with generalists who purportedly assist local schoolmen by focusing on "the facilitation of the learning process."[33] This change appeared sensible, for it simply was impossible for a small SEA staff to provide services in a wide variety of subject matter fields. However (along with the SRI report quoted earlier), one wonders whether SEA's should provide direct instructional services to local schoolmen at all. Perhaps such services could be better provided by colleges and universities with SEA's acting as brokers, matching local needs with available resources.

This change in service orientation, however, does illustrate the value of free federal money in the hands of a change-oriented SEA leader. Several of the SEA positions switched from subject matter specialists to generalists were funded through Title V. Had the federal money been earmarked for particular subject matter specialties (e.g., Title III of NDEA, until merged with Title V in 1968, supported SEA specialists only in "critical" areas), then this change to generalists would have been partly thwarted. In this case, the free money through Title V did allow the agency to change its priorities. It should be pointed out that exercising this flexibility was not without organizational costs. A year and a half later, several interviewees pointed to its lasting negative effect on agency morale.[34]

The second purported change came in the area of planning. Utilizing Title V and other federal money, Colorado was reputed to be a leader among SEA's in the development of comprehensive, coordinated, long-range planning.[35] In the view of SEA officials, the purpose of planning was "to develop long-range policy and to guide departmental operation so that the use of available resources would be at a maximum in attaining the educational objectives of the people in the state."[36]

The planning office acted mainly as a coordinating unit, with plans developed across the agency.[37] These plans were supposed to be comprehensive which, translated, meant that "the interrelationships and interdependence of every educational need, goal, objective, program, practice, service, and resource must be thoroughly studied and questioned."[38] This long-range planning was viewed by SEA officials as "vital"[39] to educational improvement and its encouragement was thought to be one of the "central problems facing education."[40] Finally, Title V played a crucial role in the agency's planning activities:

> Federal funds, largely provided by Title V, Section 503, Elementary and Secondary Education Act, basically support current activities in educational planning at the state level. Were these funds to be reduced or withdrawn, the Colorado Department of Education would be hard pressed to further its planning operation.[41]

Establishing an office to integrate the activities of various SEA units probably was a good idea. Also, developing statements (plans) about what a unit should be doing may have encouraged SEA staffers to be a bit more reflective about their objectives and activities. In this sense, Colorado's planning probably was a useful management tool. However, as discussed at length in Chapter VII, I have serious reservations about the value of comprehensive planning. For one thing, it is doubtful whether "comprehensiveness" is even possible. For another, the high hopes of the SEA for long-range planning, or at least as exemplified in the rhetoric used to describe planning, seem unrealistic. As an alternative, I suggested in Chapter VII a low-key focus on policy analysis with modest expectations for organizational change.

All in all, the Colorado SEA seemed to be a reasonably dynamic organization which, unlike some of its counterparts in other states, was raising serious questions about its decisions and programs. (Not incidentally, the legislature had insisted that some of these questions be asked.) And in this mix, Title V played a helpful role, particularly in the absence of state support for expansionary activities. In 1970, Title V paid the salaries of twenty-nine employees,[42] not a trivial number in an agency with only about 200 staffers.[43] Moreover, Title V made it possible for the SEA to hire the staff to expand its services, to make some internal improvements, and to put some ideas into practice. As one top SEA official noted: "We've been able to do what the state would not allow us to do."[44]

Appendix C

Title V in Texas

J. W. Edgar is the Texas Commissioner of Education. The Texas Education Agency is J. W. Edgar. Following the 1948 Gilmer-Aikin Act[1] which replaced an elected chief state school officer with an elected Board of Education and an appointed commissioner, Edgar was hired with the goal of ridding the SEA of its crass political reputation. For more than a generation, he has worked to create the image of a non-partisan, "above politics", fair-minded professional agency. And largely because of his efforts, the Texas SEA in 1971 appeared to be an unusually stable body, free from much of the political intervention often found in state agencies.[2]

The Texas SEA, however, did not operate in a vacuum. Local control of the schools is a particularly strong tradition in Texas. "They are independent school districts and don't ever forget that,"[3] one SEA official said. Moreover, the state was described as conservative, with a deep suspicion of new federal programs, innovative activities, or generally breaking with past practices.[4] Within this context, the SEA operated cautiously, viewing its leadership role as gently persuading local schoolmen to move in new directions by suggesting improved approaches. As one long-time observer pointed out: "The leaderly position of the Texas Education Agency rests heavily upon its identification by local school districts as one of us common folk."[5] Although probably essential within the setting of Texas traditions, this posture can lead to limited SEA influence and to painfully slow change at the local level.

As with other SEA's, the Texas agency has had its fair share of internal problems. SEA salaries were not competitive with those for comparable local positions. This encouraged a high turnover rate--about one out of four professionals reportedly left the SEA each year.[6] What happened, according to one official, was that young promising educators would join the SEA for a year or so to gain a vantage point for looking over the job market in Texas. They would find a position that they liked better (and that paid more) and then these staffers would leave the SEA.[7] Sometimes SEA employees could even earn more by returning to high school teaching.[8]

Another obstacle to SEA leadership in Texas has been the sheer size of the state and the diversity of its population. To deal with 1,200 school districts with their various problems, the Texas Education Agency helped to set up twenty regional education service centers. Funded by federal, state, and local money, these autonomous units were designed to provide a bridge between the SEA and local districts.[9] Curiously, consultants in the regional centers earned $1,000 to $1,500 more than their counterparts in the SEA.[10]

The Texas SEA, then, appeared to be a competently staffed, professional organization operating in a relatively supportive political environment. Despite low salaries and a high turnover rate, the agency appeared highly stable, mainly because of the long tenure of Commissioner Edgar. Working within the conservative traditions of Texas, the SEA offered services and leadership through gentle persuasion.

Title V expenditures: Title V was initially budgeted for a variety of activities across the agency. These projects called for staff to improve internal management (including more people for the personnel office and the business office); expansion of the Division of Research by adding personnel and by providing additional data processing facilities; programs for the improvement of staff competencies; consultants for art, music and industrial arts; and the expansion of services for language arts, mathematics, physical education and special education. Finally, a Title V project called for the development and staffing of an Office of Assessment and Innovation--which shortly after its establishment became the Office of Planning.[11] In fact, according to USOE, Texas was one of only two states which used Title V the first year of the program to establish a planning office.[12]

Over the years, Title V was used largely to continue to support these original projects. "Title V has become a subsidy and that's all," one official said. "It's like the dividend check. You expect it."[13] On the other hand, Title V apparently has not been used as a contingency fund, even though "there's always some damn thing that comes up and we scrounge around for money."[14] Rather, as Title V became available each year it was recycled into the existing Title V projects, with the agency tapping _other_ sources to meet crises during the budget cycle.[15] "Every level of government I've ever been involved with has had a slush fund. You've got to have it," an experienced SEA staffer said. "How it works depends on the ingenuity of the finance man,"[16] he added with a twinkle.

The latest available data (fiscal 1970-71) demonstrate the extent to which Title V has been used widely in subunits across the agency: $ 7,000 for the Office of the Commissioner with most of the money budgeted for salaries and travel; $69,000 for international and bilingual education with most of this paying staff salaries; $119,000 for partly staffing the Office of Planning; $122,000 for the Business Office; $1 ,000 for data processing; $38,000 for school audits; $67,000 for the Office of Teacher Education and Instructional Services; $343,000 for program development, with almost all of this used for salaries and travel for an assortment of subject matter specialists; $100,000 for the School Accreditation Division; $80,000 for teacher education and certification; $102,000 for the development of instructional media; and $148,000 for the support of special education activities.[17]

Over the years, then, Title V was spread across the agency to subsidize traditional services to the schools and internal improvements, and also to continue to partially support the Office of Planning. But, as one official pointed out: "Most of the money originally went, and still does, to the expansion of services to schools."[18]

Title V decision-making: It was difficult to gather information on the initial Title V decisions in Texas since many key participants died or left the agency. The following observations, therefore, are particularly tentative. It appeared as if the process in Texas resembled the process in New York. That is to say, the word was spread among different SEA units that Title V funds were available. People were asked to come up with suggestions on how the funds could be best used to strengthen the agency. Apparently the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner played the key roles in figuring out how the money would be divided up.[19] When I asked one official how he won part of Title V for his operation, he stated: "We knew that money was available and kept our problems in front of top management."[20]

After the first year, the separate process for deciding on the allocation of Title V resources apparently was abandoned. Once projects were originally funded, their continuance by and large was taken for granted in following years, thus absorbing most of the Title V resources. The allocation of the remaining uncommitted Title V took place as part of the normal budget cycle. Each year SEA activities were first decided upon, and then "final assignments"[21] of funding sources were made. In effect, different activities were simply "labeled' as Title V not because the program stimulated new thought or new activities, but because some Title V resources were uncommitted and the program appeared to be a reasonable funding source. In this sense, Title V was simply used as a supplemental resource to support any state priorities that might arise.

Nonetheless, as noted earlier, Texas was one of only two states that used Title V the first year to establish a planning office. Did the Title V program stimulate Texas officials to rethink their priorities the first year, to decide that planning was necessary and, therefore, to set up a planning office? Did this decision result from Commissioner Keppel's hoped-for "thorough overhaul" of SEA's?

Discussing the "outside pressures for planning,"[22] Keith L. Cruse, a Texas SEA employee, has analyzed the origins of the planning office. He pointed to a "changing" Texas "shifting from an agricultural, rural state to a multi-ethnic, substantially urbanized industrial community. .."[23] All of this was challenging educators to do a more adequate job:

> Forces outside the Texas Education Agency were combining to focus attention on the need for statewide comprehensive educational planning . . . . The Fifty-ninth Texas...Legislature established the Planning Agency Council for Texas (PACT) as a division of the Governor's Office, designed to involve all State agencies in comprehensive planning.[24]

But Cruse also emphasized that a stimulus for planning *did* come from the federal government:

> Students of organizational innovation point out that many structural inventions may come as a response to a decisive pressure exerted upon an organization. In the present instance the activating pressure was Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965....
>
> The demand for a structured device to assume these functions for Title III was irresistible. Forthwith, an Office of Planning was devised. However, it was not entirely occasion specific. The multiple pressures and visions antecedent to Title III were quite evident in the first charter for the Office....[25]

In the context of pressure on the SEA from a changing Texas, and the pressure for innovation from Title III of ESEA, a planning office was established using Title V resources. Under these circumstances, Title V acted as a facilitator, rather than a stimulus, of this structural change in the Texas SEA.

Concluding observations: The federal government has been extremely helpful in expanding the Texas SEA over the last few years.

In 1964-1965, the federal contribution to SEA administrative expenditures was $1.8 million, while the state contributed just a little less.[26] In 1971, the federal contribution was $6.5 million while the state contribution was $2.9 million.[27] Indeed, in 1970, the latest year that USOE has comparative figures, seventy percent of the Texas SEA administrative expenditures came from the federal government,[28] with only two other states, Idaho and New Hampshire, receiving a higher percentage of administrative support from federal sources.[29]

And in this mix, Title V has been extremely helpful, supplying nearly $8 million dollars between fiscal 1966 and fiscal 1972.[30] Indeed, in 1970, Title V paid the salaries of 117 SEA employees, with seventy-one percent of the entire Title V apportionment used for salaries.[31]

Aside from increasing the Agency's budget and manpower pool, the Title V program was mainly useful as a source of general operational support for a variety of activities across the agency, raning from internal management improvements, to expansion of traditional services to schools. In the context of a SEA interested in improvement, these discreet projects generally were useful in providing more, and perhaps better, services to local schools. Finally, a major contribution of Title V was its partial support of the SEA planning unit. Since SEA officials particularly view this office as contributing to SEA improvement and leadership, I will conclude with a brief exploration of this activity.

When I raised questions about SEA planning during my visit, constant reference was made to the Department's "planning machinery."

This consisted of a Commissioner's Coordinating Council composed of the top officials of the agency,[32] an Executive Planning Committee consisting of the major SEA division directors,[33] and an Agency Planning Council "composed of program directors and selected consultants."[34] These groups met on a regular basis to discuss various division plans and to decide what the agency should be doing. In addition, task forces were viewed as part of the planning machinery, and "have been the most active and the most productive of the planning strategies utilized by the Agency."[35]

Although nearly one-fourth of its time was used in meeting "emergency" situations,[36] the role of the planning office was mainly to staff the "planning machinery", and to--

> ...maintain communication and cooperation concerning comprehensive educational planning and evaluation among all divisions and programs within the Agency. Provide general coordination to the Agency-wide planning structure and mechanisms. Create new planning structures as needed.[37]

In short, the focus was on agency-wide internal planning coordinated by the planning unit. The hope was to facilitate better decisions about the allocation and use of SEA instructional resources by encouraging SEA officials to think about the outputs and products of education rather than focusing on a number of discreet funding sources.[38]

Although my visit to Texas was too short to evaluate fully the SEA planning operation and its effect on decisions, some tentative observations are in order. On the positive side, the Department, under the rubric of planning, has adopted some procedures that probably are useful in better managing the agency. Task forces, for example, are a straightforward device for attacking and solving particular problems. Furthermore, efforts to integrate the activities of different SEA units and to set up planning mechanisms for regular discussion of issues seem worthwhile. Formal mechanisms for exploring different issues may encourage SEA employees to think more carefully about what they are doing and where they should be going.

On the other hand, one must wonder about Texas' emphasis on the development of comprehensive plans. ("All of the Divisions within the Texas Education Agency will develop five-year plans for their own internal operations.")[39] As I argued in Chapter VII, it is doubtful whether having units across the agency attempt to develop long-range plans really accomplishes very much. An alternative might be to concentrate planning efforts on only a few priorities each year. This concerted analysis would allow a small planning staff, working in conjunction with program managers, to challenge assumptions, raise value questions, and explore the interaction of ends and means in a thorough way. Finally, I suspect that the SEA may be unduly optimistic when it states that: "The Division of Program Planning's long-range goal is that the Agency will operate with wholeness--with unity--as it provides leadership and direction to public education in Texas."[40] If organizations usually behave as coalitions of competing subunits, as I have argued throughout this study, then this goal may well be unrealistic.

Despite these criticisms, the planning unit on balance seemed to be providing some useful managerial services. It was competently staffed by employees who were concerned with questioning the role of the SEA and exploring alternative procedures and practices. Much of this self-examination probably would not have been possible without the money supplied by Title V and other federal programs.

Appendix C

Title V in Kansas

Kansas is a conservative state--people move cautiously and programs change slowly. Bold experimentation and innovation appear foreign to the way things are done. To be sure, keeping costs down, running a "clean" operation and seeking efficiency seem to be major governmental objectives. These concerns are reflected in civil service regulations which strictly govern the hiring of both professional and non-professional state employees. These regulations generally do succeed in keeping politicians and other "unqualified" individuals out of the executive agencies, but they also create enormous bureaucratic hurdles for agencies trying to hire persons not fitting the standard mold.[1]

Kansas' conservatism was reflected in the State Department of Education in 1965. It was small (ninety-two employees)[2] and generally not regarded as a particularly innovative agency. The state's concern with low governmental expenditures meant low salaries which hampered recruitment. Concern with costs also meant that SEA operations were closely watched by a central division of administration, with both state and federal expenditures requiring approval. Indeed, the state reportedly was hesitant to take ESEA funds in 1965 since they might dry up in the future, leaving the state to pick up the costs.[3]

Civil service regulations and low salaries continued to plague the SEA in 1971. An example helps to make the point. Given the incentive of federal money, the SEA decided in 1971 to hire an educational planner. This meant that prospective employees would have to compete for the job on the basis of their scores on a civil service examination. The one scoring the highest would also have to meet extensive formal training and experience requirements. With all that, the successful candidate could expect to earn about $14,000 a year. The problems were that the civil service group preparing the test knew virtually nothing about educational planning and the salary simply was not competitive. Curiously, the SEA, to get around these obstacles, hired a full-time consultant through a profit-making Kansas firm.[4]

Governmental activities in Kansas, then, are characterized by archaic bureaucratic procedures, a conservative view toward social action programs, and a preoccupation with what one observer has called "pedestrian efficiency."[5] Add to these problems an overriding allegiance to localism in education, and it is little wonder that the 1965 SEA was a rather nondescript unit concerned mainly with accrediting schools and certifying teachers.

Title V expenditures: In 1965, the advent of Title V meant a budget increase of approximately twenty-five percent to the Kansas SEA,[6] matching the figure for South Carolina. This money was budgeted for seven projects covering a wide range of activities. The biggest one ($91,000 out of $190,000) was designed to solve various administrative problems.[7] The Title V project paid the salaries of a personnel manager, three new employees in graphic arts, a new coordinator of federal-state programs, and part of the salary of an assistant for federal-state relations. The second largest project ($37,000)[8] was budgeted for a general overhaul of teacher certification, with Title V used to "begin a crash program of recording current teacher records for transfer to computer tape."[9]

In addition, Title V was budgeted for several other smaller projects: the expansion of SEA school accreditation activities; support for special education; refinement of its data processing operation; expansion of the SEA finance section to help in the disbursement of new federal aid; and the hiring of consultants in music and/or art, and elementary education.[10] Also, SEA officials hoped to use Title V for the employment of a departmental librarian. In this case, the central office of administration would not clear the position apparently because it seemed out of line with normal SEA activities.[11] This illustrates once more the constraints governing SEA operations and the general conservatism of the state toward new activites.

Over the years, Title V resources were expended largely to continue the initial projects. The SEA Title V coordinator estimated that about seventy-five percent of the 1971-72 expenditures could be traced to projects started in 1965-66.[12] In addition, Title V picked up the costs of state supervisory services previously supported by Titles III and X of NDEA until 1968. Finally, some Title V was budgeted in 1971 for planning and evaluation.

Title V, then, was used in 1965 mainly to fill in gaps, with the money spread among the different units of the agency. While there was some hope that Title V would support a research office,[13] more urgent problems seem to have taken precedence. After the first year Title V served chiefly as a source of general operational support with most of the money used for the continuing subsidy of the initial projects. More recently, however, some efforts were made to free up Title V for planning activities.

Title V decision-making: The Kansas SEA seemed to have reached its initial Title V decisions in the same basic way as the Massachusetts SEA. Over the course of several meetings, a "rather select group"[14] of top managers hammered out the Title V projects. "It was a matter of discussion--give and take,"[15] commented one SEA staffer. Unlike New York, there was no general solicitation of the bureaucracy for ideas, since as one SEA official noted, "the different division directors knew what was needed."[16] In short, knowing the needs even prior to the arrival of Title V, SEA officials fit existing priorities to the available money. And once these initial Title V decisions were made, the program "was a pretty ongoing thing, because funds were committed."[17]

Concluding observations: The Kansas SEA grew considerably between 1965 and 1970--its staff more than doubled.[18] Title V played an important role in this growth, paying the salaries of thirty-seven persons in 1970.[19] Title V mainly benefited the SEA by supporting improvements in its internal operations. The program also supported SEA services that were never possible prior to ESEA.

Aside from new federal funds, another important change took place in 1969. An elected superintendent of education was replaced by an elected board of education and an appointed commissioner. Filling this post since 1969, C. Taylor Whittier has been working diligently to change the agency's orientation from a focus on regulation to a concern with improved services and planning.[20] Progress has been made, but it has been slow.

In sum, the SEA did change somewhat between 1965 and 1971 as a result of its new leadership and the influx of Title V and other federal dollars. Nevertheless, the tradition of localism continued to constrain SEA activities and the state remained conservative in its approach. The changes in the Kansas SEA did not match the progress in South Carolina, despite equally substantial budget increases from Title V.

Title V in Maryland

The Maryland SEA has had several advantages over its counterparts in some other states. Maryland has only twenty-four school districts spread across a relatively small geographic area. This compactness and small number of local units facilitates state technical assistance to local schoolmen. The SEA is also part of a state executive which values professionalism. This is reflected in the SEA salaries which are competitive with those at the local level, with the exception of school districts in the metropolitan area of Washington, D. C. Moreover, political intervention in the hiring of staff is not a common pattern, with employees selected in accordance with an effective merit system. The SEA, in short, has operated within a state manageable in size and supporting good government.[1]

Not surprisingly, the SEA has also had its fair share of problems. Like many other states, Maryland faced a growing fiscal crisis in 1971. The result was a reluctance to fund new state activities and a much closer scrutiny of ongoing state expenditures. For example, the SEA personnel director reported that beginning in 1971 even the hiring of temporary employees had to be justified to the central budget office.[2] Another problem facing the agency was the housing of SEA employees at ten different sites, with two locations separated by forty miles. This made it difficult for the SEA top management to keep tabs on departmental activities or to work together as a team. Despite these problems, however, the SEA reflected the state's concern with effective state government, and appeared to have a competent professional staff.

Title V expenditures: Most of Maryland's initial Title V apportionment was budgeted for the expansion of instructional services to the schools. This entailed the hiring of specialists in art, music, health education, materials development, and elementary and secondary education. A small part of the initial apportionment also was reserved for "innovative" activities. That is, funds were set aside to cover the cost of tuition reimbursements and leaves of absence for SEA employees returning to school.[3]

After the first year, Title V continued to pay the salaries of the specialists initially hired as a result of the program. But the Department's slice of Title V available for staff development dwindled to about seven percent in 1971-72,[4] since SEA salary levels increased more rapidly than the state's Title V apportionment. "The program was all chewed up with salaries," commented a SEA official. "It is now socked in."[5] So Title V's flexibility was short-lived and the program mainly became a source of operational support for instructional services.

Title V's decision-making: Maryland SEA officials apparently made their Title V decisions in a manner somewhat similar to the approach followed in Massachusetts and Kansas. That is to say, a small group of top managers, who basically knew the needs of the agency, sat down to figure out the Department's Title V projects. There was no formal solicitation of ideas from the bureaucracy, as in New York.[6] Indeed, according to one official, the process was cut-and-dried: "From the beginning the deputy and the Superintendent were sold on the idea that he Department needed more specialists."[7] Given this "mind set"[8] of the Superintendent, competition for Title V funds was squelched from the beginning. It was "a foregone conclusion,"[9] said one official, that the money would be expended on instructional services. The money was used mainly in this area, with particular focus on those specialties that the state legislature had refused to fund in the past.[10] Only later when end-of-year money became available, noted one official, was he thrown a "bone"[11] for his research activities.

It should be emphasized that Maryland, of the nine SEA's visited as a part of this study, demonstrated the least competition for Title V in 1965. Although some units hoped to get some Title V resources, the Superintendent apparently felt strongly about improvement in instruction and exercised his prerogative to make the Title V decisions. The money was not spread evenly across the agency. With the benefit of hindsight, however, several persons interviewed seemed to think that this focus and its continuing subsidy may have been a mistake. One official stated that if additional Title V became available "less of the money would go to dedicated self-preservation."[12]

Concluding observations: The Title V story in Maryland is not very complicated. The money was budgeted chiefly for subject matter specialists, and Title V has continued to subsidize these activities. Or, to put it differently, Title V was used mainly to meet pre-existing priorities by filling gaps in the existing mode of SEA operations. In 1970, seventy-three percent[13] of Maryland's Title V apportionments went for the salaries of twenty-seven employees.[14] Indeed, Maryland seems to be a good example of the Title V expenditure pattern found in many states. As quoted in Chapter I, Roald F. Campbell and his colleagues in their 1967 study criticized the "overmuch attention"[15] to subject matter specialists in Title V expenditures.

Notes: Appendix C

Title V in Tennessee

1. Interview, September 24, 1971.

2. Interview with SEA official, September 24, 1971.

3. Several interviewees independently made this point, September 24, 197 .

4. The term "pre-bureaucratic" was used to describe Tennessee government by Daniel J. Elazar, in a 1971 interview.

5. These observations are based on interviews with various SEA officials.

6. For example, Governor Winfield Dunn became the new chairman of the Education Commission of the States in May, 1972. "He became Tennessee's first Republican governor in 50 years...and has since been noted for his progressive work to upgrade education in Tennessee." Education Commission of the States, "Education Commission of the States Bulletin," Vol. 5, No. 5 (June, 1972), p. 1.

7. Several interviewees independently made this point, September 24, 197 .

8. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D, Table 4.

9. Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, Improving State Leadership in Education: An Annual Report of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 126-127.

10. Interview with SEA staffer, September 24, 1971.

11. Interview with the SEA federal-state relations coordinator, September 24, 1971.

12. Tennessee State Department of Education, "Title V, ESEA, P. L. 89-10 (Amended 91-230): To Strengthen State Departments of Education," undated, p. 1. (Xeroxed.)

13. This description is based on interviews on September 24, 1971, with several participants in the 1965 decision-making process.

14. Interview, September 24, 1971.

15. Expression used by a participant in the 1965 Title V decision-making process, September 24, 1971.

16. Interview with SEA official, September 24, 1971.

17. Interview with SEA official, September 24, 1971.

18. U. S. Office of Education, *State Departments of Education and Federal Programs: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1970* (Washington, D. C. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 7.

Notes: Appendix C

Title V in Kentucky

1. This constitutional provision was mentioned by several interviewees.
2. Interview with SEA official, September 23, 1971.
3. Interview with SEA official, September 23, 1971.
4. Interview with SEA official, September 23, 1971.
5. Several interviewees made these points on September 23, 1971.
6. Kentucky Department of Education, "Kentucky Plan for Implementing Title V, Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965", undated, p. 3 (Xeroxed.)
7. Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, *Improving State Leadership in Education: An Annual Report of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 82.
8. This listing of first-year projects was drawn from "Kentucky Plan ...," *op. cit.*, and *ibid.*, pp. 81-83.
9. FY 1971 Title V Application, p. 12.
10. Memorandum to Dr. Harry Phillips, Director, Division of State Agency Cooperation, from Wendell P. Butler, Superintendent of Public Instruction, on Amendments to Title V ESEA Application, FY 1971, June 10, 1971, p. 1
11. *Ibid*
12. *Ibid*
13. *Ibid*
14. See the general discussion of this point in Chapter II.
15. Interview with SEA official, September 23, 1971.
16. Interview with SEA official, September 23, 1971.
17. "Kentucky Plan...," *op. cit.*, p. 2.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
19. Interview with SEA official, September 23, 1971.

20. U. S. Office of Education, State Departments of Education and Federal Programs: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington, D. C. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 6, 8.

Notes: Appendix C

Title V in Colorado

1. E. Dean Coon, "New Laws--If Schools Can Make Them Work--Will Give Public More for Its Education Dollar," in *Education Colorado* (Denver: Colorado Department of Education, September 14, 1971), p. 4

2. *Ibid*

3. *Ibid*

4. *Ibid*

5. Interview with SEA official, December 7, 1971.

6. Interview with SEA official, December 7, 1971.

7. Interview with legislative aide, December 6, 1971.

8. Interview with legislative aide, December 6, 1971.

9. More specifically, the study was commissioned by the Joint Budget Committee of the legislature.

10. Stanford Research Institute, "Strengthening Educational Management in Colorado: An Abstract Report of the Joint Budget Committee to the Colorado General Assembly" (Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, February 5, 1971), p. 1. (Processed.)

11. Stanford Research Institute, "Strengthening Educational Management in Colorado: Volume I: A Summary Report of the Joint Budget Committee to the Colorado General Assembly" (Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, February, 1971), p. 14. (Processed.)

12. *Ibid*, p. 9.

13. Several state officials made this point in interviews on December 6 and 7, 1971.

14. Several interviewees independently made this point on December 6 and 7, 1971.

15. Interview with SEA official, December 7, 1971.

16. Interview with SEA official, December 7, 1971.

17. Several SEA staffers made this same point. The quote is from an interview with a SEA official on December 7, 1971.

18. Interview with SEA official, December 6, 1971.

19. Interviews with SEA officials, December 6 and 7, 1971.

20. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D, Table 3.

21. U. S. Office of Education, "OE-5169, Part II: Program Grants [for the Colorado SEA for fiscal 1966]," undated. (Typewritten.)

22. *Ibid.* pp. 1-2.

23. Interview with SEA official, December 6, 1971.

24. Arthur P. Ludka, *Planning In the Colorado Department of Education to Facilitate Improvements in Education* (Denver: Improving State Leadership in Education, 1970), p. 1.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

26. *Ibid.* p. 2.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

29. Interview with SEA official, December 6, 1971.

30. Colorado Department of Education, "Division of Accounts and Control: Sub-Appropriation Budget Status for Fiscal Year 1970-1971, ESEA 503 Departmental Administration," undated, p. 7. (Computer printout.)

31. Interview with SEA official, December 6, 1971.

32. Interview with SEA official, December 6, 1971.

33. This is the expression used by those in the Department's Improved Learning Unit which carries out these new activities.

34. Interviews on December 6, 1971.

35. See, for example: Edgar L. Morphet, *et al.*, eds., *Planning and Providing for Excellence in Education* (Denver: Improving State Leadership in Education, 1971). On page 17, the study points to Colorado as one of the states "beginning to take steps to provide leadership in educational planning."

36. Ludka, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

38. Colorado Department of Education, *A School Improvement Process: Accreditation by Contract* (Denver: Colorado Department of Education, June, 1971), pp. 1-2.

39. Ludka, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

42. U. S. Office of Education, *State Departments of Education and Federal Programs: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1970* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 8.

43. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. See Appendix D, Table 1.

44. Interview with SEA official, December 7, 1971.

Notes: Appendix C

Title V in Texas

1. Gilmer-Aikin Committee on Education, *To Have What We Must...* Senator James E. Taylor, Chairman, September, 1948. This committee led to the legislation.

2. These observations are based on interviews with several SEA employees, December 8 and 9, 1971.

3. Interview with SEA official, December 8, 1971.

4. This point was made by several interviewees on December 8 and 9, 1971. Also see: Michael W. Kirst, "Who Governs?", in *Federal Aid to Education: Who Benefits? Who Governs?* Edited by Joel S. Berke and Michael W. Kirst (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, forthcoming), p. 66. (Page proofs.)

   > "But in...Texas, the overall state political culture imposes such great constraints that a more activist program priority orientation for the SEA is not feasible."

5. Laurence D. Haskew, "Supplementary Statement: Implications for Leadership Performance," in *The Evolution of Planning in the Texas Education Agency* (Denver: Improving State Leadership in Education, September, 1970), p. 22.

6. Interview with SEA official, December 9, 1971.

7. Interview with SEA official, December 9, 1971.

8. Joel S. Berke and Michael W. Kirst, "Intergovernmental Relations: Conclusions and Recommendations," in *Federal Aid to Education...*, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

9. For a description of these activities, see: Texas Education Agency, *State Plan: Procedures and Policies for the Operation of Regional Education Service Centers* (Austin: Texas Education Agency, January, 1970).

10. Interview with SEA official, December 8, 1971.

11. Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, *Improving State Leadership in Education: An Annual Report of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 127-128.

12. Letter from Harry L. Selden, Chief, Policy and Procedures Staff, USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation, February 4, 1972, p. 2.

13. Interview with SEA official, December 8, 1971.

14. Interview with SEA official, December 8, 1971.

15. Interview with SEA official, December 8, 1971.

16. Interview with SEA official, December 8, 1971.

17. Texas Education Agency, Operating Budget: 1970-1971 (Austin: Texas Education Agency, August, 1970), p. 289.

18. Interview with SEA official, December 9, 1971.

19. These observations are based on interviews with several SEA officials who had worked for the agency in 1965.

20. Interview with SEA official, December 8, 1971.

21. Expression used by SEA official, December 8, 1971.

22. Keith L. Cruse, The Evolution of Planning..., op. cit., p. 1.

23. Ibid

24. Ibid

25. Ibid , p. 2.

26. Data supplied by SEA official, December 8, 1971. The federal contribution to SEA administrative expenditures in 1964-1965 was $1,824,856. The state contribution was $1,779,222.

27. Texas Education Agency, Operating Budget..., op. cit., p. 2.

28. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation.

29. Ibid

30. Ibid See Appendix D, Table 4.

31. U. S. Office of Education, State Departments of Education and Federal Programs: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 8.

32. Cruse, op. cit., p. 5.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 6.

35. Ibid., p. 16.

36. *Ibid*. p. 15.

37. *Ibid*.

38. Interview with SEA official, December 9, 1971.

39. Cruse *op. cit*., p. 17.

40. Texas Education Agency, *Operating Budget...*, *op. cit*., p. 30.

Notes: Appendix C

Title V in Kansas

1. This description reflects the consensus of opinion expressed by several SEA officials interviewed on December 10, 1971.
2. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. Also, see Appendix D, Table 1.
3. Based on interviews with SEA officials, December 10, 1971.
4. Interview with SEA official, December 10, 1971.
5. Interview with Daniel J. Elazar, 1971.
6. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. Also, see the table in Appendix B.
7. Kansas State Department of Education, "Budget Estimates, FY '66". (Handwritten.)
8. Ibid.
9. Kansas fiscal year 1966 Title V application.
10. Data based on ibid.
11. Interview with SEA official, December 10, 1971.
12. Interview, December 10, 1971.
13. Interview with SEA official, December 10, 1971.
14. Quote from interview with SEA official, December 10, 1971.
15. Ibid.
16. Interview with SEA official, December 10, 1971.
17. Interview with SEA official, December 10, 1971.
18. Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. Also, see Appendix D, Table 1.
19. USOE, State Departments of Education and Federal Programs: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 6.
20. Based on interview data, December 10, 1971.

Notes: Appendix C

Title V in Maryland

1. These observations are based on interviews with several SEA employees on October 19, 1971.

2. Interview, October 19, 1971.

3. This is based on interviews and USOE, Improving State Leadership in Education (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, March, 1966), p. 87.

4. Maryland Department of Education, "ESEA Title V: 1972 Fiscal Year,' p. 4. (Typewritten.)

5. Interview with SEA official, October 19, 1971.

6. This is based on several interviews with SEA officials who worked for the SEA in 1965, October 19, 1971.

7. Interview with SEA official, October 19, 1971.

8. Interview with SEA official, October 19, 1971.

9. Interview with SEA official, October 19, 1971.

10. Interview with SEA official, October 19, 1971.

11. Interview with SEA official, October 19, 1971.

12. Interview with SEA official, October 19, 1971.

13. USOE, State Departments of Education and Federal Programs: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 8.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

15. Roald F. Campbell, *et al.*, eds., Strengthening State Departments of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago, Midwest Administration Center, June, 1967), p. 75.

APPENDIX D

MISCELLANEOUS TABLES

Table 1

SEA Administrative Expenditures and Total Employees for FY 1965 and FY 1970*

	FY '65 SEA Administrative Expenditures	FY '70 SEA Administrative Expenditures	FY '65 Total Employees	FY '70 Total Employees
Total (USA)	$ 138,924,706	$ 297,823,975	14,720	21,697
Colorado	1,351,162	3,132,135	132	203
Kansas	846,537	2,609,670	92	195
Kentucky	2,719,017	5,347,829	399	516
Maryland	1,609,060	6,244,130	132	377
Massachusetts	5,800,266	7,220,690	574	603
New York	18,900,300	35,527,851	1,778	2,467
South Carolina	910,623	7,145,912	166	448
Tennessee	2,880,815	5,505,339	349	426
Texas	3,515,735	8,087,074	500 (est.)	831

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*Data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation. "Administrative Expenditures" and "Total Employees", according to USOE, "do not include funds and positions utilized by the State education agencies for the direct operation of schools and institutions." But USOE is uncertain whether the data include programs not integral to all the states (e.g., vocational rehabilitation). For a discussion of some of the problems with these official data, see footnote two in Chapter VI.

Table 2

Growth Pattern in SEA Expenditures*
(FY 1965-'70--millions of dollars)

	1965		1966		1967		1968		1969		1970	
	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%	$	%
Federal	31.2	22.5	57.2	31.7	66.1	30.9	106.2	40.2	107.6	41	119.5	40
State	107.7	77.5	122.7	68.3	147.7	69.1	158.1	59.8	154.8	59	178.3	60
Total	138.9	100	179.9	100	213.8	100	264.3	100	262.4	100	297.8	100

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*This table is based on data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation.

Table 3

Percentage of 1970 SEA Administrative Expenditures Derived from All Federal Sources, and Derived from Title V, Section 503*

(1)	(2) FY '70 SEA Administrative Expenditures	(3) % of funds in Column 2 derived from all federal sources	(4) % of Column 2 derived from Sec. 503, Title V	(5) Column 4 as % of Column 3
Total (US.)	$ 297,823,975	40.1	8.1	20.2
Colorado	3,132,135	58.1	17.0	29.2
Kansas	2,609,670	53.8	14.1	26.1
Kentucky	5,347,829	48.3	7.8	16.0
Maryland	6,244,130	40.6	7.7	19.0
Massachusetts	7,220,690	32.8	7.6	23.1
New York	35,527,851	21.5	4.9	22.8
South Carolina	7,145,912	16.2	4.7	29.0
Tennessee	5,505,339	31.3	8.8	28.0
Texas	8,087,074	69.7	13.5	19.3

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*This table is based on data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation.

Table 4

Title V, Section 503, of ESEA

Annual Apportionments*

	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	Total
Total (USA)	$14,450,100	$18,700,000	$25,287,500	$28,262,500	$28,262,500	$28,262,500	$31,350,000	$174,575,10
Colorado	204,123	252,900	347,190	410,474	411,038	411,038	458,433	2,495,19
Kansas	210,803	259,100	354,128	414,425	410,248	410,248	450,383	2,509,33
Kentucky	245,145	308,713	417,806	477,508	475,514	475,514	525,328	2,925,52
Maryland	260,971	339,343	464,535	529,969	534,643	534,643	601,401	3,265,50
Massachusetts	317,262	420,266	581,783	626,114	628,412	628,412	704,678	3,906,92
New York	784,668	1,101,390	1,450,692	1,474,815	1,477,979	1,477,979	1,660,694	9,428,21
South Carolina	238,401	300,222	404,942	462,194	456,998	456,998	502,885	2,822,64
Tennessee	289,119	373,661	497,987	548,312	543,785	543,785	601,172	3,397,82
Texas	639,131	890,024	1,175,595	1,214,477	1,216,664	1,216,664	1,354,060	7,697,61

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*This table is based on data supplied by USOE Division of State Agency Cooperation.

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